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

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ARE CATEGORIES INVENTED OR DISCOVERED? A RESPONSE TO FOUCAULT*

JORGE J. E. GRACIA

IN A PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS I believe the speaker is allowed more latitude than in a more ordinary speech. There is more freedom to explore and perhaps even preach. So I am going to do a bit of both. My chapter and verse, some of you will be surprised to know, is a passage from the preface to Foucault's *The Order of Things*, in which he argues that categories are a matter of invention.[1] This text has had enormous impact on the issue I wish to address today, and in many ways has helped to define it and to establish as definitive, in the minds of many of our contemporaries, the view that categories are invented.

I

Foucault's Position. Foucault writes:

> This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that shattered, as I read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my thought—*our* thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age and our geography—breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between Same and Other. This passage quotes a "certain Chinese encyclopedia" in which it is written that "animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with very fine camelhair brush, (l) *et cetera*, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies." In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing that we apprehend in one great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic

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*Presidential Address at the 52d annual meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America, March 2001.

Correspondence to: Department of Philosophy, 135 Park Hall, State University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260.

[1]Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences* (hereafter, "*OT*") (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).

The Review of Metaphysics 55 (September 2001): 3–20 *Copyright © 2001 by The Review of Metaphysics*

> charm of another system of thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking *that*.[2]

Then Foucault proceeds to ask himself about the "kind of impossibility" Borges's preposterous classification forces us to face. He answers that it consists in that "[e]ach of these strange categories [in Borges's encyclopedia] can be assigned a precise meaning and a demonstrable content."[3] This is exactly what we expect of our most cherished and accepted categories; indeed, it is the mark of a category and the whole world that we have built on them. Yet, this Borgesian classification, according to Foucault, destroys the common ground on the basis of which our own categories are based. It is not the propinquity of the categories that is destroyed, but the very site on which the propinquity is based precisely because "the distance separating" the categories is too narrow.[4] What has been removed is the table "that enables thought to operate upon the entities of our world, to put them in order, to divide into classes, to group them according to names that designate their similarities and their differences—the table upon which, since the beginning of time, language has intersected space."[5] When we say that "a cat and a dog resemble each other less than two greyhounds do, even if both are tamed and embalmed, even if both are frenzied, even if both have broken the water pitcher, what is the ground on which we are able to establish the validity of this classification with complete certainty? On what table, according to what grid of identities, similitudes, analogies, have we become accustomed to sort out so many different and similar things?"[6]

Consider the case of "aphasiacs" [sic], who, "when shown various differently colored skeins of wool on a table top, are consistently unable to arrange them" according to their color patterns.[7] They earnestly attempt to classify them in various ways, but as soon as they begin one classification, they start another. For them, the field of identity that sustains the various classifications they consider is too unstable. So they can never settle on one. How is this different from what we do? It is different, according to Foucault, in that we have a

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[2] Foucault, *OT*, xv.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid., xvi.
[5] Ibid., xviii.
[6] Ibid., xix.
[7] Ibid., xviii.

table that makes our task possible, although the table in question is just one among many others. The table is the grid we use to make our classifications, to operate on the world; it is what produces the categories we employ.[8]

What does this tell us about our particular categories, according to Foucault? They are myths resulting from the system of classification we employ.[9] This system is a historical a priori.[10] It is historical, Foucault seems to be saying, because it is the product of our history, and it is a priori because it antecedes the ways in which we classify the world (more on this later). From all of this, Foucault concludes that the various classifications we use are inventions governed by historically contingent events. Indeed, this is true of even our perhaps most cherished category, that is, "man." In a passage that displays Foucault's penchant for rhetoric, he daringly tells us:

> Strangely enough, man—the study of whom is supposed to the naive to be the oldest investigation since Socrates—is probably no more than a kind of rift in the order of things, or, in any case, a configuration whose outlines are determined by the new position he has so recently taken up in the field of knowledge. Whence all the chimeras of the new humanisms, all the facile solutions of an "anthropology" understood as a universal reflection on man, half-empirical, half-philosophical. It is comforting, however, and a source of profound relief to think that man is only a recent invention, a figure but yet two centuries old, a new wrinkle in our knowledge, and that he will disappear again as soon as that knowledge has discovered a new form.[11]

Foucault's words have resounded deeply in modern thought and have been put to many uses, including the call for the elimination of particular categories. Indeed, they have been employed as means for the liberation from what some consider to be the tyranny of invented categories which have been used in the past and continue to be used in the present for the oppression of selected members of society. The attack has been systematic. If humanity itself is nothing more than a passing historical invention—"a new wrinkle," as Foucault puts it—then we can certainly do away with such other categories as male and female, race, ethnicity, and individuality, let alone duty, honor, goodness, beauty, rationality, and truth. Plato, of course, was wrong in

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[8] Ibid., xix.
[9] Ibid., xviii.
[10] Ibid., xxii.
[11] Ibid., xxiii. The point is repeated in the conclusion of the book on page 386.

thinking that there are some immutable categories, independent of history and human thought; Aristotle was wrong in holding that there are natures that things have and which establish the necessary and sufficient conditions of their being what they are; Aquinas was wrong in believing that these natures are grounded in God's thought; Kant was wrong in claiming that these categories are common to all human thinking even though we can never know if they characterize reality as it is itself, considered independently of human thought; and Ryle was wrong in proposing that they are semantic spaces in the logic of propositions. All these philosophers, so the argument goes, make similar mistakes: They do not realize that categories are inventions, resulting from systems of classification that are a priori but historically contingent.

The motivation for both Foucault's proposal and the success it has had derives from the way categories function. Surely, one of the obvious ways in which they do is that they limit our thinking. Categories function as ruts in which we fall and from which it is often impossible to escape. Once in a rut, we just continue along it to wherever it leads us. In some cases the end result is obviously nefarious. Consider for a moment the racial category "Black" as used in the United States to think of persons in terms of the so-called one-drop rule: If X has a drop of Black blood, X is Black. The consequences of the use of this category have been disastrous. Here are some examples: It has prevented Americans from thinking the obvious, that if one has just one drop of Black blood and the rest of the blood is White, then one is mostly White; it has demonized Blackness; it has prevented some persons from escaping a circle of discrimination, poverty, and oppression; it has coupled the notion of Blackness with that of impurity; and so on. Do I need to provide another example? The point should be clear: The use of categories can have pernicious consequences, particularly when categories are applied to persons. This has been amply demonstrated by sociologists in the context of race and ethnicity.[12]

Yet it is a mistake to think, as some followers of Foucault appear to do, that the use of categories is always nefarious or counterproductive, or that we can actually dispense with them. We need categories, for without them we cannot think or speak. There is not one sentence, and there is not one thought, that can be formed without its depending on categories. Moreover, categories can also function beneficently by making us see and understand things we did not see or

understand before. After all, isn't what we do in school largely to learn about new categories and the correspondingly new ways of seeing and understanding the world? The use of categories can also be beneficial in matters of social concerns. For example, the use of racial and ethnic categories can serve to empower disempowered groups and reverse discrimination, oppression, and economic disadvantage. Historically, the category Black has served to unite persons who, constituted as a group, have been able to change long-standing social modes of discrimination that otherwise would not have been changed.

The issue, then, is not whether we can do without categories, but (1) what they are, (2) the validity of particular categories, and (3) the ways in which they should be used. Naturally, the answers to these questions are all related to the issue we are addressing here: Are categories invented or discovered? Before I attempt to resolve this issue, however, let me briefly characterize Foucault's own answer.

II

Brief Analysis of Foucault's Position. First, Foucault has a very inclusive understanding of the extension of the term "category." He is not talking, as Aristotle and so many other philosophers have done, of a small group of very general, or even most general, items. Aristotle, for example, thought there were roughly ten of these: substance, quality, quantity, relation, and so on.[13] The Stoics reduced their number to

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[12] See, for example, the following studies made about Hispanics: H. H. Fairchild and J. A. Cozens, "Chicano, Hispanic or Mexican American: What's in a Name?" *Hispanic Journal of Social Behavioral Sciences* 3 (1981): 191–8; Martha Giménez, "Latino?/Hispanic?—Who Needs a Name? The Case Against a Standardized Terminology," *International Journal of Health Services* 19, no. 3 (1989): 557–71; David E. Hayes-Bautista and Jorge Chapa, "Latino Terminology: Conceptual Bases for Standardized Terminology," *American Journal of Public Health* 77 (1987): 61–8; G. Marín, "Stereotyping Hispanics: The Differential Effect of Research Method, Label and Degree of Contact," *International Journal of International Relations* 8 (1984): 17–27; Suzanne Oboler, *Ethnic Labels, Latino Lives: Identity and the Politics of (Re)Presentation in the United States* (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1995); and Fernando Treviño, "Standardized Terminology for Hispanic Populations," *American Journal of Public Health* 77 (1987): 69–72.

[13] Aristotle, *Categories* 4.1b25.

four.[14] There has been constant bickering in the history of philosophy about the number and identity of categories, but most of these authors thought of categories as most general and of their numbers as very small. Foucault, by contrast, casts a very wide net. He speaks of such things as "dog" and "man" as categories, as well as of all the items contained in Borges's list. There is nothing wrong with this; but it is important for us to keep it in mind, for what we conclude about categories if we understand them broadly, as Foucault does, will be significantly different from what we will conclude if we adopt a narrower view as encompassing only the most general categories.[15]

Second, for Foucault, categories are found in knowing subjects. They are ways in which we slice, arrange, or cut up—depending on the metaphor one wishes to use—the world. One could say, then, that they are concepts in terms of which one thinks about the world and their function is primarily epistemic.[16] This is not, of course, the only way of understanding categories, although it is one of the most common ways of understanding them today.[17] Let me mention three other ways of understanding them that are pertinent to our topic if we aim at a judgment that extends beyond Foucault's position.[18]

One of these is as the way in which things are, or, as some proponents of this view say, as properties of things.[19] This is a realistic understanding of categories if by realism one means that a category is something in the world independent of the way humans may think. In this sense, the category "cat," for example, is taken to be the way in

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[14] H. F. A. von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, 1964), 2:369.

[15] I am on record as advocating a similarly broad extension for the term "category" in Gracia, *Metaphysics and Its Task: The Search for the Categorial Foundation of Knowledge* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 132–3.

[16] Foucault, *OT*, xxii.

[17] For a conceptualist view of categories arising from a different philosophical tradition from that of Foucault, see Stephan Körner, "Thinking, Thought, and Categories," *Monist* 66, no. 3 (1983): 353–66, and *Categorial Frameworks* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970).

[18] I have explored these and other ways in *Metaphysics and Its Task*, 181–99, and "The Ontological Status of Categories: Are They Extra-Mental Entities, Concepts, or Words?" *International Philosophical Quarterly* 39, no. 3 (1999): 249–64.

[19] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.7.1017a23; David Pole, "'Languages' and Aspects of Things," *Philosophical Quarterly* 12 (1962): 306–15; and Kenneth Livingston, "Concepts, Categories, and Epistemology," *Philosophia* 19 (1989): 265–300, who argues for a modified version of realism.

which certain things are, that is, the way the things we call cats are, or put in a different way, it is a property common to all cats and responsible for them being so.

Another common view is that categories are words, although again there is considerable disagreement about what this means exactly.[20] Regardless of disagreements of details, however, this view holds minimally that a category is a linguistic entity, rather than a way in which people think or a way in which the world is. So let us assume, then, for present purposes, this means that the category "cat" is nothing more than the word "cat." This view is often put in terms of predicates, so that a category is said to be a predicate when a predicate is understood to be no more than a linguistic entity. For this reason, one might call this position a nominalist view of categories.[21]

Finally, there is the way I have proposed in *Metaphysics and Its Task*.[22] In this way, a category is whatever is expressed by a term or expression, simple or complex, that can be predicated of some other term or expression. According to this formula, a category, qua category, is not necessarily a linguistic entity, although linguistic entities are used to express them, and it is possible for some categories to be linguistic entities. Nor is a category necessarily a property of things in the world, although some of them may be so. A category is not necessarily a concept or way in which we think about the world, although a category can be that, and it is through concepts that we think about categories. Consider three examples of categories: indefinite article, capacity to laugh, and opinion. The first is a linguistic entity, for indefinite articles, such as "a" and "an," are words; the second is a property of certain animals, namely human animals; and the third is a way in which someone thinks about something or other. In all cases, there

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[20] For different views, see: Peter Abelard, *Dialectica*, ed. L. M. de Rijk (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1956), 69 and 112; John Searle, *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 105 and 120. See also Gilbert Ryle, "Categories," in *Collected Papers* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1971), 2, 174 and 180; and Rudolph Carnap, "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language," trans. Arthur Pap, in *Logical Positivism*, ed. A. J. Ayer (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), 68.

[21] The three views of categories I have outlined here (that is, as properties, words, and concepts) are in fact three of the four traditional interpretations of Aristotle's view as presented in *Categories*. The fourth is an inclusive view that tries to integrate the other three. See Christos Evangeliou, *Aristotle's Categories and Porphyry* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), 29–33.

[22] Gracia, *Metaphysics and Its Task*, 199–202.

are corresponding linguistic entities, namely, the terms "indefinite article," "capacity to laugh," and "opinion." In all cases there are also concepts through which we think about the indefinite article, the capacity to laugh, and an opinion. The categories are not these words, or concepts, but what is expressed by the words and thought about through the concepts. These are sometimes words, sometimes concepts, and sometimes properties of things, as the examples given indicate.

It is quite obvious that Foucault does not consider categories to be either properties or what predicates express. His view explicitly challenges "realistic" views of categories, and my view never occurred to him. Yet it is not perhaps as clear that he does not propose a linguistic view of categories. After all, he takes pains to indicate the importance of language, telling us, for example, that the categories of Borges's Chinese encyclopedia can be "juxtaposed" only "in the nonplace of language."[23] In an attempt to distance his view from that of phenomenologists, he describes it as "a theory of discursive practice."[24] Still, we should not be led astray by these comments, for Foucault explicitly states that the task of language is merely to spread categories before us,[25] and this entails that categories are not linguistic entities. Indeed, categories "[m]ake it possible for us to name, speak, and think,"[26] which suggests that they precede language (that is, names and speech), but is consistent with the interpretation that they are conceptual in some sense, although Foucault never quite makes clear in what sense. I shall return to this later.

Third, for Foucault, categories are the result of a priori historical systems of classification. They do not appear to be the systems themselves but rather the results of systems. The categories listed in Borges's Chinese encyclopedia cut up the world in the way they do because they presuppose a system of classification that is used in producing them. It is because the system is presupposed that it is called a priori; the system precedes the process of classifying. The system is historical because, unlike the Kantian a priori, which is universal and common to all human knowers, it is the resuslt of historically contingent events, and therefore historical and contingent itself. Categories,

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[23] Foucault, *OT*, xvii.
[24] Ibid., xiv.
[25] Ibid., xvii.
[26] Ibid., xix.

then, are the result of the application of the system. In a sense, the system is like a set of criteria (he calls them "rules," in xi), which, when applied to experience, makes us think of the world in certain ways.

Foucault does not explain how exactly this system of classification can both be the product of history and a priori. Indeed, if one thinks in terms of experience, this may appear impossible. For how can the system be a priori and thus precede experience and at the same time be the result of history, which presumably includes experience? One way to solve this puzzle is to distinguish between what might be called "causing experiences" and "affected experiences." The first are the experiences that play a causal role in the development of the system of classification; the second are the experiences that are affected or structured by that system once it is in place. Understood thus, there is no contradiction in Foucault's view insofar as one could say that the experiences causing the system are not the experiences affected by the system.[27]

Retaking a point mentioned above in passing, it should be clear that categories for Foucault are not personal and certainly not arbitrary. Foucault was quite annoyed when his view was interpreted as a kind of phenomenology, in which the observing subject and his individual consciousness are given absolute priority.[28] The systems that produce the categories through which we view the world are not particular but general, and they are revealed in discourse rather than consciousness. Moreover, in virtue of the fact that they are the result of systems, they are not arbitrary creations of individual persons but rather the results—although Foucault does not tell us whether necessary or contingent—of those systems.

Finally, we come to Foucault's most important claim for our purposes, namely, that categories are invented. They are ways we invent to think about the world. What exactly does Foucault have in mind with this? First a question of extension: Does he mean to say that only categories, and not the systems of which they are the products, are invented, or are the systems whose application gives rise to categories also invented? In characteristic style, Foucault does not explicitly ask

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[27] This does not solve other problems with Foucault's proposal, of course. For example, the problem of how change is possible is one that requires further tinkering. Foucault is aware of it and attempts an answer in the Foreword of the English edition of *OT*, xii.

[28] Foucault, *OT*, xvi.

or answer this question, but much of what he says suggests that not just categories but also the systems that are used to produce them are invented. For our purposes, the claim that is particularly important is that all categories, not just some, are invented. Here we face another question, this time concerned with intension: What does "invented" mean? Again, in characteristic fashion, Foucault does not openly tell us. His many disciples follow his lead, although they often complicate matters by also, and frequently, using the term "constructed" instead of "invented." A favorite claim these days, for example, is that race is a "social construction," although many also speak of it as a "social invention."[29] For the sake of simplicity and parsimony, however, I shall discuss only invention, not construction.[30]

From what we saw earlier, however, there seem to be at least two conditions Foucault has in mind when he writes about the invention of categories. First, categories are the products of human activity. So let us express this condition by saying that, according to him, categories are human products. Second, humans are not just responsible for producing categories; humans also seem to be responsible in some sense for making categories to be what they are. Like myths, categories are made up, although as we saw earlier, they are made up not by individual persons, but by societies. This suggests an element of creativity or design. So let us express this condition by saying that categories are designed by humans or are the products of human design. Anything that meets these two conditions is presumably invented, and this is why categories are said to be so.

From this conception of invention, we can surmise its distinction from discovery. An invention is distinct from a discovery in that something discovered is neither the product of the discoverer nor designed by him.[31] The discoverer of King Tut's tomb did not produce or design it. Obviously, we have here a rather broad sense of discovery, for one can discover such different things as the genetic structure of humans, an ancient artifact, or the concept of 0.

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[29] I discuss this particular issue in detail in Gracia, *Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality: A Foundational Analysis for the Twenty-First Century*, in preparation.

[30] For the use of "construction" in racial studies, see Michael Omi and Howard Winant, "Racial Formation in the United States," in *The Idea of Race*, ed. Robert Bernasconi and Tommy L. Lott (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), 197.

III

Are Categories Invented or Discovered? With these clarifications in mind, we can now turn to the central question of this essay: Are categories invented or discovered? I shall assume in the present discussion that the notions "invented by X" and "discovered by X" are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive in the domain in which they are applied. This means that if a category is invented by X, it is not discovered by X, and vice versa; and if a category is discovered by X, it is not invented by X, and vice versa. A fortunate consequence of this is that an answer to the question of whether categories are invented is enough to tell us if they are discovered or not. So we might as well just ask whether categories are invented. Now, from what we saw earlier, this question can be more pointedly asked, in accordance with Foucault's view, as: Are categories both produced and designed by humans?

Even in this form, however, the question is not sufficiently clear for our purposes, for categories can be understood in many different ways, and this complicates matters. In order to simplify and facilitate matters, however, I shall consider only the four ways suggested earlier, and in addition I shall frame the question in terms of a concrete example, say the category "cat." Thus, we have the following four questions:

(1) Is the word "cat" both produced and designed by humans?
(2) Is the concept cat both produced and designed by humans?
(3) Is the property catness both produced and designed by humans?
(4) Is what the predicate "cat" expresses both produced and designed by humans?

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[31] These two conditions suggest that categories are artifactual. The notion of artifact, however, is one of the most difficult to pin down in philosophy. I have discussed several attempts at formulating its necessary and sufficient conditions, all of which turn out to be inadequate in some ways, in Gracia, *A Theory of Textuality: The Logic and Epistemology* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 44–52. For other discussions of artifacts, see: George Dickie, *Aesthetics: An Introduction* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971); William R. Carter, "Salmon on Artifact Origins and Lost Possibilities," *Philosophical Review* 92 (1983): 223–32; Hilary Kornblith, "Referring to Artifacts," *Philosophical Review* 89 (1980): 109–14; Steven Schwartz, "Putnam on Artifacts," *Philosophical Review* 87 (1978): 566–74; and Randall Dipert, *Artifacts, Art Works, and Agency* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993).

Distinguishing among these questions makes it easier to answer them. The answer to (1), for example, is quite clear insofar as words are always produced by humans and include an element of design in them. Words are conventional signs constituted by various kinds of entities, such as sounds, gestures, lines drawn on a page, actions, pebbles, and so on. The entities that constitute words can be anything whatever, including mental images of some kind. The word written as "cat" is constituted by black lines; when I utter "cat," the word is made up of certain sounds; when I imagine the written word, it is constituted by the images of the lines that make up the written word; and so on. When these groups of lines, sounds, or images are used together with other words to say something, they become words.[32] The sound I utter when I say "cat" becomes a word when I use it to say, "The cat is on the mat." The conventional character of words comes from their intentional use by humans as signs in order to say something. The connection between the sound I utter when I say "cat" and its meaning is the result of human design and activity. In some cases, words are designed and produced by individual persons, as happens with the terms of some logical languages (for example, "¬"), but in others they are products of cooperative efforts among members of a group within a society or among members of the society at large (for example, "cat"). From all this we can conclude that the word "cat" was invented rather than discovered by those who first introduced it into English, although it is always possible that someone else may discover it later (the case of a Mayan glyph). Something similar could be said about all other categorial words and indeed about all words.[33]

The situation with question (2) is particularly difficult because the notion of a concept is quite contested.[34] There are, in fact, many different views of concepts, but let me mention only two for the sake of brevity: In one sense, a concept is taken to be an act of thinking itself through which we understand something; in another sense, it is conceived as a certain idea or view one entertains when one thinks

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[32] Pole, "'Languages' and Aspects of Things," 315.

[33] Obviously there are words that are not categorial, such as "Jorge," "this," and "or." This raises the question of which words are categorial and which are not. My view is that only words that can function as predicates can be categorial. This follows from my description of a category as "what a predicate expresses." Proper names and indexicals appear in third place only in identity sentences, not in predicative ones. The case of connectives and quantifiers should be obvious.

about something. If one adopts the first view of concepts, then it should be clear that we have a human act but not one designed by humans. Concepts in this sense are not invented by us, although they are produced by us. We produce concepts in a way similar to how we produce acts of digestion or sensation. This means that a concept in this sense is discovered rather than invented. If by the category "cat" we mean the very mental acts whereby we think of cat or cats, then we have something that is not invented to the extent that those acts are not designed by humans.

On the other hand, by "concept" one may mean a certain idea or view one entertains about something, and indeed this is what Foucault seems to have in mind. If this position is adopted, then whether we have something invented or not depends on the idea or view in question. If the idea or view has not been produced or designed by humans, then it is not invented; but if the idea or view has been produced and designed by humans, then it is invented.[35] The ideas of phoenix (a bird that rises from its ashes) and coat hanger (a thing that serves to hang coats in a certain way—nails are not coat hangers and yet also serve to hang coats), for example, are both invented, although the first one is an idea of something that does not exist except in the imagination, and the second is an idea of something that exists outside the mind. Both ideas are invented because there could be no such ideas were it not that someone came up with them.

Are all ideas like the ideas of phoenix or coat hanger? Consider the idea of cat. Is it like the idea of phoenix, like the idea of coat hanger, or like neither? The first two possibilities are interesting. If the first, then we have a situation in which it is a fictional invention—a mere mental model to which nothing outside the mind corresponds (or perhaps even could correspond). If the second, it is a nonfictional invention—a mental model that has been used (or perhaps even could

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[34] For different views, see: Michael Dummett, *The Logic Basis of Metaphysics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 1 and 15; P. F. Strawson, *Analysis and Metaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 7, 18, 22, and 34; Gilbert Ryle, "Systematically Misleading Expressions," in *Logic and Language*, ed. Antony Flew (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), 11–12 and 29; W. V. O. Quine, "On What There Is," in *From a Logical Point of View* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), 2; and William of Ockham, "On the Notion of Knowledge or Science," in *Philosophical Writings*, ed. and trans. Philotheus Boehner (London: Nelson, 1967), 11.

[35] For purposes of this paper I am not considering cases of nonhumans, whether divine, angelic, Martian, or nonhuman animals.

be used) to create something outside the mind. Before we can answer the question we have asked, then, we need to answer question (4) above, for this answer will reveal the status of that to which the categorial term refers and which we understand through the corresponding categorial concept.

So, turning to question (4): Is what the predicate "cat" expresses, that is cat, something produced and designed by humans? Perhaps it would be better to separate the two conditions. So, first, let us ask: Is cat the product of human action? The temptation is to answer yes or no, where "or" is taken exclusively. Instead, I submit that the sensible answer is yes and no. It is affirmative because many of the historical events that give rise to what we call cats are the result of human actions; but it is negative because many of them are not. Likewise, there are many human choices that contribute to the creation of cats—such as the invasion of a territory and capturing cats, the selective breeding of cats, and so on—but there are others that do not—such as a natural cataclysm that kills an entire population of certain kinds of cats. Thus, cat appears to be the result of both human action and factors that have nothing to do with such actions.

The second condition of inventions is human design. So we need to ask whether cat is a human design. Again the temptation is to answer yes or no, but the sensible answer is yes and no. The negative answer is justified because it is hard to find evidence that either a person, a group of persons, or an entire society ever set out to design, or actually designed, what we call cats. On the other hand, affirmatively, it is clear that there have been attempts at designing some individual cats (for example, Hunter and Peanut) and some kinds of cats (for example, Siamese or Pekinese). Genetic engineering certainly vouches for this.

So now we have an answer to question (4) about what the predicate "cat" expresses (it expresses something that appears to be partly invented and partly not invented); this can be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to other predicates. Moreover, we can go back to the property catness and the answer to question (3): Is catness invented or not? To the extent that this property is the result of human action and has been designed by humans, we must conclude that catness is invented. Moreover, to the extent that catness is invented, the concepts (as ideas) that we have of cats are also invented. So here we have the answer to the part of question (2) we had left unanswered earlier. This does not mean, however, that the concept cat is an in-

vented fiction (like a phoenix) or that it is a nonfictional invention (like a coat hanger). If we follow a similar procedure with categories other than cat, we should be able to come up with appropriate answers.

Let me summarize the conclusions we have reached in general terms:

> (1) If categories are conceived as words, then they are invented but not discovered (except in cases in which the discoverer is other than the inventor).
> (2) If categories are conceived as mental acts, then they are discovered but not invented.
> (3) If categories are conceived as ideas or views, then whether they are invented or discovered depends on the kind of idea or view in question.
> (4) If categories are conceived as properties, whether they are invented or discovered depends on the kind of property in question.
> (5) If categories are conceived as what is expressed by a predicate, then whether they are invented or discovered depends on what is expressed by the predicate.

From this it follows that the claim that all categories are invented, or discovered, is confusing. One must engage in some analysis before the question to which this claim aims to be a response can be answered. If we do, we see that only when categories are conceived as words can one sensibly argue that they are invented but not discovered (with the proviso made earlier); only when categories are conceived as mental acts can we argue sensibly that they are discovered but not invented; and the adequacy of other claims about categories when they are conceived as ideas, properties, or what is expressed by predicates, depends on the particular kinds in question. Naturally, other theories of categories will yield other alternatives.

IV

Response to a Foucaultian Retort. Still Foucault, along with some of his followers and sympathizers, may not be persuaded by my arguments. I have introduced some distinctions that may be useful, but at bottom the matter remains unresolved insofar as one can still argue, with Foucault, that categories, considered as the ways we think about things (what I earlier called ideas or views), are the products of historically contingent systems of classification. Let me address this position directly through the following arguments:

First, the very notion that some categories are invented requires that at least some others not be invented, or at least that it be possible that some not be invented. The notion of a design, which is intrinsic to invention, requires the notion of elements that are part of the design but are not themselves designed. The notion of designing something involves ordering, but an ordering involves putting things in relations with each other, and a new order involves the notion of putting things in new relations with respect to each other. This means that there is something new and something old in a design. The new is the order; the old is the things that are being placed in order. To design a coat hanger is to twist a wire (or carve wood, or whatever) in a certain way so that it can serve to hang clothes; but I must begin with the wire. Of course, one could say that the wire itself is a design—indeed it is; but if I go back far enough, eventually I will find some stuff that is not designed.

Second, consider the category "invented." Is this category itself invented, or is it not? If it is itself invented, then, according to Foucault it is the result of a particular a priori and contingent historical system of classification, but this means that this category may not be operative in other systems. So why should I use it? In short, why should I pay any attention to Foucault? Particularly when I find that what he says goes against some of my most fundamental basic intuitions, which are presumably based on the particular a priori system of classification that regulates the ways in which I think about the world? Of course, if the category "invented" is not invented, then we have a conclusion that contradicts the view that all categories are invented, and we have the result I favor.

Third, one of the things that Foucault seems to be arguing for is that the invented character of categories necessarily undermines their universal validity, but this argument surely rests on a fallacy. That something is produced and designed by humans does not entail that it is valid only within particular historical circumstances. A coat hanger serves to hang clothes in any place where there are clothes to be hung.

Of course, Foucault might object that the three arguments I have given against his view are based on certain assumptions taken from the particular a priori system of classification under which I operate. My criticisms, then, are internal to my system and, therefore, beg the question. Indeed, so the argument would go, they depend on such

things as the principle of identity which is a result of historically contingent circumstances.

Let me answer this objection with a fourth argument, based precisely on the principle of identity: A is identical to A. Am I justified in accepting this principle? Why should I not say that the category "identity" is merely invented and the product of historical contingencies? Why can't we dispense with it? On what bases can I argue, through this example, against categories resulting from some other system, including Foucault's?

The answer is very old, although it has proven ineffective in convincing hardcore skeptics: To deny identity is impossible without using it. The critic who tries to deny it must accept it. If he accepts it, then that is all that we need to show that he is wrong. The critic, then, faces an inescapable dilemma: He can either remain silent or speak, but if he speaks, he must accept the very rules he rejects.[36]

V

Conclusion. In conclusion, let me list the things I have attempted to do. First, I have tried to clarify, and I have criticized, Foucault's position. This is important because of Foucault's prominent historical place in the debate concerning the issue of the invention and discovery of categories. Second, I have tried to clarify the notions that play a role in the controversy: invention, discovery, and category. This is significant because most discussions that use these notions do not explain them, thus generating confusion and solving nothing. Third, I have drawn certain conclusions about the issue under discussion, from which, in turn, follows perhaps the most important thesis I have tried to defend, namely: Claims that all categories are either invented or discovered are suspect pending careful analysis and investigation; for some categories appear to be invented, some discovered, and some mixed. Indeed, the third kind is most significant, for those categories that affect our social and political lives generally seem to be of

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[36] The standard skeptical retort that a critic can use identity methodologically to undermine the positions of those who accept it, but need not accept it himself, works only to a limited extent. It works as identity may indeed be used to undermine the views of those who accept it, but it does not work insofar as the critic cannot, without using it, put forth a positive view of his own.

this sort. Those authors who feel entitled to reject or modify the categories we ordinarily use because they regard all categories as inventions, and those authors who argue for their uncritical acceptance because they regard them as discovered, need to take a second look. If they do, they will realize that the matter is not as simple as they think. A fruitful approach to categories must start, then, with an analysis of the sort I have provided here.[37] So even if I have failed in the particular details I have provided, I hope I have succeeded in charting a course that all those who wish to determine whether categories are invented or discovered should follow.

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[37] Let me express my gratitude to Peter Hare, Robert Mayhew, and Jonathan Sanford for some suggestions prompted by an early draft of this paper, and to Richard Gale, Dagfin Follesdall, Eleonore Stump, Brian Martine, Mariam Thalos, and Marcus Marenda, for the various comments and criticisms they offered when I presented the paper at the 2001 meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America.

REINSTATING HUMANISTIC CATEGORIES

E. M. ADAMS

BY OVEREMPHASIZING MATERIALISTIC VALUES, we have perverted the culture and set modern Western civilization on a self-destructive course. Some critics have said that the economy, science, and technology are the only healthy aspects of our society. We have what I have called a saber-toothed tiger civilization. In the evolutionary process, the saber-toothed tiger developed great tusks as effective weapons in combat, but perished because they obstructed its eating. We have developed a culture that is highly successful in advancing science and technology and producing wealth and power, but in doing so we have undermined and subjectivized the sectors of the culture that underwrite our identity, the meaning of our existence, and the norms and values by which we live our lives, organize our society, and run our institutions, including even science and the economy.[1] But unlike the saber-toothed tiger, we can discover our error and correct our course.

I

Cultural Reformation. A culture's conception of the human enterprise is reflected in its dominant values and shapes the way the culture and society develop. Our modern emphasis on materialistic values wrought a dramatic change in our governing assumptions and views about the knowledge-yielding powers of human beings. Only sensory experience under critical assessment came to be regarded as validating the concepts and providing the evidence for the house of knowledge, for sensory-based knowledge provides the kind of know-how that gives us power in imposing our will on the world. This

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[1]See my *Philosophy and the Modern Mind* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), and *A Society Fit for Human Beings* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997).

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wrought a reformation in science and put it in the service of technology, the economy, and the military; but this restricted view of knowledge gave rise to a shrunken view of the world and skepticism about, and subjectivistic interpretations of the humanistic dimension of the culture that nourishes the human spirit and sustains the social order. The world came to be understood as a purely factual structure through and through, consisting of only the existence of individuals and the exemplification of features and properties in them, and a causal structure that engages only elemental or antecedent factual events and conditions. The world, according to our modern view, has been stripped of inherent ends, normative structures and laws, values, and dimensions of inherent meaning and rationality. Objective reality is understood as imposing only factual limits on human beings, limits that can be progressively pushed back by advances in science and technology. This is a world made to order for our materialistic, technological, industrial civilization.

However, it was realized early on, by some intellectuals at least, that human beings, in order to be rendered intelligible, had to be reprocessed conceptually so that they would fit into the world as delineated in the naturalistic categories of modern science. Thus, the rationality, knowledge, freedom, and creativity of human beings were brought into question. Naturalism, having rejected the possibility of knowledge of objective values and inherent structures of meaning, was faced with the impossible task of defending science as an island of objectivity in a sea of subjectivism, and even human rationality and creativity in a world that is factually structured through and through and in which causality engages only elemental and antecedent factual conditions. Perhaps the boldest response to these intellectual problems was the abandonment of the realistic view of even scientific knowledge, rejection of the possibility of metaphysics, and redefinition of knowledge along pragmatic lines as know-how. That did not solve the deep and disturbing intellectual problems in the culture. It only denied or tried to bypass them. Their detrimental effects in the lives of people and in the society went unabated.

Rather than stubbornly following the logical consequences of the commitments of modern culture to their intellectually absurd, culturally deranging, and humanly devastating conclusions, why not critically examine and reconsider the defining commitments of the modern mind? Everyone knows that if premises yield absurd conclusions,

something is wrong with the premises. However, we persist in our cultural ways because the very commitments that generate the intellectual, moral, and spiritual problems that beset us give rise also to our wealth and power.

So long as our dominant values are materialistic, our respected ways of inquiry are scientific, and the culture makes for materialistic gains, it is most difficult for people to think critically about the cultural foundations of their way of life, especially when philosophy is largely discredited in the culture. Some would say that we, as a culture, are in the predicament of Aristotle's wicked person or that of the sinner according to traditional Christian teachings; that is, we have a wrong, self-destructive way of life, and yet we are not able to discover our error and make the necessary correction, for our faults are so deep and pervasive that they pervert our corrective powers.

I do not subscribe to this dismal view. The organizing and governing commitments of any culture, including those that pervert the culture, are subject to critical review from within the culture by being held accountable to the principles of logic and the verdicts of lived experience.

The prevailing assumptions and beliefs in our modern Western culture about the knowledge-yielding powers of the human mind and the resulting naturalistic worldview undermine and discredit truth-claims about values and inherent structures of meaning. Yet, just such truth-claims are presupposed by all human activities, including scientific inquiry and the pursuit of materialistic values. If there is no value knowledge, there is no knowledge of any kind, scientific or otherwise. If there is no knowledge, there is no human action, for human action can take place only within the context of knowledge, or at least of belief with the possibility of knowledge. The language of knowledge embraces value and meaning concepts. A knowledge-claim presupposes value judgments. For instance, one's claim to know that water will feed rather than extinguish a magnesium fire presupposes that one has good reasons for thinking so and that they are good enough for one to get it right. Notice the value concepts in this presupposition. Of course the knowledge-claim and its presupposition both are inherent structures of meaning, as well as the reasons and thinking mentioned in the presupposition. The truth of the knowledge-claim depends on the truth of the value and meaning judgments presupposed by or embraced within it. If these are discredited, then the

knowledge-claim itself is discredited. If the presupposition of a truth-claim is false, it is not simply that the presupposing truth-claim is false; it does not even present a possibility. Furthermore, a human action as such is constituted by, and has its identity in terms of, an intentional structure. An end is semantically present in the act as something that would be good if it were realized. If such a judgment does not have a truth value or its truth value cannot be known, human actions collapse into merely factual events, factually caused. They cannot be what we all take them to be when we act. All the gallant efforts of modern philosophers to defend the naturalistic bent of the modern mind notwithstanding, we must conclude, I think, that our culture is profoundly self-contradictory in a highly destructive way. It does not meet the logic test.

Neither does our modern culture meet the test of lived experience. By cleansing the descriptive/explanatory language of science of humanistic concepts and taking science to define our intellectual vision of humankind and the world, we not only killed God and disenchanted the world, we cut the foundations from under our human identity, the house of knowledge, and the norms and values by which we live our lives and organize our society and run our institutions. While we have grown materially richer and more powerful, and we have enjoyed many benefits from our wealth and power that must be preserved, we have generated a profound human identity crisis, undermined the sectors of the culture that support the human enterprise and nourish the human spirit, deconstructed the context that gives meaning to our lives, and left ourselves confused and adrift, often depressed and dependent on drugs to keep going. The verdict of lived experience, as reflected in our art and literature and in the reports of psychotherapists, clearly seems to be that success in terms of the dominant values of the culture is not humanly fulfilling and satisfying. There are deep human and social needs that are not being met by our materialistic culture and naturalistic worldview.

The basic error that set modern Western civilization on a self-destructive course was, I contend, the emphasis on materialistic values, with its distorting impact on the culture, especially on our conception of knowledge and belief about the knowledge-yielding powers of the human mind. Efforts to correct the culture must focus on these. Our governing conception of the human enterprise must be corrected in order to correct the culture. Yet we need to correct some aspects of

the culture in order to correct our conception of the human enterprise. Perhaps the first issue to be addressed is the matter of the knowledge-yielding powers of the human mind.

I claimed above that if there is any knowledge at all, there are inherent structures of meaning and value knowledge. So two important questions present themselves: (1) how is value knowledge possible? and (2) how can we know inherent structures of meaning? These are big issues, but I will give only a summary answer here.[2]

II

Knowledge of Value and Meaning. Everyone knows that value language is tied up in some way with our emotive (affective and conative) experiences. The interesting question is, how? The answer depends on the categorial structure of such experiences. The categorial structure of something cannot be discovered by a scientific investigation of it. It is, I submit, revealed by the grammar of the philosophically clarified language we use in reporting and describing the subject matter in question and what it makes sense to say and does not make sense to say about it. For instance, the multi-verb report, "I heard him come in," reveals that hearing has an intentional structure, that it has an inexistential, semantic content. It makes sense to say that the reported auditory experience may be expressed linguistically and that it was veridical, illusory, hallucinatory, or simply false. In other words, the experience is shown to embody a truth-claim and to be capable of yielding knowledge.

Value experiences, I suggest, may be analyzed in a similar way. "I am pleased that he won the election" reports my positive emotive response to the fact that he won. The multi-verb report reveals that the experience has an intentional structure, that it is constituted by, and has its identity in terms of, an inherent structure of meaning. The sentence, "It is good that he won the election," would express my emotive experience. Thus my pleasure is an experience of his winning the election as good. Others might feel that it was not a good thing that he won, even that it was a disaster. I might come to that conclusion later,

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[2] See my *The Metaphysics of Self and World* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991).

or I might find my original experience confirmed. Hence, such emotive experiences may be spoken of as contradicted, confirmed, or refuted, as correct or incorrect, as veridical or false.

"I am hungry" may be paraphrased as "I feel a bodily lack or deficiency and that I need something to eat." "Lack," "deficiency," and "need" are value words. Hunger, I suggest, is the experience of the normative condition of one's body and its requirement of food. One can have a false or illusory hunger. This is the case when one experiences an ego deficiency or an empty life as a need for food. Loneliness is a kind of hunger. It is an experience of a social lack and that one ought to have more companionship.

Consider a toothache. Is the ache in the tooth or is the tooth in the ache? The ache is not existentially in the tooth in the way in which a cavity would be. I suggest that the tooth is semantically in the ache in the way in which the computer screen is in my visual experience. The ache has a semantic content. It may be expressed with the sentence, "Something is wrong with my tooth; it is not in the condition it ought to be in." In other words, the ache is a perception of the normative condition of the tooth. To feel morally guilty is, I suggest, to experience that something one did was wrong and that one inflicted an injury on oneself as a person in doing it.

Of course we have emotive experiences not only of the conditions of our selves, but of others, social entities, cultural objects, and nature. Indeed, most anything may be experienced emotively. Such experiences are subject to a similar analysis.

What all of this indicates is that our emotive experiences, in which value language is grounded, have the categorial structure to be knowledge-yielding under critical assessment.

The language of meaning is grounded in self-knowledge and reflection on our own subjective states and acts and in perceptual understanding of the experiences and behavior of others, as well as in perceptual understanding of various cultural objects and expressions. These too, I submit, are knowledge-yielding modes of experience. We know our own state of mind and what we are doing, some of the things we thought and did in the past, and what we intend to do in the future; we know sometimes what others are saying or doing, what they are experiencing, and what their plans and intentions are; and we know the meaning of cultural objects. None of this would be possible

if self-knowledge and reflection and perceptual understanding were not knowledge-yielding.

Naturalists typically deny the reality of the normative dimension because they reject the epistemic character of value experiences. Some interpret value judgments as factual statements about value experiences and their causal conditions. Others claim that value judgments do not make truth claims, but only evince and elicit feelings and attitudes. There are serious difficulties inherent in each of these positions, but if I am correct about the epistemic character of emotive experience, there is no reason for either theory in the first place. A realistic theory is entirely plausible. Although naturalists recognize the semantic, they deny its distinctiveness. They try to interpret statements about it as factual statements about neurophysiological processes and observable behaviors. The problem they are trying to solve, as in the case of value judgments, is generated by their narrow view of our knowledge-yielding powers. If we acknowledge the knowledge-yielding powers of self-awareness and reflection and perceptual understanding, their problem with the semantic and the mental disappears, and a realistic theory of the kind I have sketched becomes tenable.

So we may conclude that modern science, in looking to only sensory experience and thought grounded in it, has a limited approach to reality that gives it access to only the factual dimension of its subject matter. However, the scientific account is widely taken to be the whole story. Indeed, a scientific explanation of a phenomenon places it in the world as delineated in naturalistic categories and thus presupposes a naturalistic worldview, even if scientists as individuals do not avow naturalism. The prestige of science is such that to call a belief unscientific is to discredit it. However, if our emotive experiences, self-knowledge and reflection, and perceptual understanding are knowledge-yielding, they may give us access to dimensions of reality not available to science with its restricted methodology. The full story may be richer than the scientific account. Indeed, the limited approach of science may distort its account of even the factual dimension.

III

Reconstruction of Our Descriptive/Explanatory Language. In the modern era, value and meaning concepts have been progressively eliminated from the descriptive/explanatory conceptual system of science, first in the physical sciences in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, then in the biological sciences in the nineteenth century, and in the social and behavioral sciences in the twentieth century. The conceptual cleansing of the physical sciences meets little objection at this point, but there is still controversy about the reduction of the biological, social, and behavioral sciences to a purely factual system. Nevertheless, there is widespread agreement that it can and should be done.

If my analysis is correct, value and meaning concepts should have a descriptive/explanatory role in science, for otherwise we get a limited and distorted view of reality. If science persists in its present ways, we should develop a critical, highly responsible humanistic account of humankind and the world that would be grounded in and accountable to the full range of our knowledge-yielding and critical powers, an account that would be fruitful in living meaningful lives and in our cultural, social, and civic endeavors. This would require relegating unreconstructed science to a subordinate position as a limited approach to its own subject matter even though it does produce useful beliefs and theories in the service of technology and the quest for wealth and power. This, however, would bifurcate our intellectual life and the culture. It would be better to have an integrated culture and a unified intellectual view of humankind and the world.

So how do objective values and inherent structures of meaning fit into or modify the scientific picture of reality? We have seen that the world, according to the scientific account, is factually constituted through and through. The structure of a fact is indicated by the grammar of a sentence with the form "There is an x such that x is F." The first "is" in the sentence indicates the existence of an individual and the second "is" indicates the exemplification (existence) of a feature or property in an individual. The term "fact" comes from the Latin word *factum*, which means "done, completed," and thus no longer in the process of becoming. The scientific world is an "is world," a world of existing individuals and exemplified properties, plus a causal structure that engages only elemental and antecedent facts. Nothing

more. Values are not properties exemplified in things and situations. They are supervenient on other features and facts; they are what ought (or ought not) to obtain.

The basic value concept is "ought," not a predicate. Regardless of what features or properties something may exemplify, it is neither good nor bad if no ought pertains to it. Something is good if it is more or less the way it ought to be; it is bad if it is not the way it ought to be or is a way it ought not to be. "Ought" is in many ways parallel with "is." Sentence forms such as, "There ought to be an x that would be F" and "There is an x that ought to be F," show values as grounded in normative requiredness, what is reported in an "ought" sentence. Normativity, like factuality, is a basic constitutive principle of reality. We think of things as constituted factually and normatively. Individuals, properties, or facts may be normatively, as distinct from existentially, in something. Anything that it is meaningful to speak of as mature or immature, or as well developed or deformed by its own inner dynamics, has a form in it normatively. In thinking of a human fetus as a human being, we are conceiving it in terms of its normative structure, what is in it normatively but not yet in it existentially. In other words, we conceive the fetus, not in terms of its present factual makeup, but in terms of what it ought to become and will, if nothing goes awry. Any process of becoming that is a fulfilling or perfecting of something has an end normatively in it, what the thing in question ought to become.

Some subject matters also have, or are partly constituted by, an inherent structure of meaning: experiences, for instance. Experiences have objects, what they are of or about. Consider a visual experience of a duck. The duck is semantically, not existentially, in the experience. Indeed, it may not exist at all. The experience may be a hallucination. Even dreams have semantic contents. Otherwise they could not be told. Of course the object of a veridical experience exists, but it exists in the world, not in the experience. It is semantically present in the experience. The experience has its identity and unity in terms of its semantic structure. Much the same is true of an act. We conceive an act in terms of the intention that gives it form and identity. The intention is of something to be done or brought about, something that the agent takes to be such that it would be good for him to do it or good for him to bring it into existence.

So some subject matters are constituted factually, normatively, and semantically. Only the factual dimension is available to us through sensory experience alone. If we restrict ourselves to what we can know through sensory experience and thought grounded in it, we have epistemic access to only one dimension of multidimensional subject matter such as human beings and cultural and social phenomena. Yet epistemic access to the factual dimension of any subject matter presupposes judgments about the normative and the semantic dimensions of the knowing subject and the culture.

IV

A Humanistic View of Causation. In addition to the dimension of factuality, normativity, and semantic intentionality, there is causality. It, like the normative and the semantic, has been problematic in modern thought. Bertrand Russell said that the idea of causation was a relic of a bygone era. He would simply eliminate it. Nevertheless it is a commonsense notion that cannot be so easily abandoned. Hume's analysis of the concept has been the most discussed account in modern thought. According to his analysis, there are four components of the concept: the cause is antecedent to and contiguous with the effect; events like the cause, under similar circumstances, are followed uniformly by an event like the effect; and given an event like the cause, an event like the effect follows necessarily; it has to happen. With his idea empiricism, Hume contended that the fourth component, the necessary connection between a cause and its effect, was a bogus idea, without any ground in reality, for we cannot have an experience of a necessary connection. Clearly this eviscerated the concept. The full-blooded commonsense idea of causation seems to be part of the unavoidable conceptual framework presupposed in living the life of a rational agent.

Immanuel Kant, in response to Hume, developed a radically new theory of causation and other categorial concepts. Very briefly, he maintained that they are generated from the structure of judgments and imposed, along with the forms of sensibility (space and time), on the data of sensory experience in forming an intersubjective ordered world of objects. This categorial structure is necessary in the sense that it is a condition for human experience of objects in an objective

(intersubjective) space-time continuum. As such categorial concepts and the principles grounded in them are said to be presupposed by empirical knowledge. So this framework of thought (categorial concepts and principles) is not the product of empirical knowledge; rather it makes empirical knowledge possible. Yet, according to Kant, the categorial structure is not inherent in things in themselves, but pertains to things only as they are present to us in sensory experience.

The prevailing view of the knowledge-yielding and semantic powers of the human mind is what has generated most of the philosophical perplexities that have beset us in the modern period, including the problems about causation and other categorial concepts and principles. My purpose here is to take a look at the category of causation and the related concept of explanation from within our broadened view of the range of human knowledge.

I have contended that if the unavoidable presuppositions of empirical knowledge and action were not true, neither empirical knowledge nor human action would be possible. The presupposing empirical truth-claims would not be merely false, but neither true nor false—that is, they would not formulate possibilities. We know, however, that they do formulate possibilities and that some of them are true. Hence we know that the categorial presuppositions of empirical knowledge and action are true. Yet what does this tell us about categorial structures? Are we restricted to a Kantian internal realist interpretation? Or do we have warrant for a full-blooded objective realist interpretation? Are they true of things in themselves? The internal realist view would make human action unintelligible. For instance, if the causal structure holds of subject matter only in its presence in actual or possible experience, how do we in our bodily existence alter other subject matter in its existence, often in ways that we do not know about until long after the fact and undoubtedly in many ways that are never known or even could not be known? The internalist says that we alter only the way things are experienced, but surely it must be acknowledged that making a difference in the way something is experienced must involve making a difference in what is experienced in its independent existence. So, if we in our existence alter things in ways that make a difference in the way in which they are experienced, then causation is at work among things in their existence.

And certainly in discovering the categorial structure of a mode of experience in determing whether it is knowledge-yielding, we have to

conclude that the categorial structure revealed inheres in the experience itself, not just in its presence to us in our reflection or perceptual understanding, for otherwise its knowledge-yielding power would be totally unintelligible.

The Kantian idea that the categories apply only to objects as present in experience derives from the view that they are grounded in the forms of judgment and are ways the human mind constructs an ordered world of objects out of sense impressions. In the first place, this Humean view of sense experience is highly questionable. It results from the rejection of the semantic dimension of sense experience. With full recognition of the semantic character of sensory experience, the constructionist view of objects is a solution to a problem that does not exist. The most important point, however, is that the basic categorial concepts and principles are unavoidable presuppositions of empirical knowledge and human action, and, therefore, are necessarily true of any world in which empirical knowledge and human action would be possible.

In short, the internal realist theory is based on a false view of sensory experience and generates new philosophical problems, whereas the objective realist position is well grounded and eliminates philosophical perplexities. That is sufficient warrant for the objective realist view.

We know, but not empirically, that the world has a causal structure. We could not count a sensory experience veridical and take its content to have a place in the objective space-time continuum if the thing in question had no effect on, and was unaffected by, other things in the real world. We know, but not empirically, that real events have causes and effects and that no real event or fact could exist in a causal vacuum. Some scientific theories that regard causation as an empirical/theoretical concept posit existences without causes but not without effects, for they would serve no theoretical purpose if they had no effects. As a categorial concept, however, an uncaused event must be questioned; we must consider the possibility of uncaused events. We have problems about causality and other categorial structures because, with our empiricist bent, we deny our ability to have knowledge of such structures as inherent in the real world. Yet if categorial analysis is knowledge-yielding, as I have contended, and if empirical knowledge and action have unavoidable presuppositions about the

categorial structure of the world that we can unearth by analysis, these problems vanish.

It should be pointed out that the necessity that is involved in truths about the categorial structure of the world cannot be imputed to the categorial structure inherent in objective reality, for it is a necessity grounded in the conditions of knowledge; but the necessity holding between a cause and its effect that troubled Hume and later empiricists inheres in things in themselves. We may distinguish the two kinds of necessity by identifying the latter kind as categorial and the former as transcendental. Categorial necessity must be acknowledged as a constitutional structure of the real world, along with existence, factuality, semantic intentionality, and normativity.

Hume's analysis of causation was done with the assumption that knowledge is of the world of sense impressions as they are factually constituted, the only world he recognized. Kant was concerned with the categories only as they apply to the world as it is available to sensory observation and Newtonian scientific thought, but he did not consider this to be the world of things in themselves. Causation requires a more complex analysis than either Hume or Kant gave, if, as I have contended, normativity and semantic intentionality are categorial modes of constitution as well as factuality.

V

Causation in Thought and Action. Let us look at causation in human thought and action, for here humanistic categorial structures are most clearly evident and most resistant to reduction or efforts to explain them away.

Humanistic philosophers who focus on overt action usually emphasize the role of the mental in causation, particularly the semantic entertainment of possibilities and the choice of an end to be realized, but they seldom consider causation among semantic states and acts themselves. Why does, and how does, one generate the thoughts that one has? How is it that one can think one thought after another on a subject in a more or less coherent manner? In forming the question, I spoke of a person thinking thoughts as though the person were the cause or generator of each thought. In a sense, that is correct, but what is a person? Certainly not a simple, indestructible substance,

capable of spontaneous, free (uncaused) acts, as some have maintained. The thinking self, I suggest, is an organized complex set of logically related semantic states and acts with normative requirements grounded in them. This complex, the mind of a person, is under the constraint of a constitutional imperative, a requirement grounded in the kind of complex it is, to be consistent and correct in all of its presuppositions, assumptions, beliefs, and takings in whatever mode. The thought that occurs to one in a connected discourse or out of the blue is a thought that this complex, or some part of it, normatively requires, and the energy of the system is mobilized by the normative requirement for its fulfillment. Of course anyone may have thoughts occur that one is not prepared to embrace. One may have thoughts on a subject that one embraces but soon abandons. Such thoughts are most probably generated by normative requirements grounded in only part of one's complex of semantic states and acts. The reflective, thoughtful person is one whose semantic states and acts are so integrated that he embraces only the thoughts that the semantic requirements of the whole system generates or supports. Such thoughts are more stable and enduring than the ones generated by normative requirements grounded in only a part of one's complex of semantic states and acts but may be contrary to others.

The normative structure grounded in one's complex system of semantic states and acts not only generates new thoughts and beliefs; it blocks the acceptance of thoughts that are incongruent with or do not fit in one's system of semantic commitments. All of us find some truth-claims unbelievable without knowing why. It may take a great deal of self-examination to locate the blockage, and, if there is strong evidence for the truth-claim in question, reconstruction of one's semantic system may be required to make room for it.

The point I want to make is that there is a dynamic at work in the operations of the mind below the conscious level, and that this dynamic is directed and powered by normative requirements. The normative is basic in the causal structure of the mental. The same seems to be true for overt behavior as well, for the formation of intentions is clearly of a piece with, and indeed a form of, the formation of beliefs. There is a physical dimension to all of these semantic states and acts, but the semantic complex with its logical and normative structures causally wags the physical rather than the other way around. The explanation of why one thought a particular thought at a given time has

to be in terms of the conceptual and propositional commitments and intentions one has, not in terms of bodily states and processes. The same is true of one's overt behavior that involves observable bodily action. An explanation of such behavior has to be in terms of one's perceptions, beliefs, assumptions, desires, plans, and intentions. Although there are concomitant bodily states and processes with all of these, the bodily states and processes do not feature in an explanation of the behavior, except in abnormal cases.

Whereas a thinking self is under a constitutional requirement to be logically consistent and epistemically justified in one's perceptions, beliefs, and takings in whatever form, a rational agent is under an inner imperative to be rationally and morally justified in one's actions. Rational imperatives make a causal difference in both thought and behavior. Of course they make a greater difference in some than in others, but to be a rational being is to be one who is subject to such imperatives and actually to be rational is to be moved by them.

VI

Causation in Biological Organisms. If normative requirements are causal in thought and behavior, obviously they are causal in the organisms involved. As I observed above, mental states and acts have concomitant neurophysiological states and processes, but in thinking, it is the normative requirements grounded in the logically structured semantic states and acts that generate new thoughts with their concomitant bodily states and processes. No doubt the physical dimension of the semantic states and acts in which the normative requirements are grounded has a role in generating thoughts; but the requirements of the semantic states and acts determine what the new thoughts are, and the semantic complexes in which the normative requirements are grounded shape the normative requirements. In the case of overt behavior that involves the whole or much of the body, it seems clear that the normative requirements grounded in the agent's complex of subjective states and acts generate the intentions that define his acts and produce the bodily processes and movements that embody the intentions. Understanding what others are doing and why they are doing it involves getting in their minds, so to speak—coming to know their assumptions, perceptions, beliefs, fears, hopes,

intentions, and so forth, not their bodily states and processes, except insofar as these may reveal or express their interior subjective structure. Consider speech acts or physical gestures. We hear the sounds one makes or observe one's bodily movements, but our focus is on the meaning of these. We seek to understand them and why they occur in terms of their place in a structure of meaning, namely, in the mind of the subject. The normative requirement grounded in the logically structured semantic complex of the speaker that generates a speech act or gesture generates its bodily dimension as well as its meaning aspect. In short, biological organisms are affected by and are responsive to normative requirements, at least to those grounded in their semantic states and acts. If this were not the case, we could not make sense of how our thoughts and intentions affect our bodily actions. This is not to say that a mental state or act has a bodily effect in the sense that M_1, a mental state or act, causes B_1, a bodily state or process. Put clumsily, it is to say that M_1, in its context of meaning, normatively requires M_2, and that M_1 and its semantic complex (with their bodily dimension) produce, by the causal power of the normative requirement, M_2 (with its physical dimension) in fulfillment of the normative requirement.

But are there normative requirements causally operative in organisms other than those grounded in the semantic states and acts of one's mind? It seems obvious that there are. Consider a human zygote that develops into a mature woman. In some sense, the form of the mature woman was in the zygote even when it was a solitary cell, but of course it was not existentially in it. The form was normatively in it, what it ought to become and would become by its own internal dynamics unless something went awry. Any aspect of the form not realized at maturity, any lack or distortion, would constitute a deformity, a deviation from the form the individual ought to have. The developmental process is end directed, with the end normatively in the process from its beginning.

Scientists say that the developmental process culminating in the mature woman was programmed by a genetic code. Of course "programmed" and "code" are semantic terms. Although scientists typically take a reductionistic approach to these concepts and the causation involved, we may well ponder whether there is a subpsychological level of the semantic. The genetic code consists of a set of prescriptions or normative requirements for the development of

the organism, but how are the prescriptions encoded? There is a physical aspect of the code. Does the physical base itself normatively require the form or does it mean that the form is required? And if there is a meaning dimension here, how do the developing cells "read" it? Furthermore, if the normative requirements are semantically in the code, how do they have causal power in cell development? Are they "felt" by the cell so that it is moved by something analogous to desire at the psychological level, which I take to be a felt or perceived imperative? Perhaps the physical, the normative, and the semantic are all involved in the constitution of the DNA.

It seems appropriate to talk about signals, information-bearing events, the fitting of structure to function (as in the case of the heart, hand, or eye), the wisdom of the body, and the like. Such talk seems to be more than metaphorical; it seems to express a truth about its subject matter that cannot be captured in purely factual language.

When we think of normative requirements as reportable by "if . . . , then . . . ought . . ." sentences, we are likely to think of normative requirements as grounded in simple facts, but clearly if this is ever the case, it is not always so. Consider the normative requirements encoded in the DNA of a biological organism. They are not grounded in the factual makeup of the individual; rather the factual constitution of the individual is shaped by the requirements encoded in its DNA. The prescriptions of the DNA are inherited, so to speak. For animals, they follow from a combination of the DNA codes of the individual's parents. Naturalistic scientists look to evolution by natural selection for an explanation of the origin and development of the DNA chain, but they do not recognize that the normative and the semantic are ontologically involved anywhere. If I am correct, the normative and the semantic may be involved everywhere. Moreover, if this is so, a different story will have to be told about the genetic code, evolution, and, indeed, the world in general.

VII

A Humanistic Worldview. Categorial structures of subject matter such as factuality, normativity, semantic intentionality, and causality are not subject to explanation in the manner of contingent features and structures in terms of contextual conditions that give rise to them.

We can explain why a particular individual has certain features, but we cannot explain why it has a factual structure. In a similar manner, we can explain why a particular situation normatively requires a certain action, but we cannot explain why there are normative requirements. We can explain why one has certain thoughts, but we cannot explain why there are subject matters constituted by inherent structures of meaning. We can explain why one thing causes another, but we cannot explain why there is a causal structure in the world. These are basic matters. They are part of the basic framework of our thought. We can clarify them, but we have no context in terms of which they could be explained. They are part of the basic structure of reality.

If normativity and semantic intentionality were present only in biological and psychological beings, we would look for an explanation of their occurrence within the context within which they appeared, for they would be effects of or at least follow upon certain contingent conditions. Yet if they are, as I have contended, irreducible categorial modes of constitution of being, and there are compelling reasons for this conclusion, they are so basic that they do not admit of explanation. So it seems that we must either deny that they are categorial modes of constitution or accept that subject matter with these categorial dimensions develops or in some way comes from subject matter that already contains them, perhaps in some rudimentary way. Naturalists deny that they are categorial and try to reduce them to the factual, but they have trouble making sense of the human phenomenon. The categorial view gives us a more complex world, but one that makes more sense of human existence and provides greater support for the human enterprise.

Furthermore, the humanistic framework of thought furthers intelligibility. There are basic constants in the physical world for which physics can provide no explanation. Yet, if their numerical values had been even slightly different from what they are, the universe would not have generated living beings capable of knowledge of it. This has led even some physical scientists to consider the so-called anthropic principle, namely, that the basic factual structure of the physical universe is what it is in order to make possible what it has brought forth, especially human beings with their knowledge of the world and knowledge-based creativity. In other words, the evolution of the universe is the maturation of being, the fulfillment of what was norma-

tively in it from the beginning, by an inner dynamic guided by a kind of inherent wisdom. The anthropic view theoretically posits a teleological causal process to account for some of the basic factual structure of the universe. So it seems that if we broaden the conceptual framework in terms of which we define the real and seek to render it intelligible, we extend intelligibility. This cannot be done without broadening also the methodology of science and its assumptions and views about the knowledge-yielding powers of the human mind, which is what I am arguing for in this paper.

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METAETHICS AND TELEOLOGY

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THERE IS AN IMPORTANT RESPECT in which virtue-centered ethical realism needs to be more Aristotelian than it is typically willing to admit. This concerns the way in which teleological considerations need to be more explicitly acknowledged. Reflection on moral phenomenology, discourse, and practice supports realism and also reveals that teleological considerations cannot be entirely disowned by it. The teleology is not a grand teleology, however; it is not the view that there is a unique perfection of human nature, and it is not the view that ethics is read off of a teleological metaphysics. On the other hand, this is not just the teleology of this and that particular subjective project, concern, or purposive action.

Much of the current debate in metaethics can be diagnosed as a dispute between a basically Aristotelian position and a basically Humean one, not in respect of first-order ethical doctrine, but in respect of the overall moral anthropology shaping the positions. On both sides, the influence of Wittgenstein is evident. We will examine what divides Aristotelian realism from Humean projectivism, and in the course of doing so we will be able to motivate a suggestion about why virtue-centered realism needs to include teleological considerations in an unembarrassed way.

I

First, how does Wittgenstein figure in all of this? The short answer is that he is widely seen as having made normativity respectable again. One of the main lessons taken from his later work, by philosophers of many different kinds, is that the use of concepts in general is a normative matter. The rule-governed behavior of making judgments

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and communicating is ineliminably normative. This normativity is not a question of there being values as some sorts of entities, perhaps apt for a Platonist ontological interpretation. Neither is the rule-governed activity of thought and discourse explicable in terms of a psychological mechanism or some particular fact of the matter in the mind or brain. This is a way between both ontological inflation and naturalistic reduction. Moreover, if the use of concepts generally is normative, then if there is a special way in which the normativity of moral judgments is worse off than normativity in general, perhaps it has to be shown and cannot be taken as a datum. There is unproblematic (which is not the same thing as "perfectly transparent, and fully explicable") normativity involved in judging that, "The cows broke out of their enclosure"—so why should, "It is wrong to harm someone just out of jealousy," be problematic? I do not mean that this point about ethical discourse was made explicitly by Wittgenstein.[1] It is, though, a point taken from his thinking by both realists and antirealists. (Not by all of them of course, but by many.) For each of the statements above there is a thick, familiar, inescapable context of judgments, perceptions, and shared responses which is their setting in the overall activity of making claims and giving reasons. It is in those contexts that we find the criteria for the correctness or mistakenness of them. If we wish to call this a kind of naturalism, that is all right, as long as we make clear that this is not a reductive naturalism.

The Wittgensteinian insights are congenial to realists, for it better enables us to go in for cognitivism with regard to value and the truth-evaluability of moral judgments without special objects and special faculties to perceive them. They are also congenial to an ethic that gives a central place to virtues, understood as centrally involving recognitional abilities and as enabling certain sorts of judgments. Recent

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[1] Wittgenstein, at the conclusion of his "Lecture on Ethics," writes: "My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it does say does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it." Reprinted in *Moral Discourse and Practice*, ed. Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 70.

realism, such as McDowell's, takes the virtues seriously in respect of their roles in practical cognition, rather than as constitutive means to the realization of human form. The work the virtues do in Aristotle's perfectionist teleology has been largely replaced by their role in ethical comprehension, the focus having shifted from the metaphysics of actualization to the epistemology of cognitive ability. A virtue can be interpreted as a state of an agent that enables him, through possession of a repertoire of relevant concepts, to make a range of (correct) ethical judgments, and to deploy them in deliberation. Quite specific concepts such as "considerate," "loyal," "cruel," "generous," "insensitive," and so forth, can have realist truth conditions in their ethical uses but also be open-ended and possess a texture that cannot be codified. Moreover, the deployment of these concepts can be reason-giving because of the role of sensibility and receptivity in having fluency with them.[2]

Antirealists are often no less eager to deploy Wittgensteinian resources. For the antirealist, the message is that realism can be rejected without landing us in skepticism or person-relative subjectivism. All of the assertoric and inferential form of moral discourse can be retained without realist commitments. Moralizing is not thereby deflated, something lesser than the phenomenology of moralizing leads us to think it is. As Blackburn argues, this is a way for moralizing to (a) involve none of the excesses of realism and (b) incur no loss. It is not a thinning of morality. It is all that it can be and needs to be.[3]

Again, if one wishes to call this naturalism, that is all right as long as it too is understood to be something other than reductive naturalism. Hume and Wittgenstein support each other in the working out of an account of ethics in which the normativity of concept use is wedded to human sensibility in the issuing of ethical judgments, without even raising ontological questions.

Much more than in the past, realists and antirealists are fighting to control the same territory rather than talking past each other. There is a shared concern to overcome dualisms of reason and passion, objective and subjective, descriptive and prescriptive, and the

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[2] See, for example, John McDowell, "Virtue and Reason," *The Monist* 62 (July 1979): 331–50.

[3] See Simon Blackburn, "Errors and the Phenomenology of Value," in *Essays in Quasi-Realism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 157.

like. Projectivists and norm-expressivists[4] are moving away from skepticism, radical subjectivism, and error-theory, while realists are moving away from Platonist ontology and intuitionist faculty epistemology. In a recent paper, David Wiggins has written:

> But on some other occasion I think I might feel moved to try to show that the main differences between Hume and Aristotle are more attitudinal, more moral (first-order moral) and more rhetorical in character than philosophically or even methodologically structural.[5]

Perhaps there is an Aristotelian–Humean reconciliation to be fashioned, the Humean dimension being developed in a way that gives proper place to practical reason as cognitive (and not merely inferential), and Aristotelian insights formulated in a way that gives a more fully value-constituting role to affect. Yet there are large-scale semantic and metaphysical considerations and commitments in the backgrounds of the two views, and there is a more than superficial difference between an interpretation of virtue in terms of loving the right things, and an interpretation of it in terms of congruence with the feelings of others in what we find lovable. We turn now to some of the differences, and the merits of the realist view.

II

One key difference is in the interpretation of habits of thought. Humeans interpret norms as expressing or reflecting habits of judgment which are not themselves rational or cognitive habits. The form of their deployment is cognitivist and assertoric, but the antirealism of the view rests on the claim that the norms themselves are not realistically true or false, or correct or mistaken, because the habits are not, whether the issue is, say, causality or morals. The habits have no representational or realist office or obligation. With regard to causality Blackburn writes:

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[4] See Allan Gibbard, *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990) for a presentation and defense of norm-expressivism. Gibbard and antirealists such as Blackburn explicitly appeal to the naturalism of natural selection to bolster their critiques of realism and defenses of antirealism with a potent combination of Hume, Wittgenstein, and Darwin.

[5] David Wiggins, "Eudaimonism and Realism in Aristotle's Ethics: A Reply to John McDowell," in *Aristotle and Moral Realism*, ed. Robert Heinaman (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 230.

> Once more the paradigm is Hume—not the Hume of many commentators, but the real Hume, who knew that talk of necessity was irreducible but gave a projective theory of it. The explanation here has us responsive to natural regularity, and forming dispositions of expectation (we might add, of observing boundaries in our counterfactual reasoning), which in turn stand us in good stead as the regularities prove reliable. Here, once we accept the Humean metaphysics, the naturalism seems quite in place.[6]

Similarly, with respect to morals, he argues that projectivism has in its favor "the possibility of identifying the [moral] commitment in a way that contrasts it usefully with belief, and a 'neat, natural account' of why the state that it is should exist."[7] Naturalism holds sway in a twofold way. First, it accounts for how there came to be creatures with the sensibility and conative capacities that make moralizing part of their lives. Second, it explains the states of mind involved in moralizing as nonrepresentational.

Apart from the naturalistic account of how ethics came into the world, no additional account is needed to supply a basis or foundation for ethics. Ethical argument and reasoning are within ethics, and not dependent upon (nor do they refer to) something else. We do not need realist values to underwrite an undisturbed phenomenology of moralizing and to sustain the genuineness of moral thought, judgment, and the meaningfulness of its language. A combination of a (broadly) causal explanation of the existence of states of norm acceptance and the rational requirements for the use of norms in judgment and reasoning is all that is needed. This is what is behind Blackburn's remark that "there is precious little surprising left about morality: Its metatheory seems to me pretty well exhaustively understood. The difficulty is enabling people to appreciate it."[8]

Wiggins (who says he is an "anti-non-cognitivist" rather than a realist)[9] has described his own view as a view on which "a property and an attitude are made for one another,"[10] and which is "a subjectivism

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[6] Blackburn, "How to Be an Ethical Anti-Realist," in *Essays in Quasi-Realism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 179.

[7] Ibid., 178.

[8] Blackburn, "Errors and the Phenomenology of Value," 163.

[9] Wiggins uses the expression "anti-non-cognitivist" in "Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life," 106, and in "A Sensible Subjectivism?" 202, he says of his position, "I should not for my positive preference call such a position *realism*, as if to contrast it with *mentalism* or whatever." Both papers are printed in *Needs, Values, Truth*, 2d ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991).

[10] Wiggins, "A Sensible Subjectivism?" 199.

of subjects and properties mutually adjusted."[11] Even this is too realist-sounding for Blackburn, who prefers the naturalistic explanation to the "Whiggish judgement"[12] which he says "is often in place, but it is of course a moral judgment. It is not pertinent to explaining how sensibilities are 'made for' values."[13]

Blackburn's projectivist alternative to being a Whig is, as it were, to be a Tory. This is not to say that there could not be practices of moral criticism and revision; it is not a point about the possibilities for first-order practice. The objection chiefly concerns the difference between conative force and normative authority with respect to ethical considerations. The concern is that what ultimately underwrites ethical norms is either (a) "this is what we do," or, (b) a causal story, which renders the role of reason or cognition in ethical judgment merely instrumental. (Or it is a combination of these that underwrites norms.) In neither case is there an adequate account of the normative authority of the judgments that are endorsed. Projectivist antirealism lacks the resources to account for what makes some ethical norms sound norms.

The concepts that figure in norms and ethical judgment are to be interpreted cognitively and realistically; they have more than just the look and feel of those features. To put the point succinctly, on the resources antirealism admits, ethical norms could be ballistic. That is, it could turn out, for example, that cruelty is not wrong. It is not enough to say, "Of course cruelty is wrong, and of course we endorse norms that require that result. Those who don't are morally disordered, so this odd-ball possibility you are describing is really quite beside the point." The projectivist might point to the natural facts that make cruelty wrong, and can say: "You see, projections do not alight just anywhere. We can be quite clear about what makes cruelty wrong." Yet, on the grounds that projectivism supplies, it could turn out that cruelty is not wrong, since the norm according to which it is wrong is reflective of an attitude rather than a cognitive recognition. For the norms that we do (correctly) acknowledge to be sound, antirealism interprets the recognition as attitudinal, and that leaves us with less than is needed to account for why we have those norms

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[11] Wiggins, "A Sensible Subjectivism?" 199.
[12] Blackburn, "How to Be an Ethical Anti-Realist," 171.
[13] Ibid.

rather than others, except by iterating attitude (which is phenomenologically implausible and explanatorily unilluminating).

The antirealist does not feel the need to answer questions about whether the basic concepts deployed in the norms are such that what makes for correct use of them is that the world is as it is believed to be by those who use those concepts correctly. From the antirealist perspective, such questions are especially awkward for the realist and they are clumsily beside the point. They raise unnecessary ontological and epistemological difficulties and have no bearing on the genuineness of moralizing. According to the realist, such questions are awkward for the antirealist because there is nothing for the antirealist to say except that correct use implies trivially, tautologically, that things are the way they are believed to be. (Given the norms we employ, some judgments are correct or true.) The antirealist can of course happily accept the fact that we argue, revise, criticize, and so forth. There is nothing wrong with saying that we enlarge or correct our moral understanding, or even that it worsens. Still, all of this is norm-domesticated in the sense that there is no cognitivist underwriting of the normative bases of these judgments. On projectivist resources, the norms could be anything, as long as consistency in their application is respected, and there is fairly stable consensus regarding them. There is, though, no rational warrant for them.

Perhaps this concern is a realist's neurosis. Why must there be rational warrant for them? Why isn't it enough that as systems, they "are adapted to achieve interpersonal coordination?"[14] If there is a neat, natural account of ethical commitments and stances, why do we need more or something else to support them? We need something else because, as Stephen Everson puts it, "what is of interest to the debate is not how the truth of a belief is determined by the norms of some discourse but also how those norms themselves can be

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[14] Gibbard, *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings*, 64. Earlier in the book, Gibbard writes: "The key to human moral nature, I suggest, lies in coordination broadly conceived. The need for complex coordination stands behind much of the way language works in our thoughts, in our feelings, and in social life. It figures centrally in our emotional dispositions, especially for such morally significant emotions as outrage, guilt, shame, respect, moral admiration, and moral inspiration. Matters of coordination, in the picture I shall sketch, stand squarely behind the psychology of norms, and hence behind what is involved in thinking something rational or irrational"; Gibbard, 26.

acquired."[15] The antirealist can do a fairly successful job of reverse engineering and can tell a story about norms and their role in the truth-evaluability of judgments once the norms are up and running. The weakness of the strategy is that the sanction for the norms is a broadly causal story of selective advantage, which is sanction in an instrumental sense at best. Or, we could appeal to the weight of consensus, but that too lacks justificatory clout. Consensus cannot yield intrinsic value.

Blackburn, for one, is sensitive to these kinds of objections. He writes:

> The charge that projectivism refuses to hear an explanatory demand as it is intended can be returned with, I suggest, much more effect. I was severe earlier with Wiggins's theoretical description of us as engaging in a kind of coordination of responses and properties [a different issue of coordination from the one mentioned above] as we become civilized. But it is telling that the Whiggish appeal to a value ("civilization") is introduced at that point. For the introduction of values into explanatory investigations is echoed in other writings in this tradition, notably in those of John McDowell. The strategy is that in a context purportedly comparing explanations of a practice—the practice of ethical judgment—we allow ourselves to invoke the very commitments of that practice.[16]

It is not the Wittgensteinian dimension that Blackburn opposes. It is the realist insistence that something external to practice validates it, even though only those inside the practice can see what is external. The antirealist insists that all that we need to look for external to ethical practice is the naturalistic explanation of how there came to be such practices. That though, is not a search for moral facts or ethical truth on an "external"[17] reading.

The way in which Blackburn portrays the external reading is somewhat tendentious. He makes it sound as though the value that is perceived is some additional entity or feature of a situation, a moral color, as it were, with primary quality status. However, realist interpretation of value is no worse off than a realist interpretation of certain animals being mammals, or the behavior of certain geese being migratory behavior. A dog's being a mammal is not some additional

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[15] Stephen Everson, "Aristotle and the Explanation of Evaluation: A Reply to David Charles," in *Aristotle and Moral Realism*, ed. Robert Heinaman (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 196.

[16] Blackburn, "How to Be an Ethical Anti-Realist," 174.

[17] Ibid., 173.

object that we encounter, though it is a fact about dogs that is appropriate to interpret realistically. Similarly, that a group of geese is migrating is a fact inviting realist interpretation, though "those geese are migrating" does not name an additional item in the world. (I do not mean that ethical judgments involve nothing more than these other judgments. The former involve the practical dimension, which is something we will come to, but they are no worse off.) The habits that underlie reliably making these judgments are cognitive habits, not just because we use criteria to sort correct judgments from incorrect ones, but because the concepts involved are to be interpreted realistically. These matters are not fully domesticated to human norms in a conventional sense (as perhaps is the distinction between chickens that are stewing hens and chickens that are fryers, or in the naval conventions earlier in the century, the difference between battleships and cruisers). In some contexts (including the ethical context) our concepts of what is allegedly projected are often parasitical upon what in fact is found. The wrongness of cruelty, for example, is not projective in the way that, say, a page of a newspaper is easy to read because of the size and quality of the print.

Our judgments of what is admirable, despicable, generous, fair, an act of betrayal, a dignified character, and so forth (across a large, complex landscape of worth, meaningfulness, and importance) are not ballistic, or ultimately instrumental, or essentially consensual, even though each of these is in fact compatible with being serviceable and stable. Granted, that there is such a complex texture of concepts and judgments depends upon human affect and sensibility and concern, but that is no challenge to realism. There is (as Aristotle argued) a crucial role for character (including sentiment and appetite) in ethical cognition, in ethical discrimination, grasp, and appreciation, but the habits of judgment and the capacities for discrimination are cognitive.

III

As noted earlier, the teleological element of virtue has been largely replaced by the agent's cognitive engagement with the world. The philosophical environment is not supportive of notions of an intrinsic end for human nature, or a unified, harmonious conception of

human good. For reasons coming from metaphysics and concerning the pluralism and incommensurability of values, it can look like teleology in ethics has been starved out, those still loyal to it fighting on after the war has ended. Yet, realist metaethics may lead us back, via moral psychology and moral epistemology (in a way which is progressive rather than regressive) in the direction of something not entirely unlike some of the metaphysics of morals that earlier had driven philosophers away from certain forms of realism. In what way does virtue-centered realism involve teleology?

It is not enough (even if it is true) to be told, "Well, the realist is concerned with truth, and preserving the cognitivist dimension of ethical claims, and realism explicates how moral judgments are genuinely (not minimally, platitudinously) truth-evaluable." Suppose the basically Aristotelian moral psychology of virtue-realism is correct, and that ethical truth is not antirealistically norm-domesticated. We are still left with a concern about the way in which cognitive considerations regarding intrinsic value can figure in practical rationality. This is where teleological considerations are needed and have some real traction.

In order to see this we need to look at the role of character in ethical cognition on this view. In characterizing the Aristotelian conception of virtue, McDowell writes:

> although the point of engaging in ethical reflection still lies in the interest of the question "How should one live?", that question is necessarily approached via the notion of a virtuous person. A conception of right conduct is grasped, as it were, from the inside out.[18]

For Aristotle, this issue was not a problem as it is for us, because his teleological commitments made intelligible how there could be practical cognition. The virtuous agent desires what in fact is good, and finds it naturally pleasing to act well, and this is so on account of the human *ergon*. A human being's nature is such as to find expression in a plan of life activities structured by valuative attachments, and there is an objective *telos* for those activities. Now it would seem that we can retain the teleology of this and that project or concern or aspiration, but the metaphysical, essentialist quality of teleology is unbelievable. This is one crucial way in which moral theory has taken over and subordinated or domesticated virtue. We can talk of virtues

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[18] McDowell, "Virtue and Reason," 331.

as dispositions to act for moral reasons but not as actualizations of objective excellences. Is there, though, a plausible, adequate notion of virtue that is free of teleological considerations? I think not.

McDowell's realism addresses the issue obliquely insofar as he describes the virtuous person's way of seeing things as reflective of "a conception of how to live"[19] and "an orectic state."[20] The import of this conception and this state is teleological. It is difficult to see how it could be otherwise. Otherwise, the possession of the virtues loses its point. The arguments concerning moral semantics and moral psychology ultimately need to be connected up with a larger conception of moral anthropology. They need not be derivable from it, but they are not "stand-alone" matters. Virtue-centered realism does not require a grand, harmonious convergence of good expressible in a theory of moral obligations. Why should we think that there could be such a thing, or that it is needed for a realist interpretation of ethical judgment?

However, the orectic state, in order effectively to be part of realistically interpreted virtue, needs to be a dimension of a *correct* conception of how to live. More than just the motivational efficacy of the orectic state is needed in order for the realist interpretation of virtue to be tenable. The notion that an orectic state is ingredient in the conception of how to live registers that the virtuous agent's way of seeing things must be action-guiding, but for virtue-centered realism there must be a connection between that state and the truth about value. The importance of an orectic state is to explain how cognition can be practical cognition through valuative attachments that do not defeat the objectivity or cognitivism of practical judgment.

For Aristotle, the point of the orectic state is strongly objective; there is a real difference between successfully actualizing one's nature, and failing to do so. Good character is not such because it is congruent with the dispositions that morality requires, but because the agent loves the things that are lovable and make his own life worthwhile and desirable for its own sake. Character makes good accessible, and good is real, common, and grounded in the *ergon* of human nature. The eudaimonism is explicit and unembarrassed, including the enjoyment supervenient upon functioning well.[21] A human being

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[19] McDowell, "Virtue and Reason," 346.

[20] Ibid.

[21] See, for example, Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.5.

can find it intrinsically pleasing to exercise his capacities in such a way as to actualize genuine human good.

What is important to emphasize here is not that feature of the view, but that in Aristotle's view, ethical considerations are objective, and ethical judgments are truth-evaluable, but not by any sort of derivation from a principle or by satisfying a criterion. That human beings aim at what they take to be good is a claim about human action, not in its own right a guide to human action. It does not specify what anyone, in any particular situation, is to do. That determination must be made through the exercise of developed capacities of recognition and appreciation, but without guidance by a criterion or codifiable rules.[22] This coheres well with Aristotle's emphasis on the transmission of values and ways of seeing situations and the way in which habituation is formative with regard to one's policies of practical reasoning.[23] The understanding of the *phronimos* cannot be formalized, and it cannot be taught or transmitted in the way that deductive reasoning can be.[24] This does not undermine the objectivity of the judgment of the *phronimos*; it is a point about the character of that agent's knowledge. Aristotle does not have a moral theory, if to have one is to have an account of a principle or principles that register obligations of a distinctive kind. He develops a moral psychology, and there are the elements of a metaethic, and a characterization of practical wisdom. Between metaethics and moral psychology there is the exercise of *phronesis* in the business of living, but there is not a moral theory or a theory of morals. There are of course important generalizations and even rules; but they are not generated from a general theory of good, and their underwriting is ultimately in particular judgments. There is constant traffic back and forth between the particular details of acts, facts, and situations on the one hand, and the articulation and elaboration of ethically relevant concepts on the other (such as fairness, generosity, courage, and so forth). The ethically sound agent knows how to deploy the appropriate concepts, which is not the same thing as applying the right rules. Rules are derivative, not basic. In early habituation, agents learn a great deal of rule-following, but the point

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[22] I explore this point somewhat more fully in Jonathan Jacobs, "Taking Ethical Disability Seriously," *Ratio* 11, no. 2 (September 1998): 141–58.

[23] See, for example, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.4.1095b4–9, 2.3.1104b31–5, 10.5.1176a17–22.

[24] See, for example, *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.9.1109b21–3.

of rule-following is that the agent should develop fluency with concepts, not simply a disposition of compliance.

Even if we lack Aristotle's confidence in harmony and uniqueness with respect to perfection, and we allow for a measure of cognitive underdetermination, realism's disowning of teleology cannot be total. We can ask what is the point or good of having the virtues. The answer will not be definitional; it will not do to say that there are reasons to possess or strive to acquire the virtues because virtues are excellences. (That is true, but in a more interesting way than by being analytic.) Nor will the answer be consequentialist or, at bottom, deontic. Even where a virtue-centered realism accommodates particularism and pluralism, it still needs a teleological element.

The agent with the virtues, the agent who acts well knowingly, for its own sake, and from a stable disposition, enjoys so acting, finding it naturally pleasing to do so. That, in turn, supplies the agent with a reason to carry on acting in those ways. Coming to see that what virtue requires involves cultivation of sensibility and appetite; the agent needs to appreciate the right things. Sustaining and enlarging virtue (for example, the interest in refining, adding texture and subtlety to one's ethical understanding) involves the teleology of the naturally pleasing, the teleology of it being a good to the agent who is good to act virtuously. For practical cognition to be practical, there must be a role for affect and (broadly) desire. The agent's appreciation of a situation, his ability to see what there is reason to do, is not captured and expressed by a purely representational rendering of cognition. Rather, correct practical cognition motivates a concern to persist in virtue because it is naturally pleasing. The agent does not act rightly because it is pleasing to do so; this is not a stealth version of hedonism. It is the view that virtue involves loving the right things. The virtuous agent's concern is with what is fine and just, though as a virtuous agent, he enjoys acting finely and justly, and that reinforces the motive to act well. The appreciation of good has a teleological aspect in its being a good to the agent, though that is not what primarily constitutes what is good. That is one main reason why the teleology of virtue cannot be reported to an agent.

Telling someone that virtue is naturally pleasing is likely to have little motivational traction, and will probably not be very satisfactorily understood, unless the agent is already disposed toward virtue. The enjoyment of excellent activity depends upon the agent's character. It

is not simply and generally available to all agents. This is connected with the fact that the realism of ethical considerations is no guarantee that they are equally accessible to all competent, rational agents. Access to them depends upon the kinds of recognition, discrimination, and receptivity the agent is capable of, given his second nature or character.

The view I have endorsed acknowledges that ethical intrinsic value is not something subsistent independent of practical reasoners; it is not brutely there. Moreover, ethical norms and judgments are not derived from some overall conception of human good or human excellence that is somehow prior to them. At the same time, human good or the excellence of a life is not domesticated to each individual's conceptions, or even to a common but noncognitivist interpretation of values. As Wiggins writes:

> However rarely or often practical judgments attain truth, and whatever is the extent and importance of cognitive underdetermination, we have found no overwhelming reason to deny all objectivity to practical judgments.[25]

Also, "It is either false or senseless to deny that what valuational predicates stand for are properties in a world."[26] The ethical virtues do not merely enable the agent to judge correctly concerning practical matters; they are also partially constitutive of the excellence of the agent. In enabling a person to do well, they also make for the good of the agent. In explicating that connection the normative naturalism of virtue-realism cannot altogether dispense with teleological or eudaimonistic considerations, though the issue of the connection is in fact often left unaddressed. It is not to be worked out once for all, exhaustively, and without contest along the way. Still, there needs to be an unembarrassed attempt to specify eudaimonistic elements as part of the project of articulating a normative naturalism, a naturalism in which the authority of norms has (at least to an extent which is nontrivial and important to acknowledge) a cognitivist basis.

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[25] Wiggins, "Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life," 131.
[26] Ibid.

IV

In what is perhaps something of an irony, certain important versions of antirealism and noncognitivism now put a great deal of weight on the features of a common human nature in order to explain the objective-looking dimensions of moralizing. Hume did so,[27] and that is how contemporary projectivism escapes from the clutches of relativism. Blackburn, for example, writes:

> To "see" the truth that wanton cruelty is wrong demands moralizing, stepping back into the boat, or putting back the lens of a sensibility. But once that is done, there is nothing relativistic left to say.[28]

It is not at all clear that confidence about the relevantly substantive and specific human sentiments and attitudes is much better supported than claims about what makes a human life or an individual's character an excellent one. However, even if we do not start from a teleological metaphysics, the philosophical anthropology that realist semantics best coheres with has a place for teleological elements, without the teleology's being derivative from agents' subjective projects. This is needed in order for the truth of ethical claims to be truth about noninstrumental value which is an object of cognition, and which has reason-giving significance.

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[27] Hume writes: "But the sentiments, which arise from humanity, are not only the same in all human creatures, and produce the same approbation or censure; but they also comprehend all human creatures; nor is there any one whose conduct or character is not, by their means, an object to every one of censure or approbation"; David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 273.

[28] Blackburn, "How to Be an Ethical Anti-Realist," 178.

IS THE COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY LIMITED AND INSTRUMENTAL?

MICHAEL PAKALUK

ARISTOTLE SEEMS TO BE CORRECT when he asserts[1] that every association is to be accounted for by reference to some good which the members of that association hope to attain, precisely through their cooperation: or, in words close to Lincoln's, people form an association to accomplish together some good that each cannot attain, or cannot easily attain, through his own efforts. Even if this good—or, we might say, the "purpose" or "point"—of their association is not entirely clear to them, presumably there is some reason for their coordinated behavior, which can in principle be made evident. The coming together of persons in political society seems to be a form of association even more than most, because of its durability and coherence, and because of the authority of its rules. What, then, is the aim of political society—its common good? Is there a single correct answer here, or could political society correctly be arranged to attain any one of a variety of goals? What view of the common good is implicit in liberal democracies, and how does this differ from the more classical understanding as articulated in the political theory of Aristotle and perhaps also Aquinas?

John Finnis argues, in an extremely interesting and even provocative paper,[2] that the common good of political society does not itself instantiate a basic human good; that it is not, in particular, the object of a natural inclination, as to something intrinsically good; but that it is only a necessary means for the instantiation of such basic intrinsic goods, primarily within families. This view he expresses by calling the

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[1]See *Nicomachean Ethics* (hereafter, "*EN*") 9.9.1160a10.

[2]"Public Good: the Specifically Political Common Good in Aquinas," in Robert P. George, ed., *Natural Law and Moral Inquiry: Ethics, Metaphysics, and Politics in the Work of Germain Grisez* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1998), 174–209 (hereafter, "Public Good").

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common good of political society "instrumental."[3] What is sought by members who associate in political society is something that assists and promotes family life; it is instrumental to other goods, goods which are sought for their own sake.

Finnis is not entirely clear about the details, but presumably his view is that the members of political society should work together to attain such things as: a military and police for protection against the aggressor, both external or internal; practices and infrastructure which serve to facilitate trade and commerce; and various means for advancing culture, such as schools, museums, and libraries. These together provide a framework within which families can flourish—a framework which Finnis refers to as "peace." Since laws should be restricted to the promotion of the common good, they are legitimately framed only if they advance peace or prohibit actions that would interfere with citizens' enjoyment of goods meant to be attained through civic peace. Laws are not competent, in particular, to direct citizens to any further end, such as the development of their own virtue in its own right, or the achievement of their own happiness. Presumably they are also incompetent to regulate life within households, except insofar as this has some real bearing upon justice and peace.

Let us say that an action or forbearance that is required for the establishment or preservation of peace is an act of "justice." Then laws, in the first instance, can command only acts of justice. Yet virtue is not something entirely unrelated to law. Laws may also promote virtue in citizens, Finnis allows, to the extent that such virtue is required if citizens are to succeed in doing acts of general justice. Finnis describes three respects in which this may be the case, which I here paraphrase:

> (1) Laws may aim to promote citizens' habitually choosing just actions, since peace will obviously be more stable if it is chosen by citizens as a consequence of an established character: and so, for example, national holidays can presumably[4] be established by law, since such celebrations have the effect of encouraging civic spirit.
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> (2) Laws may promote virtues other than that of justice, to the extent that these are in some real sense needed by citizens in order for them to succeed in acting justly: for example, it may command (presumably) that a soldier not drink alcohol when on duty—an action characteristic

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[3] Finnis, "Public Good," 187.

[4] The examples in this section are mine, not Finnis's.

> of temperance but in the circumstances needed if the soldier is to fulfill his duty reliably.
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> (3) Laws may properly forbid the public expression of actions that do not attack peace and justice directly, but which, if imitated by the young, would result in the formation of beliefs or habits that would render them unable, or significantly less able, to act justly,[5] or to enjoy the goods that are a consequence of peace: for example, the public display of homosexual affection can (presumably) be proscribed for the bad example it gives, whereas the private expression of such affection could not be proscribed.

Also, Finnis makes two points, almost in passing, which have a bearing upon the law's competence to inculcate virtue:

> (4) Even if laws should not aim to make citizens in general virtuous, still, they should aim to insure that those who govern be virtuous[6]—though it is unclear how exactly this is to be achieved in legislation, especially if the motive of promoting individual happiness is not an allowable justification for law.
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> (5) Even those laws that command acts of justice should be framed with a view to the correct conception of individual happiness.[7]

The reason for (5) is presumably twofold: (a) even if laws should not aim to inculcate the all-round virtue of individuals, at least they should not throw up any obstacles to the achievement of such virtue, and thus, legislators should refrain from making laws that, for instance, would promote the military, economic, or cultural well-being of a society, only by making it more difficult for individuals or families to live virtuously; (b) as we saw in connection with (3) above, it is necessary for public officials to judge when a public action hinders a person's ability, as a private person, to enjoy one of the intended goods of peace, but what the latter are—what peace is supposed to be for—can only be decided on the basis of a proper understanding of virtue. Presumably (4) and (5) are related: only officials who have a correct conception of individual happiness will succeed consistently at framing laws that do not hinder citizen's attainment of happiness.

It is because the common good, as Finnis construes it, is instrumental to the flourishing of individuals and households, that law, which must be restricted to what concerns the common good, is

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[5] Finnis, "Public Good," 183–4.
[6] Ibid., 187.
[7] Ibid.

limited to matters that either directly involve the common good or that have an indirect but real relationship to it. The instrumentality of the common good, then, implies limitations on the public good, on law, and on public authority.

Finnis attributes this view, in its basic form, to Aquinas as well. This is at first puzzling since Finnis's view seems prima facie incompatible with some well-known passages in Aquinas's political theory. Yet Finnis believes that this view is implied by Aquinas's considered statements on the nature of political justice and concord and that the problematic passages admit of being construed so as to be consistent with this view. Roughly, the interpretation proceeds as follows. Aquinas's thesis that "the purpose of law is to lead to virtue"[8] amounts to: the law is to provide the framework in which members of households can grow in virtue (and, of course, it promotes the virtue of justice and other virtues insofar as they bear upon justice). The claim that individuals and the household are parts of the state[9] becomes: they are components, which the specifically public good is meant to serve. That the state is not a mere alliance among citizens for commerce and protection against enemies[10] becomes: the state is an alliance for serving the needs of households within which virtue in all its fullness is cultivated. That no one can live well apart from the state[11] becomes: the state is a necessary means for procuring goods without which families would fail to instantiate basic human goods.

Note that, for Finnis, there is indeed an "all inclusive good" sought within political society: it would be the complex that consists of all the households that compose the state succeeding over time in living virtuously and well. But this comprehensive good is not sought corporately; if it is sought at all, it is sought only privately, within

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[8] See, for instance, *Summa Theologiae* (*ST*) I-II, q. 92, a. 1c. All quotations of *ST* in English are taken, with occasional modifications, from St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* (New York: Benzinger Brothers, 1947).

[9] Compare *De Regno*, 14. All references to *De Regno* cite paragraphs as marked in St. Thomas Aquinas, *On Kingship, to the King of Cyprus*, translated by G. B. Phelan (Toronto: Pontifical Institute for Medieval Studies, 1982). The paragraphs are an innovation of I. Eschmann, intended to facilitate precise reference to the text. Quotations in English are taken from this edition, with occasional modifications, and Latin quotations are from the Leonine edition.

[10] Compare *De Regno*, 106.

[11] See *De Regno*, 106.

households.[12] Citizens acting qua citizens, and legislators, seek simply to provide the preconditions for this further good; they cannot rightly be said to intend or aim at it themselves through licit public actions.[13]

I

Some Initial Difficulties. A full assessment of this view requires that we investigate what Aristotle and Aquinas mean when they refer to political society as a "complete" society, and why they think that a variety of important features converge in that sort of association: that it has self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*, or, even, that it is "self-determining"); that the governing element in that sort of association alone is justified in using coercive power; that political society alone contains law in the fullest and strict sense; and that its members relate to one another as free and equal persons, so that it alone also contains justice in the strict sense. Aristotle and Aquinas standardly add, as another item on this list, and perhaps as a necessary consequence, that political society is an association which aims at the virtue of its members. To construe this last claim correctly, its relationship to the others must be made clear; and I shall venture some remarks along these lines near the end of this paper. At this point I simply raise some initial difficulties, and in an informal manner.

The chief problem in Finnis's view, it seems, is that it apparently presumes that families (or households) are rightly understood as themselves stable and enduring associations; and that what a family is, is well defined, prior to, or apart from, the enactments or law in its

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[12] One might wonder whether the intention of the members of any individual household could be so expansive.

[13] This is not entirely clear. Certainly, on Finnis's account, a legislator must prescind from intending the virtue or happiness of individuals (though, as we said, he must take care not to hinder them). But must citizens, acting towards others as citizens, also restrict themselves to promoting nothing more than the framework of justice and peace? Is it only in some private capacity that a member of political society can licitly promote what he takes to be human virtue and flourishing? Or, rather, should we say that citizens acts as citizens only to the extent that they are following an actual law—that there is no coherent notion of citizenship, and the virtues thereof, except as these are defined by actual law—so that the only intention available, when someone is acting as citizen, is that which provides the justification for the law?

fullest sense[14]—as though the relationship between families and the state were analogous to that between autonomous states and a federal government, as in the establishment of the United States Constitution. On this way of looking at things, the public good is then defined, for this confederation, as the ensemble of institutions and means that provides for the flourishing of the antecedently existing associations.

There have indeed been instances, historically, where families have banded together to form a larger association, which was identifiably a political association: but in such cases the "families" are in fact tribes, or clans, or large aristocratic households, which are akin to political units themselves.[15] Yet typically families are relatively transient associations, easily disrupted, broken up, or displaced by death or other causes, with a relatively slight ability to remain intact if they lack governance from without; it seems to require argument to assert that they can be meaningfully referred to apart from such governance.[16]

A presumption against our doing so is perhaps derivable even from our present experience: since we see that to the extent that law has been withdrawn from the regulation of family life families have collapsed in disarray. Remove the coercive force of law, requiring adherence to the marriage contract, and fathers abandon their families; remove law requiring a mother's nurturance, and mothers abandon or even do away with their children.[17] Aristotle's remark that without law man is either a god or a beast[18] is perhaps not appropriately re-

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[14] "Prior to or independently of any politically organized community, there can exist individuals or families and indeed groups of neighboring families"; Finnis, "Public Good," 189. One wants to know what is the force of the "can" and what is implied in this possibility's being, apparently, so slight.

[15] Aristotle might say (see *Politics* 1) that they were in the process of becoming political associations, the latter being the endpoint of development of what begins as a nuclear family.

[16] Pioneers, colonists, the exiled, and so on, still define themselves in relation to some "complete" community, as providing either their origin or destination.

[17] No doubt the private motives to faithfulness and nurturance are more fundamental and most important; yet it seems insufficient that the correct view on the nature of the family be held by citizens as a merely private opinion. The private opinion, and the private motives, seem to need the support of external law, which is perceived as objective, and of public opinion based on such law.

[18] *Politics* 1.1.1253a4–5.

stricted to hermits or wild men, who are physically detached from society: it may also be taken to be confirmed by human action insofar as it falls completely outside the scope or authority of law; and in such cases it appears that, with very little prodding, men do act as beasts. Yet if law is required for the definition of marriage and for citizens' successful correspondence to what are admittedly natural and inherent standards for behavior within the family, then it seems plausible to maintain that the family is a creature of law, as well as of nature, and that it is not in the required sense prior to the state. It is unclear how law could be restricted, in principle, to providing solely for the preconditions of virtuous family life, if it is a function of law to define what counts as a family life and to distinguish and enforce the rudimentary responsibilities of family members.[19]

The same point might also be argued for from the phenomenology of marriage. It seems not incorrect for married persons to regard themselves as having taken on in marriage a role or position with regard to the broader community. To enter into marriage is to assume an office, a trust; it is not properly conceived of as something purely private. That it have such a role seems required, too, by the practice of the broader community's conferring benefits upon married persons since there would be no point in marriage's receiving public benefits if it did not confer a public service. However, then it seems something internal to or inherent in marriage, that it regard itself as directed toward the larger community; yet, if so, it is reasonable to regard the larger as having some direct responsibility for its goodness.

It might also be objected that it is unclear in what sense there is a natural impulse to marriage, that is not at the same time a natural impulse for political community. If by "natural impulse" we mean something like an urge or drive that has a certain character independently

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[19] One might say that a father's abandoning his child is against justice and disturbs the peace of society, and for that reason it can be proscribed by law. But "justice" in that sense means something other than "what provides the appropriate framework for family flourishing." Moreover, someone can be disturbed by that sort of action, with the result that it upsets his peace, precisely because he views it as simply wrong. But then it is unclear why the appropriate basis for legislation would be the disturbance, not the wrong which gives rise to the disturbance. In either case, vice becomes the concern of law directly, as something wrong, and not because of its bearing upon "justice and peace," that is, it falls within the ambit of law not as something specifically political or instrumental.

of culture and reflection, it seems incorrect to say that there is such an impulse toward marriage, that is, toward a monogamous, indissoluble relationship. In uninstructed human nature there is perhaps an urge to copulate, perhaps also to beget; but the understanding that copulation and begetting belong appropriately in a lifelong relationship with a single spouse seems a conclusion arrived at by reflection and experience. By a slight and natural extension of this sort of reflection, we arrive at the understanding of marriage as an "institution" with a public and objective character, recognized and given definition by law. Then why not characterize the impulse for marriage as that for lifelong monogamy within a broader community? In that case there would be a natural impulse for life in political society, as much as for marriage.[20]

One might additionally argue in the other direction: it is unclear in what way one can maintain that political association is simply a "necessary means for the instantiation of basic human goods," without being committed, at the same time, to holding that familial association is merely that sort of necessary means. The real subject of happiness is presumably an individual.[21] So why is it not the case that a spouse is no more than the "necessary means" for a person's instantiating the basic human good of sociality? If we say that one's relationship to one's spouse is somehow constitutive of a person's happiness, and thus not a mere means to it, why not say the same of one's relationship to fellow citizens generally? If we say that marriage provides the good of sociality in so exemplary a fashion, that nothing more is added by civic life; that the only role civic association can play, then, is as some sort of means—this seems first of all false, since civic life appears to provide something different in kind from familial life, yet not insignificant in value. Yet even if it is granted that civic life simply provides more of the same sort of thing found familial life, so that it serves as a kind of completion or fulfillment of familial association, it would not follow that civic association is dispensable or instrumental

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[20] This seems to me essentially the argument of Aristotle, *Politics* 1.1.1252b31–2, which concludes: "Hence every city-state exists by nature, inasmuch as the first partnerships so exist; for the city-state is the end of the other partnerships."

[21] Compare Finnis: "Promoting the group's good life is the king's concern. But Aquinas never supposes that such groups attain perfect, that is, heavenly fulfillment"; "Public Good," 182. Neither do families, as families.

to familial association. (Compare: association with a third friend can complete or fulfill, in some sense, the association between a pair of friends, but the former is not something superfluous or instrumental, for that reason.) Indeed, one might think that, generally, when one thing serves to complete, fulfill, or fully to actualize another, then the former is worth choosing on the same grounds as the latter.[22]

Another difficulty involves Finnis's suggestion that perhaps political society is after all basic in one respect, that is, insofar as it is required if there is to be law having coercive power.[23] The argument is not entirely clear, but perhaps its point is this: you cannot have public peace and order without law that involves coercion for the disobedient; but coercion of that sort requires that when there has been an act of disobedience, a judgment of disobedience be pronounced; but that sort of judgment cannot rightly be arrived at by a single person or by persons affected by the disobedience; it requires, rather, an impartial judge who occupies a public and definite role; but such a judge is possible only within political society. The argument itself contains various difficulties: Why is a judge possible only in political society? Why is it that law with coercive power is something desirable as a basic good and not as an instrument? If the coercive power of the law is needed simply to ensure public order and tranquility, law would seem to have an instrumental character, as much as any other aspect of the public good. If, however, we grant that law, as having coercive power, instantiates a basic good, and is not merely instrumental, why not also grant that it is good simply as law? That is, if it is inherently desirable that there be a decisive and impartial sentence pronounced upon a crime, then why is it not similarly desirable that an action of a certain sort be clearly and impartially declared to be a crime, which would come simply from the articulation of a law proscribing it? If law is inherently desirable, yet it exists or is available only in political society,[24] then so would be political society *tout court.*

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[22] Again, this seems to be Aristotle's reasoning: *Politics* 1.1.1252b28–32.

[23] Finnis, "Public Good," 193–5.

[24] Finnis observes that, "the whole construction of a strictly 'public' realm is *by* law and *for* law"; "Public Good," 195.

II

Justice, Concord, and Peace. I now turn to the question of the correct interpretation of Aquinas. Finnis claims that Aquinas's remarks about justice and peace imply a view which, in outline, is not unlike Mill's harm principle,[25] and which anticipates relatively recent developments in liberal democratic political theory. I believe, in contrast, that Aquinas's position no more resembles that of Mill or Kant than does Aristotle's. My view, in brief, is that neither Aquinas's remarks about justice, nor his discussion of concord and peace, imply the result that Finnis wishes to reach—this on account of the formal character of Aquinas's remarks about justice and the systematic ambiguities in the words, "peace"(*pax*) and "concord" (*concordia*).

First let us consider justice. Aquinas follows Aristotle[26] in drawing a distinction between general and special justice. General justice has to do with the relationship a member of an association has with other members, qua member of that association; special justice has to do with a person's observing standards of fairness and equality in his dealings with others, not qua member. The distinction can be drawn as regards any association.[27] For instance, soldiers in an army have their behavior regulated by military offices, law, and command. Suppose there are two brothers in the army, one much older than the other, but the younger brother has the higher rank. When the older salutes the younger, in accordance with military law, he is observing general justice, as regards his position in the military: that is, he is doing what is required by the principles that regulate and coordinate their behavior as soldiers. When, as private persons, the younger shows due respect for the older brother, then he is following standards required by special justice.

General justice, then, is simply doing what is right and required according to the principles or laws regulating the behavior of members of an association, as members. The laws of any association are of course concerned with the actions of its members in relation to one another, as members. Again, we regard an association as the coordination of action by persons to achieve what they cannot achieve, or

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[25] Finnis, "Public Good," 176.

[26] *EN* 5.1–2.

[27] Of course, in its strict sense "general justice" is only in political associations.

cannot easily achieve, by acting on their own. The principles or laws of any association, then, will be concerned principally and directly with that sort of coordination, which, by definition, is a matter of how the members relate to one another, not of how they act for their own purposes outside of the role they assume in the association. Clearly, the extent to which the laws of an association regulate the behavior of its members will depend upon the scope or extent of the association's purpose. In an association that has as its purpose, for instance, the complete harmony of its members, in thought, word, and deed,[28] everything whatsoever that any member of such an association does will fall within the principles or laws of such an association and thus be a matter of general justice, as regards that association. So that law is concerned with the relations of persons does not itself imply any significant limits on law.

The focal case of general justice, and that which is the referent of the term in the strict sense, is doing what is right and required by laws regulating the behaviors of members of political society, as members. It is clear from what has been said so far, then, that exactly what falls within general justice in the strict sense depends upon what the purpose of political association is: we cannot determine, from the mere idea that general justice has to do solely with the relations of citizens to each other in their cooperation to achieve the point of political association, whether there are any significant limits to the scope of law. If Aquinas's view is that the purpose of political association is simply to provide the conditions for flourishing family life, then of course general justice will involve only the actions of persons in that association insofar as such persons are related to one another to accomplish that goal. Yet if, on the other hand, he thinks the purpose of political association is greater, then the scope of general justice will be greater accordingly. If, for instance, the proper goal of political association is the (imperfect) happiness of all its members at once, then the matter of general justice becomes, roughly, the actions of persons insofar as they have some relation to one another's achievement of (imperfect) happiness—which would be a nearly unrestricted domain.

Aristotle's view, at least, seems to have been that general justice (in the strict sense) did have that sort of wide scope: he thinks it has to

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[28] Aquinas believes that the relationship of Christians to God has this character: see *ST* I-II, q. 100, a. 2.

do with the use of virtue generally.[29] So he call general justice "complete virtue'" and, in the end, asserts that it differs from the other virtues, taken in combination, only conceptually: in what they are, general justice is the same as virtue generally; they differ simply in definition.[30] On this view it would appear impossible for laws to aim at the inculcation and promotion of general justice without aiming at the inculcation of all-round virtue.[31]

It is not clear, however, that Aquinas's view is very different from Aristotle's. The prima facie sense of a variety of passages is that he shares the same view: "rulers . . . ought to induce their subjects to virtue";[32] "society must have the same end as the individual man";[33] "men become a multitude for the purpose of living well together, a thing which the individual man living alone could not attain, and good life is virtuous life";[34] the intention of a legislator is to make those subject to him good;[35] law, with its coercive power, leads it subjects to virtue more effectively than can a father;[36] and so on. These are familiar passages. The point is that we cannot interpret them as presupposing limits to legislation, simply on account of Aquinas's view that law has to do with justice, and that justice has to do with the relations of persons to one another—for the scope of justice for an association itself depends upon what the goal of that association is.

There is independent support that Aquinas's view was rather close to Aristotle's, in what Aquinas says about the divine law, in particular, the Mosaic code, and its relation to positive law. His explicit view in *De Regno* is that a sovereign should study the Mosaic code and use it as a pattern for legislation;[37] the same view is suggested by various passages in the *Summa Theologiae* as well. But the scope of

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[29] *EN* 5.1.1129b25–1130a13. Family members as such are not fully "other" to one another; Aristotle accordingly tends to look upon a person's exercise of virtue within his household as "in relation to himself." Presumably, however, a person, as citizen, is related even to a member of his family as to an "other."

[30] *EN* 5.1.1130a12.

[31] See *EN* 5.1.1129b19–25. We might also argue: to aim at the completion and use of a thing requires aiming at the thing.

[32] *De Regno*, 28.

[33] Ibid., 107.

[34] Ibid., 106.

[35] *Summa contra Gentiles* 3.115.4

[36] *ST* I-II, q. 90, a. 3, ad 2.

[37] *De Regno*, 116.

the Mosaic code in its regulation of the behavior of men to one another is not significantly restricted. A good example of this is found in Aquinas's discussion of the judicial precepts of the Old Law. He describes them as concerning justice, since they involve actions "that are directed to the ordering of one man in relation to another, which ordering is subject to the direction of the sovereign as supreme judge."[38] He says explicitly there that a contemporary sovereign could rightly enact laws modeled on those precepts: "if a sovereign were to order these judicial precepts to be observed in his kingdom, he would not sin." (The question of sin arises, in fact, because the judicial precepts are determinations of the natural law, not derivations therefrom, specifically designed for the people of Israel by God; they therefore have no binding force on non-Israelites. So, for a Christian sovereign rightly to enact similar laws, he would have to be clear that he was not bound to enact them, as if the Old Law in itself still had force over Christians: his reason for enacting them, rather, would have to be his recognition of the wisdom inherent in the judicial precepts, which Aquinas in fact goes on to explain.) Yet the precepts extend to such things as household matters and exchanges between private persons: no area of life seems outside their scope in principle. It is true they do not extend as far as thoughts and affections; yet clearly it does little to establish a limited public authority, to say that thoughts and inner motions of the will fall outside of it.[39]

Finnis's second argument relies upon Aquinas's remarks as regards concord and peace. "Concord" and "peace," however, are terms denoting a kind of unity, and "unity" notoriously has a variety of senses.[40] Thus, in Aquinas as well as Aristotle, "concord" can mean: (i) the mere absence of civil strife; (ii) agreement of citizens on important matters; (iii) civic friendship; or (iv) the complete harmony of persons, of their affections and impulses within and of their wishes and choices without. These obviously form a series of progressively greater unity, or, in the opposite direction, of increasing

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[38] *ST* I-II, q. 104, a. 1, ad 1.

[39] As Finnis observes, the thoughts of a slave fall outside the bonds of his servitude (see *ST* II-II, q. 104, a. 5); but it would be odd, for that reason, to characterize slavery as a "limited" condition of bondage—as bondage, it is fairly extensive. To be sure, even slavery is something slight, from the point of view of heaven; but clearly that is not the sense in which Finnis wishes to maintain that the public good and political authority are restricted.

[40] See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.6.

disintegration. How then do we interpret the claim that a legislator has as his aim the concord and peace of the state? It is perhaps most natural to understand this as: he should intend to move those subject to his rule along the series toward increasing unity.[41] It would also be natural to characterize the first member of the series as being especially important, since it is a precondition of everything else (compare Lincoln's concern with the unity of the republic over the abolition of slavery). *De Regno* in fact likens this primitive unity to the life of an individual:[42] clearly a person must be alive, if he is to do anything else at all. But if it is natural for this meaning of "peace" and "concord" to have a place of special significance, in passages in which Aquinas seems to suggest that concord in sense (i) is the aim, or the chief aim of the legislator,[43] we certainly cannot exclude the interpretation that he means that such minimal unity is the immediately required aim, or the aim which is decisive as being a precondition of anything else. That claim would not imply, of course, that such a limited goal was the legislator's only concern. Indeed, it is hard to see on what grounds a legislator would be bound to stop aiming at unity, in principle, at any point prior to (iv). Why would someone who could licitly intend a thing be restricted, in principle, from intending the fulfillment of that thing? It is easy to think that there might be practical impediments to the fulfillment of this intention but not restrictions in principle.

Aquinas, as was said, notices and recognizes the fuller senses of concord. Presumably concord in sense (iv) is something fully achievable in heaven;[44] it requires divine assistance and the theological virtues, and for that reason is something that human authority should not attempt to achieve through governance.[45] Yet, as Finnis observes, Aquinas asserts in one place at least that the aim of human law is to foster concord in sense (iii): "the principle intention of human law is to secure friendship of men with one another."[46] In that passage,

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[41] Not, of course, toward a unity so extreme as to destroy the state entirely—Aristotle's point against Plato's communism.

[42] *De Regno*, 118.

[43] There are few passages which suggest this: perhaps *ST* I-II, q. 98, a. 1.

[44] *ST* II-II, q. 29, a. 1.

[45] Though even this would not imply that it cannot be intended, in the manner of something for which one makes definite and precise preparations. See the discussion of the significance of the term *congruit* in *De Regno*, below.

Aquinas explains that friendship involves the attraction of like to like, and, in particular, that of good persons to the good; so presumably the aim of fostering concord implies or includes that of leading persons to become good. Moreover, Aquinas suggests that concord in sense (ii), in the manner in which it is typically achieved in a state, is not true concord: "[I]f one man is in concord with another, not of his own accord, but through being forced, as it were, by the fear of some evil that besets him, such concord is not really peace, because the order of each concordant is not observed."[47] Yet that condition seems to be what is found in a society in which good persons obey the law freely, because it is right to do so, and bad persons do so only out of fear. So long as some citizens are bad, then, there can be no real peace and concord in a society. A legislator who aimed at true peace and concord, then, would have to aim at the all-round virtue of all citizens.

Then how do we interpret *ST* I-II, q. 98, a. 1, which says that "the end of human law is the temporal tranquility of the state, which the law arrives at by proscribing external acts, insofar as those are bad things that can upset the peaceful condition of the state"? Nothing here requires that we interpret "peaceful condition of the state" in something less that sense (iii), and as not including the virtue of the citizens. Moreover, we are not required to construe the upsetting of this peace, as not involving more than large-scale infractions, or the ability or potential of an act's serving to upset peace, as its not doing so in rather indirect and remote ways. In fact, Aquinas's language seems crafted to allow for degrees, and a progression in the attainment of peace. What he says is schematic enough that it could apply to a legislator's intent to aim at increasing unity among his subjects.

The remainder of the corpus seems to suggest, in fact, this kind of progression, insofar as it endorses a high ideal for human law. The question guiding the article is whether the Old Law was a good thing. Aquinas thinks the Mosaic code was a very good legal code indeed, so his concern is to account for passages in the bible which might suggest it was something bad.[48] His explanation is that the Mosaic code can be evaluated by either a human or divine standard. By the divine standard, it fell short since it did not confer grace and merely gave

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[46] *ST* I-II, q. 99, a. 2.

[47] *ST* I-II, q. 29, a.1, ad 1.

[48] This is the Aristotelian technique of accounting for the *endoxa* that appear at odds with the view you wish to defend.

commands, without supplying those subject to it with the means of satisfying them meritoriously. By the human standard, however, it was exceedingly good. He then remarks that: "that which suffices for the perfection of human law, viz., the prohibition and punishment of sin, does not suffice for the perfection of the Divine law." Charity is needed for divine law, but the suggestion is that the apparently unrestricted prohibition and punishment of sin, of the sort found in the Old Law,[49] would constitute perfection, if found in human law. There is no basis in this article, then, to conclude that the typical character of human law—that is to say, that it prohibits and punishes gross evils, which disturb concord in sense (i) and (ii)—amounts to anything other than a practical limitation on law, given fallen nature, as is suggested also by *ST* I-II, q. 96, a. 2.

In sum, it seems the more natural reading of Aquinas's remarks about peace, and how this enters into a legislator's intention, to understand these as implying a progression: the legislator should aim at as much peace, and therefore at as much virtue in his citizens, as is practically possible. From this consideration, it seems, one cannot derive a principled restriction in the scope and extent of law.

Finnis observes that Aquinas recognizes and discusses peace and concord in fuller senses, yet he claims that:

> in the context of the passages about public good, it is clear that "peace" refers directly only to (1) absence of words and deeds immorally opposed to peace . . . ; (2) concord, that is, the "tranquility of order" between persons and groups which is made possible by love of neighbor as oneself, along with the avoidance of collisions (e.g., in road traffic) . . . ; and perhaps also (3) a sufficiency of at least the necessities of life.[50]

However, even if this were true, the list would be problematic for his interpretation, since it contains items which imply concord and peace in the fuller sense, or at least a progression thereto: love of neighbor implies goodness and virtue; and "absence of words and deeds immorally opposed to peace," if that phrase does not import a circularity, seems to imply the absence of vice generally. Yet the list is not derivable from passages about the public good: those passages are consistent with the interpretation which would take "peace" to represent an ideal that includes the all-round virtue of citizens.[51]

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[49] Insofar, of course, as sin is manifested in exterior acts.
[50] Finnis, "Public Good," 179.

Quite apart from this question of whether "peace" for Aquinas is something restricted or full, we might wonder how far the law should be taken to reach, in its authority or at least in its directive character, even in matters in which what it actually commands is rather restricted. Aquinas speaks of the law as in many cases commanding mediately what it does not command immediately;[52] we might also suppose that law can direct by example and by analogy in matters that it does not command outright. It is useful to consider these points briefly, since it is unclear that, even when law is significantly restricted in what it commands (whether the restriction is practical or principled is for now unimportant), matters outside the content of what is commanded cannot properly be said to fall within the scope of the lawgiver's intention. It would be possible, then, that the lawgiver intend all-round virtue in citizens, while commanding much less. The political common good, in that case, would similarly have this greater extension.

Here is an instance of the sort of thing I have in mind. A father needs to have some work done in the household—say, to have a room painted—and he asks his sons to do it. His concern in dealing with them, in this case as in others, is that they develop into good human beings. While overseeing their painting, he gives them instructions, or corrects them, only as this relates to the job. Suppose the sons quarrel: that they quarrel, and that their work is interrupted, provides the occasion for the father's intervention; but his purpose in correcting them is principally their own development, rather than that the paint job get finished in due time. Again, he might tell them to arrive at some fair agreement about which brother will paint which part of the room, and how much. The directive is very general; yet, because they act on the directive, the brothers can appropriately regard whatever procedure they use, and even the consequences of that procedure, as something directed by the father—so that they can look upon their entire work as indirectly under their father's supervision, though almost nothing is directly commanded.

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[51] When he interprets passages in which Aquinas refers to general justice, Finnis, it seems, takes them to be presupposing a limited and restricted end of peace; he then uses those passages, with that presumption built in, to limit and restrict what Aquinas says about peace.

[52] For instance, at *ST* I-II, q. 96, a. 3.

We might similarly ask, first: Is it appropriate for citizens to regard what they do as citizens as simply providing, in an important sense, an occasion for their achievement of something more important, namely, goodness and virtuous happiness? We honor and admire, after all, not mere achievement, but virtuous achievement, when we assess the contributions of others to the common welfare. If so, then why not say that citizens regard the intention of the law, insofar as it regulates their activity as citizens, to include their goodness and happiness?[53] (Laws prohibiting harm, on this understanding, would be aimed, not merely at preventing impediments to citizens' activity as citizens, but also at their in fact gaining the goodness of character, for which their activity as citizens should provide the occasion.[54])

Again, can citizens reasonably regard all action that is indirectly regulated by law as being under the authority of law? For instance, can a person reasonably regard his possessions as under the authority of law, to the extent that he acquired them by means of institutions and practices regulated by law?[55]

Arguably, Aquinas's views about general justice imply this sort of extension of law and its authority to nearly all of an individual's actions. When discussing the question at *ST* II-II, q. 58, a. 6, of whether general justice is essentially the same as all virtue, he interestingly does not argue that they are distinct, by claiming that there are some acts of some virtues other than justice, that do not fall under general justice. Then he proposes the analogy: "legal justice is said to be a general virtue, in as much, to wit, as it directs the acts of the other virtues to its own end, and this is to move all the other virtues by its command; for just as charity may be called a general virtue is so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good (*ordinat actus omnium virtutem ad bonum divinum*), so too is legal justice, in so

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[53] For instance, the reason for the code of military honor is not simply that violations thereof tend to hinder the military effectiveness of the group; or that actions in violation of the code belong to vices which make their possessors less likely to be effective as a soldiers. Rather, the code (arguably) stipulates fundamentals of behavior which are a precondition of military service's being honorable (or meritorious) at all.

[54] Thus law should have an intention very different from that allowed on Mill's principle.

[55] Compare the Laws' rebuke of Socrates in the *Crito*. Aquinas seems to explain the wrongness of self-mutilation in this way: "a man and all of his parts," that is, all of the parts of his body, belong to the state; *ST* II-II, q. 65, a.1.

far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good (*ordinat actus omnium virtutem ad bonum commune*)." Let us follow out the analogy. Charity, in directing acts of virtue, becomes the form of those virtues, Aquinas says.[56] We should presumably understand this claim as implying something about the intention inherent in such actions: anyone who acts out of charity is capable of construing a virtuous action that he does as an act of charity, that is, of love of God, even if the goodness of God were not "in his mind" when acting. Then we can reason, similarly, that all acts that fall under the direction of general justice, however obliquely or remotely, contain the intention of promoting the common good, and are capable of being understood as such, even if that were not an explicit motive (for example, it was not in my mind to be serving my country when I was teaching this morning).[57] There are only two precepts of charity, but actions done in response to these precepts have the form of charity;[58] similarly, the legal code of a state may be quite restricted, but actions, not simply those involving the application or determination of that code, but also those in some manner governed by such actions, have the form of general justice.[59]

To summarize what I have been maintaining in this section: Finnis would argue from Aquinas's claim that law must be restricted to matters of justice, and that its purpose is peace and concord, to the conclusion that law and public authority are in principle instrumental and limited, in the senses explained. However, these notions are incapable of establishing that conclusion. General justice is, so to speak, a purely formal notion, and we cannot tell what its shape or scope is, until we know what the aim of an association is, the general justice of which is being considered. As for concord, it is an ambiguous notion, which, however, naturally implies movement toward an ideal; and there seems to be no necessity to understand it, in Aquinas's application of it to political associations, as in principle restricted to something short of the ideal.

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[56] *ST* II-II, q. 23, a. 8.

[57] "in morals, that which gives an act its order to the end, must needs give the act its form"; *ST* II-II, q. 23, a. 8.

[58] "the precepts of love virtually include the precepts about the other acts"; *ST* II-II, q. 44., a. 3, ad 2.

[59] "Charity is called the form of the other virtues not as being their exemplar or their essential form, but rather by way of efficient cause, in so far as it sets the form on all, in the aforesaid manner"; Ibid., ad 2.

That these notions are inadequate for establishing Finnis's conclusion perhaps explains why, in the final section of his paper, Finnis writes as though he has not yet located the grounds for Aquinas's limited conception of public good: he raises anew, as though it had not been answered, the question, "But why judge the effort [to inculcate all-round virtue] wrong in principle, an abuse of public power, *ultra vires* because directed to an end which state government and law do not truly have?"[60] He turns at that point to a discussion of the natural equality of persons and households, which he suggests underlies Aquinas's view: it is necessary "to go behind the proposition that states are complete communities, and to consider the grounds for that assertion, on the tacit assumption that the institutions which give this community its completeness—law and government—need justification in the fact of the natural equality and freedom of persons."[61] However, that discussion would be unnecessary if it were possible to deduce such limitations from the mere ideas of justice and concord.

Arguments based on claims of natural equality carry us well beyond, or even outside of, the framework provided by Aristotelian political theory, in which Aquinas operates.[62] Aquinas, like nearly every thirteenth-century man, did not reject the doctrines of natural authority, of the natural subordination of some to others, and of the paternal character of political authority, which are stated and defended in book 1 of Aristotle's *Politics*, and which were passed on from classical to modern society, until the ascendancy of modern notions of

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[60] Finnis, "Public Good," 187–8.

[61] Ibid., 189.

[62] Samuel Johnson's defense of "subordination" as against the levelers is a good instance of the confrontation of this view with the modern view; for example: "So far is it from being true that men are naturally equal, that no two people can be half an hour together, but one shall acquire an evident superiority over the other"; James Boswell, *Life of Johnson* (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1917), 139. "Were we all upon an equality, we should have no other enjoyment than mere animal pleasure"; Ibid., 121; "mankind are happier in a state of inequality and subordination. Were they to be in this pretty state of equality, they would soon degenerate into brutes. . . . Sir, all would be losers, were all to work for all: —they would have no intellectual improvement. All intellectual improvement arises from leisure: all leisure arises from one working for another"; Ibid., 206. It cannot be denied, of course, that "subordination" is softened, and its significance greatly diminished, even within premodern Christianity. However, there is a huge divide here, and Aristotle and Aquinas are together on one side of it, with Locke, Mill, and Kant on the other.

equality. Yet if so, it would perhaps be better to view Finnis's thesis not as an account of what Aquinas held but did not articulate very clearly,[63] but rather as a possible development of certain elements of Aquinas's philosophical anthropology—one which is at odds, ultimately, with the Aristotelian political theory which he presupposes and uses.[64]

III

The Interpretation of De Regno. There still remains *De Regno* and the reading Finnis has proposed of some key passages, which seems to support his interpretation of Aquinas on the common good. I maintain that a careful consideration of those passages does not support Finnis's interpretation. But then we should let stand the plain sense of those various passages in *De Regno* in which Aquinas endorses the view that the proper aim of any sovereign is the virtue and happiness of his subjects.

The texts Finnis discusses are found in a chapter entitled "Ad hoc Regis studium oportet intenere qualiter multitudo bene vivat."[65] It contains paragraphs 114–122. Finnis quotes paragraph 120 and construes it in light of paragraph 115, but it is necessary to look at the full context. Paragraph 114 begins by giving an argument based on the golden rule: the king should be subject to God, just as he expects his subjects to be obedient to him. The argument is interesting chiefly in that it suggests that all material goods are ordained to the common good. This is required for the argument to have the proper force: just as no subject can claim exemption or immunity from the king's

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[63] "amid very different, obfuscating circumstances and concerns, St. Thomas had reached the same *sententia*"; Finnis, "Public Good," 196.

[64] It is not that Finnis's argument takes us "behind" the proposition that the state is a complete community; rather, Finnis effectively denies it, in the sense in which it was understood by Aristotle. (Importantly, Aquinas does not take pains to deny it; and insofar as he qualifies it, he does not do so by stressing the independence or equality of households or individuals, but rather by insisting on the subordination of state law to divine law.)

[65] Phelan renders this, "That regal government should be ordained principally to eternal beatitude" —not unjustified by the text which follows, but hardly a translation. The chapter is marked I.15, under one traditional system of capitulation.

authority, so the king cannot claim to escape the reach of God's authority:

> As the life by which men live well here on earth is ordained, as to its end, to that blessed life which we hope for in heaven, so too whatever particular goods are procured by man's agency—whether wealth, health, eloquence, or learning—are ordained to the good life of the multitude. If, then, as we have said, the person who is charged with the care of our ultimate end ought to be over those who have charge of the things ordained to that end, and to direct them by this rule, it clearly follows that, just as the king ought to be subject to the divine government administered by the office of priesthood, so he ought to preside over all human offices, and regulate them by the rule of his government.[66]

Again, the paragraph assumes a comprehensiveness in the scope of the king's authority, limited solely by the supervening, higher authority of God. The next paragraph assumes the king's subjection to this higher authority and explains what its character should be:

> Now anyone on whom it devolves to do something which is ordained to another thing as to its end is bound to see that his work is suitable to that end; thus, for example, the armourer so fashions the sword that it is suitable for fighting, and the builder should so lay out the house that it is suitable for habitation. Therefore, since the beatitude of heaven is the end of that virtuous life which we live at present, it pertains to the king's office to promote the good life of the multitude in such a way as to make it suitable (*congruit*) for the attainment of heavenly happiness, that is to say, he should command those things which lead to the happiness of Heaven and, as far as possible, forbid the contrary.[67]

Notice that two things are asserted here about what the king should effect. Just as the swordsmith both (i) makes a sword, a definite and distinct kind of thing, but in doing so takes care that he (ii) make a sword adapted to a particular use, so the king should both (i)' bring about "that virtuous life which we live at present," and (ii)' ensure that that life is, furthermore, adapted to heavenly happiness.[68] Finnis glosses the passage thus:

> the group's—the political community's—good life is to be in line with (*congruit*) the "pursuing of heavenly fulfillment (*coelestem beatitudinem*)"; by promoting group good life in that way, rulers are like swordsmiths or house builders, whose role is to make an instrument suitable for others to put to their own good purposes.[69]

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[66] *De Regno*, 114.
[67] *De Regno*, 115.
[68] Thus "qualiter" in the title of the chapter.
[69] Finnis, "Public Good," 182.

However, this is too weak a construction of the text. Finnis, we might say, has taken into account (i) and (i)', but not (ii) and (ii)'. Aquinas does not say that the public good is like an instrument produced on its own terms, to be taken up by another and used or adapted by that other person for his own purposes. He says, rather, that it is like something made or fashioned to order, carefully crafted to correspond to the use to which it will be put.[70] Now, in the case of actual craftsmen, that kind of adaptation comes about by the intended user of the product making his needs and wishes well-known, which the craftsman then adopts as his own; these things then become part of his intention and guide his work. Yet that seems to be precisely the force of what is asserted here. The connection between kingly rule and divine rule which supervenes is one of close collaboration; the link between the virtuous life of the multitude and their heavenly destination is not supposed to be something accidental or merely instrumental.

Not surprisingly, Aquinas then explains how it is that the king is to come to know in what way, precisely, he should share in God's intention of leading his subjects to heavenly happiness: not only should the king be subject to priests, but also he should study the divine law with care and internalize it:

> What conduces to true beatitude and what hinders it are learned from the law of God, the teaching of which belongs to the office of the priest, according to the words of Malachy: "The lips of the priest shall guard knowledge and they shall seek the law from his mouth." Wherefore the Lord prescribes in the Book of Deuteronomy that "after he is raised to the throne of his kingdom, the king shall copy out to himself the Deuteronomy of this law, in a volume, taking the copy of the priests of the Levitical tribe, he shall have it with him and shall read it all the days of his life, that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, and keep his words and ceremonies which are commanded in the law." Thus the king, taught the law of God, should have for his principal concern (*precipuum*

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[70] *ST* I-II, q. 98, a. 3 gives a striking example of the adaptation of the governance of a subordinate to that of a superior: "Now it is to be observed that, wherever there is an order of powers or arts, he that holds the highest place, himself exercises the principal and perfect acts; while those things which dispose to the ultimate perfection (*quae disponunt ad perfectionem ultimam*) are effected by him through his subordinates: thus the ship-builder himself rivets the planks together, but prepares the material by means of the workmen who assist him under his direction." Quite obviously, the planks have to be prepared with precision so that they can be riveted exactly as planned; they are "made to specifications." The master shipbuilder is not satisfied with simply getting planks from the lumberyard.

> *studium*) the means by which (*qualiter*) the multitude subject to him may live well.[71]

The divine law then becomes a pattern or ideal for his own legislation.[72] Note that the divine law, according to Aquinas, prescribes all of the acts of all of the virtues;[73] furthermore, as we have seen, in its *iudicalia* it regulates domestic and personal life.

The next paragraph guides the discussion for the remainder of the chapter. Assuming that the king has internalized divine law and now understands the purpose for which human legislation should be adapted, he should attend especially to three aspects of the state, in setting down legislation:

> This concern is threefold: first of all, to establish a virtuous life in the multitude subject to him; second, to preserve it once established; and third, having preserved it, to promote its greater perfection.[74]

That is to say, what it is for his subjects to live well (*bene vivere*) is something complex; it can be analyzed into: (a) the establishment of a good life in the multitude; (b) the preservation of that way of life, once established; (c) the perfection of that way of life, once preserved.[75] He goes on to discuss each of these: (a) in paragraph 118, (b) in paragraphs 119–20, and (c) in paragraph 121.

Finnis discusses 119–20, but, as will become clear, he takes them to involve a problem that is in fact raised and resolved in the immediately following paragraph, 118. It is in paragraph 118 that Aquinas

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[71] *De Regno*, 116.

[72] Thus the sense of the phrase from the end of n. 115: "ea precipiat que ad celestum beatitudinem ducunt, et eorum contraria secundum quod fuerit possibile interdicat."

[73] *ST* I-II, q. 100, a. 2. This article probably gives the more precise sense of the adaptation of human law to the eternal beatitude envisioned in *De Regno*. "Human law makes precepts only about acts of justice," but divine law is concerned with the relation of men to God, which involves intellectual virtue: "Man is united to God by his reason or mind, in which is God's image. Wherefore the Divine law [and not the human] proposes precepts about all those matters whereby human reason is well-ordered. But this is effected by the acts of all the virtues." Human law should be adapted to divine law by seeing to it that, through acting justly, men have what is required for the intellectual virtue that relates them to God.

[74] *De Regno*, 117.

[75] This is as though—to revert to the swordsmith analogy—we were now told that, in making a sword to a soldier's specification, the smith must attend to the metal he employs and the design of the hilt and blade.

presents a comparison between society and the individual, which is used to make a single and relatively simple point: whereas we can take the integrity of an individual's body and soul for granted, when we consider the question of how to educate him to live well (*bene vivere*),[76] this cannot be taken for granted by the state. The art of statecraft must provide for the existence or establishment of its objects, not simply their good function, once they exist. Thus, in order to accomplish goal (a) mentioned above, three things are needed: (i) to establish a body politic united in peace; (ii) to direct this society, now united, to living well, by setting down laws that direct to virtue; (iii) to provide it with adequate material instruments for the exercise of virtue. For an individual person, in contrast, it would be necessary only to educate him in virtue and then supply him with adequate material means:

> For an individual man to lead a good life two things are required. The first and most important is to act in a virtuous manner (for virtue is that by which one lives well); the second, which is secondary and instrumental, is a sufficiency of those bodily goods whose use is necessary for virtuous life. Yet the unity of man is brought about by nature, while the unity of multitude, which we call peace,[77] must be procured through the efforts of the ruler. Therefore, to establish virtuous living in a multitude three things are necessary. First of all, that the multitude be established in the unity of peace. Second, that the multitude thus united in the bond of peace, be directed to acting well (*vinculo pacis unita dirigatur ad bene agendum*). For just as a man can do nothing well unless unity within his members be presupposed, so a multitude of men lacking the unity of peace will be hindered from virtuous action by the fact that it is fighting against itself (*se ipsam impugnat*). In the third place, it is necessary that there be at hand a sufficient supply of the things required for proper living, procured by the ruler's efforts.[78]

If it were correct that the purpose of government is limited in the way Finnis maintains, the ruler's task would be concluded with (i)—or perhaps (iii) should be added. As it is, the sequence described is eminently Aristotelian and, it seems, not compatible with Finnis's view: make the thing exist, and endow it with the appropriate functions (a military, market, courts, and so forth); then inculcate virtue; then

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[76] Or, to the extent that we consider this matter, it belongs to a distinct discipline, that is, medicine, not ethics.

[77] Here "peace" evidently means simply the absence of civil strife, and, far from being the end and limit of legislation, is simply the most basic condition and starting point.

[78] *De Regno*, 118.

supply it with necessary instrument for the fuller actualization of that virtue.

After Aquinas has discussed the goal we had labeled (a) in paragraph 117, that is, "to establish a virtuous life in the multitude subject to him," he goes on to consider (b), "to preserve it once established." He does so by enumerating the principal threats against what has been established and then indicating how each is to be guarded against:

> When virtuous living is set up in the multitude by the efforts of the king, it then remains for him to look to its conservation. Now there are three things which prevent the permanence of the public good. One of these arises from nature. The good of the multitude should not be established for one time only; it should be in a sense perpetual. Men, on the other hand, cannot abide forever, because they are mortal. Even while they are alive they do not always preserve the same vigour, for the life of man is subject to many changes, and thus a man is not equally suited to the performance of the same duties throughout the whole span of his life. A second impediment to the preservation of the public good, which comes from within, consists in the perversity of the wills of men, inasmuch as they are either too lazy to perform what the commonweal demands, or, still further, they are harmful to the peace of the multitude because, by transgressing justice, they disturb the peace of others. The third hindrance to the preservation of the commonwealth comes from without, namely, when peace is destroyed through the attacks of enemies and, as it sometimes happens, the kingdom or city is completely blotted out [emphasis mine].[79]

In paragraph 118, Aquinas had distinguished three things implied in goal (a). In this paragraph, similarly, he distinguishes three things implied in (b)—three distinct threats to the continued existence of (as we should assume) a well-functioning, virtuous, and prosperous citizenry.[80] The sense of the paragraph is that we should be surprised that something should go wrong: after all, if the state has been estab-

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[79] *De Regno*, 119.

[80] Finnis claims that Aquinas's ease in going back and forth between "virtuous living in the multitude" and "public good," as though these were synonyms, supports his reading ("Public Good," 181). By this I take it he means that "public good" connotes something limited and instrumental, and so we should understand "virtuous living in the multitude" similarly. Yet I think the point works in the reverse: Aquinas has explicated in detail, in paragraph 118, what is meant by "virtuous living in the multitude"; hence, given the synonymy of the terms, "public good" should be taken to mean precisely that.

lished well and is functioning well, what could go wrong? Aquinas, however, wishes to remind the king that, even at this stage, vigilance is required, and he enumerates three sources of potential threats: from nature, from within, and from without. Two of these are easy to understand: the threat from without, war; and the threat from nature, that is, the finite lifespan of rulers (thus procedures for training and replacing rulers need to be in place). The third is unaccountable: why should anyone be disgruntled in a well-functioning state? This can only be attribute to irrationality, to the perversity of fallen human nature (*in perversitate voluntatum*).

Note that these threats to the continued good life of the multitude do not imply anything that might properly be called a "goal," "purpose," or "end" of the ruler—just as it would be inappropriate to say that an athlete in training for a contest has, as his goal, avoiding sickness, or taking care not to get mugged on the way to the event.[81]

We now come to the paragraph that Finnis isolates and discusses:

> In regard to these three dangers, a triple charge (*triplex cura*) is laid upon the king. First of all, he must take care of the appointment of men to succeed or replace others in charge of the various offices. Just as in regard to corruptible things (which cannot remain the same forever) the government of God made provision that through generation one would take the place of another in order that, in this way, the integrity of the universe might be maintained, so too the good of the multitude subject to the king will be preserved through his care when he sets himself to attend to the appointment of new men to fill the place of those who drop out. In the second place, by his laws and orders, punishments and rewards, he should restrain the men subject to him from wickedness and induce them to virtuous deeds, following the example of God, Who gave His law to man and requites those who observe it with rewards, and those who transgress it with punishments. The king's third charge is to keep the multitude entrusted to him safe from the enemy, for it would be useless to prevent internal dangers if the multitude could not be defended against external dangers.[82]

The first and third remedies are obvious and trivial. The second is interesting: it seems to be a recommendation that the king not diminish rewards for good conduct, or relax punishments for bad, as he might be tempted to do, even if things are going well in the state—and this on the model of God, who proposes rewards and punishments for all,

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[81] The threats give rise to three *curae* (see the next paragraph), not three *intentiones* or *fines*.

[82] *De Regno*, 120.

and with constancy.[83] In any case, even if Aquinas is making a relatively restricted point here, about the role of rewards and punishments in ensuring the mere integrity of the state over time, that hardly takes away his earlier assertion, in paragraph 118 as regards goal (a), that is, that legislation ought to induce to virtue. Finnis claims, as regards this passage:

> So the second concern or responsibility (*cura*) of rulers, a responsibility proposed by Aquinas precisely as the appropriate response to *these* just-mentioned "things incompatible with lasting public good", is not: to lead people to the *fullness* of virtue by coercively restraining them from *every* immorality. It is no more than: to lead people to *those* virtuous actions which are required if the public weal is not to be neglected, and to uphold peace against unjust violations.[84]

However, as we have seen, the paragraph, when read in its complete context, assumes that the ruler is governing over a state already established under laws designed precisely to lead people to the fullness of virtue, and which restrain as much as possible from vice; the present concern is, rather, how to fend off threats that would bring the whole thing to an end.[85]

The next paragraph, paragraph 121, corresponds to goal (c), which was distinguished in paragraph 117, that is, "having preserved it, to promote its greater perfection":

> Finally, for the proper direction of the multitude there remains the third duty of the kingly office, namely, that he be solicitous for its improvement. He performs this duty when, in each of the things we have men-

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[83] This gloss explains the reiteration of terms for reward and punishment: *penis et premiis . . . observantibus quidem mercedem, transgredientibus vero penas retribuens.*

[84] Finnis, "Public Good," 182.

[85] Finnis says that "the argument [of paragraphs 119–20] develops a careful parallel between what is needed for an individual's good life and what is needed for a community"; "Public Good," 181. However, that parallel was used, rather, in 118, as we saw. Aquinas does draw, in 120, a parallel between an enduring office in a community, and the life of an individual, insofar as he says that officeholders need to succeed one another, as generations do. But this is not a parallel between individual and community, so much as an observation that a deficiency of individuals, that is, their mortality, will afflict a community as well, unless a remedy is employed in political society, much like the remedy nature employs. It is important to point out this apparent misconstrual in Finnis's exposition since this seems to be what causes him to overlook paragraph 118 as though it simply contained material similar to what is found in 119–20. However, as we saw, Aquinas's most telling remarks about the role of legislation in promoting virtue are found in 118.

> tioned, he corrects what is out of order and supplies what is lacking, and if any of them can be done better he tries to do so. This is why the Apostle exhorts the faithful to be "zealous for the better gifts."'[86]

This seems to be simply a recommendation that the king strive always to do better at promoting the goals contained in (a) and in being solicitous as regards the *curae* enumerated under (b). There are two points that are especially interesting here. First, we might wonder what the king might do better, for promoting (a), given that the state is already (as we are assuming) established and functioning well. Presumably Aquinas has in mind constitutional adjustments that might make the "bond of peace" more secure and perhaps also the fine tuning of laws, to make them even better at promoting virtue. Second, the quotation from 1 Corinthians 13:31, St. Paul's famous encomium to charity, seems to suggest that this third element of kingly rule involves his exercise of charity, or that this third element requires charity if the king is to do well; and perhaps it is meant to suggest, also, that the zenith of accomplishment, for kingly rule, is to have provided for the growth of charity in the state under one's care. If that is indeed the point of the quotation, then, needless to say, Aquinas is thinking of the intention of the king as containing within its scope a goal that is far richer than the mere absence of civil strife and gross criminal action.

As regards *De Regno*, then, the texts examined by Finnis cannot be reconciled with the view he wishes to ascribe to Aquinas; in fact, when examined more thoroughly, they can be seen to support the opposite conclusion. A careful exegesis of other passages in the tract would tend only to confirm this point. For instance, paragraph 69 maintains that "the ruler of a multitude stands in the same relation to the virtuous deeds performed by each individual (*in hiis que sunt a singulis secundum virtutem agenda*) as the teacher to the matters taught, the architect to the buildings, and the general to the wars"; paragraph 95 asserts that a king "is to be in the kingdom what the soul is in the body, and what God is in the world," but these remarks hardly suggest that kingly rule is in principle limited. Again, that "society must have the same end as the individual man," that is, to live virtuously, as a means of attaining to the possession of God,[87] and that "men form a group for the purpose of living well together, a thing

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[86] *De Regno*, 121.
[87] Ibid., 107.

which individual men living alone could not attain, and good life is virtuous life,"[88] are remarks that seem to attribute the same value or type of goodness to life in society, as is found in the most valuable goods attainable by an individual—and this hardly suggests that the worth of life in political society, or of the good attained in political society, is that of something instrumental.

IV

Limits to Government in Aristotelian–Thomistic Theory. One might think that, if there are no limits in principle, in Aristotelian–Thomistic political theory, to legislative command by the state, deriving from a limitation on the goal of legislation, then, in a state established on that basis, there would be no safeguard against totalitarianism, and the expansion of state control in a manner incompatible with individual or group liberty would be the inevitable result: state control of all aspects of life; politics is all.

However, there are many other safeguards against totalitarianism in the Thomistic and Aristotelian view of the nature of political authority, which are arguably at least as effective as the conception of rights inherent in individuals or households, serving as a check to state power.[89] These are all rather familiar. No elaborate discussion is required; it will suffice simply to mention them:

(1) The view that positive law is derived from or based upon a natural law, which is furthermore well-expressed in an actual legal code of a particular nation, that is, the Ten Commandments and the Law of Moses.

(2) That rulers need to be virtuous, so that, in particular, procedures for the selection of public officials must aim at this.

(3) That human nature is real; that it has an actual character; and that good government must be based upon an adequate understanding of it.[90]

(4) That there are real "forms," or natures in things, which imply a difference in kind and not merely degree in levels of authority, so

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[88] *De Regno*, 106.

[89] Recall that totalitarianism is a modern phenomenon; it has in each case arisen in societies in which the notion of individual rights was antecedently widely accepted.

that, generally, no higher authority commands all of the actions of a lower, but simply corrects and directs. (In the Aristotelian picture, this hierarchy of authority is taken to be related to hierarchies in practical disciplines or *technai*, and to hierarchies in sciences. Perhaps: to the extent that either of these other hierarchies is denied, to that extent the claim that there can be a hierarchy in political authority seems similarly unaccountable. Thus, the modern notion of "technology" as involving simply various instruments, none having any intrinsic character, setting limits on its appropriate use; and the modern notion of a unitary science arrived at through "reductionism," are at odds with the idea of a real hierarchy of political authority.)

(5) That there are natural differences in authority (for example, the knowledgeable have a natural claim to direct the ignorant; the good have a natural claim to direct the bad; the mature, generally, over the young), of which political authority is a development or rationalization. Political authority is not something *sui generis*; it is simply the highest instance of something common and widespread: society is rich with real and legitimate authorities.[91] (In the absence of this view, it is difficult to see how political authority can be construed as ultimately other than an artificial and unjustifiable constraint imposed upon sovereign individuals.)

(6) That, since the role of any sort of governance is to inculcate virtue, and virtue itself implies authority and power, the role of governance is to increase the power and ability to govern of those subject to it. This together with (4) and (5) imply subsidiarity.

(7) That human activity is distinctively rational and thus we should expect that, in practices of long standing, there will be an inherent rationality, a point or purpose, which must be correctly articulated and interpreted, before a practice can be intelligently reformed or abolished. (This is a principle of conservativism.)

(8) That every association involves some sort of exchange or reciprocity (a kind of amity), so that the political community as well must be arranged so that the reasonable consent of the governed is gained.

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[90] Thus, for instance, communism is excluded. The character of human nature should be taken into account in the design of the constitution, and a knowledge of human nature should be regarded as one of the virtues required of public officials.

[91] This is the principle that Samuel Johnson called "subordination."

It is useful to list these things, since it then becomes clear that Thomistic political theory, in its reliance upon Aristotle (supplementing this with a clearer view of the basis in nature of law, as in (1)), contains many weapons and hedges against totalitarianism. The postulation of natural equality, or of the priority of families to the state, is quite unnecessary, except insofar as a conception of natural equality is used as a kind of device or shorthand to explain and express the principles of natural law with which human law must be consistent.

V

The Common Good and Perfect Society. I conclude with some remarks about why Aristotle and Aquinas agree in saying that political association is for the sake of virtue, and what precisely they mean by this.

We should begin with Aristotle's remark that every association involves justice, because it involves some kind of sharing.[92] How should this be understood? It helps to have a simple example before us, to fix ideas. Imagine a number of independent homesteaders—pioneers, perhaps, on the edge of civilization—who are not associated in any way, except for some occasional commerce, but who learn of some threat to them—say, the approach of a boat of invading marauders—and, as a consequence, resolve to form an association for mutual defense. What happens in that case is: each farmer realizes that he cannot defend his homestead well, or defend it at all, through his own efforts; so he chooses to cooperate with other homesteaders for this purpose. His decision to cooperate[93] requires what might aptly be called a "conversion" on his part. Prior to the formation of the militia, each farmer seeks his own defense, and the formation of a militia seems appealing to him as a means of his achieving what he is already doing on his own. After his decision to join the militia, however, he

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[92] See *EN* 8.9.

[93] This decision has three elements: first, that he will work with the others for their defenses; second, that he will work with others for deciding upon how their militia will be governed; third, that he will abide by the decisions of the governing body of the militia. The analogues for political society would be: the formation of a nation or political body; the establishment of a constitution; legislation in accordance with the constitution.

no longer has as his goal, simply, the safety of his own household. Rather, what he must adopt as his goal is the common goal of: defense of the group of homesteaders generally, which is aimed at by the militia, and by each homesteader as a member of the militia. He views the safety of his own household, now not as that for the sake of which he seeks the common goal, but rather as a necessary consequence of the attainment of the common goal. Once he thought of his own household's safety as an end, to which the militia would be a serviceable means; but as a consequence of his joining the militia, insofar as he thinks and acts as a militiaman, he makes his own household's safety a part of some larger goal, which is strictly his aim.

One might say: to join the militia just is to abandon the private goal in favor of the group or common goal. Thus the militia, and indeed every association, involves reciprocity and exchange. Precisely because individuals form an association to attain a good that they cannot or cannot easily each attain through individual effort, in joining the association, each gives up the seeking that good for himself and through his own efforts, and each gains the effort of the association on his behalf (through its pursuit of some common or general goal). This can be put in the language of rights and therefore justice: each gives up the claim or right to seek that good for himself; and each acquires a claim against the community for his fair share in the common good sought by the community. It is a consequence of an individual's joining any association, then, that justice with respect to what he seeks as a member of that association consists in his following the plan or law of that association. If a farmer who had joined the militia happens to pass by his own plot of land, en route to taking up an important assigned post in battle, he would act unjustly if he abandoned the task, his duty, to defend his own homestead, even though he joined the militia precisely to secure the protection of his homestead. Again, if it happened that the post to which a militiaman was assigned was his own homestead, then, even though his actions might in that case be similar to, if not the same as, those he would have undertaken, had he continued to try to defend his homestead on his own, his motive and practical deliberation are nevertheless entirely different; moreover, his actions are now expressive of justice, rather than, say, prudence and courage alone.

These reflections indicate, perhaps, how we should understand Aristotle's dictum that political society originates in need, but

continues for the sake of virtue.[94] The same could be said for any association, though with qualifications. Any association originates because of some good that individuals wish to procure for themselves on account of some need. Yet once the association is constituted, and some plan of action in pursuit of a common goal is defined, then the following of that plan becomes a matter of justice, which is something virtuous and noble (*kalon*).

We should perhaps say that what makes the following of such a plan virtuous and noble is that it is the ordering of action in a reasonable manner, in recognition of the equality of those involved. If it is inherently good, however, to act reasonably and furthermore to express or recognize the equality of others, then the following of any plan of any association would be something inherently good. That which is sought by the association is perhaps something only instrumentally good, for example, victory or defense; but the seeking of it by planned, cooperative action would be inherently good.

Yet we should observe three important qualifications that pertain to associations such as the militia we have been considering. First, the plan adopted by the militia defines justice for its members only "in a certain respect" or *secundum quid*: it articulates justice for the farmers "as regards matters of defense," not justice without qualification or *simpliciter*. Second, the plan is consequently subject to being rightly overruled. For instance, a militiaman's wife is deathly ill one day, and he decides not to report to his post, in order to attend to her. Did he do wrong, that is, act unjustly? (Recall, we are assuming that the farmers are bound together in no way other than by the militia, so there is no ordered way for arriving at a public decision on the matter.) Certainly the militia's plan of defense cannot decide the matter: it assumes that those governed by it are going to be acting in the interests of defense and decides what they should do, on that assumption (or, if the plan did attempt to decide such things, it would no longer be simply a military plan, and it would fall outside the competence of persons given authority to make military decisions). Third, we might expect that any homesteader's practice of justice "as regards matters of defense" would require the exercise, on his part, of only a few traits of character, primarily self-control and courage. Other good traits he might have would not come into play in his activity as militiaman.

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[94] *Politics* 1.1.1252b29–30.

The claim that political society is perfect should be understood, I think, as the assertion that these three qualifications do not apply to it. We shall assume that political association is roughly self-sufficient, in the sense that all important human goods[95] are available within it or through it, either through the activities of that association itself or through those of other associations to which the members of the political association belong. We shall also assume that the authority of the political association is supreme and comprehensive, since otherwise it would not be correct to speak of it as a single association.

Clearly, an association of this sort would have important traits that lacked these qualifications. First, the plan or law of the association would not constitute justice "as regards X," where X was some particular good, since all important goods are sought within and through the association. In that sense, the justice of following its law is general and unqualified.[96] Second, its law is not subject to being overruled, because the law of such an association has to be competent to compare and rank diverse and incommensurable goods. Note that that sort of competence, according to Aristotle, belongs to virtue (and especially the virtue of prudence).[97] To the extent that the law requires that those subject to it, in their actions, observe the same principles of ranking, to that extent it would inculcate the virtue required in making such laws. Third, the law of that sort of association, given its general scope and its ordering of the diverse aspects of human life, would make demands upon the resources of character generally; its good observance, we might expect, would require all-round virtue.

From these conclusions, we see that the law of a political association is deeply bound up with virtue, as regards both legislators and those subject to it. But what justifies the stronger claim that the aim of that sort of law is virtue? Why not simply say that its aim is the procurement generally of basic goods needed for human flourishing—that a political association differs in aim or purpose from a militia simply in aiming at more goods and at a greater variety of goods? Further, even if we admit that following the law of a political association is something inherently good (as is following the plan of the militia),

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[95] With Finnis, I prescind from discussing questions about the relationship between the political association and the Church.

[96] Although perhaps Aquinas would wish to say that it involves unqualified justice as regards human goods required for imperfect happiness.

[97] See *EN* 6.5.

what justifies the claim that the end of political association is something inherently good?

The basic argument in Aristotle for these further claims has to do with certain characteristics of the sort of law found in political associations.[98] Let us suppose that, generally, that for the sake of which an association exists is to be located in what an individual forswears pursuing privately, in being a member of that association. Let us suppose, also, that virtue cannot be inculcated well without (a) the use of coercive power, and (b) the ability to judge whether some principle or rule has been overruled on good grounds. If, then, individuals or families were to seek, on their own, to inculcate virtues in their members, they would have to be seeking both (a) and (b). Yet in fact we see that individual and families in political associations foreswear both (a) and (b): they neither seek to use coercive force, nor do they hope to be able to evaluate all competing claims and conflicts of interest.[99] Thus these things are included in that for the sake of which a political association exists, yet these things could not rightly belong to political association except for the purpose of inculcating virtue. Thus, the political association has, as one of its aims at least, the inculcation of virtue. (Perhaps we should then argue: Since virtue is rightly ranked above any instrumental goods that might also be sought by political association, virtue becomes the chief aim, or even the aim, of political association. Virtue cannot be a direct goal without being the chief goal.)

If law necessarily implies the possibility of its enforcement, and thus coercion, and if self-government implies law, then it is strictly speaking impossible for a single person to govern himself, and difficult if not impossible for a household to govern itself. In political association, what we might refer to as an individual's or household's self-government is therefore really: one is left free by law to employ,

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[98] The argument is not very different from that which Finnis hints at as regards the coercive character of law in his final pages; but the consequences are greater than I think Finnis allows. Finnis would argue, I believe, that that character is itself a basic good, and to that extent participation in political society has the aspect of a basic good; I wish to argue, rather, that the coercive power of law is correctly construed as in the service of virtue, thus, the fact that coercion is given up by private persons in political association implies that the inculcation of virtue is delegated to that association, as a common goal.

[99] Moreover, the absence of such forswearing amounts to civil strife.

in affairs under one's control, something analogous to law, that is, practical reasoning, taking the form of admonitions or resolutions. However, if an individual's actions are subject, as they are, to being overruled by the law of the state, and rightly so (for instance, sometimes a man must leave his family and fight in war), then they are not in fact under his law, but under that of the state. The appearance that an individual is under his own law, arises from this: for the most part the law of the political association, on account of principles of subsidiarity, and so on, leaves things in place and directs lightly, as though, in our militia example, each farmer were to receive the command, "Stand guard at you own homestead, until you hear otherwise." Nonetheless, that the law of the political association typically leaves each person in charge of his own household does not imply that he is then in the same condition as if he were sovereign over its affairs, in some association that was prior to or independent of the political association.

On the view we have been considering, political society would be inherently good because its aim is inherently good, and furthermore the achieving of that aim is inherently good (on the grounds that the following of the plan of any association is so). However, there are further considerations, Aristotelian in spirit, that support the claim that it is inherently good to act in accordance with law in the fullest sense; I sketch these in the conclusion:[100]

(1) It requires freedom to act in obedience to law, rather than out of impulse or emotion; thus, action under law is a sign or indication of the freedom of the person who acts, and (we might presume) the more fully a precept is a law, the more the action serves as such an indication; thus, freedom is especially well expressed by such action as is possible only in political society. "[J]ustice cannot be in the irascible or concupiscible as its subject, but only in the will."[101]

(2) Since laws are made to apply generally, and are deliberated in advance, apart from influence of emotions or the felt exigencies of need, they express reasonability in an especially clear way, and are inherently good as such. "[T]hose who make laws consider long

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[100] Basically the procedure here is to examine justice (I have drawn upon *ST* II-II, q. 58) for aspects of it that plausibly are inherently good. If law and justice, in the strict sense, are available only in political society (which we must at this point simply assume), so are these inherent goods.

[101] *ST* II-II, q. 58, a. 4.

beforehand what laws to make," Aquinas remarks, "and it is easier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances into consideration, than by considering one solitary reasoning . . . lawgivers judge in the abstract of future events; whereas those who sit in judgment judge things present, towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of cupidity; wherefore their judgment is perverted."[102]

(3) If practical reasoning is analogous to theoretical, so that the basic laws of the former are like the axioms of the latter, then derivations from basic laws of action, and determinations of such laws, are akin to proofs,[103] but a proof is inherently desirable on account of the reflective confidence it gives us in the correctness of a result; thus a public, promulgated law, decided upon after due deliberation, is inherently desirable on account of the confidence it gives to the correctness of the behavior commanded by that law.[104]

(4) If acting well toward someone who is other or "alien" is a distinctive achievement of a human being, different from acting well toward someone who is akin or one's own (a family member or friend)—and if there is, furthermore, a virtue or excellence of character consisting of the habit of acting reliably in that way—and if, furthermore, we act well toward someone who is other through law in the strict sense, then action under law is inherently desirable.[105]

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[102] *ST* I-II, q. 95, a. 1, ad 2.

[103] *ST* I-II, q. 94.

[104] See *ST* II-II, q. 60, a. 5: the purpose of law is *iuris declaratio*.

[105] See *ST* II-II, q. 58, a. 2, ad 4: "[Man's] dealings with others need a special rectification, not only in relation to the agent, but also in relation to the person to whom they are directed."

THE PERSISTENCE OF THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM

JOHN J. COMPTON

A CONCERN TO UNDERSTAND THE POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS of human freedom is as old as philosophy. Yet the question whether and in what sense human beings are free agents still provokes heated debate. Even a century ago, as William James began his discussion of the issue, he wondered, with some bemusement, whether there could possibly be any "juice" left in it![1] Happily, he concluded that there was still more to be said, but his eloquent defense of free will failed to convince; it became just another chapter in the ongoing and seemingly endless dispute. In the years since, many additional essays and books have been written, covering every aspect and espousing every possible view of the matter. The deep disagreements continue. It is this very phenomenon, the remarkable persistence—and resistance—of the problem of freedom, upon which I wish to reflect. Why is it that after such a long history the same vigorous differences endure? Is it more than mere philosophical partisanship that keeps the discussants talking past one another? I believe that there is more to it. I suspect, much as Kant thought, that there is here a sort of antinomy in which valid but seemingly incompatible intuitions are expressed over and over again. Perhaps by considering this possibility we can, even now, squeeze out a bit more juice.

I

Let me sketch the context of the debate as I see it. There is a kind of freedom that seems to everyone to be clear and uncontroversial: Political philosophers call it liberty, we can call it freedom *of* action. To be free in this sense is to be able to do what one wishes to do—

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[1]William James, "The Dilemma of Determinism," in *Essays in Pragmatism* (New York: Hafner Press, 1948), 37.

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within some acceptable range of actions, to be sure—without external (physical or social) interference. It means to be able to carry out one's intentions, to do what one chooses. Actualizing this freedom requires that one have, or develop, the appropriate abilities and resources and, as philosophers of all cultures remind us, it helps to be blessed by nature and to enjoy a benign social order. Politically, the force of this sort of freedom is largely negative—that one not be unwarrantedly prevented by others from acting as one chooses, or compelled to act contrary to what one chooses, that is, against one's will. Philosophers of every sort agree that this kind of freedom is crucially important for healthy political life, even though necessarily limited in certain respects. They agree that while human societies regularly repress appropriate expression of this freedom and may require reform or revolution, nothing in human nature, nothing in principle, prevents us human beings from exercising it as fully as desirable.

There is another, closely related dimension of the freedom of action which seems to be commonly understood and accepted as well—namely, that one be able to do as one chooses not only without external interference, but also without internal (bodily or mental) interference due, perhaps, to some impediment, injury, or illness. Insofar as something in our individual natures or personal histories prevents us from carrying out actions we choose to undertake, or fully to realize them, we know generally what to do. We treat such "unfreedom" as an empirical problem, and we call upon medical or psychological therapies to provide whatever measure of remediation is possible.

We easily recognize that freedom of action, in this twofold, external and internal sense, is necessary in order for a person to take or be assigned responsibility for his specific actions, and that the measure of one's responsibility is proportioned to the extent of one's freedom in these respects.

But there is another kind of freedom, we might call it freedom *in* action, upon which philosophers have never been able to agree. This is the freedom not only to do what one chooses without external or internal interference, but the freedom to choose in the first place, the freedom to form and resolve to pursue one's own purposes—what the tradition, at least since Augustine, has called the freedom of the will. Assignments of responsibility depend upon this sort of freedom as well. From the earliest theological questioning of the compatibility between God's omnipotence and human freedom to the philosophical

debates, from the seventeenth century on, regarding the compatibility between nature's omnipotence and human freedom, the issues have been the same: What does human freedom in action—the freedom to choose—require, and to what extent, if at all, does our situation as human beings, vis-à-vis either God or nature, permit us to exercise it?

One can go a little way with this question by extending the features of freedom of action backward, so to say, into the process of choice in freedom in action. If to be free to act is to be able to act without external or internal interference, then surely one's choosing to act is free only in the absence of comparable interference with the process of choosing.

Aristotle points out the basic formula: An action is voluntary (freely chosen by us) unless (i) it is done under some form of compulsion so that the agent contributes nothing to it, or else (ii) it is done in ignorance. In this way, we tend to see freedom of choice compromised (if not rendered impossible) under a variety of conditions, including some of those we mentioned earlier, in which the process of choice itself is interfered with—for example, under conditions of extreme stress or which provoke great fear or passion; under hypnosis, or under the influence of certain neuroses, habits, or addictions (even though we may have had a part in acquiring them); in case of impaired affective or reasoning capacities; or when the agent lacks particular knowledge of the situation in which he is acting. In such cases, we believe, the agent has been unable to form and project what are (properly) his own purposes.

Casuistry in law and ethics has helped to refine and extend these sorts of excusing conditions, although there are always hard cases. Because we continue to achieve new understanding of mental or social incapacitation, and because new and subtle strategies of (external and internal) control are constantly being discovered, further reflection upon such freedom-compromising conditions is always necessary. Still, the principle behind them seems clear and straightforward enough: A person is free to choose, and hence responsible for what he chooses to do, only insofar as he is in full possession of his powers to understand and assess critically the situation in which he is acting (and, of course, actually does understand and assess that situation), and insofar as he is able effectively to mobilize his understanding and assessment, his feelings and desires, so as to project—that is, to envision and make the effort to realize—some appropriate, specific action

on the basis of them. Whatever conditions impair or prevent the exercise of these (several) powers would impair the freedom to choose and also, therefore, the freedom to act.

Thus far, most people—and most philosophers—seem to agree. The question arises when we ask whether, beyond the variety of specific conditions of impairment which we recognize, there might be some more systematic impairment, indeed a total absence, of freedom of choice (and thus of responsibility for action) by virtue of the power of God, or of nature, which constitutes us the way we are and completely determines our purposes and our pursuit of them. Here is the persistent problem of freedom.

II

To philosophers since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, faced vividly with the new science, the issue became sharply focused: If we grant that human beings are in all respects parts of the natural world and that their behavior is explicable in principle by natural laws (although not all of them are known), we seem to be driven to the conclusion that, even though human beings might have (or might acquire) freedom of action in the sense I have sketched, and even though they are (or could become) free from specific impairments to their freedom in action—to their rational and affective powers to choose—they would still not have genuine or full freedom of choice. This would follow because all the mental powers of human beings and the exercise of these powers, all their understandings and assessments of their situations, all their developed feelings and desires, all their imaginings and projectings and strivings—in short, everything that enters into their processes of choice and decision—would be lawfully determined by their given natures and particular experiential histories, and thus would not ultimately be under their personal control after all.

At this point, fundamental intuitions—certainly those of philosophers—have diverged and continue to diverge. Those philosophers whom we have come to call compatibilists see in such determinism no necessary loss of freedom of choice whatever. From Democritus to Hobbes to Hume to Mill and Schlick to Dennett, they insist that free choice need not be endangered by some ultimate determination of

one's powers and their exercise, but rather that free choice actually depends upon such determination, if properly understood. Provided we see that the determination of our choices by natural law and human history involves no sort of compulsion upon us, and is thus fundamentally different from the particular sorts of unfreedom we have earlier recognized; provided further that we do not take this determination in some deflationary or reductionist, materialist sense which would remove the distinctive character of our mental powers entirely; we can then see that such determination precisely makes possible the possession and exercise of the powers which constitute free choice.

The compatibilist intuition is that no matter how these cognitive and affective powers come into our hands, or what it takes in our history and practice to acquire a developed capacity to exercise them, if we have them and actually exercise them—that is, if none of the specific disabling conditions obtain—then we actually have freedom of choice and, with it, free will.

For in this case, however we manage to carry these powers out, by whatever causal processes within us, we end up desiring and projecting what we ourselves believe is an appropriate action in a situation we ourselves have come to understand and assess. Irrespective of the fact that our process of choice is a causally determined process, so that our specific choices are determined to be as they are, this process is constitutive of who we are, and thus we ourselves will have determined what we shall choose. There is no alien causation at work here; there is no unacceptable constraint upon us; it is our nature and history which are being expressed in our powers of choice. Thus, what we choose to do is precisely up to us. We have chosen freely and we are responsible for what we choose.

On the other hand, respond the libertarians, if every step in the process of assessing one's situation, in working out an appropriate response, and in mobilizing oneself to act toward them is causally determined by one's individual nature (genetic capacities and tendencies) together with one's developed character and particular history (experience), then, in Kant's words, this appears to be "no better than the freedom of a turnspit."[2] At the moment of choice there are no

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[2] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956), 100–1.

alternatives, not even the minimal alternative of saying "No." What will be chosen is what the antecedent causes will have determined shall be chosen. It makes no difference that these causes are, in part, precisely our deliberative and affective processes and, thus, are in us. For since they and their outputs of thoughts and intentions at any moment are all in the past relative to the moment of choice, they are as much beyond our immediate, present control as any more ultimate causes are. Such causes, and indeed any causes, control us from the past. They control us, we do not control them. The choices which result from them are, thus, choices that pass through us, perhaps, but are not up to us in any adequate sense.

The libertarian intuition is that, in order to have genuine freedom of choice, a person must have the power to refuse all that has gone before (crucially, to refuse one's prior habits and desires), to confront an open alternative (perhaps many alternatives) not determined by anything in the past, that is, to initiate a causal series. To make one's own choices, to develop and express one's own character, and to be responsible for one's own actions, it must not only be true that one would have chosen differently at a given time if one had had different information, or had assessed differently in terms of different desires, or had developed different habits and tendencies at the time—all of which would be quite consistent with universal determinism. Beyond this conditional freedom, one must have a categorical freedom to start afresh, completely afresh. On the basis of the same information, assessments, or feelings, and given the same developed habits and tendencies, one must be able, at the moment of choice, to choose otherwise than one would normally (naturally, lawfully) have chosen. If this is to be possible, as the libertarian sees it, our power of free choice must involve some sort of break in the determination of nature and history.

III

But can this really be understood? It has not proved to be an easy task. Epicurus had to invoke a mysterious swerve of the atoms. Kant, the archetypal modern father of the view, could only understand the power to initiate events as an inexplicable, nontemporal causality of

pure reason, completely transcending the determinism of phenomenal nature and history. While William James took a different course and, rejecting determinism in any form, resolutely espoused a chancy universe in which selves could indeed act in nondetermined ways, he too left the precise how of it unclear. Other philosophers, such as Karl Popper, have drawn on the new physics of indeterminacy and have construed the self/mind as a special, nonphysical cause acting on the brain (in some still unexplained manner) so as to modify the range of its physically permissible states.[3] Recently, in the most impressive effort to date, Robert Kane has developed a naturalistic, nondualist, libertarian account which ingeniously incorporates indeterministic elements within the brainy, neurophysical processes that underlie our generating and assessing alternatives, struggling to choose, and sustaining effort in the face of obstacles.[4]

Now the attempt to fashion an adequate articulation of the libertarian insight surely needs to continue as part of the search for a fully acceptable philosophy of mind and behavior. To me, however, the most interesting question is this: Would (could) a more generally adequate explication of the libertarian intuition decisively affect the great debate on freedom? One has to doubt it. For how could such a development possibly change the firm compatibilist conviction that the libertarian intuition is itself fundamentally misguided? Current discussion would suggest that it cannot.

Consider Daniel Dennett, for example, who insists that compatibilism is able to give "the only sort of freedom worth wanting."[5] He argues that compatibilism can well justify the sense of human dignity, rooted as it is in the capacities for self-control and for initiating and taking responsibility for our intentions and actions. In response, a libertarian like Robert Kane counters that human beings aspire to a yet greater dignity, an ultimate responsibility for their purposes and actions which only incompatibilism, one involving undetermined

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[3] Karl Popper, "Of Clouds and Clocks," in *Objective Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972). See also, Arthur H. Compton, *The Freedom of Man* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935).

[4] Robert Kane, *Freedom and Values* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), and *The Significance of Free Will* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). These remarkable books have greatly influenced my thinking and have, in part, provoked the present analysis.

[5] Daniel Dennett, *Elbow Room* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984).

initiating causes, can sustain.[6] But it seems clear that on a Dennettesque view one will claim either to justify every bit as important, even ultimate, a sense of human responsibility in a compatibilist way as Kane might wish on his, or else that ultimate responsibility has been defined in an unreasonable way and the question simply begged. Each player will continue to defend his preferred intuition—which, unsurprisingly, coincides with his conviction about the freedom that is worth wanting. Both of the conflicting intuitions seem so compelling, indeed, that some other philosophers—John Searle, for instance—just confess that we cannot give up either one and that the problem remains as insoluble as ever.[7]

The impasse seems complete. Given the compatibilist's intuition, the possible existence of breaks in causal determinism is strictly beside the point. The compatibilist agrees that freedom and responsibility depend upon a person's being the initiating cause of his choices and actions. Yet, he argues, this does not require that there are no further causes in turn, both in the remoter past and, internally, in the process of choice. For the compatibilist the issue is not whether one's choices are causally determined as such, but rather how they are caused—whether or not they are caused by the person's own (normal and informed) processes of thoughtful assessment (or would have been, had time and occasion permitted) and, thus, whether or not they express (in some significant manner) the person's own developed character and values. On this view, what freedom requires is personal authorship of choice and action, identification with them. This is the requisite sense of a person's being their initiating cause. If there are natural and historical contingencies, or if there are undetermined elements in the processes of deliberation and choice, as perhaps there are, so be it. The existence of freedom need in no way be affected, although a choice which is largely the outcome of such factors would risk being no choice at all. The point is that whatever the chancy factors may be, whether one's choice is a free one depends en-

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[6] Kane, *Significance*, chaps. 5 and 6. Toward the close of this discussion, Kane anticipates the inevitability of the dialectic I am concerned about.

[7] John Searle, *Minds, Brains, and Science* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), chap. 6. Recently, Searle has concluded that the solution lies in pursuing the notion of a distinctive causality in human action that does not manifest causally sufficient conditions over time (*Rationality in Action* [Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001], chap. 9). Later in this essay, I suggest a similar view of human temporality in action.

tirely upon whether and how one (causally) affects these factors and makes them one's own.

The libertarian, of course, objects that this compatibilist intuition, in its turn, is misguided: So long as the human agent is simply a part of the chain of causes and effects, the agent cannot in the full and proper sense, be the initiating cause of his choices and actions. One's choices and actions cannot fully be one's own if one does not, in some respect or other, confront real (and rationally compelling) alternatives that require, in the process of choice and action, that one initiate a new causal sequence, with the result that one's choice has no further explanation beyond itself. Apart from this, one simply transmits effects. One does not choose or act at all; one undergoes. As a libertarian sees it, no matter how information is processed or one's desires are modified, unless a person has the power to evolve and incorporate fresh alternatives, to invent fresh values, at the limit to resist all of the natural and historical tendencies up to the moment of choice, a person is not fully the author of his actions.

It seems that, in this way, our partisans legitimately can and indeed must remain faithful to their respective insights, and that the dispute between them is doomed to continue unabated.

IV

Is there any way to move beyond this stalemate? I deeply hope so. If we are to find it, though, I believe we will need to begin by thinking our way back into its historical genesis. We have to meditate on the fact that the philosophical problem of freedom and determinism, as we now know it, did not arise within the Aristotelian worldview, but only after this metaphysical framework was displaced. No doubt this was in good measure because Aristotle understood natural laws to operate only generally and for the most part. The issue of universal causal determinism was not forced upon him. More important, however, was his understanding of causality itself, which he saw, not primarily as a power exerted from without, but one located within individual beings acting.

To be sure, for Aristotle beings are conditioned in their acting by certain factors (including chance factors)—by particular materials and processes within and by the actions of other beings from

without—but never simply or directly so. Through their own self-activity, as they realize their own forms and ends, individual beings respond to these other factors in a time, place, and manner appropriate to being the sort of individual beings they are—and so, of course, do human beings.

In such a world, it is quite proper for a human being to deliberate, choose, and act under normal circumstances, without any fear of external or internal compulsion or control, and with the sense that his choices are self-initiated. A person's choices are seen to be conditioned by various factors in the external situation and within the person's process of choice itself—by the interplay of reason and desire, as Aristotle would have said. Yet precisely because these are factors within the person's acting as a whole, as an individual being, these choices would ultimately be understood to be determined by that person. Any rational choice (unless clearly compelled by someone else or done in ignorance) would be a free choice, up to the agent, properly caused, authored, and owned by him.

This entire framework becomes changed after the seventeenth century. The problem of freedom, in the modern sense, arose when we began to construe the natural world (and later, human history) in terms which flatten out the varied natures of beings, times, and causal conditions which Aristotle recognized, terms which abandon his view of causation as a process through which beings actualize themselves by appropriating varied conditions and responding to them. Taught by Hobbes, Hume, and Kant, we began to envision the natural world (and later, human history) as a system of interacting, typically microphysical entities, within a unitary and homogeneous time-space, in which causation means the lawful determination of factors in the state of such a system at one time by factors in a preceding state—simply a uniform, linear relation among events. On this sort of metaphysics, it now seems clear, the kind of dialectic we have been discussing between the compatibilist and the libertarian virtually has to arise.

For, barring Kant's extraordinary appeal to a view of causation which transcends the natural world, and holding that human choices are natural events like any others, one has only two alternatives: These choices are either themselves caused or they are not. If they are, one can still affirm that however one's choices are more ultimately caused, one has, precisely within one's normal (and causally

determined) rational processes, the crucial proximate causes of those choices and, thus, that one has initiated them and is responsible for them in a crucially important sense (if not in every sense). This is the compatibilist position.

But, of course, as we saw, it is essentially unstable. In the new dispensation, proximate causes are not absolutely initiating causes; they are only transitional causes. Despite protestations, with the disappearance of any tenable notion of a being (a self) acting as a whole to make these conditioning causes his own, thus bringing the quest for a cause to an end, the compatibilist is caught trying to maintain the Aristotelian notion of self-causation without the conceptual resources to back it up. This is what Kant saw so clearly and saw to be a miserable subterfuge, and it is what motivates the libertarian alternative.

Libertarians, it turns out, are in no better shape. Again, barring Kant's own solution, libertarians must affirm some more ultimate initiating cause, also within the natural process of choice. This can only be interpreted, however, as occurring thanks to some sort of break in causal determinism which libertarians are not in a position to describe as an act of the self as a whole either. Such an initiating is necessarily a (partially) random one, a sportive internal event in the process of choice or action—what James called chance and those using the new physics an indeterminate quantum event. It has to depend for its relevance and effectiveness, for its being mine, upon other processes in the agent, virtually requiring to be saved by compatibilist considerations! It cannot constitute a genuine action of the agent either. Thus, the libertarian position is unstable too.

V

If this reflection rings true, it suggests the possibility that it is the framework concepts in our current metaphysics that are used to develop both the compatibilist and libertarian intuitions, and not necessarily the intuitions themselves, which force the impasse between them. As we might have supposed, the most fundamental issues of being, cause, temporality, and action are at stake. It is worth exploring the possibility that something resembling the earlier Aristotelian understanding of these matters might validly be restored.

Both of our conflicting intuitions seem to draw upon a common, underlying quasi-Aristotelian principle: As we saw, both the compatibilist and libertarian hold that a person is fully free only insofar as he can, in some fundamental sense, be taken to be the initiator of what he does. In Aristotelian terms: He is free only if, through the exercise of his cognitive and affective powers, he chooses and acts as a self-causing and self-actualizing agent. The language of causal determinism in the modern sense makes it virtually impossible to express this common content, however. We no longer understand self or agent causation.[8] Instead, in order to account for freedom, we are asked to decide between a view that places some causally undetermined event or process somewhere within the self and one that refuses to do so. All the while, this is not the real issue.

The real issue for freedom is to understand what constitutes an individual, personal self—what developed capacities a person needs to have, and how a person has to learn, think, and act in interplay with the things and other persons that situate him, in order for us to consider that person a personal self. How does the psycho-physical organism that one is construct and actualize itself as a self developing over time, expressing and critically shaping its distinctive, identity-constituting values as it goes? How much coherence is possible or desirable? How do varying cultural expectations and the ways we talk about ourselves, together with given biological capacities, affect the formation (the shape and the content) of the self? How are personal selves nourished and endangered, how do they succeed and fail, how do we know about them and deceive ourselves about them too?

If we could make headway in understanding the personal self in such respects, we might then be able to understand how a person can both be part of a universal microcausal process, understood in the modern sense, and also be self-causing in something like Aristotle's sense—an initiating cause of its own choices and actions. We might

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[8] Roderick Chisholm sought valiantly to restore this concept, but he could not convince his readers that its meaning was either clear in itself or consistent with the need to be able to apply to our actions, or their subtending conditions, the more common concept of Humean or transeunt causation as well. See Roderick Chisholm, *Person and Object* (Lasalle, Ill.: Open Court Press, 1976). In the account that follows, I essentially take Chisholm's view, but try to elucidate the manner in which personal agents may be said to cause their own actions without appealing to "agent-causation" as a special concept.

then see how to bring both the libertarian and compatibilist intuitions about freedom together.

VI

Of course, this is an immense order, needing long-term, elaborate, and self-critical philosophical and scientific development. From the very shape of the issue as we have construed it, however, certain prolegomena do seem to follow. In this spirit, let me describe some characteristic features which appear to be bound up with our shared experience of personal agency and which would be required for us to consider a person to be a personal self, a self-causing, self-actualizing agent, for whom some comprehensively adequate account of human freedom might be developed.

1. *A person becomes a personal self insofar as he comes to be an independent and integral individual in action.* Human beings are first psycho-physical organisms, and the human self is an embodied self in the midst of other bodily beings. To be a personal self, though, it must come to be able to act as a whole, expressing its individuating goals and values. To be such a self, acting out of itself as a whole, a personal self must be so organized internally, and so distinct from the other beings around it, that influences upon it from without do not (normally) elicit responses in a merely reactive way, a way which simply transmits the effects of those external influences without significantly affecting the outcome. This requirement of independence as an organized individual is critical for any notion of self-causation and, hence, for freedom.

Reflex response, for example, is not a response to external stimuli by a personal self functioning as an organized individual under normal circumstances—although reflexes are, indeed, highly useful mechanisms of behavior, embedded within the individual by nature or culture, and available to elicit responses under special (perhaps immediately threatening) conditions. Insofar as causality may be understood simply to be a linear relationship among factors in events, unaffected by the individuality of the beings involved, it is necessary to say that a person acting out of himself, as a self, is not involved in causal relations with its environment! This is true, even though, at the same time, it may be that this linear model applies under special

circumstances—those consisting of part-reactions between selected external factors and certain of the individual person's (relatively) isolated subsystems—just the sort of circumstances, for example, under which behavior is studied and reflexes are elicited in the laboratory. One is not acting as a personal self to the extent that physical (or for that matter, social) causalities outside the self directly dominate what he does.

Similarly, acting as a personal self requires that isolated, internal causalities not dominate what one does either. Particular mental and physical conditions within an individual do not, in normal circumstances, elicit merely reactive, unmediated responses, but are processed through and express the developed values of the whole person. Without this integral response, instead of the actions of a self, we would have a sort of pathology—a fracturing of true action in which relatively independent mechanisms within the embodied self are called into play.

The normally functioning personal self, on the other hand, should be thought of as a psycho-physical whole, a (largely if never completely) unified process of activity, all of whose subprocesses modify one another in some measure—one in which all mental and physical states are interconnected, all mental states in some measure physically embodied, and all bodily states in some measure psychically significant and expressive. Thus, whatever physical or mental occurrences take place in one region of an embodied self would be expected to have resonances in, and would themselves be informed by, what takes place elsewhere. The values that come to constitute a personal self will be expressed in every word and gesture, and will in turn be modified by them.

2. *A person constitutes himself as a personal self in interplay with other beings.* The independence and individuality of the embodied self is a relational achievement, a precarious acquisition over time, not an absolute possession. There is necessarily a reciprocal interweaving between self and world. In this way, to be a personal self, to be an independent and integral individual self, is precisely not to be something in itself, fixed and changeless. Instead, as Heidegger shows, it is to be in concerned relations with other selves and other things. When we experience ourselves as embodied selves, as self-causing, personal beings among other beings, we neither experience ourselves as mere passive resultants of external activity upon us—al-

though there is crucially a passivity in everything we do—nor as sheerly autonomous in our own activity with things—although there is an activity in everything we undergo as well. We experience ourselves, to use Merleau-Ponty's term, as "field beings," as constantly bringing out of our interplay with everything around us an individual and distinctive set of commitments, our personal way of orienting to the world.

We can see the personal self, then, as a structured constellation of thus far developed ways of dealing with other people and with things. It is rooted in given biological tendencies and capacities, further structured through linguistic and other cultural forms of interpretation, and instituted—through responses to situation after situation and through the stories we tell about ourselves—into a range of habits and skills, of formative beliefs and desires, of commitments and hopes and fears, all expressing some not-well-defined, but recognizable, individual style of thought and action. In short, one's personal self is not a thing, but a kind of evolving normative reality, a complex set of operative values, not necessarily explicit and certainly not finished, an individual character or personality out of which one encounters and responds to things.

Specific choices and actions take their significance from this context of developing self-constitution. We may be able to make sense of the typical compatibilist-libertarian debate in terms of it as well. For the intuitions of both parties have to be saved in some way: A choice (or action) is ours, one we have ourselves initiated in the proper sense, only if we confront real alternatives and, thus, as the libertarian urges, only if we bring into being something genuinely new. Yet it is also ours, as the compatibilist insists, only if this choice (action) is not simply a matter of chance, not arbitrary, but actually expresses who we are. We can see how both of these requirements hold if we reflect upon our experience of the process by which the self changes and grows in interplay with events. In this process, as one's individual character and personal style evolve, it turns out that both libertarian novelty and compatibilist continuity are essentially present.

Imagine a certain executive who has developed a strong need to achieve, to be seen as first in everything. If he confronts a situation in which he cannot satisfy this desire without hurting someone he loves, he will, explicitly or not, make a choice as to what to do. There are many ways to respond. He might ride roughshod over his friend, thus

reinforcing his ambition and redefining his friendship; on the other hand, he might redefine his ambition and newly enhance his friendship; or he might avoid confrontation entirely, thus defining another feature of his personal style. The possibilities are legion, but as Sartre might say, nothing can conclusively tell him what to do or what he will do. Even should he be totally clear in his resolve, he might fail to follow through.

The libertarian is partially right here: Motives and reasons are always at hand, but they are in the past, they do nothing. They incline, but they do not compel. They conflict, they must be selectively taken up and given the power that they will have through the present choice the executive makes. He does confront real alternative possibilities; he must invent; his actual choice will make a difference. It will make a difference in what he does and who he is.

But the compatibilist is partially right too: No choice is unmotivated. The executive must take account of the values and commitments he has thus far developed; they orient his encounter with the situation and define the issues. He cannot abandon one motivating factor without drawing upon another. No matter what he chooses (and does), what he will have done is to define further those commitments and values in some way, refining some, modifying others, perhaps significantly altering or negating still others. The likelihood is very great that what he chooses to do will still be recognizably his choice, a choice in character. This is just the way one's orientation to the world evolves—by expressing antecedent, thus far developed possibilities, perhaps ones not hitherto prominent, yet always expressing them in new ways. We do change, but we do not, without long preparation, become persons very different from those we have been.

3. Thus, *a personal self inhabits time in a distinctive way.* This is perhaps the most fundamental condition under which a personal self can be a personal self: Not only must one be an integral individual in one's way of being independent of, yet necessarily in interplay with, other beings around one, but one must also be independent of one's past (and future), and yet necessarily in interplay with it (them). There must be a thickness in the temporality of a self. A self must bind time in such a way that both past and future are really related in it. This, as we just saw, is what the growth of one's distinctive character as a self involves—a temporal process in which, through one's present choices (and actions), one becomes oneself by rooting

oneself in an accomplished but still effective past and projecting oneself toward a possible but realizable future. To be an individual self is necessarily to be temporal (as well as embodied), but a self is not simply carried along by time; it constitutes its time. It must actively live its time, it must temporalize itself. It is its temporality.

Aristotle understood this, but early modern philosophy, pursuing its mathematizing vision of things, repressed it, with predictable consequences. The antinomy of freedom depends, as Kant saw, upon a view of time which separates it from its variable contents (from the activities of particular, existing beings), deprives it of real thickness, and dissolves it into a series of externally related moments. On this view, actions become simply momentary events in time and initiating has either to be seen as taking place at a moment, through a break in the temporal order, or not at all.

Another alternative now seems more plausible: We could recognize the fact that, however useful the mathematical analysis of linear, momentary time may be, and however well it may fit the behavior of certain carefully circumscribed physical systems (where, of course, it is also limited), it is a severe abstraction from the way in which organized beings, and centrally human selves, actually exist through time. To the extent that they are organized individuals in active interplay with their environments over time, beings exist in the whole of their time. An individual being's past, as well as its future, are inseparable from, while being transformed in, its present activity. Because this is so for human beings, the causally effective meaning of what we have been and done—as well as what we will be and do—is, in this way, in some measure, always within our present control. This is what being a self-causing, self-actualizing, personal self ultimately requires.[9]

The idea that human beings—even most, and perhaps all beings—temporalize themselves in this integral way has been a theme of much of contemporary metaphysics, in Bergson, Whitehead, Dewey, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. On this view, humanly experienced temporality is a clue to temporality in general. On this view, individual beings, of whatever stripe, do not just last in time as in some container. They do not merely stay or persist. Instead, they are to be seen as historical

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[9] For an account of what this might mean for the sciences of human behavior, see my "Human Science, Human Action, and Human Nature," *Tulane Studies in Philosophy: Studies in Action Theory* 28 (1979): 39–61.

activities, constantly at work reconstituting themselves in and through time. Temporality exists only in and through this field of interactive, historical individuals. These individuals exist only as they enact themselves in time, taking up their past while projecting their futures.

In this way, each individual being is seen to be under a kind of necessity—it must take up unfinished projects from its past; and it has a kind of freedom—it must transform them, at least in some way, however modestly, as it projects itself, in each fresh situation, toward future possibilities. As such, because of the very way individual beings are in time, causal necessity is contingent and, somewhat as Hume insisted, the lawfulness of beings is seen to be (simply) a matter of their persistent, empirical habits of activity. Their behavior, even when regular and reliable, is always going to be variable to some extent.

Now I do not presume that this metaphysical standpoint is uncontroversial; it faces difficulties of its own. Yet if it is as promising as it seems to be, then the problem of understanding the meaning of necessity and freedom in human life would fall nicely into place: Beings vary in their natures. Some, such as human beings, tend to have a much greater range of activity, of past projects and future possibilities, and have capacities for much more sensitive assessments and creative responses to their situations than do others. Human beings bind time more flexibly. They achieve far greater variety and individuality in their self-constitution than do maple trees or monkeys. In an obvious sense, human beings are freer than they (and freer to fail as well), and among human beings, freedom will also vary in character and extent. There are, in short, degrees and manners of freedom characteristic of differing beings and their differing circumstances.

From this perspective, then, freedom requires that determination in general be understood differently—as dependent for its behavioral import on the way individual beings take up the implications of their past and, in light of their present, situated projects, render those implications effective. Every being is subject to its past in this way. Human beings only differ from others in carrying out this process in an especially self-conscious, socially responsive, and innovative manner. The notion that human beings must be thought to be radically different from other beings, to transcend the natural world in some sense, or that freely initiated human choices require a moment in time in

which there is a break in natural determination would, on this understanding of things, be as unnecessary as it is impossible.

VII

There are, nonetheless, various ways in which human choices, as well as the careers of other beings, are affected that seem properly to be said to be undetermined. With our (all too brief) reflection on personal selfhood in mind, however, I believe we may now be able to assess the role, for human freedom, of the inclusion of such factors among the determinants of choice (or action). Many physical and biological processes involve indeterminate, statistically determinate, or chaotic factors. A number of scientists and philosophers have conjectured that some such processes—for example, statistically unlikely quantum events, possibly amplified by chaotic effects within the network of the nervous system—might function to make possible certain novelties in choice or action at the level of conscious, active life. Libertarians, of course, have hoped to make use of this possibility. It does seem that, as our understanding in the neurosciences grows, one might find such processes useful in explaining how an agent comes up with fresh associations of ideas, is suddenly struck by the force of an argument, shifts attention from one thing to another, imagines entirely new options for action, resolves a seemingly unresolvable conflict of values, exerts or sustains (or fails to sustain) an unexpected effort to attain a goal.[10]

At the same time, we should be clear about the limits of this sort of consideration. The compatibilist insight must have its relevance too: From the standpoint of freedom, any mental contents generated in this chancy way have exactly the same status as those generated in more predictable and lawful ways. If they are to play any role in a person's experience and action, they must be further processed so as to allow the person to make them his own. A new association or line of reasoning, an item freshly attended to, a new option entertained, a resolution of conflicting, incommensurable values, or a surprising burst of energy, all have to acquire a determinate meaning. This can happen

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[10] As I noted earlier, Robert Kane makes very suggestive use of such indeterminist mechanisms in the brain in his naturalistic account of libertarian freedom.

only as they are further interpreted and, as one might put it, incorporated, by the agent. Such novelties must be evaluated in terms of the individual's developing self-understanding, his situation, abilities, and skills. They present conditions which must be taken up in freedom, they are problems or data for freedom, but they cannot be said to define freedom.

Human freedom, as we have had to insist, is not a matter of the occurrence or absence in us of some special sort of event; thinking of it in this way forces just the impasse we have sought to avoid. Rather, freedom is the way in which, as integral, individual beings, we live through and enact our temporality as such. It is found in the integral time of experience and action, in the interplay among factors which are given from the past (from our prior commitments and values), assessed in our presently perceived situation, and projected in our future possibilities, an interplay out of which we develop, refine, and redefine who we are. Freedom is not an occasional visitation, but a constitutive reality for us. It is a kind of space for this interplay, a distance or hollow within our space and time, from which we can take perspective on our space and time without being simply caught up in them, and which permits us to respond with sensitivity and care.

Somehow a remarkable complex of mental/physical processes (as well, of course, as some remarkable social and educational practices) makes all this possible, and it will be a long time, if ever, before we understand how this is so. We must be open to the combined philosophical, neurological, psychological, and sociological inquiry which will tell us how this comes about. It may well be that certain neural novelty generators, such as those we have mentioned, will turn out to be conditions without which individuals would not possess the cognitive and affective powers needed for the self-temporalizing interplay that is human freedom. Moreover, a better understanding of these unusual processes might enable us to explain how some persons can be enormously more creative and resourceful than others in exercising these powers and, thus, in realizing their freedom. This would constitute a remarkable advance, but it would not give the libertarian any more comfort than the compatibilist; for what we would have, if we got it, would be a lawful connection between the existence of such processes (and many others, more predictable, with them) and our possessing these powers, an outcome perfectly conformable to the compatibilist's as well as the libertarian's expectations.

We have to recognize that, whatever form it takes, this sort of microexplanation cannot, by itself, constitute an understanding of freedom, for it is the experience of freedom in choice and action that guides the very search for this sort of microexplanation and makes it understandable. My argument in this essay has been that, if we get our intuitions clear—if we can, as I have suggested, bring together the insights of both compatibilists and libertarians—then, however the further elaboration of conditions of possibility turns out, if we have remained faithful to the experience of freedom, we will not have a victory for one or the other, but a more comprehensive and comprehensible outcome than we could have expected from either standpoint by itself.

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SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

ELIZABETH C. SHAW AND STAFF

ABBEY, Ruth. *Nietzsche's Middle Period.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. xvii + 208 pp. Cloth, $45.00—This book is a well researched, topically organized, nine-chapter synopsis of Nietzsche's works from 1878 to 1882, including *Human, All Too Human, Assorted Opinions and Maxims, The Wanderer and His Shadow, Daybreak,* and parts 1–4 of *The Gay Science.* This group of aphoristic texts is arguably the least appreciated, the least understood, and the least read portion of the Nietzsche corpus. Abbey's aim is to defend the distinctiveness, as well as the "superior worth," of this neglected phase of Nietzsche's development, and thereby to take the first steps toward a "genealogical inquiry" into the "choices Nietzsche made across the course of his writing career" (p. 156). Abbey initiates this inquiry in a spirit of competent cross-examination. Her approach is logical, her Nietzsche liberal in outlook.

In the middle period texts we see Nietzsche in the process of becoming a genealogist of morals (p. xiii). However we see him achieving this through an "apprenticeship" (p. 3 and following) with figures he later repudiates: Socrates, Voltaire, and Fontenelle. Eventually, Nietzsche will develop a case of "the anxiety of influence" (p. 199) about these and all other mentors, and "invent" the idea of *his* invention of a new philosophy (p. 141 and following), with no small loss to the quality of his thinking. For the distinctiveness of this "other," middle Nietzsche is not a matter of themes or opinions found only here, but rather of an openness, a complexity, and hence a "temper" Abbey calls more interesting and valuable than that of the familiar Nietzsche (p. 19).

In contrast to the attitude expressed in later books such as *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and *Ecce Homo,* the middle Nietzsche works with rather than against tradition (p. 143 and following). The middle writings assign less importance to the distinction between noble and base which signifies greater benevolence in their author than we find later on (p. 19). Nietzsche's treatment of gender identity is accordingly less "essentialist" than it eventually becomes (p. 108 and following). The middle Nietzsche is also less reductionist (p. 18), more committed to a scientific and Enlightenment perspective (p. 87 and following), and is a

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*Books received are acknowledged in this section by a brief resume, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgement does not preclude a more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. From time to time, technical books dealing with such fields as mathematics, physics, anthropology, and the social sciences will be reviewed

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believer in truth (p. 8). He is more self-critical (less sure of himself), more open to surprise, to the genetic, the artificial, and the contingent (p. xv), more interested in friendship and dialogue (p. 73 and following), and less condemning of marriage (p. 123 and following) than the later Nietzsche. He is also critical of the vanity he himself later displays, and champions a moderation missing in later works (p. 52). Finally, the middle Nietzsche focuses on self-preservation, rather than power, as the driving motive behind morality (p. 15).

I profited from Abbey's synthesis of themes in the middle writings and since I have spent more time with Nietzsche's later works, I value the correction she seeks in Nietzsche scholarship. My favorite chapters—"Equal Among Firsts" and "We Children of the Enlightenment"—concern friendship and science. The friendship chapter exhibits Nietzsche's genuine insight on this classical theme, and it is strengthened by its use of his letters.

However, throughout her analyses Abbey tries to discern a morality in Nietzsche rather than a philosophy of morals. She prefers the works of the middle period because here "Nietzsche's psychological inquiries are less encumbered by such grand themes" as the master/slave schema (pp. xvi–xv). Abbey has two objections to this schema. Casting some people in the slave role is offensive. Yet worse is the loss of "complexity and mobility" in the picture of the psyche, and of the "art of nuance" in interpretation, as soon as Nietzsche places his moral research in the service of a metaphysics (p. xv). This is why Abbey calls the master/slave theme a "reductionist" binary opposition (p. 18). For Abbey, the problem with the later Nietzsche is his return to philosophy.

What if a philosophy does lurk at the edges of Nietzsche's bright assertions in the middle period? What if the aphoristic works are intended as an apprenticeship not just for Nietzsche, but also for readers? What if Nietzsche uses aphorism to focus attention not on assertions of value, but on the "value" of values? Would this explain why the Shadow, speaking to the Wanderer, says readers "will recognize in [our conversation] only your opinions: no one will think of the shadow"?

Focusing on assertions of position also fortifies Abbey's impression that the later Nietzsche repudiates positions taken in the past, including his own. However, there is no simple opposition to tradition, nor to his own earlier writings, in Nietzsche's mature work. Such opposition would be reactive. That is why Zarathustra in "The Three Metamorphoses" looks beyond the Lion's rejection of inherited burdens, extolling instead the Child who can play with old things as if they were new, and why he later summons listeners to "redemption" from resentment about the past.

The real "binary opposition" that rules Abbey's Nietzsche is: He must either engage tradition by avoiding philosophy in his middle period, or he must pursue philosophy by avoiding tradition in the later.—William Rowe, *The University of Scranton.*

BENARDETE, Seth. *The Argument of the Action. Essays on Greek Poetry and Philosophy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. xxi + 434 pp. Cloth, $39.95—*The Argument of the Action* is a collection of essays by Seth Benardete on Greek poetry and philosophy selected and introduced by Ronna Burger and Michael Davis. We must be grateful to the editors for making these remarkable essays available to readers once again. The collection encompasses the greater part of the most significant authors of Greek antiquity: Homer and Hesiod, the tragedians, and Plato and Aristotle. Each essay opens up the work under consideration and illuminates its essential concerns in such a new and yet convincing way that the reader is forced to experience simultaneously a shock of surprise and a sense of recognition. In interpreting these works, Benardete never repeats himself, never foists an alien schema upon the text, and never merely rests upon the laurels of an insight previously won. Yet, and this is one of the most admirable aspects of the book, despite the range of their topics and the individuality of each interpretation, the essays exhibit a rare unity of intellectual purpose. They constitute an exploration of a single terrain of reflection which includes, on the one hand, the character and meaning of Socrates' "turn to the speeches" or his "second sailing" and, on the other, the setting and preconditions of that turn displayed in the works of the Greek poets.

Benardete understands Socrates' turn to be the genuine discovery of philosophy (p. 408) that is, nevertheless, essentially consequent to the "historical" beginning of philosophy. Thought, he argues, necessarily begins with a false articulation of the question which is nonetheless that without which its true articulation would prove impossible. According to Benardete's analysis, this is a consequence of the "mutual interference" of the double starting point of philosophy: reflection on the nature of the beings, on the one hand, and on the nature of the good, on the other (p. 411). For the attempt to reveal the being as a part works at cross-purposes with the attempt to comprehend the whole of which it is a part. As a consequence we conceive as separate what can only be understood as together—a one is taken for a two—or as one and the same what is in fact irreducibly different—a two is taken for a one. Socratic dialectics (collection and division in speech), as Benardete understands it, constitutes the way to overcoming both the false unities and the false divisions of opinion in an ascent to the truth of the whole.

According to Benardete's interpretation of Socrates' own account of his discovery of this way (pp. 287–93), Socrates came to understand that all "presocratic" causal analyses of becoming are in fact versions of the erroneous starting point of opinion. Such analyses understand the togetherness of parts in a whole to be the result of a process of aggregation that is modeled on the operations of counting as commonly understood (p. 287). In the light of this realization, Socrates saw that the problems inherent in the attempt to understand the coming-to-be of two from the addition or division of ones pose insuperable difficulties for all causal accounts, since opposite causes must be supposed to produce one and the same effect and the same cause opposite effects (pp. 286–7). When he found this same problem, however, embedded in the relation between the teleological and efficient causation that lies at the

heart of the Anaxagorean account of mind as cause (p. 290), he realized that causal accounts as such are unintelligible or merely "mythological," that is, they treat as separate—or as an aggregate—what can only be understood as essentially together or, as Benardete has it, they understand a "disjunctive two" in terms of a "conjunctive two" (p. 289; compare p. 316).

Socrates, therefore, came to see that not only the togetherness of things, but their separation as well can be understood only as operations of mind, not as final or efficient cause but as at work in the speeches. Thus he was compelled to, in Benardete words, "jump to logos away from fact" or "the things" (p. 288). He turned from a causal analysis to what Benardete calls an "eidetic analysis" (p. 371). Ceasing to attempt to account for *how* two are together, he sought instead to demonstrate *that* they cannot be what they are apart from their being together (p. 296). Yet Socrates' new way incorporates the error of the old within it: the conjunctive two is retained not as a mode of directly understanding the beings, but as an event within the speeches, namely, the starting point of dialectics in the ideality of opinion which the argument of the action of dialectics cancels or overcomes (pp. 286, 320, 329, 346–7, 372).

Benardete shows how, in the works of Plato, this "mythological" starting point is dictated by the dialogic situation. Socrates is paired with a particular interlocutor whose limited perspective conditions and partially determines the character of the speeches. The erotic aspect of Socrates' philosophy—his coupling in speech with another—therefore insures that the arguments of Plato's dialogues are always together with a particular set of conditions apart from which they cannot be understood. At the same time, the understanding of the truth of those arguments equally requires that one tease apart the argument from the distorting influence exercised by these same conditions. This separating of the speeches from their conditions, however, is the "dialogic equivalent" or the truth of the separation of soul and body: the "practice of dying and being dead." When these two partial aspects of Socrates' philosophizing are put together they amount to the "double practice . . . of collection and division . . . whose single name is dialectic" (p. 167). The togetherness of Socratic *dialectike* and *dialegesthai* (p. 350) means that Socrates' starting point is the political opinions of his interlocutors or the "idealism" of the city and that the initial assumption of the apartness of the beings is a function of the false political understanding of the good: its reduction to the just or the beautiful. Socrates' turn to the speeches, therefore, is also the discovery of political philosophy (p. 413).

That Benardete's work is devoted not simply to Socratic philosophy, but also to an analysis of the works of the Greek poets that preceded Socrates is explained in part by his conviction that the poets, long before Socrates' revolution in thought, had undertaken similar inquiries—the tragic poets in formulating the nature of the city (p. 215) and Homer and Hesiod in their recognition of the relation of argument and action (p. 416). Hesiod, Benardete remarks, knew as well as Socrates that no direct access to the beings is possible, but that "the recovery of the beings is through the meaning of the beings" (p. 11). Socrates' discovery of political philosophy is, therefore, in fact a rediscovery (p. 415). Benar-

dete's remarkable insight in this regard is that philosophy as such cannot have a perfectly original starting point, but is always and necessarily the recovery of a prior possibility.

In the two final essays of the volume, Benardete acknowledges his debt to Leo Strauss whom he understands to be the first to have succeeded in recovering political philosophy since the similar and comparably momentous efforts of al-Farabi in the tenth century. In doing so he identifies his own work as an extension of the renewal of political philosophy that the thought of Strauss represents. Benardete's accomplishment in this regard is extraordinary. His interpretations of the Greek tragedies, the poems of Homer and Hesiod and, above all, the dialogues of Plato, while proceeding on the basis of Strauss's own principles, illuminate in unprecedented ways the central concern of Platonic political philosophy as both Strauss and Benardete understand it: "to articulate the problem of cosmology" in answering "the question what philosophy is or what a philosopher is" (p. 416).—Steven Berg, *Bellarmine University.*

BENCIVENGA, Ermanno. *Hegel's Dialectical Logic.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. vi + 143 pp. Cloth, $32.00—In this compact, well written essay Professor Bencivenga (University of California, Irvine) goes to great lengths to make Hegel both intelligible and plausible to a skeptical Anglo-American reader. For the most part he succeeds. First Bencivenga contrasts Aristotelian "analytic" with Hegelian "dialectical" logic (alas largely ignoring the "genuinely speculative" thinking Hegel found in *de Anima* and the *Metaphysics*). Next he demystifies Hegel's idiosyncratic use of terms such as "concept" (not exclusively mental), "sublation," "absolute" (its focal meaning has much to do with "absolved," becoming disencumbered of such things as the quantitative infinite), "truth," "necessity" (best appreciated along the lines of a retrospective insight into the logical flow of a narrative or personal life story), "spirit," and "eternity" (a logical succession of events culminating in synchronicity, in an overarching "now"). In what is perhaps his exegetical capstone the author then leads his reader by the hand from a commonplace intuition of "the wholeness of things" to absolute idealism's conviction that all reality is a coherent and closely knit unity.

Chapter 4 seeks to deflate Hegel's grandiose-seeming claims regarding "the end of history." Bencivenga at once undergirds the rationality of history by utilizing the notion of standing in an "imminent future" while looking back, and underscores Hegel's insistence upon the "momentous" power of contingency. Finally, the author tries to save Hegelian dialectical logic by "localizing" it—a move unlikely to sit well with most Hegel scholars. In order to avoid being stifled within Hegel's totalistic system, Bencivenga urges, we must do such allegedly un-Hegelian things as abstract, decontextualize, sever, and play, for "such is the freedom that matters" (p. 109). I think not. All animals, not just we, do all

that ongoingly. They are legitimate "moments" of the empirically real which, as Hegel was well aware, we must acknowledge and on occasion transcend if we are to experience the distinctively human freedom of which we are capable.

Bencivenga brings to his study of Hegel a touch (fortunately light) of deconstructionism, perhaps best exemplified by the following observation: "in philosophy problems are not solved but *appreciated*: embedded in a finer, subtler understanding of the human condition. As logic proceeds to take over all substantive disciplines, we begin to realize that in Hegel's perspective the perpetual search for the semantics of terms which logic has turned out to be—the following of semantic developments through innumerable twists and turns [an etymological meaning of the German word for 'necessary' (*notwendig*), the author might have noted], beyond countless sublations—coincides with science itself" (p. 42). What emerges at the end of this intriguing comment is a sense of the term (and concept of) "science" which, while entirely in keeping with Hegel's understanding of that architectonic discipline, should be at the very least intelligible to us as well. Science is indeed as ubiquitous in the human world as is spirit, Hegelianly conceived. Neither has any business being compartmentalized, and subject as both are to the vicissitudes of human experience, the one is as recurrently errant and misshapen as the other.

An additional virtue of this succinct treatise is the author's occasional invocation of the etymology of Hegel's more difficult terms (already indicated with respect to "absolute"). This too helps to demystify Hegel's thought, and facilitates crossing linguistic boundaries (more apparent than real) not only between German and English specifically but between classical and modern languages in general. On the other hand, Professor Bencivenga writes so clearly and effectively that one wishes he had attempted his own translations instead of quoting from standard English renditions (in particular A. V. Miller's clumsy and opaque versions) of Hegel's work.—Peter Fuss, *University of Missouri-Saint Louis.*

BRAGUE, Rémi. *La sagesse du monde. Histoire de l'expérience humaine de l'univers.* Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1999. 333 pp. n. p.—If modern natural science were to be our guide, the truth of cosmology ought to be fully expressible in the abstruse but concise language of mathematics. As an account of the genesis of the universe as a whole and in its every part, however, a truly completed cosmology would culminate in an understanding of its own coming to be, and thereby provide both a recapitulation of the many past attempts human beings have made to understand themselves and their place, and an explanation of the genesis of that which is true *and* false in each such attempt. For this and for other reasons one might well doubt whether a genuinely comprehensive cosmogenesis is possible for us, to say nothing of one set forth in exclusively mathematical terms. It seems fair to say, in any case, that that

part of a conjectural history of the universe devoted to "the history of the human experience of the universe" would easily dwarf all of its other parts in size, and not only in size.

One might, therefore, be inclined to construe the title of the present volume as a preposterous boast, were it not for the author's ready admission, in his "Avant-propos," of the laughable disproportion between his own historical, linguistic, and analytical abilities and the magnitude of the task he sets for himself (pp. 7–8). Further proof of Brague's amicable sobriety is to be seen in the deference he subsequently pays to the famed English cosmologist P. G. Wodehouse (p. 223). Even so, the range of texts discussed in *La sagesse du monde* is nothing short of astonishing. It would appear that its author has considered, in their original languages, most if not all of the principal premodern texts directly relevant to his theme written in Hebrew, Greek, Latin, and Arabic. Although Brague has little to say about the universe as conceived by mathematical physics, he does provide a concise yet still remarkably wide-ranging summary of the modern literary history of the cosmos, in which he displays a firsthand knowledge of key texts in English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish. His focus is, therefore, decidedly but also expansively "Mediterranean": only the most narrow or ungenerous soul, or one badly ravaged by current academic fashion, would fault him for a failure to be sufficiently "inclusive." It bears mentioning in this regard that Brague has elsewhere argued that Mediterranean experience is distinctive precisely because it allows a privileged access to the whole of the human world (translated under the title *Eccentric Culture: A Theory of Western Civilization*, by S. H. Lester [South Bend: Saint Augustine's Press, 2001]).

By identifying the present book as a "history," Brague signals that he intends something more than a chronological litany of *Weltanschauungen*. While it will undoubtedly prove very useful as a reference work of sorts, a florilegium if you will of ancient and medieval cosmologies, *La sagesse du monde* seeks to develop and defend a specific historical thesis, namely, that until the onset of modernity most authoritative texts of either a theological or a purely philosophical cast concurred in supposing that "ethics," or thoughtful reflection upon the human good, was inseparable from "anthropology," an understanding of that which human beings were given by God or nature to be or become, and that "anthropology" so conceived was in turn to be grounded in and in some measure also completed by a "cosmology" (p. 12). By the same token, and once again notwithstanding the many differences between Biblical piety and its philosophical analogue, Brague argues that these two principal schools of "ethics" often agreed in thinking that the cosmos was itself essentially incomplete or less than whole apart from its knowing reflection in the human part, such that one might well say that it is "good" not only for us but for the universe that it afford us the place to become what we are to be (pp. 128–9, 223, 250–1). In short, Brague seeks to demonstrate that worldly wisdom, the wisdom of the world, was in premodern times usually both a subjective and an objective genitive, or rather, a subjective because an objective genitive, and vice versa.

To be sure, *La sagesse du monde* also devotes a good many pages to ancient and medieval thinkers who did not agree with what Brague identifies as the dominant cosmological tradition in supposing that the human good and the extra-human whole were somehow of a piece. As he shows, however, even such figures were compelled to confront the problem of the worldhood of the world, or of the wholeness of the whole. In the broadest terms, therefore, Brague's study takes up a series of responses to the question as to how it is, or what it means to say, that man as man is able to attain sufficient distance both from himself and from the universe such that he might thereby see it and himself without distortion (p. 15). Admittedly, not one of the premodern cosmologies traced in this history achieved what would strike us as providing a satisfactory "cosmography"; what each proposes in the way of a "general geography" or topology of the universe is never better than elementary. Insofar as these various cosmologies attempted a "cosmogenesis," they must again strike us as deficient in large ways and in small. Notwithstanding such shortcomings, however, the numerous ancient and medieval texts Brague adumbrates all display what is by contemporary standards the considerable merit of at least acknowledging the burden science is under to seek an explanation for its own possibility (see pp. 12–16).

Depending upon one's source in such matters, either "God" or "the devil" is "in the details." It is in any case quite impossible to say much if anything in a space such as this about the particulars that enliven this dense work. The book is divided into four principal parts, of two, four, five, and three chapters respectively. In the first part, Brague provides a brief "prehistory" of the Greek philosophical discovery of the world as world, which proposes that our remote ancestors were too much under the dominion of "earth" and "sky" to be able to identify the one overarching whole within but also over and against which the Greeks came to see themselves; he then goes on to offer a preliminary description of the Greek discovery as it surfaces in the poets and "pre-Socratic" philosophers. The second part sets out four ancient cosmological "models": (i) the Platonic modification or correction of the Socratic "turn" away from the heavens and toward the city, (ii) Greek and Roman atomism, (iii) the "world" as it looks to the Bible, Jewish and Christian, and the Koran, and (iv) gnostic eclecticism. The third, longest, and surely the most rewarding part is devoted principally to various responses to the legacy of cosmologizing, philosophical and inspired, in late antiquity and in the "middle" age that followed. The first chapter of part 3 observes that already in antiquity there were some who rejected the possibility of any substantial connection, positive or negative, between cosmology and ethics; in the next four chapters, Brague enters into the dialectic of the human and the extra-human, and of the rational and the divinely revealed, as played out in the medieval experience of the cosmos. *La sagesse du monde* concludes, in part 4, with a snapshot of the universe in its modern signification; despite its concision, and the author's admission that he there oversteps the bounds of his scholarly competence (p. 214), it manages to be at once insightful and suggestive;

from what has already been said, it should be clear that Brague supposes modernity to be largely defined by an orientation to the universe that is ethically or humanly indifferent.

No study of such a massive—although still very partial—human whole as the literary tradition or traditions addressed in this book could reasonably expect to please every reader in all respects. Notwithstanding the author's rare erudition, there could not help but be omissions to lament, and readings of particular texts with which to quarrel. If it is the part of a critical notice always to propose at least a word or two of criticism, I might here venture to say that Brague's account of the "Platonic" cosmos rests upon an interpretation of the *Timaeus* as proposing not merely a "likely story," but an ethically and politically salutary one. Such a reading has certainly enjoyed much favor over the millennia, but it by no means goes without saying, as Brague himself freely concedes (see pp. 45, 91–5). Having admitted this much, however, and given the role Timaeus' long and often baffling speech has played in subsequent cosmological "history," to say nothing of the thesis animating the book under consideration, one might well have wished that Brague had attempted a more sustained examination of the dialogue and its *aporiae*. On the other hand, or perhaps otherwise stated, *La sagesse du monde* is as a whole so charged with literary or historical particulars that it would have benefited from an analytical and synthetical statement of the cosmological possibilities rationally available to us at present, in Brague's own judgment, in view of that which has been given us to know or to suppose about the nonhuman whole over the course of the modern era. It is hardly the fault of this rich and rewarding study, however, that it should suggest by such defects that the problem of accounting for the genesis of "cosmology" is both a sign and a cause of the problem of accounting for the genesis of the cosmos.—John C. McCarthy, *The Catholic University of America.*

CARRUTHERS, Peter. *Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. xx + 347 pp. Cloth, $59.95—Carruthers's central project in *Phenomenal Consciousness* is to naturalize consciousness. Given the vast success of naturalism in science, he maintains that we should require powerful reasons to abandon it when constructing philosophical theories of consciousness. Unsurprisingly, he then argues that there are no such reasons. In particular, he claims that the well-known arguments of Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson fail, as do inverted and absent qualia arguments. Carruthers's main strategy for defusing these arguments involves first distinguishing a "thin" notion of property (according to which properties are individuated by way of our concepts of them) from a "thick" notion of property (according to which properties are individuated independently of our concepts) and then arguing that the various antinaturalistic arguments conflate these two different notions. Although he admits that the

antinaturalist may not find these considerations wholly convincing, he construes the dialectical situation in such a way as to relieve him of any obligation to do more (p. 23). As long as it can be shown that the antinaturalistic arguments are not obviously successful, which he takes himself to have done, Carruthers claims that the presumption in favor of naturalism remains. Thus, a theory of consciousness must be compatible with the following two naturalistic claims: first, all mental events occur in accordance with causal laws; and second, all mental events can be given a reductive explanation in physical terms.

For Carruthers, the reductive explanation is achieved by reducing phenomenal content to intentional content. Specifically, he offers a dispositionalist higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness: an occurrent mental state, M, of a subject, S, is conscious if and only if M is disposed directly to (that is, noninferentially) cause S to believe that he has M (p. 227). Importantly, it should be noted that his argument for this representationalist view, which makes up the bulk of the book, proceeds largely from within a representationalist framework. Carruthers takes himself to have established fairly quickly that some version of representationalism must be true—too quickly, the nonrepresentationalist reader will undoubtedly (and rightly, in my view) complain—and thus seems to view his real task as showing that other versions of representationalism fail where his succeeds.

The distinction between his view and other representationalist theories can be summarized roughly as follows. First, since his theory requires higher-order representations (HOR), he departs from representationalists such as Michael Tye and Fred Dretske who offer first-order representational (FOR) theories. Second, since the higher-order representations that his theory requires are thoughts, he departs from other HOR theorists such as William Lycan, who offers a higher-order experience theory, and Daniel Dennett, who offers a higher-order description theory. Finally, since he does not require that a phenomenally conscious state actually be targeted by some HOT—rather, on his view, it is enough for such a state merely to be available to a HOT—his dispositionalist theory departs from actualist HOT theories such as that offered by David Rosenthal.

To defend the dispositional element of his view, and in particular to explain how a dispositional view can account for the categorical nature of the qualitative "feel" of phenomenally conscious states, Carruthers employs a version of consumer semantics. For an experience to be available to a HOT, it must be held in a "short-term memory store" where it can be fed into various "down-stream concept-wielding consumer systems," for example, a practical reasoning system, a belief-forming system, and most importantly, a "mind-reading" faculty (p. 241). According to Carruthers, the attachment of these consumer systems to the contents of states transforms their contents and confers on them their qualitative feel: "Each experience is at the same time . . . a representation that we are undergoing just such an experience, by virtue of the powers of the mind-reading consumer-system" (p. 248). Notice, however, that even if we accept that these downstream consumer systems can change the contents of states, it is not clear that this is enough

to ensure phenomenal content. Thus, whether the invocation of consumer semantics does the work that Carruthers needs it to do seems to me an open question.

Of special interest and importance are the arguments defending the move from first-order to higher-order representationalism. First, Carruthers argues persuasively that FOR theories cannot account for the distinction, motivated by data from both science (for example, blindsight) and common sense, between conscious and nonconscious experience. For example, an absentminded driver surely has perceptual experiences of the road even when he is not conscious of seeing it. The problem for FOR theories arises from the fact that they tend to identify phenomenally conscious states as ones which are "poised" to affect an organism's belief-forming systems so as to guide behavior (pp. 114–15). Nonconscious experiences, however, seem capable of being similarly poised. Second, Carruthers defends HOR theories from the charge that they do violence to our intuitions regarding the phenomenal consciousness of nonhuman animals. Biting the bullet, he admits that HOR theories preclude (most) nonhuman animals from having phenomenally conscious states but denies that this should count against such theories. Once again invoking the distinction between conscious and nonconscious experience, Carruthers suggests that our intuitions that nonhuman animals such as cats and dogs are phenomenally conscious should be better understood as the intuition that such animals have experiences. Nothing in our intuitions, however, precludes such experiences from being viewed as nonconscious.—Amy Kind, *Claremont McKenna College.*

COMAY, Rebecca, and MCCUMBER, John, editors. *Endings: Questions of Memory in Hegel and Heidegger.* SPEP Studies in Historical Philosophy. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999. vii + 245 pp. Cloth, $79.95; paper, $29.95—The eleven essays collected here include three papers, written in the 1980s, on the influence of Hegel on Heidegger's thinking by Jacques Taminiaux (edited by Michael Gendre), Dominique Janicaud, and Michel Haar, respectively; a paper on Heidegger's several readings of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* by Robert Bernasconi; two papers on Hegel's aesthetics by Martin Donougho and John Sallis; a paper on Hegel's philosophy of history by David Kolb; two papers on Hegel, Heidegger, and Antigone by Dennis J. Schmidt and Kathleen Wright; an essay on unpublished notes by Friedrich Hölderlin, with references to Heidegger's philosophy by David Farrell Krell; and a general introduction to the volume by one of its editors, John McCumber. The French papers, which are in the background of many of the remaining papers, have been previously published, as has the contribution by Krell, which is reprinted from an earlier volume with a few minor changes and the addition of a short paragraph (on p. 183). The paper by

Sallis is based on a chapter from a previously published book that has been expanded to include a discussion of Hegel's aesthetics.

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and Heidegger's texts that address that work are often front and center in the discussions, as are Hegel's lectures on the history of the fine arts, which were edited and published by one of his students as Hegel's *Aesthetics*. So also are the poetry of Hölderlin, Hegel's friend and Heidegger's favorite German poet, and Sophocles' *Antigone*.

The underlying question of the collection is whether Heidegger is in any respect a Hegelian, but the papers are also concerned with history (understood in a Hegelian sense, as the manifestation of Absolute Spirit in the world) and great art, and whether and how, in some sense, both can be said to have become things of the past at a certain point in time. A third theme of the papers is the meaning of memory in history and in the philosophies of Heidegger and Hegel.

On Heidegger's Hegelianism, Janicaud, who raises the question "Isn't Heidegger's thought forever tied to a Hegelian heritage?" observes that "Heidegger and Hegel come closest to each other regarding the question of the history of Being" (p. 40). Taminiaux, who asks "How does the Heideggerian overcoming of aesthetics, as a figure of metaphysics, come to intersect and overlap Hegel's aesthetics?" (p. 126), suggests that the Hegelian "shadow of the speculative history of Spirit is brought to bear on Heidegger's meditation on art" (p. 136). Among the three French philosophers, Haar is perhaps the boldest, however, in suggesting the Hegelian character of Heidegger's thought, when in his discussion of Heidegger's notion of *Geschick* ("the destiny of Being"), understood as the "strict self-closure of history," he asks whether the notion of *Geschick* is not "some new variety of Hegelianism" (p. 48), albeit an "inversion of Hegelianism" (p. 51). Considering the philosophical kinship of Hegel and Heidegger, Kolb writes that "[t]he difference between the two thinkers concerns the past as possibility" (p. 75), while in his discussion of Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art," Sallis claims that the essay "is written in the shadow of Hegel's *Aesthetics*, in the shadow cast by Hegel's declaration of the pastness of art" (p. 207).

Schmidt, who is concerned to show how Hegel and Heidegger approach "the problematic of memory and history" (p. 103), concludes that both thinkers "develop ultimately tragic visions of history and the polis," but "whereas Hegel takes this tragic moment as foreshadowing a general solution to the riddles of both history and the polis, Heidegger takes this as foreshadowing the impossibility of either history or political life" (p. 113). According to Donougho, as philosophers of aesthetics Hegel can be seen as a "representative philosopher of beauty with Heidegger as [a] thinker of the sublime" (p. 148).

In her study of Heidegger's two readings of Sophocles' *Antigone*, Wright suggests that in the latter reading, "Heidegger sexualizes Dasein [existence]. He implicitly masculinizes Dasein in 1935 and explicitly feminizes Dasein in 1942" (p. 164). Comparing these readings with Hegel's comments on the tragedy in the *Aesthetics*, Wright concludes: "Heidegger is, I would argue, vying with Hegel for Antigone." For

Wright, this amounts to a "rivalry between Heidegger and Hegel" for Antigone (p. 172), even "a competition against Hegel for Antigone" (p. 173).

It is well known that in middle age, Heidegger turned to a form of what we now call literary criticism. In particular, he devoted several university courses to Hölderlin's poetry, and in other lectures and essays, wrote about art and the poetry of Rainer Maria Rilke and Stefan George, among others. In his old age, he was a friend of the French artist Georges Braques and even collaborated in Switzerland with the Basque sculptor Eduardo Chillida in the preparation of an illustrated text on "Art and Space." In the texts on poetry, Heidegger's theme is often enough language, but in the Hölderlin texts, he also meditates on themes that may be broadly characterized as philosophical and political. These efforts have attracted scholars in both philosophy and literature. However, while Heidegger strictly distinguished between what poets and philosophers do, respectively, several of *Endings*' authors, second and third generation Heidegger scholars who have been as attracted to the philosopher as much for his literary criticism as for his philosophical and phenomenological studies, seem to mix callings. As a result, but unlike Heidegger in this, in a few of the essays presented here, it is often difficult to know where philosophical analysis leaves off and a kind of intellectual memoir begins. Much of the affectation of this writing is inspired by Jacques Derrida. More important, however, unlike Heidegger's texts, which were written for classroom presentation or as public lectures for a general audience, some of these texts seem to have been written for a small coterie of insiders, who understand a code with which some philosophers who read the essays may be unfamiliar.—Miles Groth, *Wagner College.*

CUA, A. S. *Moral Vision and Tradition: Essays in Chinese Ethics.* Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, Vol. 31. Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1998. xiii + 357 pp. Cloth, $66.95—Those familiar with A. S. Cua's distinguished career as writer and philosopher should already anticipate the virtues displayed in this collection. Cua has a unique style of treating issues in Chinese ethics. His approach is primarily analytic, attending carefully to the conceptual and dialectical aspects of Chinese ethical thought. He is, above all, enormously sensitive to the specific contexts in which terminology is used.

The fourteen essays that comprise this book are presented in the chronological order in which they were written. Contained are ten previously published articles, one previously unpublished article (entitled "The Possibility of a Confucian Theory of Rhetoric") and three updated articles (the final three) which incorporate materials from Cua's most recent publications. The vast majority of material treats Confucian and

neo-Confucian themes. Only two essays ("Forgetting Morality: Reflections on a Theme in the *Chuang Tzu*," and "Opposites as Compliments: Reflections of the Significance of *Tao*") deal extensively with Taoism.

Of the many analytic distinctions that serve Cua well in this volume, perhaps the most pervasive is Xunzi's distinction between *gongming* and *bieming*, or "generic" and "specific" terms (see pp. 195–6, 231, 253, 265, 273). "Specific" terms are those that lend specification to the more abstract "generic" terms employed in various contexts of discourse. Specific terms in one context of discourse, Cua informs us, may become generic terms in another context of discourse, and vice versa. As one might imagine, sorting through these various contexts and designations in a Chinese philosophical environment requires enormous subtlety and deft. Cua displays these virtues in the fourteen exercises here. In each, Cua plumbs both texts and commentaries to come up with the interdependent meanings of various terms, then relates this system of meanings to broader themes in Chinese ethics, epistemology, and moral reasoning.

To keep up with Cua's train of thought, however, requires some skill. For instance, in essay 5 ("Opposites as Complements: Reflections on the Significance of *Tao*") Cua begins with a consideration of complimentarity, using Herman Hesse's novel "Narcissus and Goldmund" as illustration, and closes with a section on the notion of "wordless teaching." Essay 12 ("The Confucian Tradition: *Tao-t'ung*") commences with a very interesting exploration of the meaning of "tradition," and then moves swiftly into a discussion of moral adjudication. These essays record a powerful mind at work, actively drawing distinctions and making connections between ideas. The reader must remain alert in order to follow. For example, the "principle aim" of essay four ("Chinese Moral Vision, Responsive Agency, and Factual Beliefs") is "to offer a plausible basis for a philosophical appreciation of the Chinese vision of *Tao* as creative harmony of man and world." There are a number of distinctions required to get at this harmony, first a distinction between the "focal" and "matrix" selves, then the "two conceptions of responsive agency," and finally the respective world-visions for the Taoist (residing in world "t") and the Confucian (residing in world "c"). This analytic *tour-de-force* culminates in the consideration of "the problem of communication of one's vision as an ideal theme and the role of factual beliefs (in ethical discourse)" (p. 73). The process exhibited in this essay, subjecting broad themes to fine distinctions, analyzing these according to context and perspective, and then synthesizing anew, is quintessential Cua.

While these essays cover a lot of material, Cua is always focused on the moral dimension of his subject. He is interested in explicating the nature of Chinese ethical thought and in constructing a systematic Confucian moral philosophy relevant to and conversant with contemporary western ethical discourse. Throughout this volume he develops the notion of the "moral community" in Chinese thought (for a crystallization of this notion see essay 9, "Between Commitment and Realization: Wang Yang-ming's Vision of the Universe as Moral Community") and is interested in exploring the normative dimension of moral adjudication as it obtains in the various contexts that bind this community together as a

tradition (see, for instance, essay 14, "Principles as Preconditions of Adjudication"). The years of scholarship to which this volume attests has indeed resulted in a formidable moral philosophy, a systematic Confucian virtue ethics, which is showcased in essay 13 ("Basic Concepts of Confucian Ethics"), an extremely subtle and enlightening analysis of the interdependence of fundamental concepts in Confucian ethical thought.

This collection should be of great interest to Chinese philosophers, particularly those concerned with the role of Chinese philosophy in contemporary East/West ethical discourse.—James Behuniak, *University of Hawaii at Manoa.*

DOMBROWSKI, Daniel A. *Not Even A Sparrow Falls: The Philosophy of Stephen R. L. Clark.* East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2000. xvi + 366 pp. Cloth, $39.95—Stephen R. L. Clark has authored twelve books covering three philosophical themes: religion, duties toward animals, and politics—"Unfortunately, however, those familiar with one realm of his work, tend not to be familiar with what he has done in other areas" (overleaf). Even those who may be familiar with the whole of Clark's corpus may find it difficult to discern a coherent philosophical message among these disparate themes. Dombrowski seeks to present a comprehensive overview of Clark's thought, and to elucidate Clark's primary philosophical concerns and prejudices, which run through all his works. However, Dombrowski's admiration for Clark's philosophy does not preclude him from offering his own unique analysis and critique.

Part 1 concerns religion. Immediately, the first tenet of Clark's approach becomes evident: an abhorrence toward extremes. Clark is a religious conservative, and yet is skeptical of attempts to ground religious faith in an analytic philosophical system. Clark favors the mysticism of John of the Cross and Julian of Norwich, as well as Buddhism.

An example of Clark's aim to negotiate a middle path is his "dipolar theism": an understanding of God as both transcendent and immanent with respect to creation. Clark professes high regard for both Aristotelianism and neo-Platonism, yet he flirts with process theism. Here, critics find Clark's thought lacking in that he does not formulate a clear system of his own. He borrows from what he finds appealing in various other approaches, which may not be compatible with each other. Dombrowski urges Clark to dedicate himself more wholeheartedly to process theism. Dombrowski continues this critique with respect to Clark's address of the problem of evil.

Part 2 analyzes Clark's views regarding human and animal nature. Clark finds humans and animals to be more closely related than is recognized. He claims that the animal kingdom is largely misunderstood. This is due to an anthropocentrism, which begins with the belief that humans are the only rationally moral beings. While such may be the case, Clark claims that animals are "ethical" in nature. One example is

violence. Clark asserts that animals are not as naturally violent as humans perceive them to be. Animals engage in ritualized combat where death is sought only if necessary for the preservation of food, life, or territory. Clark finds humans to be more violent in terms of our engagement in wars involving mass destruction and the killing of innocents. However, Clark does hold a "just war" theory. Dombrowski offers a critique from the perspective of a committed pacifist. He sees Clark heading in the pacifist direction, but "traditionalist" tendencies hold him back.

Clark has profound insights regarding the duties humans owe to animals. Due to the fact that Clark depicts animals in a natural continuum with humans, they should be recognized as members of the community. One striking argument regards experimentation. Many argue that medical experimentation on animals is warranted for the preservation of human life. Clark counters that the need for medicine, in many cases, can be attributed to unhealthy life-styles and environmental pollution. Clark is offended by the sacrifice of animals to perpetuate unhealthy human behaviors.

Part 3 presents Clark's political theory, characterized as a conservative "anarcho-capitalism." Clark adopts the Aristotelian notion of humans as "political animals" and argues that humans naturally form "communities" based on friendships developed in a "shared space." Government is largely unnecessary and negatively impacts on naturally formed communities by turning them into antiseptic "societies." Clark critiques both Rawlsian social contract theory and utilitarianism as offering empty rationalistic political formulas which fail to ground universally applicable principles for human communitarian interaction.

In the final chapter, Dombrowski ties Clark's political views with his religious conservatism: true human community begins with the recognition that we are constituent members of a "World Soul." Humans must avoid anthropocentrism and recognize that the cosmos is much larger than our limited individual existence. We must recognize the divine nature which informs the world. Neo-Platonism and mysticism are Clark's models of choice. Clark's views regarding animals are also present in his call to move from anthropocentrism toward a respect for all sentient life.

Reading this book with no previous familiarity with Stephen R. L. Clark, I must say that Dombrowski has effectively illuminated the key elements of his thought in a manner which demonstrates both the general coherency of Clark's project and the insightful brilliance he brings to the round-table of philosophical discussion.—Jason T. Eberl, *Saint Louis University.*

FOSTER, John. *The Nature of Perception.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. viii + 289 pp. Cloth, $55.00—Following his earlier books *The Case for Idealism* and *The Immaterial Self* John Foster once again defends a form of idealism. For much of this book, however, idealism remains in

the background. Instead, the focus is on theories of perception; Foster examines what purports to be an exhaustive taxonomy of physical realist theories of perception and, finding each one wanting, portrays idealism as the only acceptable alternative. The arguments, a selection of which are summarized below, are highly organized and clearly expressed but make relatively little explicit reference to recent literature on perception.

Foster begins by distinguishing four types of theory. The "broad representative theory" (BRT) differs from "strong direct realism" (SDR) in that the former states, whereas the latter denies, that perception involves mediation by a psychological state. By contrast, the "narrow representative theory" (NRT) differs from "weak direct realism" (WDR) in that the former states, whereas the latter denies, that perception is psychologically mediated by the occurrence of a perceptual object in the mind. Some versions of WDR and BRT are compatible. This taxonomy "reshapes the issue," replacing the standard dichotomy between direct and representative theories with two separate issues.

SDR is dealt with first. According to SDR the perceptual relation between perceiver and object is psychologically fundamental; it does not decompose into further, mediating psychological states whose nature is independent of what is perceived. Foster argues that no form of SDR can account for the "phenomenal content" of perception, that is, "how, in the perceiving of [an] item, the subject is *sensibly appeared to*" (p. 45). Phenomenal content thus construed is not available in cases of pure hallucination because it is a form of perceptual content, always involving the perception of an item. SDR can thus sidestep certain standard objections to direct realist accounts. It is nonveridical perceptions of objects, however, which lead to the problem for the prima facie most promising version of SDR, the "presentational" view (pp. 59–72), according to which "each phenomenal featuring of a quality is the featuring of that very instance of it which occurs in the physical item perceived" (p. 90). According to Foster, the problem with such a view, in which the qualitative elements of the external situation are immediately present to the mind, is that even the most infinitesimally small perceptual distortion would have to be counted as nonpresentational (pp. 67–70). Since this requires an arbitrary and implausible distinction between the phenomenal content of veridical and nonveridical perceptions, Foster concludes that all perceptions are nonpresentational.

The rejection of SDR implies the presence of a mediating psychological state. A lengthy chapter (over one hundred pages) is devoted to the nature of this mediation. After rejecting various "cognitive" theories, sense-datum theories, and the "adverbialist" theory, Foster settles on a novel version of NRT called the "sense-quale theory." This is similar to a sense-datum theory except that the perceptual objects, sense-qualia, are "concrete universals," capable of being encountered by different individuals and at different times yet nonexistent if never perceived. Foster explicates this notion by analogy with the relation between objects and their temporal stages: the same object is wholly present at each time but (unlike an abstract universal) its existence depends on its particular occurrences (pp. 189–95).

In the following chapter, however, Foster argues that although the sense-quale theory correctly accounts for the nature of phenomenal experience it cannot explain how the mediating psychological states combine with further facts to create perceptual contact with the physical world. This is because theories of this kind imply that "the immediate objects of awareness are ones whose occurrence is in the mind, rather than in the physical world" (p. 202). Hence "we ordinarily, but mistakenly, take the qualia themselves to be elements of [physical] reality" (p. 202). We also lack epistemic access to reality because mistaking the nature of sense-qualia renders our claims to knowledge vulnerable to Gettier-style objections.

The idealism which Foster proposes as a solution to these difficulties posits a mind-independent reality responsible for the "sensory organisation" which creates the illusion of a physical world, but "whereas the realist *equates* this reality with the physical world, the idealist takes it to be something which *underlies* the physical world" (p. 253). Many details of the position, such as an account of intersubjectivity and the structuring of the illusory physical world, are left for further development.

If it transpired that the idealist account could not be completed coherently then presumably we would be back to square one. This, combined with the relative lack of explicit discussion of recent literature (such as debates about the coherence of nonconceptual content) may limit the book's power to convince devotees of realist theories.—Simon Prosser, *University of Warwick.*

GRASSI, Ernesto. *Rhetoric as Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition.* Translated by John M. Krois and Azizeh Azodi. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2001. xviii + 122 pp. Cloth, $29.00; paper, $16.95—The reissue of Ernesto Grassi's *Rhetoric as Philosophy* in English by Southern Illinois University Press prompts a reconsideration of this twentieth-century Italian intellectual's contribution to rhetoric and philosophy. The book is a set of closely related essays around the central theme that Italian humanism compliments and enriches the hermeneutic understanding developed by Grassi's mentor, Heidegger. Grassi wishes to retrieve and promote the neglected resources of the ancient rhetorical tradition as they were nurtured and embellished by great and lesser known humanists of the Renaissance. Just as does Hans-Georg Gadamer, Grassi uses the distortions of the dominant Cartesian worldview of apodictic certainty as foil. Against this modern backdrop Grassi offers up an entire tradition of humanist scholarship which locates human understanding in the familiar rhetorical territory of probability, situatedness, and invention. Not the deadened instrumentalist technique that rhetoric was accused of becoming after Aristotle, Grassi reveals a rich treasury of conceptual resources which comport plausibly with the hermeneutics of facticity (early Heidegger) and a poetics of thinking (late Heidegger). Perhaps the most rewarding aspect of Grassi's effort

in *Rhetoric as Philosophy* is that, in support of his argument on behalf of Renaissance humanism and classical Latin culture, he introduces us to an untapped treasure-house of scholarship that includes not only the familiar names of Giambattista Vico, Fabius Quintilian, Juan Luis Vives, and Leonardo Bruno, but a host of lesser known figures such as Angelo Poliziano, Coluccio Salutati, Hugo of St. Victor, Brunetto Latini, and the younger Pico, all of whom make striking contributions to what seems very like a kind of rhetorical-hermeneutic understanding of the world.

In the introduction to *Rhetoric as Philosophy*, Grassi argues not only that Italian humanism was a forerunner to Heidegger but that it still makes an important and original contribution to hermeneutic thinking. This amounts in part to a defense, since Heidegger was particularly harsh in rejecting Latin thought and culture in favor of the ancient Greeks. What Grassi finds original in humanism is the emphasis on *ingenium*, which is the faculty of discovering similarities in unlike things. He argues that in fact metaphor underlies the hermeneutic process: "The metaphor is, therefore, the original form of the interpretative act itself, which raises itself from the particular to the general through representation in an image, but, of course, always with regard to its importance for human beings" (p. 7). The disclaimer at the end of the sentence identifies a reciprocity between the inventional capacity and human social need, a dialectic between the creative and the material: "Even the metaphor, that figurative transfer of meaning, stands in the service of satisfying urgent needs" (p. 14). In chapter 2 Grassi develops the priority of rhetorical understanding over the logic of reason. He is not precise in defining rhetoric, and it passes through several formulations—an interpretation of the *Phaedrus* supports the identification of rhetoric and philosophy (p. 32). At one point rhetoric precedes logic as the invention of *archai*, the starting points of deduction: "'Rhetoric' is not, nor can it be the art, the technique of an exterior persuasion; it is rather the speech which is the basis of the rational thought" (p. 20). Elsewhere rhetoric is the emotive, as opposed to the rational, word which serves to attest to what is true rather than demonstrate it.

Chapter 3 offers a loose set of guiding concepts in Renaissance humanism that suggest a rhetorical paradigm for knowledge. Grassi suggests, by way of recourse to his Latinate sources, that the traditional rhetorical concepts of invention and topical resources are fundamental epistemological tools for finding the places of meaningful insight into truth. Unlike Vico, he draws a sharply polemical opposition between logos and pathos: "Philosophy in this sense, too, is no longer a rational, deductive process, but an emotive speech guided by insight, which has no rational character and has preeminence" (p. 63). Of particular note is the emphasis on imagination and the image as a guide to understanding. Here Grassi stakes out a position that later hermeneutics moves decisively away from in favor of linguistic understanding.

Grassi suffers from a certain sketchy thinness, which is all the more glaring given the rich storehouse he has tapped into. He offers a number of important theses without doing the deep work of thought that nurtures our own thinking. He is more a scholar than a major thinker, and he is more valuable for the breadth of his scholarship, opening up an

entire hidden tradition, and the importance of his guiding idea. He is one of those thinkers who is valuable for having got hold of an important theme, rather than for originality or depth of insight. The importance of situating rhetoric and hermeneutics in a position of reciprocity is something that the German scholars gladly acknowledged but did not adequately develop. To the extent that Grassi stands as the standard bearer for this important idea, he will remain an important figure.—John Arthos, *Denison University.*

HALLETT, Garth L. *A Middle Way to God.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. viii + 162 pp. Cloth, $35.00—Proofs for belief in God polarize between the extremes that no demonstration is required (Alvin Plantinga) and arguments based upon a complex, inductive calculus (Richard Swinburne). Since traditional questions are no longer fruitful, Hallett proposes a lateral shift in our thinking by undertaking an exploration of what "rationality and good evidence look like in areas where standard criteria do not apply" (p. 9). The goal is to promote fresh vision through a shift in perspective.

The book makes a critical evaluation of Plantinga's thesis that if belief in other minds is rational, so is belief in God. Definition of terms and questions of method are explored in chapters 1 and 2. Hallett's central question is "Does belief in God [as One who is infinite in goodness, wisdom and power] bear comparison with other-mind beliefs with limited backing (e.g., a mother's single loving look at her child) which nonetheless have a strong claim to being both rational and true?" (p. 119). Both objects of belief transcend direct experience and neither can be inferred logically.

The willingness of persons to accept the existence of other minds while having doubts about God appears to argue against Plantinga's claim. Chapter 3 explores the nonepistemic factors biasing against belief in God while having little effect on belief in other minds: human autonomy, science and positivistic spectacles/blinders, the ideological conflict of the Enlightenment, the inept apologetics of theists, and the effect of doubt.

Chapter 4 explores reports of direct awareness of God and of other minds. Considering particular cases, Hallett argues that perception of God in the world is analogous to his personal experience of a mother's loving look. Appealing to Swinburne's Principal of Credulity, Hallett contends that if it seems that he perceived the mother's love, he probably did. If a woman reports perceiving God through her parents, it is probably so.

Analogical, teleological, and cosmological evidence is explored in chapters 5 through 8. Hallett argues that prayer is analogous to the experience of making requests of other minds. He contends that the exclusion of divine intervention as a possible cause of experience is not re-

quired by science. Hallett proposes that we understand the cosmos on the analogy of a novelist's relationship to his book. The world bears the marks of genius, but is it an Evil Genius?

We might have reason to believe, as a child believes of an adult's actions, that all evils are in fact explained. If so, the teleological argument would retain its force in the face of our inability to explain evil. Hallett argues that we are naively overconfident of human rationality by seeking to demonstrate the impossibility of our imagining an alternative world in which evil is eliminated without unwanted side-effects.

Through a review of the possibility of multiple personalities, Hallett addresses the problem of reference which arises for cumulative arguments. How can we be certain that all cases of testimony refer to the same God or other person. Hallett argues that it is best to consider reports of divine experience as referring to the same God just as we assume a single personality associated with an other mind unless there is compelling evidence to the contrary. The arguments from evil receive a similar answer. "Given our cognitive limits, we have no valid reason to suppose that good and bad are not more fully integrated in the universe than are good and bad, love and hate, within a single person" (p. 116).—Charles T. Davis, *Appalachian State University.*

HEDLEY, Douglas. *Coleridge Philosophy and Religion: Aids to Reflection and the Mirror of the Spirit.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. xiv + 330 pp. Cloth, $64.95—Douglas Hedley's study reveals Samuel Taylor Coleridge as a leading figure in the nineteenth-century revival of Christian Platonism. This tradition flourished at Cambridge in the seventeenth century until it was eclipsed by the Lockean tradition, which prevailed in the eighteenth century among Christians as well as nonbelievers. Coleridge's theological work was explicitly a polemic against the Cambridge empiricists. His importance was such that John Stuart Mill divided Victorians into "Benthamites and Coleridgeans" (p. 287).

Hedley argues, as his main thesis, that Coleridge's hidden agenda in the *Aids to Reflection* is the affirmation of the doctrine of the Trinity as a philosophical idea. The Unitarian, Joseph Priestly, argued that the essence of Christianity consists of following the ethical teachings of Jesus, which are validated by miracles. He saw the Trinity as a corruption of Christianity that came about through the influence of Platonic philosophy.

Coleridge was a Trinitarian and Platonist whose life and work reflect a Neo-Platonic, Augustinian restlessness. The purpose of philosophy is to awaken the soul to the task of returning to its source. Because the human soul mirrors the Divine, our salvation requires that we follow the Delphic imperative of self-knowledge. Through contemplation, self-knowledge goes beyond knowing the self as one particular person to an insight into divine reason and the states of consciousness to which "the

teacher of moral and religious truth refers us" (p. 116). The teacher of truth is not just the historical person, Jesus of Nazareth, but the *Logos* living in us as a perpetual source of illumination.

Hedley shows the relation between the "Word of God" and human language by the use of aphorism in Coleridge's work. The aphorism, a short, self-contained expression, is an unusual approach to philosophy because it does not allow for a sustained argument. However, Coleridge uses aphorisms as spiritual exercises based on the conviction that enlightenment comes through personal insight rather than through formal argument. Unlike an argument, which can be conclusive and therefore complete, the aphorism by its nature allows for continuous interpretation and therefore growth. Hedley argues that a key idea in Coleridge is the distinction between understanding and reason, which the Enlightenment had run together. For Coleridge, understanding is discursive thinking, but reason provides immediate insight.

Hedley contrasts Coleridge's understanding of ethics with that of Paley and the Enlightenment theologians. The latter was based on the promise of happiness as a reward, which Hedley contends is otherworldly, but not spiritual. It is as egoistic as Hobbes and as hedonistic as Epicurus. For Coleridge, the purpose of ethics is to awaken the self-love and self-knowledge by which the human soul strives to return to its source. These are attained only in community and involve a dying to the limited ego and a rebirth into the larger spiritual life realized through the indwelling of Christ.

The revival led by Coleridge was successful for a time. "In 1890, *almost all* English speaking philosophers were idealists" (p. 291). By the beginning of the twentieth century, British Christian Platonism went into a second eclipse. This was due to secularization in philosophy, anti-Hellenism in Protestant thought, and neo-Thomism in Catholic thought. Hedley's book can fill the reader with some yearning for the richness and fertility of the Platonic tradition. It is forgotten but not gone. Although Hedley does not make a prediction, he leaves us with an impression that another revival is not out of the question.—Richard P. Mullin, *Wheeling Jesuit University.*

HEIDEGGER, Martin. *Introduction to Metaphysics.* Translated by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. xxx + 255 pp. Cloth, $30.00; paper $14.95—One may ask why a new translation of Martin Heidegger's *Introduction to Metaphysics* is needed. The present volume is the second English version of Heidegger's 1935 lecture course, *Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik,* the text of which was first published in German only in 1953. An earlier translation appeared in 1959 and has remained in print until the present; now, however, we have a version that the student of twentieth-century Continental philosophy will likely find more congenial than the first, although important problems remain in the translators' attempt to make Heidegger's thought accessible. It is well known that Heidegger was in the habit of writing out

the lectures for his courses, many of which have appeared posthumously. His *Introduction to Metaphysics* is no exception, and the text (based on Volume 40 of the Klostermann *Collected Works*), which includes the author's marginal notes made between 1935 and 1953, remains as compelling now as it was when Heidegger first presented the course soon after the troubling time of his rectorship at the University of Freiburg.

The translators provide their own thematic outline of the course, a brief introduction, which discusses Heidegger's basic words, a German-English glossary, and an index. For easy comparison with the German text, marginal references are given to the Niemeyer edition pagination. Missing, however, are the very helpful "Afterword" by the German editor, Petra Jaeger, her detailed table of contents, and several related texts provided for the latest German edition (1983), including an earlier version of pp. 77–89. Heidegger himself provides helpful summaries of the argument of the course at pp. 77, 90, and 201.

The *Introduction to Metaphysics* focuses on what Heidegger takes to be "the fundamental question of metaphysics"—"Why are there be-ings [*Seiende*] as such and at all instead of nothing?" (p. 39; all translations are modified in this and the following citations)—in which is embedded the even more basic question: "What is the status of be[-ing] [*Sein*]?" (p. 41). Heidegger claims that, to ask the latter question "means nothing less than to initiate *anew* our historical-spiritual existence [*Dasein*], in order to transform it into the other beginning [*Anfang*]" he seems to suggest is inevitable for it (p. 41).

"Be-ings, as such and as a whole," he explains, "are *phusis*" (the early Greeks' word for emergence into observability) (p. 81), which Heidegger also identifies with "be[-ing] itself, [that] by virtue of which be-ings first become and remain observable" (p. 15; see also pp. 19, 110, 132, 172). Heidegger eventually concludes that be[-ing] is also the same as "*logos*, *harmonia* [harmony], *aletheia* [unconcealment], *phusis*, *phainesthai* [self-showing]" (p. 142), that be[-ing] also "disclosed itself to [the Greeks] as *dike* [the overwhelming (p. 171)]" (p. 175), and that be[-ing] means "*logos anthropon echon*: be[-ing], [that is,] the overwhelming appearing, necessitates the putting together [*Sammlung*] that pervades and grounds being-human [*Menschsein*] (p. 187; see also p. 131 on *logos*). Here Heidegger inverts the classic Aristotelian definition of the human being as the *zoon logon echon* (the animal that has language), in order to suggest that language has man.

Although the course explicitly "asks about the '*disclosedness of be[-ing]*'" (p. 21) as *phusis*, Heidegger admits that "we are not able to lay hold of the *be[-ing] of* be-ings directly and expressly, neither by way of be-ings, nor in be-ings—nor anywhere else at all" (p. 35). How, then, are we to get at the substance of the course: be[-ing]? This is crucial for Heidegger, since "[t]he question of the status of be[-ing] also proves to be the question about the status of our existence in history" (p. 217).

Given that "be[-ing] is in fact almost nothing more than a word nowadays" (p. 53), Heidegger devotes the second part of the course to a discussion of the etymology of the word *Sein*. He suggests that, in such an undertaking, "[w]hat is really at issue is an essential clarification of the

essence of be[-ing] as regards its essential involvement with the essence of language" (p. 57), since "[t]he name [be[-ing]] and what it names are one of a kind" (p. 85). For Heidegger, this means that, ultimately, in the history of philosophy linguistic analysis and metaphysics coincide. The discussion reveals that the infinitive "be" (which is the basis of the verbal noun "be[-ing]") "names something that lies at the foundation of all inflections of the verb" (p. 72), and is ultimately the *sine qua non* of every other word. "Suppose," he writes, "that there were no indeterminate meaning of be[ing]. . . . *Then there would be no language at all*" (p. 86).

The second half of the course considers four classic contrasts in the history of metaphysics: be[-ing] and becoming [*Werden*], be[-ing] and seeming [*Schein*] ("be[-ing] essentially unfolds *as* appearing [*Erscheinen*]" [p. 107]), be[-ing] and thinking [*Denken*], and be[-ing] and the ought [*Sollen*] ("[T]he ought arises in opposition to Be[-ing] as soon as be[-ing] determines itself as idea" [p. 211]). In a series of interpretations of selected fragments of Parmenides and Heraclitus, be[-ing] and thinking are shown to be the fundamental complementarity among the four traditional contrasts. In fact, for Heidegger, "[t]he entire Western tradition and conception of be[-ing], and accordingly the fundamental relation to be[-ing] that is still dominant today, is summed up in the title *be[-ing] and thinking*" (p. 220). Heidegger's readings of Heraclitus and Parmenides, with whom he had a lifelong conversation, are famously idiosyncratic, as is his challenging suggestion that they fundamentally agree (p. 103). (Heidegger goes so far as to say that "in the history of philosophy all thinkers have at bottom said the same thing" [p. 102].)

Although the present translation is more helpful than its predecessor, it still falters with peculiar renderings of several Heidegger's basic words in this text; for example, forms of the word "inception" (at pp. 126, 176, 186) for *Anfang* (beginning), "sway" (at pp. 65, 181, 186) for *Walten* (tension), "gathering" (at p. 187) for *Sammlung* (putting together or composing), and above all "Being" for *Sein*, an appropriate rendering of which is necessary to make Heidegger's discussion of the grammar and etymology of the word comprehensible. Rendering *Sein* as be[-ing] highlights the infinitive in the nominalized participle. As Heidegger points out (especially pp. 57–74), the force of the word is its infinitive character, which is obscured by the verbal noun form it takes on. The uniqueness of be[-ing] is especially noticeable in contrast to the many kinds or ways of be-ing [*Seiende*] that inhabit the world. One more comment on translation is in order: it seems to me that there is no longer any good reason to leave *Dasein* (existence) untranslated, as still happens in the present translation, as long as we realize that, for Heidegger, existence is the distinctively human relation to be-ing. Questions of translation here are important since, as in so many of his works, one of the topics of Heidegger's *Introduction to Metaphysics* is translation, the activity of gaining access to thinking and therewith to be[-ing].—Miles Groth, *Wagner College.*

HOFFE, Otfried. *Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung.* Munich: C. H. Beck, 1999. 476 pp. Cloth, DM 68—As a phenomenon, as a concept, as an essential trait of human individual and collective activity, to be "global" has become a familiar commonplace. As is often the case with the familiar, it is not necessarily well understood, and as such a problematic concept, "globalization" evokes contradictory emotions of hope and anxiety (p. 13). In his extremely penetrating and encompassing philosophical analysis of this notion as a complex political concept and phenomenon affecting every arena of life today, Otfried Höffe offers a vision and analysis of the need for and the constitution of a worldwide system of law and government in which the concepts of law and an order of law, human rights, justice, and peace are pivotal.

Taking a second look at such self-descriptions of our age as a "global village," Höffe finds us instead to be a civilization in transition, one in which a globally interlinked world society does not yet exist (p. 25). This world may be seen as consisting of three fundamental dimensions. First, it displays the exercise of force, the historical might before right carried out today as organized crime (including the arms and drug trade, industrial espionage, money laundering, and pornography), terrorism, the threat of atomic weapons, and environmental damage counting also as such an exercise of force extending beyond national borders (pp. 16, 360–1). This dimension is countered by a cooperative community, with cultural elements (philosophy, human and natural sciences, medicine, technology, and governmental and private organizations dealing with economic, ecological, financial, and human rights issues) spreading from one part of the world to another and being regionally adapted; the internet, which treats all places, persons, undertakings, and states equally, is given special mention (pp. 17–19). However, even this community is shot through with competition and its consequences include contributing to a third dimension, the community of need and suffering (p. 20). Moreover, even the positive offer of cooperation by a modern technological society can in fact jeopardize a nonmodern culture (p. 358), other forms of aid can effectively colonize a foreign economic culture (p. 407), and the emigration of peoples involves further issues of rights of its own (pp. 356–59).

Because of the international scope of these activities, the problems cannot be solved internal to the individual states (p. 360), and because they involve more than economic considerations, they are not only matters to be left to the specialized spheres of economics, international law, international political theory, and sociology (p. 14). Höffe's political philosophical account of a subsidiary and federal world republic offers a *via media* between two kinds of forces seen shaping these activities, those of the market and of evolution, between two kinds of ways of responding to the problems, top-down intervention (by the state) and bottom-up competition, and between two forms of political organization whose proponents are respectively the communitarians who oppose the notion of a global state entity, and global state theorists who worry that the universal claim of juridico-morality gets lost, or at the very least weakened, with keeping individual states; their world state in turn raises the objection of an undifferentiated cosmopolitanism (pp. 9–10,

303–4). Höffe emphasizes that the demise of the individual state is neither empirically foreseeable, nor normatively required, nor desirable; what is needed is a new political form which will supplement, but not replace the individual state (pp. 14, 172).

The idea of a world republic entails a threefold consideration: a universal normative claim of justice, a world-wide societal need of global trade and activity, and the *de facto* limitations of the ability of individual states, existing in the plural and eroded by external forces, to act collectively and address the common problems listed above (pp. 9, 227, 267). The question is not that of an either/or, either a world market, or a world order of law, but of how much and what kind of each (p. 424). The world republic's responsibility is an appellate one, to ensure the requisite cooperation between states and to define the parameters for this cooperation (p. 360). It takes original responsibility for such tasks as peace between the states, the order of the world market, social and environmental standards, and only a subsidiary role for things remaining the primary responsibility of the individual states, such as the legal protection of individuals and groups, health and education, the promotion of their economies, science, and culture, and the provision of social insurance (pp. 425–6, 307). In response to an objection already raised by Kant, that an organization of such compass could not be governed, Höffe recommends a three-tiered structure, with the individual states forming intermediate continental or subcontinental associations and the world republic completing it as the final building block in the global structure of law and democracy (pp. 306–7, 426). Höffe adds a further component to his argument which is not only absent from modern political theory, but is dismissed as peculiar to the political world and philosophy of antiquity: a need for and an account of civic virtues. Devoting two full chapters to the topic, Höffe counters the view that the self-interest of its citizens is enough for a democracy to get by, and discusses specific virtues to meet particular conditions of today's society: a sense of right, of civic courage, of justice, of tolerance, of community, in addition to temperance, composure, and prudence (p. 194). Such civic virtues first make citizens in the full sense, active co-constituters of the state, out of those who are citizens only in the legal sense of belonging to the state (p. 195). They bring about an agreement between individuals' expectations and their own efforts and contribution (p. 221). At the global level too, Höffe argues that without a world civic motivation and its stabilization in customs and character traits, no world republic can be established and maintained (p. 335). While Höffe argues that the vision he presents is a realistic one, pointing to its elements already manifest in a wide number of governmental and private organizations operating in the world, his final word is a note of caution, a call for patience: the desired result can only come over time and the process is analogous to that of rebuilding a ship on the high seas, all the while ensuring that the ship remains seaworthy, that what has already been achieved is not undermined (p. 427).

Höffe develops his argument for a subsidiary and federal world republic as a three part study. The first part (consisting of seven chapters) begins with the question of criteria for the universal legitimacy of democracy and ends with the first discussion of the need for civic virtues for

the establishment and continuation of democratic institutions. Focusing in this part on the identification of the requisite principles of justice, Höffe summarizes these in the fifth chapter under three headings: constitutive and normative principles, and principles of application whereby law and justice are concretely universally realized. In the second part (five chapters) he addresses a range of objections to the idea of a world republic, including the dismissal of a universal claim of justice as idealistic, alternative proposals such as a strategic world order that rules without a state, or the democratization of states on the whole, and the fear of a global leviathan. The discussion begins by tracing parallel strands of thought in the history of philosophy, primarily those of law and state, apolitical cosmopolitanism, right of the people (international law of the modern age), freedom, and progress. Höffe notes that only with Kant are these concepts connected and peace acquires an equal status to the other concepts. The last chapter again returns to the subject of civic virtues, now the virtues of world citizens. The third part (four chapters) is an account of the institutions and primary and subsidiary functions of the world republic, ending in the final chapter with the question, what does a world society, which organizes itself and subordinates that self-organization to moral-political claims, look like?

An expansion of Höffe's earlier theory of political justice (1987), the present study has much of obvious importance to recommend it. I would like to focus on an aspect of it which someone like a political theorist primarily interested in the issues raised may be less likely to emphasize. In a time when philosophy is often justifiably charged with having become a remote and abstract discourse, which even in its moral discussion has made itself inaccessible to the very public that is daily increasingly confronted with complex ethical issues, Höffe provides an art and style of philosophizing in the finest form of its tradition: historical, critical, analytical, constructive, illuminatingly engaged with and hence offering guidance for the contemporary human condition. Eminently readable while yet thoroughly researched and thought through, drawing on a wealth of literature from both East and West, from the epics *Mahabharata* and the *Iliad*, to a list of nearly 600 figures spanning the centuries from Solon to Rawls, Rorty, and MacIntyre today, Höffe's writing adheres to such fundamental dicta of his teachers as Aristotle's condition that philosophy must test its conclusions not only for the logic of the argument, but also for their agreement with empirical life, and Kant's conception of the history of philosophy as the history of the use of reason which is in turn to be used for philosophizing, for exercising one's own use of reason (and not as a mere history of ideas). Höffe not only understands but practices philosophy as the "counsel of humanity" (p. 34). He reminds us that globalization is neither unique to our time, that it does "not provide any absolutely new relations" of human history, nor is it "the exclusive mark of our age," and that indeed it shares with philosophy the anthropological conditions of its possibility, the human capacities of reason and speech (pp. 14, 20–3, 36). Höffe's style of argumentation follows the elements of formal disputation: What is said about the concept or question under investigation, historically and philosophically (for example, "subsidiarity")? What are the objections?

How are these to be answered? What is the present author's response? In the footsteps of Kant, philosophy is formal and universal; it develops the normative parameters, not the particulars, and must take care to keep its normative concepts distinct from the conditions of their application (pp. 351, 73). This means that in a discussion of globalization it seeks not to identify some singular dominant interest of the people, the same highest good for all (rejected already by Aristotle as a goal in the practical sphere), but it seeks to articulate what is effectively a transcendental level of interest, the conditions of agency which will lead to the realization of a just world order in which the rights and abilities of human beings are actualized (pp. 63, 58–9). Such a vision of global civilization as a form of society admits the socially cultural differences (p. 33). There is much work to be done, of course, in filling in details, but the discourse for this work has been introduced. For example, to give concrete reality to the formal shape of the new world citizen living and acting at the three levels of for instance, Frenchman, European, and World Citizen (pp. 336–7), to realize this as completely integrated individuals whose spheres are mutual and reciprocal, and not merely a series of layers, calls for the development of many particulars that are the purview of the educator, psychologist, sociologist, and so forth. The challenge to realize this is not an optional task. No thoughtful individual reflecting upon, and seeking to understand and come to terms with this challenge in order to act deliberately and responsibly in the contemporary world, will want to miss benefiting from Hoffe's clear delineation of what all it entails.—G. Felicitas Munzel, *University of Notre Dame.*

KEKES, John. *Pluralism in Philosophy: Changing the Subject.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000. ix + 225 pp. Cloth, $32.50—This is a significant and original book, the first half of which expounds the following problem.

Humans seek to live good lives, trusting in habit and custom as primary guides. However, certain facts arise which disrupt the attempt to realize such lives. These facts might be anything from wars and revolutions to the invention of the pill. When these arise, and custom and habit prove insufficient to deal with them, humans look to trans-habitual "modes of reflection" to provide satisfactory ways of interpreting the facts and continuing to live good lives. Examples of these modes of reflections are the religious, aesthetic, moral, scientific, subjective, and historical. The chief difficulty, however, is this: different modes attribute different significance to the same facts. The result is a conflict which causes meta-questions—philosophical problems—to arise. Such philosophical problems include, for example, the possibility of free action, the place of morality in good lives, and the nature of human self-understanding. Coping with such conflict normally involves one of two approaches.

The first approach, called absolutist, asserts that a certain mode of reflection provides the true significance of the facts and therefore must be assigned priority over the others, which have value only in subordination to this mode. The precedence of a mode is justified, says the absolutist, when (and because) it is backed by the most rational and therefore most general reasons—reasons which hold for all agents in all circumstances.

The second approach, called skeptical relativist, claims that, since there is no independent, supra-elementary standard capable of deciding the issue in favor of one mode of reflection, the resolution of philosophical problems is futile. Instead, one should abandon the search for decisive solutions and embrace the peace which attends understanding that it is in the essence of modes of reflection to conflict indecisively. Reflection will thus cease to operate on the philosophical level, and one must be content to reason only within particular modes of reflection, or to allow human custom to deal with the disruptive facts of life.

Kekes agrees with the absolutist that philosophical problems must be answered, but agrees with the relativist (and, he claims, with the history of philosophy) that it is futile to search for decisive, universal, and permanent solutions to philosophical problems. He proposes instead the pluralist approach. This does not seek to dissolve problems but to resolve them, that is, "defuse" them through rational, particular, and temporary solutions (p. 78). In other words, rationality need not be tied to universality, and one may reasonably construct a hierarchy of modes of reflection "as the context of the comparisons and evaluations changes" (p. 70). Pluralism is, in effect, an *ad hoc* rational prioritizing of certain modes of reflection over others by reason of the particular facts, circumstances, possibilities, and agents.

In the second half of this book, Kekes applies this pluralist approach to resolving five philosophical problems: the meaning of life, the possibility of free action, the place of morality in good lives, the art of life, and the nature of human self-understanding. Within the limits of the book's range of interlocutors, he is largely successful.

To briefly summarize: this is one of the more lucid and articulate books to discuss this important issue. Because the writing quality is of a very high order, the reader will readily absorb Kekes's initial exposition of the problem and follow him to his final conclusions. One may end up disagreeing with these conclusions, but one will have learnt to look at an old problem from a novel, illuminating, and human angle.—Christopher Albrecht, *St. Basil College.*

KIMBALL, Roger. *Experiments Against Reality: The Fate of Culture in the Postmodern Age.* Chicago: Ivan R. Dee Publisher, 2000. viii + 359 pp. Cloth, $28.50—Roger Kimball is managing editor of *The New Criterion*, an art critic for the *London Spectator*, and a frequent contributor to the *Wall Street Journal.* Not the sort of credentials we might expect from a

metaphysician. Still, since many modern and contemporary "metaphysicians" are actually poets masquerading as philosophers, Kimball's metaphysical analysis is an instance of the delicious irony that philosophy's history often plays on hubristic intellectuals: the nonprofessional must enter the scene to show the so-called experts how to do their job.

Kimball describes his book as "largely a chronicle of spiritual disillusionment—by turns artfully resisted or eagerly embraced" (p. vii); an apt description of any accurate history of modern philosophy. However, Kimball's work is more than an overview of modern philosophy's history: a trenchant philosophical critique of many of the silly things intellectuals say and do to avoid the damaging cultural consequences that necessarily flow from logically consistent application of their metaphysical errors. Kimball's case is also an instance of considering the damaging effects that culture suffers when intellectuals take seriously the notions that everything is possible and nothing is true.

More specifically, *Experiments Against Reality* is a sober philosophical critique of the Enlightenment project and its damaging cultural effects. Kimball divides the book into an introductory chapter and three parts that include sixteen subsequent chapters. In order, title chapters are: 1. "Experiments Against Reality"; 2. "Art *v.* Aestheticism: the Case of Walter Pater"; 3. "The Importance of T. E. Hulme"; 4. "A Craving for Reality: T. S. Eliot Today"; 5. "Wallace Stevens: Metaphysical Claims Adjuster"; 6. "The Permanent Auden"; 7. "The First Half of Muriel Spark"; 8. "The Qualities of Robert Musil"; 9. "James Fitzjames Stephen *v.* John Stuart Mill"; 10. "The Legacy of Friedrich Nietzsche"; 11. "The World According to Sartre"; 12. "The Perversions of Michael Foucault"; 13. "The Anguishes of E. M. Cioran"; 14. "The Trivialization of Outrage"; 15. "'The Two Cultures' Today"; 16. "Francis Fukayama and the End of History"; 17. "Josef Pieper: Leisure and Its Discontents."

Fittingly, Kimball starts his analysis and defense of philosophical realism against Enlightenment sophistry by reference to Ernst Robert Curtius's classic *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages* (1948). Like Curtius, Kimball envisions his own work to be more than the product of scholarly interests. Kimball rightly recognizes that an antiphilosophical, totalitarian impulse underlies the Enlightenment mind, the same sort of impulse that we witness in old Thrasymachos finds rebirth in thinkers like Nietzsche and his bastard children Derrida, Foucault, Heidegger, Rorty, and so on. This creates a problem for modern culture. Philosophy helps "to create a moral climate intolerant of tyranny" (p. 340). Yet today philosophy is in disarray; it is virtually nonexistent. Philosophy helps to create a climate that enables us to listen to reasoned arguments. Philosophy depends on leisure. Modernity, however, eschews leisure and "the contemplative attitude of beholding" that philosophy needs to exist and flourish. "Consequently, the obliteration of leisure naturally leads to the perversion of philosophy" and of culture (p. 342).

Kimball's text is largely, if not entirely, a sustained reflection on the obliteration of culture that has necessarily ensued as modernity engaged in a dangerous attack on philosophical realism. Kimball sees this as an attack on the conditions of culture. Hence, we witness in all cultural areas a blurring of once sharp distinctions. For example, while de-

constructists like Rorty, Derrida, and Foucault practice "an attack on the cogency of language and the moral and intellectual claims that language has codified in tradition" (p. 15), the fine arts in general become trivialized as they gradually replace an allegiance to beauty with obsession with novelty, outrage, extremism, and an increasing allegiance to propaganda.

Like nature, the fine arts abhor a vacuum. Through writers like Pater, Eliot, Stevens, Auden, Spark, Musil, and so on, Kimball traces a series of struggles that have occurred within the world of modern fine arts as intellectuals have fought to avoid or fill just such a vacuum left by the Enlightenment deconstruction of philosophical realism. Kimball's work displays sweeping familiarity with classical philosophy and unusual philosophical acuity. *Experiments Against Reality* is a serious philosophical work, one of the few legitimately philosophical works that I have read from the hands of a contemporary writer. Anyone interested in resisting our slide toward totalitarianism and rebuilding philosophical realism should find this book to be a rich resource of ammunition.—Peter A. Redpath, *St. John's University, Staten Island, NY.*

LANGAN, Thomas. *Surviving the Age of Virtual Reality.* Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000. 200 pp. Cloth, $29.95—The tone of its title notwithstanding, this book is not a self-help tract hawking glib recipes for success in the Cyber Age, nor even a contribution specifically to the philosophy of technology. Although Langan hopes for a broadly literate readership, his task is to understand "the *Being* of the epoch in which we are trying to survive" as requisite to deciding how best we should live. The problem of surviving the age of virtual reality thus rejoins the perennial concerns of philosophy in a renewed *gigantomachia* over Being.

What is called for, Langan argues, is the kind of thinking that will afford a full appreciation of all that is "given" in our age as a font of possibilities from which to appropriate responsibly those that best serve to realize the full potential of our nature. To this end, he seeks methodologically to strike a delicate balance, combining a "realist" mindfulness to the way things are independently of our interpretations with a hermeneutic sensitivity to the changing interpretive horizons within which things come to be for us in the first place. Langan's use of the term "Being" reflects this strategy, encompassing in a conception of all that is or can be, both the real in itself existence of things, persons, and their relations (*esse*) and their historical being-interpreted (*Sein*). Yet he would feign to keep this "ontological difference" dialectically open. To give absolute priority to *esse* would belie our essential historicity and undervalue our hermeneutic situation; but giving absolute priority to *Sein* would foreclose a genuine appreciation of the permanent dimensions of human reality, including what stems from the infinite *esse* of God.

Against common usage, Langan uses the term "virtual reality" not just to denote the range of our technologically created simulations of relations to the real. The term also signals for him a deeper issue, to wit, that in our time all of our relations to reality have become complicated in new and varied ways, and in the event appear in an unprecedented manner to be deeply problematic. The immediate issue is to learn how to survive in such circumstances, since the danger of losing contact with what is truly real and living out an illusion—always a fatal possibility—is now especially great. In another sense, however, the issue is learning to survive the age itself as an age characterized by the ubiquity of problematic, "distracted" relations to reality, an age which as such, *Dei gratia*, we will learn truly "to live beyond" (*super-vivere*).

Langan names the distinctive being of our epoch, "HTX." HT stands for "High Technology," the adjective "high" signaling the high degree of abstraction from the immediate mechanical manipulation of natural givens that marks the "being" (hence the whole configuration of techniques, mind-sets, institutions, implements, symbolizations, that constitute and sustain them) of the prominent technologies (chemical, nuclear, and electronic) that are characteristic of our age; X because the phenomenon has no ready name, not quite culture or civilization, but encompassing and "Xing out" both, constituting in the process the ultimate situating context, the "world system" within which, like it or not, we all must learn to live. Roughly two thirds of this study is devoted to discovering truly "where we are" by examining the HTX phenomenon itself—its seeds in the transition from the primitive world to the advent of civilization to industrialization; its essence and anatomy as both deeply rooted historically, yet constituting an essentially new planetary-scale social reality; and its allegedly "capitalist heart." The latter third of the study considers the survival question itself in terms of the appropriation from this epochal reality of genuine possibilities for a renewed spirituality and relation to what is real.

This book continues the project that Langan began in *Tradition and Authenticity*, *Being and Truth*, and *The Catholic Tradition*, in which he explores the dimensions of "appropriation" as a critical process in the service of understanding the "sense of it all" with a view to authentic being. His argument is guided by a "natural faith" convinced that much of what comprises the reality of our situation is a grace, having its ultimate source not in *Gunst des Seins* but in God. Accordingly, Langan identifies the root of our current difficulties not in absolute intrinsic shortcomings of the HTX, but in our own failure to appreciate and carry forward the genuine possibilities for authentic being that are truly given to us to be appropriated. Doubtless, those who do not share this natural faith will have difficulty appreciating the positive aspects of the capitalist, patrician, 1950s American ethos that Langan celebrates as redemptive, seeing instead in the current HTX actuality of these elements, the very injustices, exploitations, *bêtises*, and hypocrisies that constitute a dimension of the problem. Still, given what is at stake, only the foolish or dishonest would dismiss Langan's argument out of hand.—Robert Burch, *University of Alberta.*

MEIER, Georg Friedrich. *Vernunftlehre.* Edited by Günter Schenk. Halle: Hallescher Verlag, 1997. x + 1002 pp. DM 222—G. F. Meier was born in Halle in 1718 and died there after an uneventful life in 1777. He may not be well known to the English speaking public, but he is important because he was among the most authoritative figures of the *Aufklärung* and in particular because his influence on Kant was considerable. In accordance with the understanding of logic that prevailed during the eighteenth century, Meier's *Vernunftlehre* and its abridgment for courses, the *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre,* both published in 1752, are at the same time and especially an introduction to the whole of philosophy. In fact, their goal is not just the elaboration of the formal aspects of logic, but rather the individuation of the elements of thought and language that make human cognition possible. What is peculiar in Meier's approach is that instead of limiting himself to formal truth, he includes in his logic all kinds of epistemic truths. Meier deals not only with "dogmatic" and "historical" truths, but also with "merely aesthetic," "merely philosophical," and even "aesthetical-philosophical" truths. Moreover, Meier's logic is not only inclusive of aesthetics, it is at the same time rhetoric. In fact, at the beginning of both books, Meier declares that under *Vernunftlehre* he understands a science that deals with the rules of philosophical cognition and philosophical speech. Kant adopted Meier's two logic books for his lectures on logic for forty years. It is not at all surprising, then, that Kant's own logical writings and even his *Critique of Pure Reason* were influenced by Meier. So too, one finds in Kant's *Reflections on Logic* and *Lectures on Logic* elaborations of some of the fundamental issues addressed by Meier, such as the analysis of prejudices and the articulation of the conditions for the constitution of a horizon. In this context, Locke's philosophy plays an especially important role. In fact, Meier served as mediator between Locke and Kant. Meier not only knew Locke well and appealed to his theories in his writings; he also helped to introduce Lockean issues such as the "extent of human knowledge" and the "degrees of assent" to the teaching of logic in the German universities; and, most important, he made such issues salient for the philosophy of Kant.

There was, in any case, no "overcoming" of Meier by Kant, just as there was no "double life" of Kant as a teacher in Königsberg and as a scientist within the *république des letters.* There was rather a genuine connection of teaching and research. In fact, if one examines the logic lectures together with the *Critique of Pure Reason,* one sees that many terms adopted or introduced by Meier played a decisive role in shaping the terminology of the First Critique. In his consideration of continuities and transformations in Kant's logical writings, Norbert Hinske has shown that Kant gradually put together a new philosophical language by drawing upon traditional Greek-Latin or Latin terms and recent Germanizations; and both sorts of terms were available to Kant from Meier in great number (*Zwischen Aufklärung und Vernunftkritik* [Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann Holzboog, 1998], pp. 30, 32–9). For an example, Hinske points to the development of Kant's understanding of "science." In moving from an initial adherence to Wolff's mathematical method to his own critical formulation in the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant passes

through his remarks upon Meier's notion of a system as a connected set of "dogmatic truths." One cannot commend enough the editor, Günter Schenk, and the publisher, the Hallescher Verlag, for reprinting Meier's *Vernunftlehre*. It remains to be said that besides a huge set of interesting endnotes to Meier's text, Schenk's reprint edition offers also the texts of the reviews that saluted the publication of the book as well as all remarks made on it by J. H. Lambert and a selection of those by Kant. There is also a biographical sketch and registers to German, Latin, and Greek technical terms.—Riccardo Pozzo, *The Catholic University of America*.

MORAN, Dermot. *Introduction to Phenomenology*. New York: Routledge Press, 2000. xx + 568 pp. Paper, $24.99—Drawing upon his almost thirty years of reading and lecturing on phenomenology (p. xvii), Moran provides in this book an introduction to the phenomenological movement—a movement that, as he rightly claims, "in many ways, typifies the course of European philosophy in the twentieth century" (p. xiii). Moran's book sketches the views of nine philosophers whose works either fall squarely within the parameters of phenomenology or draw a significant inspiration from phenomenology. He begins with an introduction to the thought of Franz Brentano, whose concern for an "exact scientific philosophy, and, specifically, his project for descriptive psychology" provide much intellectual impetus for the founding of phenomenology by Edmund Husserl (p. 23). Moran then devotes four of the remaining twelve chapters to the views of Husserl, two chapters to those of Martin Heidegger, and one chapter each to the philosophies of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hannah Arendt, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Jacques Derrida.

In his comments on all of these philosophers, Moran provides the reader with interesting details from their personal and intellectual biographies (and he includes a rather careful look at Heidegger's connection to the Nazi party). He then provides an explanation of what he sees as their most important philosophical contributions, with a focus upon those contributions that are either phenomenological in character or that respond in some way to phenomenology. Moran highlights Husserl's early *Logical Investigations*, his subsequent development of the phenomenological "reduction," and his concern for the historical contributions to knowledge, especially as seen in his later work, *The Crisis of European Sciences*. He then focuses upon (among other things) Heidegger's investigation into the meaning of "Being" and his development of a hermeneutical phenomenology, Gadamer's hermeneutics, Arendt's analyses of totalitarianism and the human condition, Levinas's other-oriented ethics, Sartre's analysis of consciousness and its relation to the ego and the world of the "in-itself," Merleau-Ponty's views on perception and the "incarnation" of awareness, and Derrida's development of deconstruction from a critique of phenomenology and structuralism. Moran connects the views of each philosopher with those of others

within the phenomenological movement, and he raises important problems that each philosopher's perspective must face. His book ends with an extensive bibliography and index.

Moran's writing is consistently clear, and his work provides information useful to readers of various philosophical backgrounds interested in familiarizing themselves with phenomenology (and thus with much of twentieth-century Continental thought). His work on the French phenomenologists is particularly helpful. He also successfully heads off some common mistakes of interpretation. For example: he makes it clear that Husserl undergoes no fundamental reversals of thought in his movement to an investigation of history (p. 65), that the transcendental domain and the historical effects upon knowledge are affirmed together by Husserl (p. 67 and pp. 80–1), that Husserl's aim of a presuppositionless beginning does not require a deliverance from history but simply a turn to evidence (p. 126), that Heidegger relies upon Husserl's notion of interpretation (*Auffassung*) and world (pp. 234–5 and pp. 226–7), and that Derrida does not intend to deny the principle of noncontradiction (p. 449). Unfortunately, after clarifying Husserl's notion of presuppositionlessness as calling us to evidence, he allows that notion to be contrasted with Gadamer's notion of prejudice as a condition of evidence without comment (p. 278). Moran is also unable to provide a sufficient clarification of the pivotal Husserlian concept of the transcendental ego (compare p. 174), which should be characterized as the locus of phenomenological evidence (that evidence uncovered by the transcendental-phenomenological reduction) and carefully distinguished from the admittedly related conception of the *eidos* ego. It would have also been nice to have included a section introducing at least one text representative of the later Heidegger. (Moran focuses entirely on *Being and Time*, and gives only a few general comments on Heidegger's earlier and later thought.) Even with its shortcomings, Moran's *Introduction to Phenomenology* remains an extensive and worthy reference work.—Andrew Lamb, *University of Georgia.*

MORELAND, J. P. and RAE, Scott B. *Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics.* Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2000. 384 pp. Paper, $22.99—What do Jerusalem and Athens have to do with the Mayo Clinic? Biola University professors Moreland (philosopher) and Rae (ethicist) show us the intrinsic connection between substance dualism and the ethics of personhood. Far too often, "science" or "medicine" makes pronouncements on the status of this or that individual's personhood, and it simply has no business doing so. This, Moreland and Rae argue, is the domain of theology and philosophy—however helpful science might be in giving insight to how physical systems (such as the human body) function. Scholar and student alike will profit from their insights, and this book would make an excellent textbook for classes in applied or medical ethics and certain metaphysics courses.

The book is divided into two parts. In the first part (one chapter of it), they begin by presenting biblical justification for a substance dualist position. In the remainder of part 1, they go on to offer an impressive array of sophisticated metaphysical arguments defending this view.

Perhaps contrary to expectations, Moreland and Rae are not Cartesian dualists, but Thomistic substance dualists. This more integrated dualism better supports the kind of *functional holism* familiar to us all—a deeply unified body–soul/mind interaction which eludes us in Descartes's argumentation. Yet such a formulation makes conceptual room for a temporary disembodied existence. The soul is the "individuated essence that makes the body a human body and that diffuses, informs, animates, develops, unifies, and grounds the biological functions of its body" (p. 202). At any rate, this book serves as an important corrective to the presumed materialism/physicalism in much of today's philosophical (and even theological) climate. After all, if God—a spiritual Being and Creator—exists, then the believer has good reason to think human souls can interact with physical bodies, the physical world, and other free agents and self-movers.

Throughout the bulk of part 1, materialist and complementarian views are examined and found wanting. Human persons are substances rather than property-things. Also, a truly robust understanding of personhood embraces free agency and significant personal identity.

By the admission of many naturalists or complementarians (who make theology and philosophy subservient to the hard sciences), libertarian free agency is simply impossible. However, Moreland and Rae argue that substance dualism rescues robust free agency from the grips of determinism and makes room for personal moral responsibility—in addition to first-person awareness and absolute personal identity. Naturalism—which denies any kind of essence or nature to humans—ultimately robs them of their dignity, freedom, and moral status. As Jaegwon Kim admits, naturalism is "imperialistic," demanding "full coverage," exacting "a terribly high ontological price."

In part 2, abortion and fetal research, reproductive technologies, genetic technologies and human cloning, and euthanasia/end-of-life issues are treated. Moreland and Rae are equally capable in dealing with ethical issues, applying the previously discussed metaphysical insights to the moral status of the fetus, clones, extracorporeal embryos, the comatose, and so forth. It is here we come to a unique feature of the book: Moreland and Rae rightly place importance on the ontological and ethical priority of essentialism as opposed to functionalism (defining human personhood according to the functioning of consciousness, mental abilities, goal-setting abilities, and so forth). Because human beings are substances with hierarchically ordered soulish capacities, even if certain capacities are not presently functioning in some human beings (just as they don't when the rest of us are sleeping!), such capacities continue to exist (latently) because the human whole is ontologically prior to its parts. Such a realization brings clarity to the ethical ramifications regarding personhood, which have been made fuzzy by physicalistic and naturalistic anthropologies. We have an obligation to care for all human beings—whether mentally and physically functioning in normal or abnormal states and at varying maturity levels—and to do harm to none.

Moreland and Rae ably defend the rights and intrinsic value of the fetus, the personhood of human clones (as they, being more than identical genetic material, possess souls—although cloning them is ethically problematic), and the personhood of extracorporeal embryos (they possess the same internal essence as the rest of us, needing only the time and environment to mature).

It is no accident that the theistic worldview, which has biblically and historically been dualistic, is being challenged by naturalism and materialism. Substance dualism has important theological ramifications and we should not be surprised to see naturalists resisting them. However, such opposition is not due to the lack of solid philosophical or metaphysical arguments presented by substance dualists. Truly, such a book offers an important counterargument to the rampant pneumatophobia in academia.

Philosopher Richard Swinburne writes of this book: "It is very good to see a version of dualism (constant with the Christian tradition) not merely developed and defended but applied to most of the central issues of medical ethics which are pressing today. . . . The authors show convincingly how many of their views about medical ethics follow directly from their version of dualism."—Paul Copan, *RZIM/Trinity International University.*

MURPHY, Liam B. *Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. viii + 168 pp. Cloth, $35.00—Murphy's book is concerned with what he calls the "puzzle of beneficence": that, while there are many moral issues on which people tend to agree, there is not only no consensus about the extent of the obligation to promote the well-being of strangers, but in fact a contentedness about the uncertainty of our obligation in this regard. Although there are some famous philosophical suggestions concerning the reasons for this puzzle (Sidgwick's point that there are often severe practical limitations on what we can do for those who are removed from us, for example), Murphy claims that what is most important is our tendency to view beneficence in terms of collective responsibility. The question of collective responsibility raises particularly the issue of "non-ideal theory"—"what a given person is required to do in circumstances where at least some others are not doing what they are required to do." Murphy's chief aims are first to explain the absurdity of the demands of the utilitarians' "optimizing principle of beneficence"—that we must keep benefiting others until the point where further efforts would burden us as much as they would help the others—and to suggest instead a more plausible principle of beneficence. His suggestion—a "collective principle of beneficence"—involves a "compliance condition": that the demands on a complying person should not exceed what they would be under full compliance with the principle.

Murphy argues at some length that the apparent absurdity of the optimizing principle of beneficence is due not to a problem of "overdemandingness" in general, but rather to a failure to take into consideration nonideal situations where there is only partial compliance. Although his more technical formulations of the correcting "collective" principle of beneficence are admittedly "cumbersome," the "basic idea," as he represents it, is that "a person need never sacrifice so much that he would end up less well-off than he would be under full compliance from now on, but within that constraint he must do as much good as possible" (p. 87). The argument for this position has some intuitive appeal when it is applied, for example, in situations where the fairness of imposing extreme demands is clearly in question. Murphy uses the following example: if everyone else including me would die from a nuclear explosion that I can prevent by exposing myself to a lethal does of radiation, I am required under his principle to do so (since under "full compliance" I would be dead anyway and thus no better off than in my heroic partial compliance). Murphy has to give a more complicated response to a less intuitively appealing apparent consequence of his principle—that, when used to consider issues like poverty, it would not seem to require many people in our actual world to sacrifice. He admits that his principle cannot be a stand-alone basis for ethics—for one thing, the concern of his argument is specifically with the difficulties of principles of beneficence, which make a requirement on us that it would be wrong not to perform; voluntary or supererogatory acts are thereby left aside. There are, as well, some familiar further problems (Would anyone ever act on this principle? How precisely is it to be action-guiding?) which may in the end, however, be no more difficult for Murphy's principle than for the principle of optimizing beneficence.—Allen Speight, *Boston University.*

RANASINGHE, Nalin. *The Soul of Socrates.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000. xx + 196 pp. Cloth, $35.00—In *The Soul of Socrates* Nalin Ranasinghe seeks to "reconstruct the uncanny experience of meeting" Socrates, which has been "lost in the verdant groves of academia" (p. ix), by emphasizing the philosopher's humanity, playfulness, and resoluteness in the face of modern nihilistic challenges of "fundamentalism" and "rampant materialism" (p. xv). In so doing Ranasinghe challenges several current factions in Platonic scholarship, including postmodern philosophers who merely "read Plato with a view to displaying their own cleverness and urbanity," as well as analytical philosophers who "may interrogate the dialogues with the same rigor that they would lavish on a professional colleague, but . . . fail to see the dramatic unity of a dialogue" (p. x). Ranasinghe also sets himself apart from other scholars who "are keenly aware that a Platonic dialogue is as much a dramatic performance as a logical argument," and yet whose interpretations paradoxically "lead to a very skeptical opinion of Socrates" (p. x). Taking his cues from such "giants" as Stanley Rosen, Leo Strauss, and Jacob

Klein, Ranasinghe returns to several early Platonic dialogues, including the *Republic*, *Protagoras*, *Phaedo*, and *Symposium*, in order to "derive a more positive view of the human condition" and of Socrates' way of life generally speaking (pp. xv–xvi). This positive view sees Socrates as a teacher of philosophic *eros*, which reflects a perennial tension between *poros* and *penia*, plenty and need, and is yet at the same time a "transcendental force that attunes the loving soul to the cosmos" (p. xii).

Choosing essentially to preach to the converted rather than directly confront dissenters of a postmodern, analytical, or skeptical bent, Ranasinghe candidly admits that his book contains few references to other scholarly works, but instead offers "interesting and consistent readings that reveal the profound dramatic unity of the dialogues in question" (p. xiii). For him, this exclusive focus on the dialogues is ultimately "more vulnerable and more demanding" (p. xi). The vulnerability of this approach is apparent, however, in Ranasinghe's reading of the *Republic*. That Socrates is more determined to curb Glaucon's tyrannical tendencies than to define justice in any absolute or totalitarian sense is an argument which has already been set forth in more detail by others. The same can be said of Ranasinghe's contention that in the *Phaedo*, Socrates is less interested in providing definitive proofs of the immortality of the soul than in reminding us of the "transcendental ideas by which he oriented his life" (p. 56).

The book, however, is not without instructive insights. For instance, Ranasinghe situates the *Protagoras* within the context of Athens toward the end of the Peloponnesian War, shedding light on Pericles' conceptions of democratic rule and political virtue by comparing them with the views of Protagoras. For Ranasinghe, the "erotic contest" that occurs in the *Symposium* "parallels the quarrel of the goddesses Athena, Aphrodite, and Hera." He explains: "Since he defends the family and chthonic forces deeply resentful of the optimistic aspirations of democracy, tragedy, and humanism, Aristophanes well resembles Hera. . . . Conversely, Aphrodite and the [other interlocutors] are connected through the optimistic mentality of excessive and unenlightened eros that led, paradoxically, to such violent and tragic events as the Trojan and Peloponnesian Wars" (p. 109). Socrates resembles Athena in his desire to moderate between *poros* and *penia*, as well as the wily Odysseus, whose preference for the "moral prudence of Penelope" over the "effortless knowledge" of Circe and Calypso mirrors the philosopher's lifetime striving for self-knowledge (p. 158). Ranasinghe also draws enlightening parallels between Alcibiades' treatment of Socrates at the end of the *Symposium* and Menelaus' interrogation of the elusive Proteus. A particularly thought-provoking comparison between the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus* concludes the book.—Lisa Pace Vetter, *Villanova University*.

RAPPE, Sara. *Reading Neoplatonism: Non-discursive Thinking in the Texts of Plotinus, Proclus, and Damascius*. New York: Cambridge University

Press, 2000. xxii + 266 pp. Cloth, $59.95—It was Plato who informed the Greek philosophical tradition of how the King of Egypt declared that writing will inevitably "implant forgetfulness in men's souls; they will cease to exercise memory because they rely on that which is written, calling things to remembrance no longer from within themselves, but by means of external marks" (*Phaedrus* 275a). Plotinus likewise knew how these "wise men of Egypt" therefore chose to inscribe only one image in their temples and thus "manifested the non-discursiveness of the intelligible world" (*Enneads* 5.8.6). Sara Rappe reminds us that such passages are not infrequent throughout the history of Neoplatonism, suggesting how Plato and his followers struggled to understand the proper use of the written word, the role of images and symbol, as well as the very possibility of the transmission of truth itself. Focusing on the question: "How is intuitive wisdom communicated, especially within the context of a philosophy that repudiates language but continues to practice speculative metaphysics?" (pp. 1–2), Rappe has produced a helpful work aimed at examining the Neoplatonic hermeneutic.

The first half of this work (pp. 25–114) begins with an examination of Plotinus' criticism of discursive thinking. Although dependent upon Aristotle's notion of ἐνέργεια, the immaterial, precognitive union between the knower and the known, Plotinus "wants to lead the mind out of its habit of looking at the world as essentially outside of the self, as composed of a number of objects with discrete essences that are known in all sorts of ways, but primarily through the senses and through thinking about the essences" (p. 44). Given his metaphysics of unity, a point that is unfortunately not developed here, Plotinus' henology insists on the denial of essentialism and discursive reasoning so as to transcend any subject-object duality. As Rappe so vividly pictures it, Plotinus wants to train and exercise the mind to realize that it can only see the beautiful objects of the world by seeing through the world: "the world as a whole . . . is conceived as an icon, a sacred image of the god who can be encountered face to face within his shrine. . . . The exercise helps the student to treat the world as a theophany, as an image of the deity whose real presence is yet to be recognized. This recognition is best attained, according to Plotinus, within an introspective search: Plotinian prayers employ the formula, 'alone to the alone'" (p. 89). Throughout this discussion, Rappe shows how although Plotinus may have prefigured Descartes in the use of "thought experiments," the Plotinian turn within is anything but Cartesian, the latter being a discursive introspection reifying and personifying the thinker. This section concludes with an examination into Plotinus' understanding of personhood, self-knowledge, subjectivity, as well as the importance of symbolic language throughout the *Enneads*.

By the beginning of the second half (pp. 117–243), Rappe's main point becomes clear: Neoplatonism's understanding of knowledge as union sought a way of transmitting truth that did not threaten the very unity it sought. She therefore next demonstrates how later thinkers came to incorporate the images and symbols of Orphic cosmology and Pythagorean number because "the authority extracted from the prestige of these symbols allows an alternative to the authority of the texts themselves. It is this freedom or hermeneutic space occasioned by the ap-

propriation of the Pythagorean elements that now allows for self-reflection" (p. 120). That is, Proclus saw the text as a didactic process aimed at initiating and transforming the reader into the ways of vision and union. Like Proclus' *Platonic Theology*, later writers such as Damascius, the last of the platonic *Diadochi* (d. 538), also saw the text as pointing to theurgic ritual. Rappe accordingly shows how these later texts wish to reveal "a sacred space that the soul is supposed to fill out with its vision" (p. 185).

It is refreshing to see the later Neoplatonists receiving more and more scholarly attention. Sara Rappe is an Associate Professor in the Department of Classics at the University of Michigan and has produced a path-breaking study. Often the transitions within and between chapters could be clearer, possibly due to Rappe's borrowing from four previously published articles. More important, one seeks in vain for a reason why Neoplatonism is limited to non-Christian thinkers. Would not the rich apophatic tradition of Christianity, so well expressed in Pseudo-Dionysius' criticism of those who "are concerned with meaningless letters and lines, with syllables and phrases" (*On the Divine Names* 708c), be a welcomed complement here? These criticisms withstanding, this work will prove helpful for all interested in Neoplatonism and the role of language and symbol within philosophical systems.—David Vincent Meconi, S.J., *University of Innsbruck.*

SCHACHT, Richard, editor. *Nietzsche's Postmoralism: Essays on Nietzsche's Prelude to Philosophy's Future.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. xiv + 264 pp. Cloth, $54.95—The essays in this volume focus upon Nietzsche's conception of philosophy as a postmoral, postreligious reinterpretation and reevaluation of human living. With the exception of Schacht's own contribution, these essays were originally presented at an international conference on "Nietzsche's Philosophical Thought and Its Contemporary Significance" at the University of Illinois in October 1994, during the sesquicentennial of Nietzsche's birth. I briefly summarize each essay.

Ivan Soll, in "Nietzsche on the Illusions of Everyday Experience," attempts to resolve an apparent incoherence between, on the one hand, Nietzsche's claim that our perceptual, linguistic, and artistic reconstructions of the world amount to Appolonian illusions for the sake of rendering life tolerable and, on the other, Nietzsche's rejection of the Kantian appearance/reality distinction, upon which the very notion of illusion seems to be founded.

Rüdiger Bitter, in "Masters without Substance," adverts to the fact that Nietzsche's anti-Aristotelian denial of substance, and specifically his claim that there are no free human subjects behind human activity, lies in tension with the doctrine of the will to power, an analysis of

human action wherein more powerful subjects in some manner come to subdue less powerful subjects. Bittner attempts to reconcile these two notions by challenging Nietzsche's adherence to the myth of creativity.

Alan Schrift, in "Rethinking the Subject," examines Nietzsche's genealogical and antimetaphysical critique of the classical notion of human agency as grounded in the subject. Sympathetic to recent postdeconstuctive trends calling for a retrieval of the subject, Schrift draws upon the thought of Foucault and Gilles Deluze to offer a reinterpretation of Nietzsche's *Ubermensch*—not as a fixed ideal of human perfection, but rather as a dynamic way of becoming by self-overcoming.

Alan White, in "The Youngest Virtue," attempts to interpret the meaning of Nietzsche's central intellectual virtue, *Redlichkeit*. White differentiates *Redlichkeit* from honesty and truth-telling and provides a genealogical account of the development of this virtue. *Redlichkeit* overcomes nihilism by maintaining a willingness to speak in life-affirming ways, even while cognizant of the absence of any horizon which might provide metaphysical assurances for such affirmation.

Robert Pippin's essay asks how it is possible, given the impossibility of objective truth, to love nondogmatically and free of *ressentiment*, one particular way of life over another. He suggests that Nietzsche would ground the meaning and significance our allegiance to ideals neither in reflection and deliberation, nor in the willing of responsible subjects, nor, certainly, in any Platonic or Christian appeal to an objectively and universally confirmable good. Rather, life-orienting ideals must emerge from an historical understanding of "what fell apart and why" (p. 96) which clarifies the past, where we are now, and the desirability of possible ways of continuing life.

Maudemarie Clark, in "On the Rejection of Morality: Bernard Williams's Debt to Nietzsche," identifies a variety of Nietzschean elements within Bernard Williams's critique of morality. Specifically, Clark employs Nietzsche's thought to elucidate Williams's distinction between morality and ethics, as well as the devaluation of ethics which occurs through a moralistic emphasis upon blame, voluntariness, moral obligation, guilt, shame, and the ascetic ideal of moral purity.

Robert Solomon's essay attempts to account for the *ad hominem* character of Nietzsche's writings by exploring the possibility of situating Nietzsche within the tradition of virtue ethics. Solomon discusses Nietzsche's revaluation and appropriation of traditional virtues, as well as his advocacy of distinctively Nietzschean virtues and character states.

Richard Schacht's own essay, "Nietzschean Normativity," challenges the view that Nietzsche's contribution to moral philosophy has been merely negative or capriciously relativistic. While there remains no transcendent ground of normativity, there does emerge, implicit within various forms of human living (*Lebenssphären*), a "service of life" which is itself normative inasmuch as it makes possible diverse manners of establishing personal identity and sociocultural involvement.

James Conant, in "Nietzsche's Perfectionism: A Reading of *Schopenhauer as Educator*," challenges standard interpretations of Nietzsche's perfectionism as construed in terms of a moral, political, or aesthetic

elitism. Rather, Nietzsche's perfectionism is to be understood in terms Nietzsche's intention philosophically to engage his reader in the self-disruptive task of self-perfecting.

As a whole this volume constitutes a significant contribution to Nietzsche scholarship and, as intended, indicates possibilities for a Nietzschean future of philosophy.—Paul St. Amour, *St. Joseph's University.*

SHARPE, R. A. *Music and Humanism: An Essay in the Aesthetics of Music.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. ix + 221 pp. Cloth, $35.00—From the nature and origin of expression in music to authenticity in performance, almost every topic implied by the title makes an appearance in this book. The author's apparent familiarity with a vast number of publications on the subject is overwhelming, his acquaintance with the repertoire is impressive. If the reader is prepared to work through the maze of discussions, the final paragraph of the book reveals Sharpe's thesis: "The marginalization of tonality . . . is . . . a tragedy for the art."

The preceding 207 pages offer a thinly camouflaged defense of many a traditional view of music. Foremost among these is the validity of value judgments, and the distinction between Western classical music and all others. The "camouflage" consists of the trendy application of feminine pronouns wherever the general nature of the reference permits, even though almost every name mentioned in the book belongs to a man, and of bowing to the musically aesthetically untenable rejection of Wagner—a favorite sport of the last fifty years. Sharpe also acquiesces in including the period between 1500 and 1700 as part of the great flowering of European art music, while clearly aware of the sparse lineup before the arrival of Bach.

In his gentle, civilized manner, Sharpe seems to take on everyone whose thoughts on the subject of music have been published in English during recent decades, while relying for support on voices from the more distant past. Especially in the first half of the essay, he cites Wittgenstein with great frequency, but then proceeds to impeach his star witness by recalling what he sees as Wittgenstein's gross error in failing to appreciate Mahler. Significantly, though, he manages to weave his argument to the point where he feels justified in proposing that any statement about music may be instantly contradicted by citing an example for the opposite view.

There is a fundamental question about this essay's intended audience. Beyond a very select group of musicologists and others who write about musical aesthetics, it is difficult to identify the beneficiaries of Sharpe's reflections. Music lovers, even informed ones, would be lost among the bewildering array of references to writers, composers, works, performers. Professional musicians would find the emphatic rejection of Liszt, Wagner, Brahms ("except for Symphony No. 2"), and Puccini, and mild dismissal of Chopin and Verdi—all in favor of Janácek, Shostakovitch,

Sibelius, and Stravinsky—unnerving, and even an inveterate Anglophile such as I am, cringes at the suggestion that Britten could rival Bach, and that audiences may have invested in comprehending Tippett much in the way they had done in the case of late Beethoven.

What of serious students, then? Alas, they would look in vain for enrichment of their understanding of music. That is significant, for Sharpe lists no fewer than seven categories of "understanding" music. However, missing from the lineup is an altogether different kind of understanding, the pursuit of which makes all of us students for life. It is the perpetual dialogue with the great creators of music, the exhilarating, frustrating, rejuvenating effort to comprehend and execute just one phrase of a Mozart Concerto, a Beethoven Sonata, a Chopin Ballade perhaps a fraction better than the time before.

Often closer to meditating aloud than to writing a treatise, Sharpe does not make reading his opus an easy task. Editorial attention to duplicate words, confusing sentences, and structural clarity would have helped. Yet Sharpe cares deeply about music, and that is of overriding importance at a time when the dearth of new music (of lasting value) is complemented by a suicidal "reevaluation" of our musical treasury by much of academia.—Balint Vazsonyi, *Concert Pianist, formerly Professor of Music, Indiana University.*

SKLAR, Lawrence. *Theory and Truth: Philosophical Critique within Foundational Science.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. x + 153 pp. Cloth, $29.95—This concise book derives from a series of the John Locke Lectures given at the University of Oxford in 1998. Sklar argues in it, in an original and interesting way, for the familiar idea of essential inextricability or continuity of science and philosophy. In particular, he is concerned to show that a number of key problems about science, discussed in a very abstract way by philosophers, are the very problems that face scientists doing research in the foundations of physics. When one realizes that and focuses one's attention upon those scientific problems, one will be able to shed new light upon abstractly pursued philosophy of science. By the same token, a convincing case will be made against "quietist" or "naturalistic" views that regard scientific practice and scientific theories as complete and self-explanatory, as well as hold that they do not require any external philosophical interpretation.

Sklar discusses three groups, or families, of problems common to science and philosophy. All of them are expressions of moderate skepticism concerning the idea that our scientific theories are for the most part true and accurately represent the way the world is. In the first group, problems deal with the distinction between observable objects or properties and the unobservable ones, and with the various attempts to eliminate the latter. In abstract philosophy those attempts of ontological elimination are in general motivated by epistemological considerations, for example by the conviction that we do not have proper evidential support for the statements about unobservables in order to accept

them, or—more radically—that such statements are devoid of cognitive or representational content. Although those considerations appear also to play an important role in ontological reductions within particular scientific theories, the reductions are mainly motivated and justified by special features of the theories in question (a desire to incorporate new data in simple and nonarbitrary way, a desire to remove conceptual and mathematical difficulties inherent in a theory, and so on). The second family of problems which Sklar delineates is driven by the idea that fundamental physical theories are applicable to the real world only after a number of idealizations have been made (for example, it has been assumed that the system considered by a given physical theory is not subject to interference from the outside, or it has been taken to be a special "limiting case" of some real system). Thus, there is a point to the claim that scientific theories do not describe the real world but merely construct various, more or less simplified and "distorted," models of it. The third group of problems discussed by Sklar relates to the idea that our scientific theories are transient, and therefore it is unreasonable to believe that even those we currently firmly accept, and consider extremely well-supported by available evidence, will not be refuted in the future.

Sklar concludes his book with the general moral "that there is a profound role played within the scientific enterprise of constructing, testing and revising, or replacing foundational physical theories by just the kind of critical, philosophical thinking familiar within general methodological programs" (p. 141). However, he also constantly emphasizes that such thinking generates within science slightly different issues than those that attract the attention of philosophers deploying it in more abstract contexts. Presumably that is right, but if so, then Sklar weakens his case considerably against the advocates of quietism or naturalism, since they may reply that what we have here is simply theoretical thinking that brings profitable results within science, and goes astray in pure philosophy.—Tadeusz Szubka, *Catholic University of Lublin, Poland.*

SPINOZA, Baruch. *Political Treatise.* Translated by Samuel Shirley. Introduction and Notes by Steven Barbone and Lee Rice. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2000. xvi + 193 pp. Cloth, $34.95—This volume completes the series of translations of Spinoza's main Latin works by Samuel Shirley. The translator, working almost to his ninetieth year, is to be congratulated on the clarity, accuracy, consistency, and readability of his work. The previous English version of the *Political Treatise* (by A. G. Wernham) dated from 1958 and is now unobtainable. The only other version still on sale (by R. H. M. Elwes, 1883) has many omissions and mistakes.

The introduction, notes, and bibliography make use of the latest international Spinoza scholarship and will be indispensable to both the student and the serious scholar. The book would be worth buying for its bibliography alone—at 26 pages, an invaluable resource for the study of

Spinoza's political thought. The editors' notes unearth countless cross-references to other works. The introduction rehearses the issues familiar to Spinoza scholars—the debt to Hobbes, the connection with the other writings, the contents of the missing final chapters—with elegance and clarity. A lucid contrast is drawn between *potentia* and *potestas*. The introduction is perhaps less useful for students or for beginners to Spinoza's thinking. It contains less than might be expected on the inflammatory events which surrounded his two political works. The context is sketched, but we are left to ourselves to decide whether it posed a question to which Spinoza's works were an answer.

Steven Barbone and Lee Rice make an solid attempt to relate the *Political Treatise* to the *Ethics*: a task which surely remains worthwhile, given the surprising level of ignorance of Spinoza's nonmetaphysical work which lingers in the English-speaking world. Nothing is this area in uncontroversial. The introduction tells us, for example, that "Instead of God, the opening chapters of the *Political Treatise* (which summarize Spinoza's metaphysics, a metaphysics that one can arguably maintain lies rooted in the physical universe) focus on nature" (p. 22). So the beginner might be puzzled to find Spinoza writing in chapter 2, that "the power of natural things by which they exist, and consequently by which they act, can be no other than the eternal power of God" (p. 37), or that "God has right over all things, and God's right is nothing other than God's power" (p. 38), or that "Nature's ordinances are the ordinances of God" (p. 45); but of course these remarks have been read in many different ways.

The edition is prefaced by a few sensible pages on "Why Read the *Political Treatise*?" by Douglas Den Uyl. These offer sound remarks on the strangeness of Spinoza's world and, at the same time, its relevance to current political thinking. The hint that Spinoza shows us how a link can be made between "systematic philosophy and social theory" (p. xiv) is valuable.

Neither Barbone and Rice nor Den Uyl dwell on Spinoza's Jewish background. The reader might be curious to know whether this had any effect on his thought. On the place of women on the final page of the text, Den Uyl notes that "What Spinoza says here is not so contemporary in its argument" (p. xiv): a reticent comment on views which are as heretical today as Spinoza's views on religion were in his own time.

Like its predecessors, this volume is a commendable contribution to Spinoza studies. Even at its hardback price it is a bargain, but for the sake of students a paperback edition should follow as soon as possible.—Richard Mason, *Wolfson College, Cambridge.*

STERN, Josef. *Metaphor in Context.* Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000. xvii + 385 pp. Cloth, $45.00—Engaging contemporary notions of metaphor and drawing on his past work on the subject, Josef Stern presents a theory of metaphor (or more precisely, metaphorical interpretation) which is based both on context and semantics. Over the past two decades phi-

losophers of language, linguists, and cognitive scientists have generally believed that metaphor is external to the general conceptions of semantics and grammar. Moreover, metaphor is understood in its pragmatic sense, that is, as having its nature defined by its employment and various uses in language as opposed to the content and character present in the meaning of metaphor. Stern sets as his goal a challenge of such readings of metaphor. Dialoguing with and challenging eminent thinkers on the subject of metaphor, including Donald Davidson and David Kaplan, Stern competently sketches his vision of metaphorical meaning which underlies a speaker-hearer's capacity to interpret a metaphor by "drawing on a deep analogy between demonstratives, indexicals and metaphors." His engaging views raise interesting questions and give much food for thought. Issues addressed include: the literal paraphrasability of metaphors vis-à-vis cognition, the roles of exemplification and similarity in metaphorical interpretation, dead metaphors, the pictorial character of metaphors, and the relation between metaphors and the literal.

Specifically, Stern maintains, "the component of a speaker's ability to interpret a metaphor that falls within his semantic competence proper is precisely what enables him to express knowledge *by* the metaphor that is *not* equivalently expressible except through its metaphorical mode of expression" (p. 261). In order to achieve his aim, the author proves, and convincingly so, how two key theses about knowledge by metaphor hold together. First, "[m]etaphors (i.e., utterances in which at least one constituent is interpreted metaphorically) are truth-valued utterances; hence metaphors have truth conditions or propositional content no different from that of literally interpreted utterances" (p. 265). Second, "[t]he information or knowledge or cognitive content (i.e., content that is either true or false, or true or false *of* things) communicated by a metaphor is at least in part a function of the specifically metaphorical mode by which the utterance is interpreted" (p. 265).

Stern weaves a middle course between both the decoration and autonomy theorists. Stern remarks, "By identifying the cognitive significance specific to a metaphor with its character and distinguishing it from its propositional content, we can acknowledge that there *is* a genuine semantic and cognitive difference between the metaphorical and the literal without making it occult. What distinguishes metaphors is their context-sensitive character-istic perspective. By subsuming metaphors within the general category of expressions of nonconstant character, including demonstratives and indexicals, we can both recognize what makes them different and begin to understand [them]" (p. 299). Many questions arise from Stern's theory. For example, are character and content so easily distinguishable as Stern would have us believe? Are metaphors truly analogous to demonstratives and indexicals or are they *sui generis*? Are the Dthat and Mthat discussions adequate as they stand? Are there degrees of nonconstancy which would catapult metaphor outside of its semantic context, especially given that metaphors seem not to be solely determined by their context and given the element of surprise (p. 274 and following)? Stern admirably anticipates and

deals with such questions, especially in his discussion of Kaplan, Davidson, and Frege. He also intimates possible responses to such questions in the section devoted to objections and replies in chapter 6.

Stemming from the richness of Stern's investigations, the philosopher is challenged by many issues implied by Stern's discussion. The author treats the issue of similarity in chapter 5 and metaphor and simile in chapter 6. Metaphors not only communicate similarities, but, often tacitly or apophatically, they communicate profound differences. These differences must be taken into consideration. Hence, when Juliet is metaphorically called the "sun" by Romeo (metaphor of exemplification), we also imply, albeit tacitly, many differences. For example, Juliet is not like, that is, she is different from the cold night; she is not like the frigid moon. Though Stern discusses the many meanings possibly communicated by metaphors and the fact that metaphors of exemplification can also conceal "a fully conceptualized and independently understood property" (p. 163), the direct question of difference and its relation to similarity in metaphorical expression, interpretation, and knowledge, a theme which weighs heavily in French linguistic thought (Levinas, Derrida, and others), is not fully addressed. Stern mentions the mediaeval notion of analogy, of which metaphor was a certain type. Analogies and metaphors, for the mediaevals, express both a *similitudo* and a *differentia*. It would have been interesting to hear what Stern has to say on the subject of difference and whether it is related to or stems/derives from the difference he discusses as existing between character and content. Moreover, though Stern speaks of judgment here and there, one is curious to learn more about the role judgment plays in understanding and interpreting metaphors, that is, if judgment is somehow distinguished but not separated from knowledge and the act(s) of cognition. Does metaphor imply a certain kind of judgment internal or external to its structure? This wish is more a personal desire on the part of the reviewer, which springs from Stern's in-depth analyses, and is not a reflection of a gap in Stern's thinking. Finally, the most interesting and engaging is the last chapter devoted to the relationship between the literal and the metaphorical. Stern admirably addresses the notion of transcendence and dependability and their commensurability and incommensurability vis-à-vis metaphor and its relation to the (literal) context it operates both within and above. In sum, Stern gives contemporary philosophers both a scholarly and philosophical text that is rich in research, meaning, and philosophical possibilities.—Antonio Calcagno, *University of Guelph.*

THAGARD, Paul. *Coherence in Thought and Action.* Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000. xiv + 312 pp. Cloth, $35.00—In this ambitious book, Paul Thagard develops a theory of coherence as constraint satisfaction that is precise enough to be stated formally, yet general enough to have application to an array of philosophical problems. Working within the framework of cognitive naturalism, Thagard aims to reunite philosophy and psychol-

ogy by employing "a computational theory of coherence to illuminate both the psychological task of understanding human thinking and the philosophical task of evaluating how people ought to think" (p. 2). The formal theory of coherence is presented in chapter 2, and is used in chapter 3 to characterize the main kinds of epistemic coherence: explanatory, analogical, deductive, perceptual, and conceptual. Over the next few chapters, Thagard applies these to a variety of venerable philosophical problems, including the nature of reality, the existence of God, the problem of other minds, and (with the introduction of deliberative coherence) the ethics of capital punishment and abortion. In a very interesting chapter, the theory of coherence is extended to account for the role of emotion in human cognition and later applied to understanding judgments of beauty and humor. One should consider this book not as giving the final word on these matters, but as showcasing the promise of cognitive naturalism.

Thagard contends that much of human thinking can be explained in terms of coherence. Each of the following can be characterized as a coherence problem: determining which propositions to believe, deciding which scientific theories or normative judgments to accept, and choosing which courses of action to take. What is needed is a principled way to determine whether the proposition, theory, normative judgment, or course of action "fits" or "hangs together"—that is, coheres—with all the available evidence. Thagard presents a formal theory of this coherence. The general idea is to partition a set of elements (propositions, theories, actions, and so forth) into disjoint subsets (Accepted and Rejected) maximizing the satisfaction of constraints determined by the coherence- and incoherence-relations holding between elements. Coherence-relations include explanation and deduction; incoherence-relations include inconsistency and incompatibility. If two elements are coherence-related, they are positively constrained and should be accepted or rejected together. If two elements are incoherence-related, they are negatively constrained, and one should be accepted if and only if the other is rejected. Since the strength of the coherence between elements may vary, the constraints can be assigned different weights. The coherence of a partition of a set of elements is defined as the sum of the weights of the constraints that are satisfied. "Coherence is maximized if there is no other partition that has greater weight" (p. 19).

This account of coherence can be implemented quite naturally in a connectionist network, and Thagard admits that his formal account is an abstraction from a connectionist program called ECHO that he has used successfully to solve explanatory coherence problems having as many as 150 elements. (In the appendix to chapter 4, Thagard gives the results of using ECHO to test the comparative coherence of materialism, dualism, and theism.)

In chapter 7, Thagard uses his theory of coherence to construct a model for consensus in medicine, the natural sciences, and politics. Thagard gives an instructive account of the change in consensus regarding the cause of ulcers, and evaluates the effectiveness of consensus-building practices in the medical community. The book ends with a somewhat technical comparison of coherentist and probabilistic

accounts of causal inference, and a brief discussion of the future of coherence. Thagard writes in an accessible manner, and at the end of every chapter is a useful summary. I recommend this book to anyone curious about the fecundity of the methods of cognitive science to philosophy as a whole.—Ray Rennard, *Johns Hopkins University.*

VENEMA, Henry Isaac. *Identifying Selfhood: Imagination, Narrative and Hermeneutics in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur.* Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. xii + 206 pp. Paper, $20.95—This book is a careful study of writings by Paul Ricoeur from his early discussions of phenomenology, through the development of his hermeneutic philosophy, to recent texts on the self and the other. Venema identifies the development of a hermeneutical understanding of identity and selfhood as the central issue that belongs to Ricoeur's work. He discusses the distinct phases that belong to that work, and the specific concerns that Ricoeur comes to address in those phases, in the light of this issue. The hermeneutical treatment of identity and selfhood begins in a critique of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. Venema develops that critique by focusing, not exclusively but significantly, on the first part of *Ideas I.* He argues that one finds in transcendental phenomenology claims to a self-transparent and independent ego whose achievements occur with necessity. A critique that discovers immanent problems in these claims is the first step that Ricoeur takes in moving toward a hermeneutical understanding of identity. A second step occurs when Ricoeur focuses on the significance of the imagination. Imagination mediates between the multiplicity of involuntary dispositions and the unifying function of voluntary capacity. It also mediates between the finitude of passive receptivity and the infinite effort to determine what is received with names. This effort, in turn, locates the self in a situation of power over others in a context that nonetheless also calls for the reciprocals constitutions of selves. Venema notes the anomalous character of this position. He claims that it continues to be present in related and basic ways throughout the development of Ricoeur's work. The analyses of metaphor seriously attempt to exhibit the reciprocity of identity and difference and to contribute to a hermeneutic of reciprocal self-constitution. At the same time, parts of those analyses suggest a primacy of identity over difference in relation to language, selfhood, and Being. This undercuts the claim that selves are constituted through reciprocal relations with each other and with the world. The analyses of narrative uncover an understanding of identity as something that comes about insofar as narrative discourse configures and refigures temporal experience. At the same time the appropriation of narrative possibilities seems to presuppose a voluntary *cogito* that stands over against the flux of symbolic and narrative discourse. Finally, Ricoeur extends the discussion of identity expressly to include the problem of selfhood. Continuing to define identity in narrative terms, he insists on both the distinction between and the correlation of self-sameness and self-

constancy in the identity of the self. However, the way in which his discussions of identity and selfhood combine a semantic analysis of self-reference with a pragmatic analysis of self-designation leads to problems that ultimately render his account of the self's receptivity of the other inadequate or at least incomplete.

Throughout, Venema combines detailed comment on the many specific issues that Ricoeur addresses in his key works with a discussion of the central issue that Venema identifies as belonging to Ricoeur's work as a whole. He is not simply offering a commentary on Ricoeur's work. He is entering into a genuine philosophical dialogue with that work that probes its details, identifies the overarching problem that unites those details, and addresses Ricoeur's treatment of that overarching problem with sustained critical reflection. Venema's final aim is to exhibit the essential merit of Ricoeur's hermeneutical understanding of identity and selfhood and to indicate at the same time the limits of a project that identifies the world in which the self is located with the referential world of the text. One might ask, however, if an assessment of the limits as well as the merits of a hermeneutical consideration of identity and selfhood might not profit from a further analysis of the philosophical position whose critique is the starting point of that consideration. Transcendental phenomenology, one may argue, offers subtle and dialectical possibilities for understanding identity, selfhood, and self-constitution that are not always noticed from that standpoint of hermeneutical critique. If so, then an understanding of those and related matters would best develop through a dialogue between transcendental phenomenology and the hermeneutical phenomenology that Ricoeur develops and that Venema discusses in a very substantial and genuinely philosophical way.—Martin J. De Nys, *George Mason University.*

WEDIN, Michael V. *Aristotle's Theory of Substance: The Categories and Metaphysics Zeta.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. xiii + 482 pp. Cloth, $55.00—Significant scholarship has been devoted to the problem of the incompatibility of Aristotle's accounts of substance (*ousia*) in the *Categories* and in the *Metaphysics*. Substance, in the former treatise, is that category of being distinguished from the other accidental categories by reason of the ontological dependence of accident upon substance: every accident must be present in a substance to be present at all. Primary substances such as "Socrates" are distinguished from secondary substances such as "human being" or "animal" since secondary substances are said of primary ones. Only primary substances are neither said of a subject nor present in a subject, depending upon nothing else for their existence. This assertion of the ontological primacy of the individual seems to be withdrawn by Aristotle, however, in the *Metaphysics*, in which substance emerges in a discussion of the *hupokeimenon*—the underlying subject of which everything else is predicated. This subject is to be understood in three senses: as matter, as form, and

as the composite of the two. Primary substance, finally, is granted to form alone, the "most perplexing" of the candidates, according to Aristotle (*Metaphysics* 7.3.1029a20–33), and the one that turns out to refer to the same thing as essence. Since what Aristotle means by essence looks to be a form common to all individuals of a particular species, it is not surprising that commentators identify at worst a contradictory theory regarding substance, and at best a transformation of an immature theory of substance into a mature one.

Yet Aristotle (as his teacher Plato) has offered the reader no written indication either that one theory ought to be rejected or that we need pay attention to whether some of his investigations are mere youthful attempts at understanding. Michael Wedin's book is thus a refreshing exploration of the problem of substance in the thought of Aristotle. Hoping to overcome the "orthodoxy of the day" (p. 2), Wedin proposes that Aristotle's separate discussions in fact complement one another by forming a unified theory of substance, and that their apparent incompatibility stems from the fact that the project of the *Categories* is ontological, while that of the *Metaphysics* is explanatory.

The *Categories*, Wedin successfully argues in his first three chapters, contains from the beginning a carefully drawn strategy (this is, it turns out, a rather unorthodox view). The three *onymies* are employed because it is necessary to locate a single grouping principle—synonymy—that can provide the basis of a system of categorizing individuals, whether substantial or nonsubstantial. The system detailed in the early chapters of the *Categories* is not merely a taxonomy of the basic sorts of beings that are, but a complex semantical theory of "the underlying ontological configurations for standard categorical statements" (p. 37). After a deepening of the debate concerning the status of nonsubstantial individuals in chapter 2, where it is argued that no such individual is in a substance universal, chapter 3 turns to the topic of ontological commitment. For Aristotle, it is necessary to provide an account of "what things must exist and in what relations they must stand, if ontological statements are to be true" (p. 67). Aristotle's concern is to develop an underlying ontology of a primary substance or individual, giving the notion of classification central importance. Since this concern is Aristotle's primary one in the *Categories*, he leaves unresolved the ontological status accorded to secondary substances such as species and genera. *Metaphysics* Z might appear to concern itself with and resolve this very issue, but Wedin argues that *Metaphysics* Z "is devoted almost entirely to form and its role in explaining the nature and chief features of what the *Categories* calls primary substances" (p. 121).

Chapters 4 through 10 of Wedin's book are devoted to a full account of how the theory of the *Categories* serves as an explanandum for the theory of the *Metaphysics*. The question for Aristotle now concerns the substance of the substances of the earlier treatise. Form is primarily the substance of such substances, and an analysis of what form must be like to serve as such a substance is essential for explaining why a given portion of matter counts as an individual thing. Form, as the essence of the individual thing, assumes a causal role and thus assumes the explanatory primacy sought by Aristotle. Since form serves such an explanatory function, it must for Aristotle be general or universal, despite what

Aristotle appears to claim later in *Metaphysics* Z.13. For Wedin shows, with what he calls his "No-Part Argument," that Aristotle is establishing only that "no universal can be a part of the substance-of something it is predicated of" (p. 385).

Wedin is a careful and insightful reader of Aristotle, and his book will prove to be invaluable to specialists schooled in the analytic tradition. Those, however, not familiar with or opposed to the methodology of analytic philosophy might be suspicious of some of Wedin's moves. For example, when attempting to account for why Aristotle turns to the soul in one set of examples but not in another, Wedin proposes that in one instance "the soul occurs as a subject chiefly as a matter of convenience and without canonical standing" (p. 123). Others take Aristotle's use of the soul to signal the fundamental importance of the nature of the questioner as part of any genuine inquiry into the perplexity that is *ousia*. Another related difficulty is perhaps to be located in the particular methodology Wedin employs. Wedin admits that he deals only with certain chapters of *Metaphysics* Z, reflecting his view that the chapters he omits "were not part of the original course of *Metaphysics* Z," or not part of what he considers to be the "canonical chapters" (p. 8). Since Wedin is optimistic that the omitted chapters could possibly be compatible with his reading of Aristotle's intended account, it would be unfair to accuse him of succumbing to the very same sort of orthodoxy that he seeks to overturn.—Michael Golluber, *St. John's College, Santa Fe.*

WEIGEL, Valentin. *Gebetbuch (Bilchlein vom Gebet): Vom Gebet: Vom Beten und Nichtbeten.* Edited by Horst Pfefferl and Valentin Weigel. Sämtliche Schriften: Neue Edition, vol. 4. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1999. 242 pp. n. p.—An important figure in the history of German thought, Valentin Weigel, a contemporary of Michel de Montaigne, was for long time unjustly underestimated. In the last years, however, there has been a reawakening of interest in him, proved by the new start of the historical-critical edition sponsored by the Academy of the Sciences of Mayence in 1996 (a previous start resulted in seven volumes produced between 1962 and 1978) as well as by a number of recent studies, among which the notable monograph by Andrew Weeks, *Valentin Weigel (1533–1588): German Religious Dissenter, Speculative Theorist, and Advocate of Tolerance* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999). In his works as a theologian, a philosopher, and an alchemist, Weigel anticipated the advent of a tolerant culture of individual knowledge and conscience. His sources are to be found in the traditions of medieval mysticism (Meister Eckhart, Johannes Tauler, the *Theologia Germanica*), Renaissance philosophy (Nicholas Cusanus and Paracelsus), and Reformation-era radical theologians (Sebastian Franck, Andreas Karlstadt, Caspar Schwenckfeld). He looked with sympathy at Thomas Müntzer and at the Anabaptists, which led to his

exclusion from mainstream Lutheranism. Weigel argued for the inner autonomy of the lay individual in search of knowledge and salvation.

Weigel had but a very scarce impact in his own life. Most of writings were edited posthumously by a group of followers (Weigel's most famous writing are *Vom Gesetz oder Willen Gottes, Gnothi seauton,* and *Der güldene Griff, Alle Ding ohne Irrthumb zu erkennen, vielen Hochgelährten unbekannt, und doch allen Menschen nothwendig zu wissen,* which contain a mystical theory of cognition with special attention to visual perception and have been reedited by Horst Pfefferl in 1996 and 1997) and influenced Jakob Böhme and other seventeenth-century Protestant mystics. The *Gebetbuch* was never published in its completeness, although its first part had been included in the *Vier Bücher vom wahren Christentum* by Johann Arndt (Brunswick, 1606), which provided it with considerable influence on Protestant edification literature and a profound impulse to the interiorization of prayer in the history of Protestant piety.—Riccardo Pozzo, *The Catholic University of America.*

YOURGRAU, Palle. *Gödel Meets Einstein: Time Travel in the Gödel Universe.* Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1999. xxiv + 253 pp. Paper, $24.95—"Intuitive time," Gödel says, "is what everyone understood by time before relativity theory." Such an understanding includes the perception or experience of objective lapse of time, presupposing a layer of successive "nows," and a change in the existing. The notion of temporality that Gödel came up with in his work on the general theory of relativity has, in contrast, often been taken to demonstrate the impossibility of such a theory to account for the intuitive notion of time, and even be inconsistent with it. So instead, what Gödel suggested is temporal idealism, that intuitive time is an illusion.

Gödel arrived at this conclusion from his discovery of a new solution to and model of field equations of the general theory of relativity, known as rotating or Gödel universes. In these worlds there exist closed, timelike world lines, and time travel, insofar as we can speak of it in such timeless models, becomes possible.

In this perceptive and important book, Palle Yourgrau goes on to explain and describe Gödel's discovery of such universes, his research on the relativity theory, and his struggle with the questions on the notions of time that Einstein's theory would permit or disallow. In particular, Yourgrau asks why Gödel arrived at this conclusion. Why did he not conclude that relativity theory itself would have some intrinsic limitations, in the spirit of his other impossibility results? This latter question, although interesting and reflecting the title of the book perhaps better than a couple of other topics in the book, is not discussed in any considerable length, however. (I suspect that the answer would have something to do with the special character of Gödel and Einstein's relationship, and the high opinion they had of each other's work.) A comprehensive exposition of these relations, to complement the picture we now have on Gödel's work on time and relativity, is still needed.

The book discusses Gödel's work in physics in depth, and tries to locate it within the more recent philosophical discussion on time, especially in the philosophy of language. It seems that the philosophical weight of Gödel's cosmology needs to be compared with his overall philosophical views, especially those he had in the philosophy of mathematics, however. Such a general comparison is not attempted in this book, although it provides much useful material on other related and acute philosophical topics, such as the notion of possible worlds, indexicality, reference, causality, and tense logics. Unfortunately these subjects are not rigorously judged against Gödel's general philosophical views. A fruitful starting point could be Gödel's actualism, his conviction that all meaningful concepts pertain to one actual world, and that other *possibilia*, insofar as the existence of such unrealized worlds or states of affairs is at all needed, reduce to, or can be analyzed within, our world. If temporal notions become of illusion, there are no other "ways things could have been" or "ways things will turn out to be," and so they all can be included within one generous whole. Although Gödel universes are merely possible in the sense that they are different, as intuitive time disappears in them while existing in ours, Gödel nonetheless did try to reconcile the two, to be able to announce that our world is a Gödel universe.

The book is a new and expanded edition of the author's *The Disappearance of Time: Kurt Gödel and the Idealistic Tradition in Philosophy* (Cambridge University Press, 1991). It has one new chapter and two new appendices. The book would certainly not remain a last word on the subject, but it functions as a good source book on Gödel's cosmology and related philosophical problems. It should be remembered that Gödel himself took differing views on what counts as an intuitive notion of time, such as a change in the existing, and whether the concept of existence is something that cannot be relativized without destroying it. A reasoned analysis of intuitive time should then analyze also how one approaches intuitions in philosophy in general.—Ahti Pietarinen, *University of Helsinki.*

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PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 38, No. 3, July 2001

A "Meinongian" Solution to a Millian Problem, MARGA REIMER

Reimer proposes a Millian solution to IPEN, a solution that draws on Meinong's infamous account of singular terms—an account according to which some such terms refer to objects and individuals that do not exist. The proposed solution claims only that Meinong's theory, specifically, his view that there are nonexistent objects and individuals to which one can refer, is presupposed in ordinary, nonphilosophical discourse.

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 39, No. 1, January 2002

Art in the Advancement of Understanding, CATHERINE Z. ELGIN

Art often operates at the cutting edge of inquiry, as it challenges complacent assumptions, not just about matters of fact, but also about how problems and proposed solutions should be framed. Elgin suggests that a conception of cognitive progress complex enough to account for the scientific understanding cannot avoid accommodating art.

Felt Evaluations: A Theory of Pleasure and Pain, BENNETT W. HELM

Helm argues that pleasure and pain are not atomic constituents of other mental states, nor are they compound states made up of further atomic constituents. Rather, what makes something be a pleasure or pain is that it is an instance of a more general kind which she identifies as felt evaluation.

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*Abstracts of articles from leading philosophical journals are published as a regular feature of the *Review*. We wish to thank the editors of the journals represented for their cooperation, and the authors of the articles for their willingness to submit abstracts. Where abstracts have not been submitted, the name and author of the article

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Self-Deception and Valuing Truth, MARY FORRESTER

The contrast between valuing and desire explains how self-deception is possible—how a person can suspect and have the means for learning the truth and yet avoid it. Self-deception is in some respects intentional, and in others not.

Recent Work on Virtue Ethics, KAREN STOHR and CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN

Stohr and Wellman review recently published texts by Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Michael Slote and then consider virtue ethics's capacity to respond to three of its standard objections: virtue ethics cannot supply action guidance; virtue ethicists cannot establish an adequate link between virtue and flourishing; and virtue ethics cannot account for our convictions regarding rights and justice.

The Moral Relevance of Shame, JENNIFER C. MANION

Manion discusses shame's moral significance, and highlights its potential positive function for the person experiencing it, while recognizing a number of important qualifications. As with other powerful emotional experiences, not all occurrences of moral shame do an individual any good.

Fanning the Flickers of Freedom, DANIEL SPEAK

John Martin Fischer has certainly extended Harry Frankfurt's original argument in a powerful way by challenging the indirect relevance of the alternatives available to agents in the prominent counterexamples of the principles of alternative possibilities. This extension combines potently with the increasingly sophisticated formulations of these counterexamples.

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 10, No. 1, April 2002

Adorno on the Ethical and the Ineffable, JAMES GORDON FINLAYSON

The thesis is that Adorno has a normative ethics, albeit a minimal and negative ethics of resistance. However, Adorno's ethical theory faces two problems: the problem of the availability of the good and the problem of whether a normative ethics is consistent with philosophical negativism. The author argues that a correct of understanding the role of the ineffable in Adorno's *Negative Dialectics* solves both problems: it provides an account of the availability of the good that is consistent with his philosophical negativ-

ism. The author counters the prevalent objection that Adorno's aporetic philosophy, like some negative theology, leads to irrationalism and mysticism. The parallel with negative theology is developed by means of a comparison with Nicholas of Cusa. Drawing on Wittgentstein's saying/showing distinction and Adrian Moore's work the author argues that Nicholas and Adorno can be seen to share a philosophically defensible notion of ineffable knowledge.—Correspondence to: jgf2@york.ac.uk

The Causal Exclusion Puzzle, DAVID PINEDA

The article is divided into two parts. The first part offers a careful reconstruction and detailed discussion of the argument of causal exclusion, as well as of the implications it has for physicalism. In its second part the article examines two important objections to the causal exclusion argument: the generalization objection, which holds that the argument is unacceptable since it confers causal efficacy only to ultimate basic properties, which arguably might not exist; and Yablo's objection, according to which underlying the argument of causal exclusion there is a principle of causal parsimony which leads to strong counterintuitive results and should therefore be abandoned. The article offers grounds for rejecting both objections as well as a new diagnosis of the problem for mental causation generated by the causal exclusion argument.—Correspondence to: david.pineda@udg.es

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JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 38, No. 4, October 2000

Aristotle on Hope, G. SCOTT GRAVLEE

Gravlee looks at the place of hope in Aristotle's philosophical work, most notably in his discussions of courage. Gravlee focuses on the distinction between hope as a theological virtue and hope from a secular perspective.

Possible Worlds in the Tahafut al-Falasifa: Al-Ghazali on Creation and Contingency, TANELI KUKKONEN

Kukkonen presents the second half in an inquiry into the debate between al-Ghazali and Averroes on the metaphysical basis of modalities. Kukkonen examines al-Ghazali's "Tahafut al-falasifa."

Occasionalism and Occasional Causation in Descartes' Philosophy, DAVID SCOTT

Scott examines two issues pertaining to the body–mind relation in Rene Descartes's philosophy—the notion of body–mind occasionalism and body–

mind occasional causation. Scott argues that Descartes's occasional causation amounts to a form of interactionism that he terms "inefficacious body–mind transmissionism."

Shaftesbury's Two Accounts of the Reason to Be Virtuous, MICHAEL B. GILL

Gill examines Anthony Ashley Cooper's (the third Earl of Shaftesbury) ontological distinction between a moral sense theory and rationalism. Gill analyzes Cooper's reasons to be virtuous.

Judgment and Truth in Frege, MICHAEL KREMER

Kremer explores the textual reasons behind author Thomas Ricketts's interpretation of Gotlob Frege's conception of judgment, truth, and logic. In addition, Kremer takes a look at the connection of Frege's views to contemporary debates on the nature of judgment, truth, and logic.

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 39, No. 1, January 2001

A New Look at the Prime Mover, DAVID BRADSHAW

The Prime Mover is the activity of self-thinking thought; it is also actuality in the fullest sense, as both the cause of being for all things and as an existent altogether free of potency, and therefore possessing full and complete reality in the highest degree.

Suarez' Doctrine of Eternal Truths, AMY D. KAROFSKY

An interpretation of Francisco Suarez's doctrine of eternal truths is presented. Suarez considers and rejects several theories before developing his own.

Sensible Ends: Latent Teleology in Descartes' Account of Sensation, ALISON SIMMONS

One of Rene Descartes's hallmark contributions to natural philosophy is his denunciation of teleology. It is puzzling, then, to find him arguing that human beings have sensations in order to preserve the union of mind and body.

Malebranche's Distinction Between General and Particular Volitions, ANDREW PESSIN

The distinction between general and particular volitions is central to Nicolas Malebranche's theories of divine activity, theodicy, and occasionalism. Almost everything Malebranche says directly on the subject can be interpreted either way.

Getting Maimon's Goad: Discursivity, Skepticism, and Fichte's Idealism, PETER THIELKE

The historical evidence for Moses ben Maimon's influence on Johann Gottlieb Fichte is presented. Viewing Fichte in a Maimonian light simply adds another dimension to the understanding of the *Wissenschaftslehre*.

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 39, No. 2, April 2001

Aristotle as A-Theorist: Overcoming The Myth Of Passage, JACQUELINE MARIÑA and FRANKLIN MASON

Mariña and Mason analyze the puzzles raised by means of the commonplace ideas mentioned by Aristotle and they explore how Aristotle's own theory avoids a commitment to pure temporal becoming as real, the idea that the now moves through a fixed continuum along which events are arranged in chronological order. They also discuss Aristotle's substrate of time, namely change, and show why Aristotle argues that change must be thought of as following a magnitude.

Some Thoughts on What Spinoza Learned from Maimonides about the Prophetic Imagination. Part One: Maimonides on Prophecy and the Imagination, HEIDI M. RAVVEN

Ravven discusses Maimonides's theory about the prophecy and the imagination. Maimonides warns that philosophers have difficulty maintaining their rational–spiritual focus and turn to teaching and writing as grave social responsibilities.

Descartes' Dualism: Correcting Some Misconceptions, ANDREA CHRISTOFIDOU

Christofidou focuses on the claim that Rene Descartes based his dualism on a fallacious argument found in the "Discourse" Part IV, which involves a move from what he can or cannot doubt to a metaphysical conclusion. The argument is standardly referred to as the "argument from doubt."

Berkeley's Christian Neoplatonism, Archetypes, and Divine Ideas, STEPHEN H. DANIEL

Larrimore provides a brief survey of the tradition of temperament before Immanuel Kant, and expounds Kant's early and mature views of temperament in the context of his tradition, as well as in the context of his emerging practical philosophy. Some well-known parts of Kant's ethics make a new kind of sense when read in the light of the fact that their author thought humanity subdivided into temperaments.

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 39, No. 3, July 2001

What's Wrong with These Cities? The Social Dimension of sophrosune *in Plato's* Charmides, THOMAS M. TUOZZO

Tuozzo examines the treatment of the social dimensions of *sophrosune* in Plato's *Charmides*, focusing on passages mentioning two hypothetical cities.

Hume's Pyrrhonian Skepticism and the Belief in Causal Laws, GRACIELA DE PIERRIS

In "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding," David Hume endorses the normative use of causal reasoning but appears to contradict his own radical skeptical conclusions concerning causation and induction. De Pierris proposes a novel way to resolve this puzzle.

Some Thoughts on What Spinoza Learned from Maimonides on the Prophetic Imagination. Part Two: Spinoza's Maimonideanism, HEIDI M. RAVVEN

Spinoza agreed with Maimonides's doctrine of the imaginative (literary) character and the political function of the Bible, its authors, and the major prophetic figures. Spinoza adopted Maimonides's conception of prophecy as mimetic or productive and not only, or chiefly, as receptive.

Dilthey's Epistemology of the Geisteswissenschaften*: Between* Lebensphilosophie *and* Wissenschaftstheorie, JAMES REID

The comprehensive scope and detail of Wilhelm Dilthey's theory of life in the *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* have led to widely divergent assessments of his philosophical significance. Dilthey's thought falls short of the standards of rigorous science.

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 39, No. 4, October 2001

"By the Things Themselves": Eudaimonism, Direct Acquaintance, and Illumination in Augustine's De Magistro, MICHAEL MENDELSON

Mendelson discusses a passage from Augustine's *De Magistro*. As odd and as digressive as the eudaimonistic interlude may strike the present-day reader, it does not seem to strike Adeodatus as at all odd, nor does it seem out of keeping with the eudaimonistic emphasis that is such a prominent feature of Augustine's other works from roughly the same period.

Worthy Constraints in Albertus Magnus's Theory of Action, COLLEEN McCLUSKEY

McCluskey discusses Albert the Great's view of action within its historical context, considering the development of his theory throughout his career by examining the various texts in which he addresses the issues of action. He also looks at a possible motivation for Albert's position in *De homine* and concludes by indicating what is valuable in this account.

Tolerance as a Virtue in Spinoza's Ethics, MICHAEL A. ROSENTHAL

Rosenthal presents Spinoza's argument for tolerance as a component of his broader theory of virtue in the *Ethics*. He believes that Spinoza's tolerance is both a public and a private virtue.

Problems in Kant's Vindication of Pure Reason, TED KINNAMAN

Kinnaman demonstrates that Immanuel Kant's defense of reason in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is vulnerable to two strong objections. There are no grounds, on the basis of the argument in the first *Critique*, to think that the goals reason sets for one can be achieved; nor does Kant's theory provide a basis for defending his conception of reason against other plausible and coherent sources of warranted assertion, such as religion or culture.

MIND
Vol. 111, No. 441, January 2002

Tensing the Copula, DAVID LEWIS

A solution to the problem of intrinsic change for enduring things should meet three conditions. It should not replace monadic intrinsic properties by relations. It should not replace the having *simpliciter* of properties by standing in some relation to them (unless having them *simpliciter* always means standing in some relation to them, which is refuted by Bradley's regress). It should not rely on an unexplained notion of having an intrinsic property at a time. Johnston's solution satisfies the first condition at the expense of the second. Haslanger's solution satisfies the first and second at the expense of the third.

The Analytic Limit of Genuine Modal Realism, JOHN DIVERS and JOSEPH MELIA

According to the Genuine Modal Realist, there is a plurality of possible worlds, each world nothing more than a maximally interrelated spatiotemporal sum. One advantage claimed for this position is that it offers us the resources to analyze, in a noncircular manner, the modal operators. In this paper, the authors argue that the prospects for such an analysis are poor. For the analysis of necessity as truth in all worlds to succeed it is not enough that no modal concepts be used in the realist's account of a possible world (a fact the authors grant); rather, such an analysis will succeed only if the set of worlds that is postulated is complete. By appealing to plausible truths about the number of possible alien natural properties, the authors show that there are serious difficulties in guaranteeing that such a set exists without taking some modal concept as primitive. Accordingly, at least in its current form, Genuine Modal Realism must curtail its analytic ambitions.—Correspondence to: j.divers@leeds.ac.uk, j.w.melia@leeds.ac.uk

The Demise of the Doomsday Argument, GEORGE F. SOWERS, JR.

A refutation of the doomsday argument is offered. Through a simple thought experiment analyzed in Bayesian terms the fallacy is shown to be the assumption that a currently living person represents a random sample from the population of all persons who will ever have existed. A more general version of the counterargument is then given. Previous arguments that purport to answer this concern are also addressed. One result is determining criteria for the applicability of time sampling arguments, in other words, under what conditions can a specific instant in time be regarded as a random sample from a time span. Given this new understanding, the incredible conse-

quences of the doomsday and related arguments evaporate.—Correspondence to: gfsowers@msn.com

Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution, GOPAL SREENIVASAN

This paper examines the implications of certain social psychological experiments for moral theory—specifically, for virtue theory. Gilbert Harman and John Doris have recently argued that the empirical evidence offered by "situationism" demonstrates that there is no such thing as a character trait. The author disputes this conclusion. The article's discussion focuses on the proper interpretation of the experimental data—the data themselves the author grants for the sake of argument. The author develops three criticisms of the antitrait position. Of these, the central criticism concerns three respects in which the experimental situations employed to test someone's character trait are inadequate to the task. First, they do not take account of the subject's own construal of the situation. Second, they include behavior that is only marginally relevant to the trait in question. Third, they disregard the normative character of the responses in which virtue theory is interested. Given these inadequacies in situationism's operationalized conception of a "character trait," the author argues that situationism does not really address the proposition that people have "character traits," properly understood. A fortiori, the social psychological evidence does not refute that proposition. I also adduce some limited experimental evidence in favor of character traits and distil two lessons we can nevertheless learn from situationism.—Correspondence to: gsreenivasan@nih.gov

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PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 52, No. 206, January 2002

A-Theory for B-Theorists, J. PARSONS

The author attempts to characterize the A-theory of time in such a way as to avoid certain standard objections to it, like those derived from McTaggart's paradox. These objections often arise from conflation of the A-theory with other doctrines which are not entailed by it, but which happen to be held by individual A-theorists. In the author's view, the A-theory is most defensible when combined with a certain analysis of tense (which the author calls "the counterfactual theory of tense"), and with realism about the past and future.—Correspondence to: josh@coombs.anu.edu.au

Gruesome Connections, M. K. MCGOWAN

It is widely recognized that Goodman's grue example demonstrates that the rules for induction, unlike those for deduction, cannot be purely

syntactic. Ways in which Goodman's proof generalizes, however, are not widely recognized. Gruesome considerations demonstrate that neither theories of simplicity nor theories of empirical confirmation can be purely syntactic. Moreover, the grue paradox can be seen as an instance of a much more general phenomenon. All empirical investigations require semantic constraints, since purely structural constraints are inadequate. Both Russell's theory of empirical knowledge and Putnam's model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism illustrate the inadequacy of purely structural constraints.—Correspondence to: mmcgowan@wellesley.edu

Personal Identity and Thought-Experiments, T. S. GENDLER

Through careful analysis of a specific example, Parfit's "fission argument" for the unimportance of personal identity, the author argues that our judgments concerning imaginary scenarios are likely to be unreliable when the scenarios involve disruptions of certain contingent correlations. Parfit's argument depends on our hypothesizing away a number of facts which play a central role in our understanding and employment of the very concept under investigation; as a result, it fails to establish what Parfit claims, namely, that identity is not what matters. The author argues that Parfit's conclusion can be blocked without denying that he has presented an imaginary case where prudential concern would be rational in the absence of identity. The author's analysis depends on the recognition that the features that explain or justify a relation may be distinct from the features that underpin it as necessary conditions.—Correspondence to: tgendler@syr.edu

Lewis' Strawman, E. MARGOLIS and S. LAURENCE

In a survey of his views in the philosophy of mind, David Lewis criticizes much recent work in the field by attacking an imaginary opponent, "Strawman." His case against Strawman focuses on four central theses which Lewis takes to be widely accepted among contemporary philosophers of mind. The theses concern (1) the language of thought hypothesis and its relation to folk psychology, (2) narrow content, (3) de se content, and (4) rationality. The authors respond to Lewis, arguing (amongst other things) that he underestimates Strawman's theoretical resources in a variety of important ways.—Correspondence to: s.laurence@sheffield.ac.uk

Understanding Kant's Distinction Between Free and Dependent Beauty, P. MALLABAND

The author interprets Kant's distinction between free and dependent beauty in a way that makes it possible for an object to be judged dependently beautiful without being judged freely beautiful. This is an alternative to the analyses provided by Malcolm Budd and Christopher Janaway, which both face a dilemma because they entail that an object must be judged freely beautiful in order to be judged dependently beautiful. The dilemma is that either the determinant of a judgment of dependent beauty is based upon nonaesthetic criteria (if the object is not freely beautiful), or else the judgment is su-

perfluous for an account of aesthetic value. The author's analysis of the distinction allows both kinds of beauty to play a meaningful role in a theory of aesthetic value.—Correspondence to: phil.mallaband@talk21.com

Meaning and Truth-Conditions: A Reply to Kemp, R. G. HECK

In his *Meaning and Truth-Conditions*, Gary Kemp offers a reconstruction of Frege's infamous "regress argument," which purports to rely only upon the premises that the meaning of a sentence is its truth-condition and that each sentence expresses a unique proposition. If cogent, the argument would show that only someone who accepts a form of semantic holism can use the notion of truth to explain that of meaning. The author responds that Kemp relies heavily upon what he himself styles "a literal, rather wooden" understanding of truth-conditions. The author explores alternatives, and says a few words about how Frege's regress argument might best be understood.—Correspondence to: heck@fas.harvard.edu

Avoiding the Conditional Fallacy, J. GERT

Oversimple internalist accounts of practical reasons imply that we cannot have reasons to become more rational, because they claim that we have a reason to only if we would have some desire to if we were fully rational. However, if we were fully rational, we would have no desire to become more rational. Robert Johnson has recently argued that in their attempts to avoid this problem, existing versions of internalism yield reasons which do not have an appropriate connection with potential explanations of action. The author suggests that the problem is partly a result of failure to see that action-tokens are usually tokens of a wide variety of action-types, and that the internalist conditional need only be true of one of these types in order to justify a reason claim about the token.—Correspondence to: jgert@mailer.fsu.edu

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PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 52, No. 207, April 2002

The Varieties of Retributive Experience, C. BENNETT

Retribution is often dismissed as augmenting the initial harm done rather than ameliorating it. This criticism rests on a crude view of retribution. In our actual practice in informal situations and in the workings of the reactive (properly called "retributive") sentiments, retribution is true to the gravity of wrongdoing, but does aim to ameliorate it. Through wrongdoing, offenders become alienated from the moral community: their actions place their commitment to its core values in doubt. We recognize this status in blaming, a withdrawal of civility and solidarity which symbolizes the moral distance wrongdoers have put between them and us. Atonement is the

means by which they make themselves "at one" again with the community. Retribution is properly understood as a cycle which recognizes disruption and alienation, but aims at reconciliation.—Correspondence to: c.bennett@shef.ac.uk

The Doomsday Argument and the Number of Possible Observers, K. D. OLUM

If the human race comes to an end relatively shortly, then we have been born at a fairly typical time in the history of humanity; if trillions of people eventually exist, then we have been born in the first surprisingly tiny fraction of all people. According to the "doomsday argument" of Carter, Leslie, Gott, and Nielsen, this means that the chance of a disaster which would obliterate humanity is much larger than usually thought. However, treating possible observers in the same way as those who actually exist avoids this conclusion: our existence is more likely in a race which is long-lived, and this cancels out the doomsday argument, so that the chance of a disaster is only what one would ordinarily estimate.—Correspondence to: kdo@cosmos.phy.tufts.edu

Is Perspectival Self-Consciousness Non-Conceptual? A. NOË

As perceivers we are able to keep track of the ways in which our perceptual experience depends on what we do (for example, on our movements). This capacity, which Hurley calls perspectival self-consciousness, is a special instance of our more general ability as perceivers to keep track of how things are. The author argues that one upshot of this is that perspectival self-consciousness, like the ability to perceive more generally, relies on our possession of conceptual skills.—Correspondence to: anoe@cats.ucsc.edu

Analysis and Decomposition in Frege and Russell, J. LEVINE

Michael Dummett has long argued that Frege is committed to recognizing a distinction between two sorts of analysis of propositional contents: "analysis," which reveals the entities that one must grasp in order to apprehend a given propositional content; and "decomposition," which is used in recognizing the validity of certain inferences. Whereas any propositional content admits of a unique ultimate analysis into simple constituents, it also admits of distinct decompositions, no one of which is ultimately privileged over the others. The author argues that although Russell accepts this distinction between analysis and decomposition, Frege does not. In particular, the author considers claims which Dummett makes regarding how analysis and decomposition are related to two different models Frege at least suggests in discussing the composition of thoughts, the part/whole model and the function/argument model; and the author argues that in each case, while Russell accepts views which Dummett attributes to Frege, Frege does not.—Correspondence to: jlevine@tcd.ie

Further Remarks on Truth and Contradiction, B. ARMOUR-GARB and J. C. BEALL

The authors address an issue recently discussed by Graham Priest: whether the very nature of truth (understood as in correspondence theories) rules out true contradictions, and hence whether a correspondence-theoretic notion of truth rules against dialetheism. The article argues that, notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, objections from within the correspondence theory do not stand in the way of dialetheism. The authors close by highlighting but not attempting to resolve two further challenges for dialetheism which arise out of familiar philosophical theorizing about truth.—Correspondence to: bradley.armour-garb@wolfson.ox.ac.uk

Okasha on Inductive Scepticism, M. LANGE

In a recent paper replying to the inductive skeptic, Samir Okasha says that the Humean argument for inductive skepticism depends on mistakenly construing inductive reasoning as based on a principle of the uniformity of nature. The author disputes Okasha's argument that we are entitled to the background beliefs on which (he says) inductive reasoning depends. Furthermore, the article argues that the sorts of theoretically impoverished contexts to which a uniformity-of-nature principle has traditionally been restricted are exactly the contexts relevant to the inductive skeptic's argument, and (*pace* Okasha) are not at all remote from actual scientific practice. The author discusses several scientific examples involving such contexts.—Correspondence to: mlange@u.washington.edu

Reply to Heck on Meaning and Truth-Conditions, G. KEMP

Richard Heck has contested the author's argument that the equation of the meaning of a sentence with its truth-condition implies deflationism, on the ground that the argument does not go through if truth-conditions are understood, in Davidson's style, to be stated by T-sentences. The author's reply is that Davidsonian theories of meaning do not equate the meaning of a sentence with its truth-condition, and thus that Heck's point does not actually obstruct the author's argument.—Correspondence to: g.kemp@philosophy.arts.gla.ac.uk

Descartes and Ancient Skepticism: Reheated Cabbage? GAIL FINE

Several commentators have argued that there are significant differences between ancient and modern skepticism. Descartes is often thought to be the first to articulate the allegedly new and modern version of skepticism.

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW
Vol. 109, No. 4, October 2000

Nonconceptual Content and the "Space of Reasons," RICHARD G. HECK, JR.

Heck discusses Gareth Evans's argument that the content of perceptual experience is nonconceptual, and examines John McDowell's objections to these claims. Heck argues that there is a way of developing Evans's argument so that it is not vulnerable to these objections.

Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument, MICHAEL HUEMER

Huemer examines Peter van Inwagen's argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism, which he calls "the Consequence Argument." He presents an alternative version that makes the beta rule valid.

What Is the General Will? GOPAL SREENIVASAN

Sreenivasan argues that Rousseau's general will is the totality of unrescinded decisions made by a community when its deliberation is subject to certain constraints. He cites Rousseau's "Social Contract" as the textual basis of his argument.

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW
Vol. 110, No. 1, January 2001

Conceptual-Role Semantics for Moral Terms, RALPH WEDGWOOD

There is one semantical issue that has been prominent in contemporary metaethical discussions—namely, the dispute between cognitivists and noncognitivists. However, most contemporary metaethical discussions focus on metaphysical questions.

Changing the Cartesian Mind: Leibniz on Sensation, Representation and Consciousness, ALISON SIMMONS

G. W. Leibniz is not a Cartesian philosopher of mind. Leibniz claims that the mind is immaterial and immortal: that it is a thinking thing and is never

not thinking. Leibniz's views on sensation, representation, and consciousness are discussed.

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW
Vol. 110, No. 2, April 2001

Real Realism: The Galilean Strategy, PHILIP KITCHER

There are almost as many versions of realism as there are antirealists, each ready to supply a preferred characterization before undertaking demolition. Kitcher proposes that two distinct debates involve a common family of antirealist arguments, and that these arguments can be met through the application of a uniform realist strategy.

Intentionalism Defended, ALEX BYRNE

Traditionally, perceptual experiences were thought to have two distinct components; however, recently a number of philosophers have argued that this picture of perception is incorrect. According to them, the sensational component of a perceptual experience cannot vary independently of its intentional components: the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is entirely determined by the experience's propositional content—that is, by what it represents.

PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 76, No. 2, April 2001

An Error about the Doctrine of Double Effect: A Response to Kaufman's Reply to Botros, SOPHIE BOTROS

In replying to the author's article "An Error about the Doctrine of Double Effect," Kaufman claims that the permission given by the four-condition Doctrine for certain mixed actions is merely complementary to an absolute prohibition—which he claims is the DDE's primary function. The author points out again that in many cases this makes an appeal to the DDE's fourth condition not merely redundant but incoherent. Furthermore, his claim that the author is a utilitarian maximizer, frustrated by a doctrine prohibiting intentional harms however great the net overall benefit, is based on a misrepresentation: the author did not object to a candidate for justification under the DDE being rejected before reaching the fourth condition, only to its being accepted.

PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 77, No. 1, January 2002

The Neglected Controversy Over Metaphysical Realism, MARY KATE McGOWAN

The author motivates and clarifies the controversy over metaphysical realism (the claim that there is a single objective way that the world is) by defending it against two objections. A clear understanding of why these objections are misguided goes a considerable distance in illuminating the complex and controversial nature of m-realism. Once the complex thesis is defined, some objections to it are considered. Since m-realism is such a complex and controversial thesis, it cannot legitimately be treated as inevitable unless, of course, there are no viable alternatives to it. For this reason, a brief defense of nonrealist metaphysics is offered. Since m-realism is both controversial and substantive, a commitment to it requires both explicit recognition and sustained defense.

The Place of Beauty, ANTHONY SKILLEN

The article seeks to function as a cluster of reminders of the rich, robust, and subtle place of "our" concept of beauty—hence of its contrasts. It illustrates this through everyday life examples as well as through criticism of writings that, in apparent embarrassment about using the idea, seek to supplant it with something less suspect. The article seeks to show the concept of beauty at work not only in art but, as Plato urged, in human action and reaction at all levels, as well of course in nature. The author tries to sketch an epistemology of sensibility and a logic of beauty as a more or less topic-neutral concept attaching to whole, hence individual and perhaps unique situations.

Political Desire and the Idea of Murder in Machiavelli's The Prince, CHARLES D. TARLTON

Machiavelli's much advertised science of politics turns out, in the long run, to falter. Machiavelli's various stratagems for controlling political outcomes are workable a small percentage of the time at best. Unpredictability works continually against the theory of practical action. A large part of Machiavelli's adaptation to this deficiency is to turn at many crucial moments to the unambiguous and startling clarity of murder as a political instrument. It is this central position of murder that helps to account for worrying guiltiness that sticks to *The Prince* despite many years of efforts to soften the book's message. In the final analysis, one might even suggest that a kind of erotic fascination lurks within the book's texture of murder.

Hume on Induction: A Genuine Problem or Theology's Trojan Horse? STEPHEN J. BOULTER

In this paper the author offers a straight solution to Hume's problem of induction by defusing the assumptions on which it is based. The article argues that Hume's problem only arises if we accept (i) that there is no necessity but logical necessity, or (ii) that it is unreasonable to believe that there is any form of necessity in addition to logical necessity. The author shows that Hume's arguments in favor of (i) and (ii) are unsound. The author then offers a suggestion as to how the weakness of his arguments has escaped detection. Finally, having claimed that there remains a surmountable problem with inductive arguments, the article ends by characterizing that problem and a possible approach to its solution.

The Simple View of Colours and the Reference of Perceptual Terms, GABRIELE DE ANNA

This essay deals with the problem of the status of colors, traditionally considered as the paradigmatic case of secondary qualities: do colors exist only as aspects of experience or are they real properties of objects, existing independently of human and animal perception? Recently, John Campbell has argued in favor of the simple view of colors, according to which colors are real properties of objects. The author discusses the place of Campbell's position in a debate that was started by John Mackie and continued by John McDowell, and defends it from a criticism due to Michael Smith. The author concludes that the simple view is a philosophically credible position. Subsequently, the article considers an alleged contradiction between the simple view and semantic externalism pointed out by Jim Edwards. The author suggests that a supporter of the simple view may consistently maintain semantic externalism if he also accepts epistemological externalism about the canonical warrant of perceptual judgments.

Fame as the Forgotten Philosopher: Meditations on the Headstone of Adam Ferguson, ROY SORENSEN

An ill-informed reading of Adam Ferguson's epitaph has given the author an idea for securing posthumous recognition. Consider philosophers in the year 2201 who read the author's epitaph: "Here lies Roy Sorensen who will be long remembered for his paradoxes." If these future scholars remember the author, then well and good. If they do not remember the author, the epitaph will appear to be rendered false by their failure to recall him. Suppose the poignancy of this self-defeat leads the epitaph to be widely repeated. The author thereby acquires ignominy as the forgotten philosopher. However, eventually someone will notice that no one can remember that Roy Sorensen is forgotten. For if someone did remember that Roy Sorensen is forgotten, then he would indeed be forgotten—not remembered. After all, memory implies truth. Thus the self-defeating aspect of the epitaph is itself self-defeating! The happy ending is that the epitaph becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy by a curious kind of double negation.

Some More Thoughts About Thought and Talk: Davidson and Fellows on Animal Belief, DAVID BEISECKER

Donald Davidson's argument that nonlinguistic creatures lack beliefs rests on two premises: (1) to be a believer, one must have the concept of belief, and (2) to have the concept of belief, one must interpret the utterances of others. However, Davidson's defense of these premises is overly compressed and unconvincing. In a recent issue of *Philosophy*, Roger Fellows provides new arguments for these premises. In this paper, the author explains why he is not persuaded by Fellows's attempt to bolster Davidson's line of reasoning and cast doubt on Davidson's and Fellows's overall strategy of attaching special significance to the concept of belief.

RATIO
Vol. 15, No. 1, March 2002

Descartes's Real Argument, J. P. DOWNEY

It is still commonly supposed that Descartes based his argument for the mind–body distinction on the law of the indiscernibility of identicals. The author argues that this interpretation is very unlikely to be correct. The article explains three contemporary versions of this interpretation and says why the author rejects it. Basically, use of this law for Descartes's conclusion would require reference to human bodies or else the supposition, for the purpose of the argument, of reference to human bodies. However, at the time Descartes formulated his argument, he would not have allowed either. Instead, the author amends a different interpretation which others have found, and briefly defends it against one famous objection.—Correspondence to: jdowney@hollins.edu

Analytical Descriptivism Revisited, A. HATZIMOYSIS

Analytical descriptivism purports to identify the meaning of ethical sentences with that of the descriptive sentences that capture the clauses of mature folk morality. The paper questions the plausibility of analytical descriptivism by examining its implications for the semantics, epistemology, and metaphysics of morals. The discussion identifies some of the reasons why the analytical descriptivist fails to deliver a reductionist account of normativity.

Aristotle's Account of Anger: Narcissism and Illusions of Self-Sufficiency, S. LEIGHTON

This paper considers an allegation by M. Stocker and E. Hegeman that Aristotle's account of anger yields a narcissistic passion bedevilled by illusions of self-sufficiency. The paper argues on behalf of Aristotle's valuing of

anger within a virtuous and flourishing life, showing that and why Aristotle's account is neither narcissistic nor involves illusions of self-sufficiency. In so arguing, a deeper appreciation of Aristotle's understanding of a self-sufficient life is reached, as are some interesting contrasts between Aristotle's understanding of anger, its connections to value, and our own understanding of these matters.—Correspondence to: leighton@post.queensu.ca

A Duty Not to Vote, P. SHEEHY

The view that there is a duty to vote in a fair and free democracy has been a source of philosophical debate. In this paper the author turns from the question of whether there is a positive duty to vote to whether there can be a duty not to vote in a "decent" democratic state. Considerations of fairness and of respect for one's peers underpin an argument that a voter who is indifferent about the outcome of an election has a duty not to cast her ballot. This is not an argument against a general duty to vote, other things being equal, but points to one of the ways in which such a duty can be undermined or outweighed by competing considerations.—Correspondence to: paul.sheehy@kcl.ac.uk

Disintegrated Persons and Distributive Principles, D. W. SHOEMAKER

In this paper The author considers Derek Parfit's attempt to respond to Rawls's charge that utilitarianism ignores the distinction between persons. The article proceeds by arguing that there is a moderate form of reductionism about persons, one stressing the importance of what Parfit calls psychological connectedness, which can hold in different degrees both within one person and between distinct persons. In terms of this form of reductionism, against which Parfit's arguments are ineffective, it is possible to resuscitate the Rawlsian charge that the utilitarian maximizing approach to matters of distribution ignores something that is of moral relevance, namely, the difference between the degrees of connectedness that hold between different stages of the same person and between that person and his nearest and dearest, and the lack of connectedness between that person and distant others who may be benefited at his cost. To Parfit's charge that reductionism sees the differences between persons as being "less deep," the author replies that the sense in which they are less deep is not at odds with their retaining their original moral importance, perhaps now better understood.—Correspondence to: david.shoemaker@csun.edu

Towards a Theory of Oppression, T. L. ZUTLEVICS

Despite the concern with oppressive systems and practices there have been few attempts to analyze the general concept of oppression. Recently, Iris Marion Young has argued that it is not possible to analyze oppression as a unitary moral category. Rather, the term "oppression" refers to several distinct structures, namely, exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. This paper rejects Young's claim and

advances a general theory of oppression. Drawing insight from American chattel slavery and the situation of the German Jews during the 1930s, the author argues that to be oppressed is to be unjustly denied the opportunity for what the author calls "resilient autonomy." The article argues that all instances of oppression can usefully be analyzed in these terms. The author tests this analysis against each of Young's five structures of oppression, concluding that in each case they are captured by the analysis.—Correspondence to: tamara.zutlevics@flinders.edu.au

*DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS 2000–2001**

University of Alberta
(37) (24) (15)

LYNN A. ADAM, "Kathy Acker and the Hysterical Sublime: The Movements of Technological Martyrdom, Grotesque Perversity, and Post-Freudian Aesthetics." Advisers: Margaret M. Van de Pitte and Christine Wiesenthal.
MASON D. CASH, "Intentionality in Action: Looking for 'Life' in All the Wrong Places." Advisers: F. Jeffry Pelletier and Wesley E. Cooper.
ANITA T. S. HO, "The Ethics and Politics of Health-Care Resource Allocation." Adviser: Glenn G. Griener.
CHRISTOS Y. PANAYIDES, "Aristotle on Modality and Determinism." Adviser: Martin M. Tewwdale. (Awarded in 2000)

University of Arizona
(32) (32) (16)

SCOTT HENDRICKS, "Epistemic Reasons & the Basing Relation." Adviser: Keith Lehrer.
AVERY KOHLERS, "Grounds for Global Justice." Adviser: Allen Buchanan.

Boston College
(108) (92) (25)

PATRICK D. BROWN, "'System in History' in the Thought of Bernard Lonergan." Advisers: Charles Hefling and Patrick Byrne.
MICHAEL R. MILLER, "In Defense of the Reconciliation of Divine Will and Human Freedom According to St. Thomas Aquinas." Advisers: Stephen Brown and Thomas Hibbs.
JOSEPH G. SHAY, "The Radicalization of a Phenomenological Theory of Meaning: From Husserl, Through Heidegger, to Levinas." Advisers: Jacques Taminiaux and David Rasmussen.
SHANNON VALLOR, "How We Think About Things: Reference in Husserl and the Analytic Tradition." Advisers: Richard Cobb-Stevens, Jacques Taminiaux, and Eileen Sweeney.

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*The three figures below each institution's name refer to (1) the number of graduate students enrolled in its philosophy department, (2) the number of "full-time" graduate students as the term is understood by the institution, and

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Boston University
(79) (41) (24)

PAUL BRODERICK, "The Analog-Digital Distinction and the Flow of Information: An Inquiry in the Foundation of Computers." Adviser: Jaakko Hintikka.

LUIGI CARANTI, "The Development of Kant's Refutation of Idealism." Adviser: Henry Allison.

NICOLAS DE WARREN, "The Promise of Time." Adviser: Daniel Dahlstrom.

BRUCE FRASER, "Analysis and Behavior in the Philosophies of Noam Chomsky and W. V. Quine." Adviser: Jaakko Hintikka.

GABRIELA MARTINEZ, "Desire & Transcendence: A Reading of Plato's *Symposium* & *Phaedrus*." Adviser: Charles L. Griswold, Jr.

ROBERT McCARTHY, "David Hume's Sceptical Science of Morals." Adviser: Knud Haakonssen.

JOE McCOY, "Aporia & Philosophy: A Commentary on Plato's *Meno*." Adviser: Charles L. Griswold, Jr.

JAMES STUMP, "Metaphysics & the Interpretation of Physical Theory: A Historical Examination from the 17th Century to the 19th Century." Adviser: Tian Yu Cao. (Awarded in 2000)

Bowling Green State University
(42) (22) (18)

KATHRYN BRADIE, "Illuminations of Terrorism." Adviser: Donald Callen.

S. HAROLD BURNETT, "Ecosystemic Goods: The Pros and Cons of a Property Rights Approach." Adviser: Fred Miller.

LAURA DEHELIAN, "Evolutionary Theory as a Framework for Moral Psychology." Adviser: Michael Bradie.

PETER FOUND, "Never Judge a Dutch Book by Its Cover." Adviser: Edward McClennan.

URI HENIG, "The Logic of Desire and Deliberation." Adviser: Edward McClennen.

BILL KLINE, "Stability, Convention and the Sensible Knave: The Foundations of Hume's Theory of Justice." Adviser: James Child.

RADO KOTOROV, "Innovation, Entrepreneurship and the Firm: The Wealth of Individual." Advisers: Edward McClennan and James Child.

ALEXEI MARCOUX, "Legal Normativity Reconsidered: Raz, Positivism, and Political Authority." Advisers: James Child and Christopher Morris.

LAURA NEWHART, "Post Modern Procreation: Subjectivities and Sexual Difference Beyond Phallocentrism." Adviser: Donald Callen.

PAMELA RYAN, "Sublimely Metaphysical: Kant's Politics of Revolution." Adviser: James Child.

JIM SPENCE, "The Moral Foundations of the Duty to Rescue." Adviser: R. G. Frey.

JAMES TAYLOR, "Personal Autonomy: Its Theoretical Foundations and Role in Applied Ethics." Adviser: R. G. Frey.

IAN YOUNG, "Unity and Diversity: A Reconciliation." Adviser: Christopher Morris.

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PETER MARTON, "Skeptical Games." Adviser: Ernest Sosa.
DOUGLAS WEBB, "On the Libertarian Approach to Freedom and Responsibility." Adviser: James Van Cleve.

University of Calgary
(24) (23) (16)

JANET DAVENPORT SISSON, "The Influence of Mathematics on Plato's Moral Theory." Adviser: John A. Baker.

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(51) (41) (16)

JASON BRIDGES, "Locating Thought: Externalism & Naturalism about Mental Content." Adviser: Barry Stroud.
CHRIS COWELL, "The Nature & Function of Consciousness." Adviser: John Searle.
STREFAN FAUBLE, "The Interpretation, Function, and Metaphysics of Works of Art." Adviser: Richard Wollheim.
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(111) (55) (17)

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SISTER M. REGINA VAN DEN BERG, O.S.F., "Community in the Thought of Edith Stein." Adviser: Robert Sokolowski.

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(85) (59) (25)

MATTHEW ALTMAN, "The Unquiet Spirit of Idealism: Fichte's Drive to Freedom and the Paradoxes of Finite Subjectivity." Adviser: Robert Richards.
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JOHN KULVICKI, "On Images: Pictures and Perceptual Representations." Adviser: Murat Aydede.
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University of Cincinnati
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Claremont Graduate University
(32) (10) (15)

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(60) (29) (17)

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Georgetown University
(42) (42) (28)

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JEFFREY JENNINGS, "Prenatal Authority." Adviser: Edmund Pellegrino.

University of Georgia
(26) (19) (14)

DAVID L. STEGALL, "Albert Camus as Ethical Fallibilist." Adviser: Bernard P. Dauenhauer.

University of Guelph
(34) (32) (13)

Harvard University
(44) (39) (15)

SEAN GREENBERG, "Hidden Folds of Freedom: Freedom and the Will in Malebranche and Leibniz." Advisers: Richard Moran and Alison Simmons.

PAMELA HIERONYMI, "Virtue and Its Imitation." Advisers: Christine M. Korsgaard, Richard Moran, and Thomas M. Scanlon, Jr.
AARON JOHN JAMES, "The Objectivity of Practical Reasons." Advisers: Thomas M. Scanlon, Jr., Christine M. Korsgaard, and James Pryor.
THOMAS PAUL KELLY, "The Ethics of Belief." Advisers: Derek Parfit and James Pryor.
ADAM J. LEITE, "Reasonable Doubts: Skepticism and the Structure of Empirical Justification." Adviser: Warren Goldfarb, Richard Moran, and James Pryor.

University of Hawaii
(47) (45) (14)

ANDREW R. COLVIN, "A Contextual Study of Yang Xiong's Fa Yan." Adviser: Roger T. Ames.
JANGHEE LEE, "The Autonomy of Xin and Ethical Theory in Xunzi." Adviser: Roger T. Ames.
BRIAN J. LUNDBERG, "Musical and Ritual Therapeutics in the Xunzi: The Psychological Dynamics of Crafting One's Person." Adviser: Graham R. Parkes.
KARMA LEKSHE TSOMO, "Into the Jaws of Yama, Lord of Death: Death and Identity in China and Tibet." Adviser: Eliot Deutsch.

University of Illinois at Chicago
(30) (27) (19)

MATTHEW E. MOORE, "On Lengths of Lines and Reals." Adviser: W. D. Hart.
TRISTAN D. TAMPLIN, "Motivating the Discursive Turn in Moral Theory." Adviser: Charles W. Mills.

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
(39) (33) (18)

JOSHUA FINKLER, "Notes on the Mereology of Classes." Adviser: Timothy McCarthy.
STEPHEN FINLAY, "What Does Value Matter? The Interest-Relational Theory of the Semantics and Metaphysics of Value." Adviser: James Wallace.
PAUL HENDRICKSON, "A Social Critique of Reflexive Reason: Relocating Critical Theory After Habermas and Foucault." Adviser: Richard Schacht.
LISA KING, "A Politics of the Every Day: Identity and Normalizing Power." Adviser: Richard Schacht.
REZA LAHROODI, "Psychology and Virtue Epistemology: Three Studies." Adviser: Frederick Schmitt.
DONALD MOULDS, "The Morality of Familial Obligation." Adviser: Jefferson McMahan.

LAURA K. ROBERTS, "Situated Objectivity: Ethical Judgment, Critique and Justification After Wittgenstein." Adviser: Richard Schacht.
JOSEPH THOMPSON, "Nietzsche as Philosopher of Religion." Adviser: Richard Schacht.

Indiana University
(55) (55) (13)

ASPIETA AXEL ARTURO BARCELO, "Mathematics as Grammar." Adviser: David C. McCarty.
JEFFREY R. DILEO, "Is There a Text in Philosophy? Writing, Style, Rhetoric, and Culture." Adviser: Michael L. Morgan.
JACK GREEN MUSSELMAN, "Judicial Craftsmanship at the Supreme Court: A Critical Legal Studies Examination of Court Crafts Informing the Hate Speech Debate." Adviser: Milton T. Fisk.

University of Iowa
(21) (21) (11)

HEE-JONG KIM, "On Trope Theory." Adviser: Panayot Butchvarov.

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(39) (23) (11)

TIMOTHY L. CHALLANS, "Meditations on Moral Autonomy and the Military." Advisers: Jerome Schneewind and Susan Wolf.
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JOHN PARTRIDGE, "The Art of Love in Plato's *Phaedrus*." Advisers: Richard Bett and Jerome Schneewind.
MARK A. RIGSTAD, "Two Essays on Philosophy and Penal Power." Advisers: Jerome Schneewind and Susan Wolf.
JOHN UGLIETTA, "Escaping the Consequences: Two Problems in Consequentialist Moral Theory." Advisers: Susan Wolf and Jerome Schneewind.
CHARLES F. WARD, "The Priority of Form: Anti-Reductionism and the Concept of Organization in 20th Century Embryology and Developmental Biology." Advisers: Peter Achinstein and Karen Neander.

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(41) (37) (14)

RICHARD BUCK, "The Logic of Constructivism." Adviser: Rex Martin.

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KIRK WOLF, "Nietzsche and Foucault on the Genealogy of Ethical Subjectivity." Adviser: Fred Rush.

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(29) (29) (17)

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Loyola University of Chicago
(103) (88) (28)

DAVID BILLINGS, "Articulation and Evaluation of the Idea of Public Reason in Kant, Arendt, Rawls, and Habermas." Adviser: David Ingram.
LIAM HARTE, "An Examination of the Concept of Tradition as Dealt with in Classical Liberal Political Theory." Adviser: David Ingram.

Marquette University
(63) (40) (27)

ANDREW B. GUSTAFSON, "Mill on Moral Affections, With Application to Marketing Ethics." Adviser: Kevin W. Gibson.
PAUL R. GYLLENHAMMER, "Ricoeur's Theory of Narrative as a Reformulation of Husserl's Notion of Intentionality." Adviser: Thomas C. Anderson.
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LOUIS J. SCHIANO, JR., "The *Kehre* and Heidegger's *Beitrage zur Philosophie* (Vom Ereignis)." Adviser: John D. Jones.

University of Maryland
(35) (20) (20)

University of Massachusetts at Amherst
(36) (18) (13)

KEVIN MOON, "Ethical Theory and Populations." Adviser: Fred Feldman.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(30) (30) (11)

AGUSTIN RAYO, "Plural Predication." Adviser: Vann McGee.
ANTHONY GRAY, "The Semantics and Metaphysics of Contingent Identity." Adviser: Robert Stalnaker.
MIGUEL HERNANDO, "Studies in Belief and Belief Attribution." Adviser: Robert Stalnaker.
OLAFUR JONSSON, "Vague Objects." Adviser: Judith Thomson.

McGill University
(25) (25) (15)

ALAN KIM, "Original Fracture: Plato in Philosophies of Paul Natorp and Martin Heidegger." Advisers: Stephen Menn and Philip Buckley.
ANNA MOLTCHANOVA, "The Basis Principles of the International Legal System and Self-Determination of National Groups." Advisers: Alan Patten and Daniel Weinstock.
KATHRYN MORRIS, "Geometrical Physics: Mathematics in the Natural Philosophy of Hobbes." Advisers: Alison Laywine and Stephen Menn.
ACHIM OBERST, "The Existential–Ontological Connection of Language and Death in Heidegger's Being and Time." Advisers: Philip Buckley and George de Giovanni.

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JAMES B. STEEVES, "Imagining Bodies with Merleau-Ponty." Adviser: J. Mitscherling.

University of Memphis
(35) (33) (15)

RANDY L. CAGLE, "A Narrative of *Aufklärung*: Kant's Doctrine of Moral Progress." Adviser: Mark Timmons.
REX GILLILAND, "Heidegger's Concept of Freedom: His Confrontation with the Ethics of Kant and Schelling." Adviser: Robert Bernasconi.
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(41) (41) (19)

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GREGORY WALSKI, "Descartes's Doctrine of the Creation of the Eternal Truths." Adviser: Edwin Curley.
ANDREA C. WESTLUND, "Selflessness and Responsibility for Self: The Implications of Deference for Autonomy, Shared Agency and Love." Adviser: J. David Velleman.
JAMES WOODBRIDGE, "Truth as a Pretense: A Deflationary Account of Truth-Talk." Adviser: Mark Crimmins.

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(28) (25) (24)

JOHN A. HOLMES, "Species Pluralism." Adviser: Fred H. Gifford.
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KATHARINE L. BROWN, "Resistance and Resilience: MacIntyre's Communitarianism and the Cherokee Tribal Tradition." Adviser: Douglas E. Lewis.
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Université de Montreal
(103) (52) (23)

CHRISTINE DAIGLE, "Le nihilism est-il un humanisme? Etude sur Nietzsche et Sartre." Adviser: Lukas Sosoe.
SYLVIE LARAMEE, "Commentaire sur les Catégories: Introduction, traduction, notes et études." Adviser: Richard Bodéüs.
FLORIAN PELOQUIN, "De l'idée de rareté chez Marx." Adviser: Maurice Lagueux.

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(21) (18) (11)

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CANDACE UPTON, "A Contextual Account of Character Traits." Advisers: Harry Ide and Joseph Mendola.

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(26) (26) (11)

STEVE SCHOLZ, "Forgiveness as Absolution: A New Model of Forgiveness." Adviser: Sergio Tenenbaum.

DANIEL ZUPAN, "Autonomy and Noncombatant Immunity: An Investigation in Just War Theory." Adviser: Sergio Tenenbaum.

New School for Social Research
(196) (67) (8)

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KEVIN J. DOHERTY, "Freedom and Nature in Kant's Politics." Adviser: Agnes Heller.

JEREMIAH J. DOLAN, "Hobbes's Theory of Definition." Adviser: Dmitri Nikulin.

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

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

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

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HUMAN DISCOURSE, EROS, AND MADNESS IN PLATO'S *REPUBLIC*

DAVID N. McNEILL

I

IN BOOK 9 OF THE *REPUBLIC*, Socrates tells Adeimantus that the "tyrant-makers" manage to defeat the relatives of the nascent tyrant in the battle over the young man's soul by contriving "to make in him some eros, a sort of great winged drone, to be the leader of the idle desires." This "leader of the soul," Socrates claims,

> takes madness as its bodyguard and is stung wild, and if it detects in the man any opinions or desires deemed good and which still feel some shame, it kills them and pushes them out of him until it purges the soul of moderation and fills it with foreign madness.

Adeimantus responds to this account of eros and madness with the claim that Socrates' description of the genesis of the tyrant is most perfect (παντελῶς). Whereupon Socrates asks, "Is it because of this that love has been from old called a tyrant?"[1]

Socrates' description of the role of eros in the genesis of the tyrant contains the fiercest criticism of eros in Plato's dialogues. The strange coupling of an implanted (ἐμποιέω) eros and an imported (ἐπακτός) madness cannot help but call to mind the very different association of eros and madness we find in the *Phaedrus*. Moreover, the assessment of eros as a tyrant is in direct contradiction to Socrates' claim in the *Phaedrus* that eros is "a god, or something divine."[2] Indeed, the *Republic*, the *Symposium*, and the *Phaedrus* contain not only, in general, strikingly different representations of eros, they also contain directly contradictory assessments of eros's

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[1]*Republic* 572e–573b. All citations from Plato are from John Burnet, *Platonis Opera* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). Translations are the author's unless otherwise cited.

[2]*Phaedrus* 242e.

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supposed divinity, with each of these assessments seemingly endorsed by Socrates in the context of the various dialogues.[3] Previous interpretations of these divergent assessments of eros have, for the most part, either gestured toward the more or less ascetic moods created by the different subject matters of the various dialogues or have suggested that each dialogue presents us with a different stage in Plato's developing assessment of the role of eros in human life.[4] In contrast to these interpretations I would like to suggest that Plato's intention in presenting these different accounts of eros is both more systematic and more programmatic.

Whatever else we can say about Plato's conception of philosophic eros, it seems clear that it deals with the way in which we are led from our everyday experience of the world toward those things which "most truly are," and hence with the relation between opinion and knowledge. I would like to suggest that the different representations of eros in the *Republic*, the *Phaedrus*, and the *Symposium* correspond to three different philosophic orientations or hypotheses concerning the relation between human discursive activity and the intelligible realm. (By "human discursive activity" I mean to comprehend both discursive rationality and poetic activity.) These three orientations are: (1) human discursive activity is considered relatively autonomous and conceived as radically separate from the intelligible

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[3] In the *Symposium*, Diotima tells Socrates that *Eros* is "a great daimon" (δαίμων μέγας) and as such is "between god and mortal" (μεταξύ ἐστι θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ). See *Symposium* 202d.

[4] See especially Martha Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), chaps. 6 and 7; Anthony W. Price, *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 55–8; Gerasimos Santos, *Plato and Freud: Two Theories of Love* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 64; Francis M. Cornford, "The Doctrine of Eros in Plato's *Symposium*," in *Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays. Volume 2, Ethics, Politics, and Philosophy of Art*, ed. Gregory Vlastos (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1971). An important exception is Leo Strauss's claim, in *The City and Man* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 111, that the depiction of eros in the *Republic* is the artifact of "a deliberate abstraction from *eros*" in that dialogue. Compare Stanley Rosen, "The Role of Eros in Plato's *Republic*," *The Review of Metaphysics* 18 (1965): 452–75. Rosen claims that in the *Republic* "Plato camouflages Eros, or bends it to political use" (469), in effect arguing that *thumos* is a mask for eros. Contrary to Rosen's interpretation, and consistent with Strauss's claim, I would contend that the "politicized" eros of the *Republic* is a mask for *thumos*. On my divergence from Strauss's interpretation, however, see note 10 below.

realm, which is the orientation I associate with the *Republic*; (2) human discursive activity is considered directly dependent upon and revelatory of the intelligible realm, which is the orientation I associate with the *Phaedrus*; and (3) human discursive activity is indirectly revelatory of the intelligible realm, which can only be apprehended through human discursive activity but is not directly apprehended in that activity, which orientation I associate with the *Symposium*. I do not mean to suggest by this claim that each of these dialogues contains no reference to the perspectives represented by the other two dialogues. Instead, I believe that each dialogue gestures toward possible limitations with its given orientation. Moreover, although I believe that Plato viewed these three hypotheses as the most significant alternatives regarding the relation between human discursive activity and the intelligible, I do not believe that Plato viewed them as equally valid. Hence, after exploring the opposition between the immanent perspective of the *Republic* and the transcendent perspective of the *Phaedrus*, and indicating how a recognition of this opposition can shed interpretive light on the *Republic* in particular, I will conclude by offering some brief reflections on the *Symposium* intended to suggest reasons for believing that the view of human discursive activity and its relation to the divine presented in that dialogue is closest to Plato's own views on the matter. However, I will devote the greater part of this essay to making plausible the most controversial aspect of my thesis, that the *Republic* presents us with a hypothesis of immanence wherein the world disclosed by our everyday discursive activity is conceived of as radically separate from the realm of the intelligible and the divine.

Before turning to the details of the transition between opinion and knowledge in these different accounts I would like to show the ways in which the difference between the tyrannic eros of the *Republic* and the divine eros of the *Phaedrus* points us toward systematic differences between the two dialogues concerning the connection or lack of connection between the everyday world of our experience and the intelligible and divine realm. I will try to show these systematic differences between these two dialogues with reference to a number of issues. First, I will discuss the character and assessment of madness. Second, I will treat the representation of the gods in each and its relation to their divergent accounts of poetic activity. Third, I will present, briefly and schematically, differences between the two

dialogues in their representation of the Forms, their description of philosophic method, and their account of the sources of human character.

II

At *Memorabilia* 1.1.16 Xenophon differentiates Socrates from those who speculate on "the whole of nature" by listing those "human things" about which Socrates was "always conversing." He writes:

> He was always speaking about the human things, considering what is pious, what is impious; what is beautiful, what is ugly; what is just; what is unjust; what is sanity (σωφροσύνη), what is madness; what is courage, what is cowardice; what is a city, what is a citizen; what is rule of human beings, what is a ruler of human beings.

Xenophon's inclusion of the opposition between "sanity" and "madness" among (indeed, central among) those questions about which Socrates habitually conversed presents a problem for what has become a relatively standard account of the Socratic elenctic method and its relation to "Socratic Intellectualism." This is an account most centrally associated with Gregory Vlastos and his students but endorsed in one form or another by such disparate commentators as Terence Irwin, Jonathan Lear, and C. D. C. Reeve, among others. Speaking about the "intellectualist theory of desire" he finds in the Socratic dialogues, Terry Penner writes:

> According to this theory, all desires are rational desires, in that they always automatically adjust to the agent's beliefs about what is the best means to the ultimate end. . . . Rational desires adjust to the agents' beliefs. In fact, on this view the *only* way to influence my conduct is to change my opinion about what is best.[5]

Clearly, this intellectualist understanding, not only of rational desires but of persuasion and education, is deeply at odds with the understanding which informs the account of the musical education of the guardians put forth by the Socrates of the *Republic*. For this very reason many commentators consider the intricate psychological reflections of the *Republic* to signal the decisive break between Socratic

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[5] Terry Penner, "Socrates and the Early Dialogues," in Richard Kraut, *The Cambridge Companion to Plato* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 121.

and Platonic views of the soul. Writing about the *Republic*, Jonathan Lear presents the case in this way:

> Socrates, as he comes to us in the earlier dialogues, did not have a psychology. Knowledge, for Socrates, was sufficient for virtue. Bad acts could only be committed out of ignorance and thus akrasia was impossible. Although a person might have conflicting beliefs, and thus there might be conflict within the psyche, there was no room for relations of the psyche with itself. Overcoming conflict was a matter of eliciting and expelling false belief. There was, therefore, no conceptual need for an account of psychological structure.
>
> It is meditating on the failure of the Socratic project that psychology is born.[6]

This notion of the Socratic project and of Socrates' elenctic activity, however, is difficult to reconcile with Xenophon's claim that the question "what is madness" (τί μανία) was central to Socrates' concerns. If, as Xenophon suggests, Socrates considered the question of madness as significant and puzzling as he considered the other human questions Xenophon enumerates, it seems extremely unlikely that he could have been guilty of the relatively simple-minded understanding of the process of overcoming all varieties of false belief that has often been attributed to him. For, whatever madness is, in whatever way it could be assimilated to error, it is surely different, at some level, from simply having the wrong account of the road to Larissa.

I believe that madness, and in particular the distinction between divine madness and human madness adduced by Socrates in the *Phaedrus*, is of central significance to our understanding of Socratic philosophy and Socratic elenctic method even, or especially, in those dialogues which seem to lack any reference to the notion of divine forms of madness. The *Republic* is one such dialogue, and by comparing Socrates' treatment of madness there to his account of it in the *Phaedrus* and other dialogues we can begin to see the outlines of the immanent hypothesis I have claimed characterizes the *Republic*.

Madness first arises in the *Republic* in Socrates' book 1 conversation with Cephalus. Hard on the heels of his questionable reformulation of Cephalus' views Socrates presents a counterexample that

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[6] Jonathan Lear, "Plato's Politics of Narcissism," in Terence Irwin, Martha Craven Nussbaum, and Gregory Vlastos, *Virtue, Love and Form: Essays in Memory of Gregory Vlastos* (Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing, 1994), 139.

encapsulates in a few words the most profound problems that any account of justice must confront. He says,

> I mean something of this sort: everyone would surely say that if someone were to take weapons from a friend who is sane and that friend, becoming mad, demands them back, one must not give such things back, nor would the one who gives them back be just, nor again should one wish to tell the whole truth to a person in this state.[7]

Without going into Socrates' dialogic motivation for posing to Cephalus such a devastating counterexample to a definition that Cephalus never, in fact, offered, it is sufficient for now to recognize that the introduction of madness brings along with it deep questions about intentionality, objectivity, and responsibility that, if they are answered at all in the *Republic*, are only answered by the *Republic* in its entirety; that is, with this example Socrates already frames the question of justice in terms which could only be adequately resolved by the introduction of philosopher-rulers and the ascent out of the cave. For, as the account of the decline of the regimes in book 8 indicates, the *Republic* presents degenerate cities as in some sense pathological. Given this fact, it is not unreasonable to assume that at least some tyrannical regimes will be as "mad" as the tyrannical individual of book 9. However, from the perspective of such a degenerate regime, it is the philosopher, the just man, and the just action that will appear insane. Consider, for example, Glaucon's claim that the person who is able to do injustice "would never set down a compact with anyone not to do injustice and not to suffer it." To do so, Glaucon claims, such a person would have to be mad.[8] Consider Socrates' claim at the beginning of the *Sophist* that it is not much easier to discern the class of true philosophers than that of the gods. Thanks to the ignorance of the rest of human kind, he says, the true philosophers can appear "disguised in all sorts of ways" (παντοῖοι φανταζόμενοι); they can appear as statesmen, or as sophists, or sometimes "they may give people the impression that they are altogether mad" (τοτὲ δ' ἔστιν οἷς δόξαν παράσχοιντ' ἂν ὡς παντάπασιν ἔχοντες μανικῶς).[9]

Now, let us put Socrates' challenge to Cephalus in the broader context of madness as it is treated in the dialogues as a whole. A

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[7] *Republic* 331c.
[8] *Republic* 359b.
[9] *Sophist* 216c–d.

friend has given you a weapon to hold while he is away from town and when he returns and demands it back he is, it seems to you, not himself anymore. In fact, he seems quite mad. It may be reasonable—or at least prudent (in our sense of that term)—not to return these things to this person. However, it also seems that one could only know that one was acting justly in refusing to return the weapons if one knew that he had become, as we would say, mentally ill. But what if he had become inspired by a god or become a true philosopher?

These, however, are not possibilities that arise in the context of the *Republic*, where madness is unequivocally presented as a bad thing. This is due to the fact that the goods that are associated with madness elsewhere in Plato's dialogues—prophecy, divine and poetic inspiration, even recollection—are, at least on the surface, systematically excluded from the *Republic*, as I hope to show. The valorization of madness in the *Phaedrus* depends on countenancing the possibility that within our everyday experience of the world there are moments that are decisively informed by something that transcends that experience. Central among these moments in the account of the *Phaedrus* is our perception of someone as beautiful and the experience of falling in love. Love, in the *Phaedrus*, is a divine madness, which reminds us of that time, before we were embodied, when we followed in the train of a god and caught some glimpse of the beings beyond heaven. It is my contention that this kind of transcendence is absent from the "city in speech" that Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus found, if not entirely so from the dialogue in which they found it.

According to the account Socrates gives in the *Republic* there are only two routes of access to the intelligible and divine realm: first, through the educational program of the philosopher-rulers and the ascent out of the cave; second, (in the myth of Er) through the report of an experience of life after death. At one level we can see this aspect of Socrates' account as an exemplification of the problem divine madness poses for the possibility of a wholly just rule, already alluded to in Socrates' counterexample to Cephalus. If divine madness in its poetic, erotic, or philosophic guises were to be countenanced in the "city in speech" it would bring with it the possibility of threats to the legitimacy of the philosopher-kings' attempt at imaging the intelligible and divine realm in the world of becoming. Insofar as the character of such instantiation is *ex hypothesi* partial and imperfect, as long as there remained the possibility of access to the divine realm by figures

other than the philosopher-rulers there could be potentially legitimate alternate visions of how to best imitate the divine. The only way to ensure that in any conflict between the rulers and the ruled in Kallipolis justice is on the side of the rulers, access to the divine and intelligible must be, in some sense, controlled.

However, at an even more fundamental level, I believe that the exclusion of divine madness and divine eros can be ascribed to what I have called the philosophical orientation of the *Republic*. Much of the *Republic* is concerned with presenting an account of the social and cultural forces which lead to the development of the character of the both individuals and constitutions. I will try to show that this account is part of a larger attempt to work through a hypothesis of immanence, which contends that the world of our everyday experience is constituted by and through human discursive activity. The *Republic* contains, I believe, the most complete working through of this hypothesis we are given in Plato's dialogues, and the most complete assessment of the limitations of that hypothesis. It is for this reason that divine inspiration, poetic and prophetic madness, indeed the gods in general, are excluded from the *Republic* to the degree possible.[10]

III

In the *Phaedrus* Socrates distinguishes between four parts (μέρη) of divine madness allotting each part to the inspiration of a god: prophetic madness to Apollo, the mysteries to Dionysus, poetic madness to the muses, and love to Eros and Aphrodite. In three out of the four kinds of madness (the rights of purification are excepted) Socrates explicitly denigrates the power of merely human art and sanity in comparison to divine madness. Of the poets in particular Socrates says "the man who arrives at the doors of poetry without madness from the muses persuaded that art is sufficient to make him a poet, imperfect [or incomplete], both he and his poetry are eclipsed, that of the sane by that of the mad."[11] The inspiration of the Muses is not only praised in the *Phaedrus*; it is also enacted in play or earnest by Socrates himself, who begins his first speech with an elaborate invocation of the Muses. While Socrates' second speech begins without an invocation to the Muses, it ends with a direct address to the god Eros. Even more significantly, Socrates' Stesichorean Ode contains a

mythic account of the Olympian gods as they travel to the summit of heaven.

Now compare the *Phaedrus*' account of poetry to that given in *Republic* books 2 and 3, where poetry is discussed entirely as an art of imitation, a discussion from which the notion of divine inspiration is

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[10] By characterizing the tyrannic or immanent philosophic orientation of the *Republic* as more fundamental than the problem of a wholly just rule in determining the exclusion of divine eros and divine madness from the "city-in-speech," I mean to distinguish the reading I am offering here from Strauss's reading as presented in his essay on the *Republic* in Strauss's *The City and Man*—or at least one plausible interpretation of that very difficult essay. At least initially, Strauss seems to present the "deliberate abstraction from *eros*" which he claims characterizes the *Republic* as following from the political concerns of the dialogue, and in particular, following from the requirements of Socrates' attempt to realize perfect justice in the "city in speech." On this view, once Socrates has embarked on the question of whether the just or the unjust life is superior, this very question leads to that perspective from which justice might be perfectly realized, and this perspective is one which must, of necessity, abstract from eros. Therefore, on Strauss's presentation, it is the positing of justice as the highest virtue that leads to the presentation of eros as a tyrant. (A particular clear presentation of this view can be found in Drew Hyland's *Finitude and Transcendence in the Platonic Dialogues* [Albany: State University of New York Press: 1995], 150–1.)

In my view, to the contrary, the *Republic* begins from a certain perspective on eros, a perspective I have called the tyrannic perspective. This perspective holds that human eros is not essentially directed to the intelligible and the divine. Eros, on this view, is a polymorphous outward striving and something drive-like (*Trieb*, ὁρμή) which seeks to assimilate all things to the self; as such, tyrannic eros in the *Republic* appears to be an instantiation or modification of τό θυμοειδές. On this interpretation, it is less the case that the *Republic* abstracts from eros than it is the case that eros as represented in the *Republic* abstracts from the divine. And, in contradistinction to the above presentation of Strauss's view, I believe that it is on the basis of this hypothesis that justice is posited as the highest virtue. That is, if the tyrannic hypothesis were true, if the world of human thought and experience were constituted by autonomous human discursive activity and human desires were not essentially directed toward something higher than the merely human, then it would seem that the legislating activity of the philosopher-ruler would represent the perfection of human possibilities. To put the point another way, according to Plato's Socrates, if human beings did not have some intuitive access to the intelligible and divine, the highest political possibilities would be the highest human possibilities simply.

An adequate defense of these claims stands outside the scope of the present essay, and would require an elaboration of certain aspects of what Ferrari, Lear, and Reeves have called the "psycho-political" argument of the *Republic*, and, in particular, a detailed account of the role of τό θυμοειδές in that argument, an elaboration I undertake in a forthcoming essay.

[11] *Phaedrus* 245a5–9.

entirely absent. The absence of any account of divine inspiration in the *Republic* conflicts not only with the *Phaedrus* but also with most treatments of poetry in Plato's dialogues. It is, in fact, something of a Socratic cliché to say that the poets compose their poems through divine inspiration and not by means of wisdom.[12] Moreover, the absence of the Muses from the account of book 2 and 3 is gestured toward at various points in the dialogue. When Socrates is introducing the distinction between simple narration and imitation in his discussion of the poet's manner of speaking, Adeimantus is at a loss to understand what Socrates means. To make matters clearer, Socrates chooses as an example what he calls "the first things of the *Iliad*" (τῆς Ἰλιάδος τὰ πρῶτα) "in which the poet tells of Chryses' entreating Agamemnon to release his daughter, and Agamemnon's anger, and Chryses' prayer to the god against the Achaeans when he failed." Socrates claims that before Homer represents Chryses as speaking, "the poet himself speaks and does not try to turn our thought elsewhere as though someone other than he were speaking."[13] This claim, however, is false. Socrates has left out of his account Homer's invocation to the Muse, an invocation in which he calls upon the goddess to sing of Achilles rage and how "the plan of Zeus came to fulfillment, from the time when first (τὰ πρῶτα) they parted in strife Atreus' son, king of men, and brilliant Achilles."[14] In his invocation, Homer does precisely that which Socrates claims he does not do, he directs our thoughts away from himself as author and toward the goddess whom he represents as the true source of his inspired poetry.

An even more obvious sign that something has been left out of the account of poetry occurs when Socrates is telling Adeimantus that the guardians will let no private man tell a lie in their city. He claims that the ruler will punish anyone in the city found lying, "among those who are craftsmen, whether prophet or healer of illness or worker in wood."[15] The quotation is taken from the *Odyssey*, book 17. Eumaeus is the speaker, and he is defending the fact that he has brought a beggar, Odysseus in disguise, to Odysseus' halls. He complains that no one will accept a beggar or anyone else from a foreign land unless he

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[12] See *Apology* 22c, *Phaedrus* 241e, 249d, 253a , *Ion* 533e, 535c.

[13] *Republic* 393a.

[14] *Iliad* 1.4–6, trans. A. T. Murray (London: William Heinemann, Ltd. 1924). See note 18 below.

[15] *Republic* 389d.

is a craftsman, doctor, carpenter, or (and this is what Socrates leaves out) a θέσπιν ἀοιδόν, a singer filled with the words of god.[16]

The clearest indication of Socrates' conscious exclusion of divinely inspired poetry, however, comes at the end of his discussion with Adeimantus of the art of imitation in book 3. There Socrates claims that if a man "who is able by wisdom to become every sort of thing and to imitate all things" should arrive in the city-in-speech, they would "revere him as one sacred and holy and pleasing." But, saying that it is not ordained (θέμις) for such a man to come to be in their city, they would send him out to another city, anointed with myrrh and crowned with garlands.[17] In this remarkable passage, the poet is first honored like a statue of a deity, and then expelled from the city like a sacred scapegoat.[18] The divinity of the poet is appealed to, in Socrates' account, only at the moment when he is sent beyond the limits of the city. I believe that we can see a similar gesture at the beginning of book 8, where in direct contradiction to Socrates' claims in book 3, Homer's invocation of the Muse is allowed to reappear only with the dissolution of the best city and the degeneration into timocracy. Indeed, it is the Muses now who tell us how "faction first attacked" (πρῶτον στάσις ἔμπεσε).[19]

Both more revolutionary and more significant for the argument of the *Republic*, however, are Socrates' earlier restrictions in book 2 on how the gods may be represented in poetry or, rather, how they may not be represented. Socrates argues that "however the god happens to be, so must he always be described."[20] Since, however, the god is wholly simple and unchanging, it seems that he cannot be represented at all. We can see this in two ways. First, as the argument about the

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[16] *Odyssey* 17.383–5. Compare Bloom's note to *Republic* 390a–b in *The Republic of Plato*, 2d ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 452.

[17] *Republic* 398a–b.

[18] See Ferrari's note, in *Plato: The Republic*, ed. G. R. F. Ferrari, trans. Tom Griffith, *Cambridge Texts in Political Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

[19] *Rep.* 545d–e. The passage is taken by Adam, Bloom, and Ferrari to be a reference to *Iliad* 16.112, but Shorey takes the reference to be *Iliad* 1.6., that is, Homer's first invocation of the Muse quoted above. In truth, Socrates seems to be combining the two invocations. See notes to the passage in James Adam, *The Republic*, 2d ed., ed. D. A. Rees (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963); Bloom, *The Republic of Plato*; and Ferrari, *Plato: The Republic*.

[20] "οἷος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὤν, ἀεὶ δήπου ἀποδοτέον"; *Republic* 379a.

lovers of sights and sounds at the end of book 5 makes clear, the objects of poetry are entirely in the realm of becoming. Therefore, it seems that there can be no strictly poetic representation of the god as he truly is. Second, to borrow an argument from the *Theaetetus*, if the god is wholly simple and pure, he is like an element that does not enter into any combination, a letter that forms no part of any syllable, and as such remains wholly unspeakable and unknowable.[21]

Socrates continues his argument by asking Adeimantus whether the gods, though themselves incapable of transformation, "make it seem to us that they appear (φαίνεσθαι) in every way, deceiving and beguiling us?"[22] To this question Adeimantus answers "Perhaps"—and it is easy to see why. Defenders of god's simplicity who nonetheless consider it impious to exclude any possibility of god's communication with human beings have often argued in similar fashion. Socrates claims, however, that the god would never want to lie, either in speech or in deed, by presenting a phantasm. His argument is as follows:

> (1) A lie is only useful against enemies or, like a preventative drug for so-called friends, when from madness or folly they attempt to do something bad.
> (2) The god is not afraid of enemies.
> (3) None of the foolish or the mad is a friend of the god.
>
> ---
>
> Therefore, the god never lies.

The argument concludes: "The god, then, is entirely simple and true in deed and in speech, and neither changes himself nor deceives others, by phantasms, speeches, or the sending of signs—either in waking or in dreams."[23] This argument is strange in many ways. It undermines the Oracle at Delphi, from whom the city is to receive its most sovereign musical practices. It makes a liar of Socrates with his daimonic sign and his dream messages of the *Phaedo*, the *Apology*, and the *Crito*. Strangest of all, in denying the god access to the medicinal lie, the same kind of lie the rulers will use later, it either does not consider the idea that every human being is foolish when compared to the

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[21] *Theaetetus* 201e–203c. It seems significant in this context to note that Socrates claims to have heard the doctrine that the elements are unknowable in a dream.

[22] *Republic* 381e.

[23] *Republic* 382e.

god, or it accepts this possibility but denies that the gods are friends to any human.[24] I believe it is difficult to overestimate the significance of the fact that in the *Republic* the ruler and lawgiver can and must lie for the good of the city, but the god is forbidden to lie for the sake of any human being.

IV

Before turning to the *Republic*'s account of the transition from opinion to knowledge in books 6 and 7, I would like simply to present what I see as the most significant remaining contrasts between the picture of transcendence we are offered in the *Phaedrus* and the picture of immanence we are offered in the *Republic*.

In the *Phaedrus* differences in human character (τρόπος) are said to be the result of the different gods each of us followed before we fell to earth and became embodied. As opposed to the account of the *Republic*, such differences in human character are not directly equated with better and worse kinds of life. Instead, there are nine kinds of life, determined by how recent and comprehensive was our glimpse of the beings beyond the heavens, and eleven kinds of human character corresponding to the eleven Olympian deities who made the ascent to the summit of heaven.[25]

In the *Republic* differences in human character are said to be the result of a combination of natural aptitude, education, and the formative familial and socio-cultural experiences an individual encounters. In Socrates' description of the decline of the regimes these first two largely drop out of the picture. Thus, on the account of the *Republic*, the character of human beings who do not happen to live in Kallipolis is largely socially and culturally determined.

In the *Phaedrus*' account of the procedure of collection and division, collection is described as a "seeing together" (συνορῶντα), and the process of division aims at "being able to cut it up again according to its natural joints," likening the process to anatomical analysis of an organism.[26] The virtues are classed among "the beings beyond heaven" and are said to be recollected. The gods stand on the vault of

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[24] Compare *Republic* 352b.
[25] *Phaedrus* 246e–248e, 252c–253c.
[26] *Phaedrus* 265d–266b.

heaven and contemplate the beings. Education to philosophy is described as "leading the beloved to the likeness of the god."

In the *Republic*, the upward path of dialectic uses hypotheses as starting points and impelling forces (ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς), while the downward path is likened to geometry and related arts.[27] "Seeing together" (σύνοψις) refers, in the *Republic*, not to the unification of many disparate perceptions under one form, but rather to the integration of the disparate mathematical studies (μαθήματα) undertaken by guardians in order to demonstrate the kinship of these studies to one another and to what is.[28] The forms of the virtues are found through the construction of a city in speech, and the subsequent analysis of that construction, a process that has been likened to geometrical analysis. The most extensive treatment of the forms is in book 10, where they are forms of artificial objects, the form of table and bed. At no point in the education of the guardians do they study organisms or natural bodies. Insofar as we are made privy to it, the distinctly philosophical education of the guardians in books 6 and 7 is devoted to the mathematical sciences severed from their appearances in the natural world.

These differences between the two dialogues are summarized in the table below:

The *Republic* and the *Phaedrus* on Immanence and Transcendence

	Republic	*Phaedrus*
Eros	Eros as Tyrant	Eros as God
Madness	Human Madness	Human and Divine Madness
Poetry	All poets are imitators	The best poets are divinely inspired
The Gods	"The god is entirely simple and true in deed and in speech, and neither changes himself nor deceives others by phantasms, speeches, or the sending of signs either waking or dreaming."	The four types of Divine Madness are each attributed to the inspiration of a god. Socrates' second speech describes the ascent of the gods to the summit of heaven.

[27] *Republic* 511b–d.
[28] *Republic* 537c.

The *Republic* and the *Phaedrus* on Immanence and Transcendence

	Republic	*Phaedrus*
Human Character	A combination of natural aptitude, education, and socio-cultural influences. The lawgiver "wipes clean" the city and the dispositions of human beings.	Some aspects of character seem to be innate. In Socrates' second speech we are said to derive our character from the god in whose train we followed.
Philosophy	Mathematical education	Recollection and Wonder
The Ascent	Compulsion	Awe and Desire
Dialectic	Up and Down from Hypotheses. The upward path uses hypotheses as "starting points" and "impelling forces" (ἐπιβάσεις τε ὁρμάς), while the downward path is likened to geometry and related arts.	Method of Collection and Division. Collection is described as "seeing together" (συνορῶντα), while the proper method of division is likened to anatomical analysis of an organism.
Forms	The Forms of the virtues are found through a process of construction and subsequent analysis of that construction. The most extended discussion of the Forms (in book 10) deals with the Forms of human artifacts (the bed and table) and treats the Forms themselves as divine artifacts.	Insofar as the "Forms" as objects of contemplation are discussed (they are not referred to as εἴδη) they are such things as knowledge, justice, wisdom, and beauty. The gods do not make these "beings beyond heaven"; the gods contemplate them.

V

At the end of book 5 of the *Republic*, Socrates separates the lovers of seeing (ὁι φιλοθεάμονες) and the lovers of hearing (οἳ φιλήκοοι) from philosophers by making a radical distinction between opinion and knowledge, a distinction which, I will argue, carries over into the analogies of the Sun and the Cave in books 6 and 7 and which has profound implications for the account of the transition between opinion and knowledge given there. Socrates makes the following distinction between different capacities (δυνάμεις):

> With a capacity I consider only this, what it is set over and what it accomplishes, and this is how it is I call each of the capacities a capacity—that which is set over the same thing and accomplishes the same thing, I

> call the same capacity, and that set over something else and accomplishing something else, I call a different capacity.[29]

In this context, Socrates gives sight and hearing as examples of what he means by capacities.

> We will say that capacities are a certain class of beings by which we are capable of what we are capable, and also everything else is capable of whatever it is capable. I say, for instance, that sight and hearing are capacities—if you understand the form of which I want to speak.[30]

The examples of sight and hearing are significant because of the radical heterogeneity of their objects. If the powers Socrates had chosen were sight and touch, we could imagine someone claiming that some of the proper objects of touch, the rough and the smooth for example, can be perceived in a different way by sight. One might even argue that sight perceives these more clearly than touch. This, however, is not the case with sight and hearing; sight can no more perceive the proper objects of hearing than hearing can perceive the proper objects of sight.[31]

Just a few lines later, Glaucon affirms that the same radical heterogeneity applies to the objects of opinion and knowledge. After it is established that opinion and knowledge are different powers, and Socrates and Glaucon have agreed that each naturally is directed toward or set over different things (ἐφ' ἑτέρῳ), Socrates asks Glaucon whether opinion opines the same thing that knowledge knows and whether the knowable will be the same as the opinable. Or, Socrates asks, is this impossible? To this Glaucon responds that on the basis of what has been said before, it is impossible.

The definition of opinion as a power or capacity is, I believe, the crucial move that sets up everything that follows. The question we must ask is: What does it mean to conceive of opinion as a distinct capacity? Why not think of opinion, instead, as a relative incapacity when compared with knowledge? This seems to be the route taken in the *Meno* where the difference between having true opinion and having knowledge seems to depend on whether or not one is able to give an account of one's true opinions. Thus, true belief is marked off from knowledge by the fact that the possessor of true opinion lacks a

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[29] *Republic* 477c–d.
[30] *Republic* 477c. My translation follows Bloom's.
[31] Compare *Theaetetus* 184e–185a.

specific capacity that the possessor of knowledge has, the capacity to give an account. I even think that Plato (and/or his Socrates) is gesturing toward this alternative account of opinion with a bit of wordplay. When Socrates asks Glaucon whether opinion could opine the same things that knowledge knows or whether that is impossible, the words translated as "Or, is this impossible?" are ἢ ἀδύνατον. I think there is a pun on ἀδύνατον here gesturing toward το ἀδύνατον, that is, powerlessness or lack of capacity.

By conceiving of opinion and knowledge as separate capacities, set over different things and accomplishing different things, Socrates and Glaucon have taken a crucial step toward conceiving the world disclosed in our everyday discourse about the world as radically separate from the world as conceived outside of that discourse. If opinion and knowledge are not set over the same things—forms or class characters or objects or events or states of affairs in the world—it is hard to see how it is at all possible to move from one to the other. Opinion and knowledge come to seem like two separate tracks, moving alongside of one another and never intersecting.

I have suggested that the *Republic* is a working out of the hypothesis that everyday human discursive activity is relatively autonomous and radically separate from the intelligible realm. I believe that the conception introduced in book 5 of opinion as an independent capacity that has its own proper objects is a crucial aspect of this hypothesis—indeed, I believe some such account is a necessary aspect of any theory that wants to present human language and thought as autonomous. Coherence theories of truth and/or knowledge provide familiar examples of this kind of theory, and indeed, some interpreters of the central books of the *Republic* have argued that Plato is explicating there an essentially coherentist account of knowledge.[32] However, I believe a more illuminating comparison can be drawn between the *Republic* and Kant's account of the autonomy of human discursive activity; not least of Kant's virtues for this purpose is that he lifts his

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[32] See, especially, Gail Fine, "Knowledge and Belief in *Republic* V," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 60 (1978): 121–39; and "Knowledge and Belief in *Republic* V–VII," in Stephen Everson, *Epistemology, Companions to Ancient Thought, 1* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For a brief but persuasive critique of coherence accounts of Plato's epistemology in the *Republic*, see Francisco J. Gonzalez, *Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato's Practice of Philosophic Inquiry* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998), 229–30.

terminology right out of the *Republic*. According to Kant's transcendental idealism we can consider all objects in the world either as *phenomena*, insofar as they can be objects of possible experience for us, or as *noumena*, insofar as they can be thought abstracted from the conditions of possible experience. The noumenal or intelligible character of an object is merely this abstraction from the conditions under which it can be an appearance for us. As Kant writes in the *Critique of Pure Reason*: "But this something, thus conceived, is only the transcendental object; and by that is meant something x, of which we know, and with the present constitution of our understanding can know nothing whatsoever."[33] Despite Kant's claim, however, that we cannot know "things in themselves," Kant argues that we can know, and know a priori, the transcendental conditions that make our experience possible.

In what follows, I will begin to sketch out a reading of the Sun, the Cave, and the mathematical education of the guardians that is Kantian in two respects.[34] First, I will argue that the analogy of the Cave gives us an account wherein the phenomena of our everyday world of experience are radically separate from the intelligible realm. Second, I will argue that the mathematical education of the philosopher-rulers in book 7 begins with a hypothesis that implicitly denies any direct access to the intelligible realm and attempts, instead, to delineate the logical conditions under which any phenomenal experience of the world can be apprehended.

VI

We are all familiar with the basic situation—the prisoners chained from childhood, the wall, the human beings carrying artifacts,

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[33] *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1933), 268.

[34] Despite my appropriation of Kantian terminology, my interpretation differs in a number of obvious respects from the neo-Kantian interpretation made famous by Paul Natorp in his *Platos Ideenlehre: eine Einführung in den Idealismus* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 1994), the most obvious differences being my focus on the discontinuity between the accounts of human discursive activity given in the *Republic*, the *Phaedrus*, and the *Symposium*, and, of course, my claim that the *Republic* demonstrates limitations of the hypothesis of the radical autonomy of human discourse.

the shadows, the fire, and above and behind it all the opening of the cave. As I have by now made clear, I want to emphasize what I see as the radical separation between the visible and intelligible worlds we are offered in this image. The first thing I would like to note is the fact that what the prisoners see before them are shadows, that is, gaps in the light created by the statues and artifacts dancing on the wall behind them. In the original analogy between the Sun and the Good, Socrates stressed the role of light as the yoke that binds together the sense of sight and the power of being seen.

> Surely, when sight is in the eyes and the man possessing them tries to make use of it, and color is present in what is to be seen, in the absence of a third class of thing whose nature is specifically directed to this very purpose, you know that the sight will see nothing and the color will be unseen.[35]

In contradistinction to the image of the Sun/Good, in which the light/truth discloses things seen/things known to the sight/intellect, in the image of the Cave the prisoners see not an object in the light but rather an absence of light caused by an unseen object. The prisoners see no color, no object, indeed in some sense what they see is a nothing, an artificial gap in an artificial light. This artificiality is the second point I would like to stress, the shadows are shadows of artifacts, all sorts of implements, we are told, and statues of men and animals. We are not told who made these artifacts or how they made them. Yet the answers to these questions are of the utmost importance because, it seems, the only thing that connects these artifacts to the intelligible beings outside the cave is the mimetic capacity of whoever fashioned these statues. Unless we know that the sculptors have been out of the cave, seen the intelligible realm, and have at least some "true" mimetic capacity (however that is to be conceived), there is no reason to think that these statues correspond in any way to the beings outside the cave. This problem is particularly troubling in a dialogue that casts mimesis in such an unfavorable light.

There is, of course, a great deal of controversy over who makes and who carries these statues. I believe that we should count among the sculptors poets such as Homer and Hesiod. However, it also seems likely that among the shadows and echoes the prisoners perceive we should also include less conscious artifacts and artificers of

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[35] *Republic* 507d–e (Bloom translation).

culture including conventional accounts of the virtues and vices. This would be consistent with Socrates' imagining that there would be "honors, praises and awards among them" for the person who proved "sharpest at discerning the things passing by." Indeed, insofar as the Cave is said to be an image of "the effect of education and lack of education on our nature," and the fire seems to represent the power of human artifice therein,[36] I believe all of the artifacts of human culture and language are intended, including the concepts embedded in any natural language. This would be consistent with the fact that the one natural thing the cave denizens could be said truly to perceive, albeit indirectly, are the voices of human beings echoing off the wall.

Turning now to Socrates' description of the journey up out of the cave, and returning for a moment to the theme of eros or its lack, I note that there is no mention at any point of that account of anything beckoning the prisoner to the world outside the cave. Instead the cave dweller has to be dragged every inch of the "steep upward path" and pulled out into the light of the Sun. Nor is there any description of any awe or pleasure he experiences when he is becoming accustomed to the outside world. It is only when he recollects his experiences in the cave and the pity he feels for those still below that he is said to consider himself happy for the change.

Once he finally becomes accustomed to the intelligible realm, our potential philosopher-king stares directly at the Sun/Good and "infers (συλλογίζοιτο) that this provides for the seasons and the years, and is the steward of all things in the visible place and is in a certain way (τρόπον τινὰ) the cause of all those things he and his companions had been seeing."[37] The way in which the Good is the cause of those things is left deliberately vague, and from Socrates' description it is hard to see what relation the knowledge he receives in the intelligible world could have to his former home. The things specifically mentioned outside the cave are all natural things: human beings, the heavens, the stars, the moon, and finally, the sun. The conclusions he

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[36] See the myth of the *Protagoras* (320c–323c), the subject of which is also education and its lack. Protagoras describes how Prometheus stole from Hephaestus and Athena "wisdom in the arts, along with fire—for without fire there was no means for anyone to possess or use art itself—and so gave them to man"; *Ion, Hippias Minor, Laches, Protagoras*, trans. R. E. Allen, *The Dialogues of Plato*, vol. 3 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).

[37] *Republic* 516b–c (Bloom translation with alterations).

draws about the "intelligible sun" are about how it is the source of the seasons and the years. He is not said to discern anything that could play the role of bridging the gap between the natural world outside the cave and the artifice dominated world within it. He does not see anything that would seem to correspond to the "true city," nor, more significantly, is he said to catch a glimpse inside the human soul.[38] He sees neither the two horses and charioteer of the *Phaedrus* nor the hydra/lion/human composite of the *Republic*. According to the *Phaedrus*, unless a speaker knows both the truth of the things that are and the nature and variety of human souls, he will not be able to persuade anyone who does not already know the truth of the things that are. If this is correct even in part, then it remains mysterious how any of what is seen outside the cave will help the philosopher-ruler in his contest with the perpetual cave dweller over the phenomena inside the cave, phenomena which are, as Socrates says, "the shadows of artificial things."[39]

VII

I have been arguing that the *Republic* presents a vision of the world based on the hypothesis of a radical separation between the world of human discursive activity and the intelligible and divine realm, between the world inside the cave and the world outside the cave. This hypothesis, which I have described as a hypothesis of immanence, precludes any direct intuition of the world outside of our ways of speaking and thinking about the world. This does not mean that we have no apprehension that there is a world outside of the world constituted by our discursive activity; rather, we are presented with just such an apprehension in Socrates' discussion of the presentiment every soul has about the good. However, as we will see, this presentiment is not a direct intuition of what lies beyond our customary ways of thinking and speaking of the world. It does not specify a limit

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[38] Nor, indeed, is he said to see "true justice." At 520c, when Socrates imagines himself and Glaucon speaking to the philosopher-ruler who has been raised in the city-in-speech, he speaks not of "true justice" but rather "the truth about the fair, just and good things." See also 517d–e, where Socrates comes very close to equating the just with the statues rather than with their originals. Compare Adams's note to his 517d29.

[39] *Republic* 515c.

to the world of our experience; rather, it is presented as merely an inchoate sense that the world of our experience has limits.

Socrates claims that while many people would choose to do, have, and enjoy the reputation for things that are opined to be just and beautiful even if they are not, things are quite different in regard to the good. Here people are not satisfied with mere opinions about the good but seek out what really is good, and this is what every soul pursues and for the sake of which it does everything it does. Every soul has, Socrates claims, "a presentiment that the good *is* something," but since the soul is unable sufficiently to grasp what this something is and cannot attain the kind of "stable trust" that it has about other things, it "loses whatever advantage it might have had in those others."[40] Thus, Socrates makes quite clear that this presentiment by itself offers us no guidance in our inquiry into the nature or character of the good. The best it can do is instill in us the conviction that there indeed is some such good toward which we can direct our inquiries.

This hypothesized lack of any direct intuition into the nature of the beings can, I believe, also account for the character of the educational program Socrates prescribes for the guardians in book 7. As Socrates and Glaucon begin to consider what studies would have the power of turning the soul away from becoming and toward being, their first step is to exclude the entire education of the guardians up to that point as "wholly engaged with coming into being and passing away."[41] They put aside music, gymnastic, and the arts as all having, in the language of the image of the Cave, the status of the shadows of artificial things. When Glaucon despairs of finding any study besides these, Socrates suggests that they take something that applies to them

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[40] *Republic* 505d–e. The word I have translated as "presentiment" is ἀπομαντεύομαι, an apparent neologism coined, I suggest, to distinguish it from μαντεύομαι, which I will discuss in section 8 below. That this "presentiment" is not meant to be a direct intuition of the character of the world outside the cave is confirmed by the fact that its only other occurrence in the *Republic* is at 516d, where it is used to refer to the habit-based ability of the cave dwellers to predict the succession of appearances in the cave. See Bosanquet's characterization of this capacity as "induction" in Bernard Bosanquet, *A Companion to Plato's Republic for English Readers: Being a Commentary Adapted to Davies and Vaughan's Translation*, 2d ed. (Folcroft, Pa.: Folcroft Library Editions, 1976), 236–7. Compare *Sophist* 250c1, *Lysis* 216d3.

[41] *Republic* 521d–e.

all, "that small matter of distinguishing the one, the two and the three, I mean in sum (ἐν κεφαλαίῳ), number and calculation."[42]

I would like to point out one salient feature of the way Socrates introduces the studies of number and calculation and then offer an interpretation of its significance. Throughout this passage Socrates puts a great deal of stress, first, on the universality, and second, on the absolute necessity, of number and calculation in all areas of human thinking. Socrates says that number and calculation are common to all kinds of art, thought, and knowledge; that they are something necessary for everyone to learn from the first; that every kind of art and knowledge is compelled to participate in them. Most significantly for my reading, when Socrates asks Glaucon whether the study of calculation and number is a necessary study for a warrior, Glaucon responds, "Most of all, if he's going have any understanding whatsoever of how to order the troops, or rather, if he is even going to be a human being."[43]

What I want to suggest is that number and calculation are being presented as necessary or logical conditions for the possibility of any human thinking, conditions which have objective status even in the cave. These are conditions that must apply to our perception of the world regardless of whether or not the shadows we see in the world of our everyday experience correspond to any objects in the world outside the cave. Thus, whether or not there is any reality which corresponds to our concept "finger," and whether or not we are mistaken in the particular predicates we unify under that concept, the very fact that we can perceive them as a unity depends upon there being some unity that is not given to us in sense perception. I suggest that we should understand all of the mathematical studies prescribed for the guardians in book 7 as explicating necessary conditions for the possibility of experience, and that these necessary conditions include not only number, calculation, and proportion but also space—in the study of solid geometry—and time—in the study of astronomy abstracted from the actual motion of the heavens. Time is the only content that I, at least, can give to a study of those movements in which the "really fast" (τὸ ὂν τάχος) and the "really slow" (ἡ οὖσα βραδυτὴς) are

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[42] *Republic* 522c.
[43] *Republic* 522e.

moved in relation to one another and move in turn those thing which are "in them" (τὰ ἐνόντα).[44]

This "conditions of the possibility of experience" reading of the mathematical education of the guardians can only go so far. It cannot give us any clear sense of the dialectical studies the guardians are to take up after they have been fully trained in mathematics. But, of course, the *Republic* gives us no clear sense of the content of those studies either, and it is my contention that in Plato's view the philosophical orientation of the *Republic* cannot give any content to those studies. This is the way Socrates summarizes everything he has talked about prior to the introduction of dialectics:

> All of the other arts are turned toward human opinions and desires, or to generation and composition, or to the tending of everything that is grown or put together. And for those remaining, which we said did grasp something of what is—geometry and the things following it—we see that they dream about what is but are unable (ἀδύνατον) to see it itself in waking as long as they leave unmoved the hypotheses they use and are incapable of giving an account of them (μὴ δυνάμεναι λόγον διδόναι αὐτῶν).[45]

He completes this summary with what seems to be a direct statement of the problem we have been following throughout, the problem of the radical heterogeneity of human discursive activity and intelligible realm as it is presented in the *Republic*. He says,

> For, when the beginning is what one doesn't know, and the end and what is in between is woven from what one doesn't know, what contrivance could ever turn this sort of agreement into knowledge?[46]

VIII

I have been arguing that the *Republic* is a working through of a philosophical hypothesis of immanence, which conceives of human discourse as relatively autonomous and radically separate from the intelligible realm. I have also suggested that this hypothesis is inherently limited, that it leaves out aspects of human experience that Plato considered central to an adequate account of the philosophic life.[47] That something is left out of the central books of the *Republic*

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[44] *Republic* 529d.
[45] *Republic* 533b–c.
[46] *Republic* 533c.

and that something is lacking in the approach taken there is signaled from the very moment Socrates introduces the idea of the Good into the discussion, where Socrates says, "Blessed men, what the good itself is, let us let it go for now, for my current opinions about the good appear to me to be more than our present impulse can attain."[48] Shortly thereafter we have this exchange between Glaucon and Socrates:

> "Don't in any case stop," he said. "Not at least until you've gone through the likeness with the sun, if you leave out anything."
>
> "But I am leaving out much," I said.
>
> "Don't," he said, "leave out even a bit."
>
> "I believe I will," I said. "Probably, a lot. But nonetheless, at least insofar as it is possible in the present case, I won't willingly leave anything out."[49]

As I have suggested above, I think the crucial move that compels Socrates to leave something out "in the present case" is the identification of opinion and knowledge as different capacities dependent upon or set over different things. The question now is, what is it that Socrates is leaving out.

The answer to this question leads us back to the issues of eros and madness. Madness, I suggest, is what is left out of the philosophic education of the guardians in book 7, specifically its philosophic variety, which Alcibiades calls in the *Symposium* "the Bacchic frenzy and madness" of Socratic philosophy. In my discussion of divine madness in the *Phaedrus* I referred to the idea that there are moments in our experience that seem to be informed by something that transcends that experience. Put in another way, it is an experience of something which seems at once wholly strange and somehow recognizably our own. This experience Plato and Aristotle seem to have referred to as the experience of wonder, and both Plato and Aristotle seem to have thought that philosophy begins in wonder. In the *Theaetetus*, for

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[47] Compare Socrates' claim that the man who has received the right kind of musical education will "have the keenest sense for what has been left out and what isn't a fine product of craft and what isn't a fine product of nature"; *Republic* 401d–e (Bloom translation).

[48] *Republic* 506d–e.

[49] *Republic* 509c.

example, Socrates claims "this feeling of wonder very much belongs to the philosopher, for there is no other beginning to philosophy than this."[50]

Again, wonder is systematically excluded from Socrates' account of the Good, the Sun, the Line, the Cave, and the philosophic education of the guardians. There are only six occurrences of a form of the words θαῦμα, θαυμάζω, or θαυμαστός between the introduction of the likeness between the Sun and the Good and Socrates and Glaucon's agreement that "the treatment of the studies is complete."[51] Five of these appear in phrases that explicitly exclude wonder, phrases like "do not be surprised at x" or "is it any wonder that y."[52] The one remaining appearance is especially remarkable. In a phrase used to describe the wall behind the prisoners upon which the human beings carry the artifacts which cast the shadows on the back of the cave, the wall is said to be "just like the screen that wonder-workers (τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς) set in front of people and over which they show their marvels (τὰ θαύματα)."[53] This is the only instance of the noun form of wonder in book 7.[54] Here it refers to a conjurer's trick, and it is used to describe the architecture behind the illusions of the cave. I think we can see a similar gesture in the one appearance of "recollection" in the *Republic*, where the term is used to refer to the memory the philosopher outside the cave has of his former prison home.[55]

I would like to conclude my remarks on the *Republic* by focusing on another form of divine madness that is essential to Socratic philosophy and essential to the argument of the *Republic*. I suggested earlier that the goods that are associated with madness elsewhere in Plato's dialogues are systematically excluded from the surface of Plato's *Republic*. One form of divine madness is, however, very much on display throughout the dialogue. This form is the distinctly

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[50] *Theaetetus* 155d.

[51] *Republic* 506d–535a.

[52] Compare *Symposium* 205b3, 206b5, 208b8 with 205b4, 207c9, 208b4, and 208c3. Diotima's attempt to restrain and channel Socrates' wonder seems both to be an aspect of his education in τὰ ἐρωτικά—she is directing him toward a vision of "something wonderfully beautiful in its nature" (τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν) (210e4)—and one reason Socrates compares her to "the most perfect sophists" (οἱ τέλεοι σοφισταί) (208c1).

[53] *Republic* 514b.

[54] And one of only two in the *Republic*—the other occurs, characteristically, in the phrase "it's no wonder" at 498d.

[55] *Republic* 516c.

Socratic variant of divination or prophecy, ἡ μαντικὴ τεχνή. Fully one third of the occurrences of a form of μαντεύομαι[56] in Plato's dialogues, eleven out of thirty-three, are in the *Republic*, and eight of those eleven surround the account of the Good and the education of the guardians.[57] In each case the meaning is the same. Socrates is prophesying what effect a particular kind of experience is going to have on a particular kind of person, what good or harm will come to them from that experience, and what can be expected of them in the future. That is, Socrates' divinations always have to do with thinking about what kinds of education are appropriate for which kinds of souls. This is precisely the kind of thinking that has been on display throughout the *Republic*, from the founding of the true city, throughout the musical and gymnastic education of the guardians, the decline of the regimes and down to the critique of poetry in book 10. This is also precisely the kind of thinking that is absent from the mathematical education of the guardians and the ascent out of the cave, a thinking concerned with those human things about which, according to Xenophon, Socrates was always conversing. To put it in something of a formula, what is missing in the philosophical education of the guardians is the reflection on divine and human madness in Socratic philosophy.

IX

Before turning to the *Symposium* I would like to venture a couple of brief suggestions about the way in which the transcendent orientation of the *Phaedrus* abstracts from Socratic philosophy in ways complementary to the *Republic*, consonant with its setting outside the city walls in a place dedicated to pastoral deities. As I have suggested, I believe that the divine eros of the *Phaedrus* corresponds to the hypothesis that human discursive activity is directly dependent on and revelatory of the divine and intelligible realm. In it there seems to be little distinction drawn between Socrates' "second sailing" and a direct inquiry into the beings. This can help to account for Socrates' apparently "pre-Socratic" speculations about the nature

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[56] See note 38 above.

[57] There are two occurrences at 506a, one at 523e, one at 531d, and four at 538a–b.

of the self-moving soul.[58] The orientation of the *Phaedrus* also suggests a resolution to the problem posed by the apparent disunity of the two halves of the dialogue. As many commentators have noted that while eros is the dominant theme of the dialogue through Socrates' "palinode," from that point forward the discussion of eros seems to be entirely supplanted by an inquiry into the nature of rhetoric and writing.[59] I suggest that the account of a science of rhetoric given in the latter part of the dialogue depends upon the account of divine eros presented in the former part. A number of features of the argument of the *Phaedrus*, in particular, the notion of a direct and natural correspondence between forms of soul and forms of rhetoric,[60] the implication that the principle of "logographic necessity" could give to a written speech the organic unity of a living being,[61] and Socrates' claim that when one employs the dialectical art one can sow speeches like living seeds in the soul of the listener,[62] all seem to rely on radically discounting the artificiality which dominated the account of human discursive activity given in the *Republic*.[63]

The transcendent orientation of the *Phaedrus* can also help to explain the extraordinary claims about philosophy made in Socrates' second speech. The philosophic lovers, followers in the heavenly procession of Zeus, are said seek out a soul "that is something of a Zeus itself" and hence to look for "a philosophic and commanding nature." In their quest to make their beloved like their god, they "seek in themselves the nature of their god" and "find a way because they have been compelled to look upon the god."[64] Earlier in the speech the thought (διάνοια) of the philosopher is said to be winged. This is due to the

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[58] See Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, *Phaedrus, Translated with Introduction and Notes* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1995), 29 n. 63.

[59] See Ibid., xxvi–xxix.

[60] *Phaedrus* 271d.

[61] *Phaedrus* 263b–c.

[62] *Phaedrus* 276e–277a.

[63] Consider, also, Socrates' representation of the art of rhetoric and the "arguments approaching to testify against her" as interlocutors (260d–e), his characterization of written and spoken discourse as brothers (276a), his characterization of Lysias' discourse as "Lysias himself" (Λυσίου ἐμαυτόν) (228e), and his request that Phaedrus read Lysias' word so that "I may hear the man himself" (Λέγε, ἵνα ἀκούσω αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου) (263e). These last two should be contrasted with Lysias' appearance in the *Republic* among the *mute personae*.

[64] *Phaedrus* 252e–253a.

fact that memory, as far as it is capable, always keeps the thought of the philosopher close to the beings—the same beings which make the gods divine because they are close to them.[65] To say the least, these claims seem quite distant from that "human wisdom" which recognizes it is, in truth, worth nothing with respect to wisdom.

X

Alongside the tyrannic hypothesis of the *Republic* and the divine hypothesis of the *Phaedrus* there is, I have suggested, a third daimonic hypothesis, which I have associated with the *Symposium*. This hypothesis contends that insofar as intelligible world can be apprehended, it can only be apprehended through human discursive activity but is not directly revealed within that activity. Of the three hypotheses, it is the one most didactically presented and, I believe, the most difficult to understand. That Socrates presents the education in erotic matters he received from Diotima as containing some such view of the relation between human discursive activity and the divine and intelligible realm is relatively clear. Her account of the ladder of ascent begins with the love of one beautiful body and the production of beautiful speeches and ascends to "a certain single philosophical science," but it is pointedly not for the sake of this philosophical science that the ascent is made. Rather, the initiate who has been correctly educated in erotics and has viewed the beautiful things in the right way will suddenly get a glimpse of "something wonderfully beautiful in its nature" for the sake of which all his previous efforts were undertaken. This is something not to be found in any body or in any speech or knowledge. Indeed, it is not to be found in anything else, "not in an animal, or in earth, or in heaven" but is said to be "by itself with itself always being of a single form."

How we are to understand the scope and limits of the daimonic hypothesis, and what sense we can give to the claim that philosophic discourse is a necessary propaideutic to this wondrous vision which seems to stand so entirely outside that discourse—these are, to say the least, more difficult questions, ones I will not attempt to address

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[65] "διὸ δὴ δικαίως μόνη πτεροῦται ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια· πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἀεί ἐστιν μνήμῃ κατὰ δύναμιν, πρὸς οἷσπερ θεὸς ὢν θεῖός ἐστιν"; *Phaedrus* 249c.

here. Instead, I will merely indicate a way in which one aspect of Socrates' speech, Diotima's description of the daimon Eros himself, suggests that this daimonic hypothesis discloses something essential about Socrates' discursive activity as it is presented to us in Plato's dialogues.

The *Symposium* is set in the home of the tragic poet Agathon at a party celebrating his first victory at the Lenea, one of the two great Athenian dramatic festivals in honor of the god Dionysus. The occasion for speeches on the theme of eros is provided by Eryximachus, who recounts Phaedrus' complaint that neither the poets nor the Sophists have ever made a fitting eulogy to the god Eros. The various encomia to Eros offered by Agathon's guests are intended to make up for this lack. Thus the proper relation between human speech and the divine provides, in some sense, the organizing theme of the dialogue.[66] If we view the six speeches concerning eros from this perspective, we can divide them into two groups. The first three speakers, Phaedrus, Pausanias, and Eryximachus, center their respective accounts of eros around the authority of a particular kind of existing human discursive activity: Phaedrus is primarily concerned with myth, Pausanias with laws and customs, and Eryximachus with science or craft. The second group of speakers, on the other hand, is made up of individuals famous for producing distinctive kinds of discourse: the comic poet Aristophanes, the tragic poet Agathon, and Socrates—who, according to Alcibiades, makes speeches of a kind wholly unlike those of any other human being, past or present.

It is this Socratic variety of discourse that seems to be at issue in Diotima's description of the birth and nature of the daimon Eros. He is the offspring of Poros and Penia, that is, resource and poverty—though he is, by her account, closer in nature to his impoverished mother than his resourceful father. He is neither wholly wise nor wholly ignorant, which is to say he is wise to the degree that he knows he is ignorant. He is a seeker after wisdom, a philosopher. Having the

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[66] The contrast between their divergent dramatic contexts can suggest another way of formulating the distinction between the tyrannic, daimonic, and divine hypotheses as presented in the three dialogues under consideration, a way which makes more explicit the intimate relation between Plato's conception of human discursive activity and the *polis*. If the *Republic* presents the attempted self-perfection of the city, and the *Phaedrus* begins at the boundary of the city, the *Symposium*—like the Lenea and the City Dionysia—shows the city pointing beyond itself to the divine.

nature of his mother, he is not tender and beautiful, but tough, dusty, shoeless, and homeless; by virtue of his father he is an awesome hunter of the beautiful and the good as well as a skilled druggist, wizard, and sophist. Clearly this barefoot, daimonic philosopher is meant, at some level, to call to mind Socrates himself; it seems to be an idealized portrait of Socratic philosophy, one which abstracts from what is merely human or contingent about Socrates the individual. Consider in particular Diotima's characterization of Eros as "homeless" (ἄοικος). Socrates may be, as Alcibiades suggests, somehow essentially "strange" (ἄτοπος), but he is not a stranger (ξένος); he is an Athenian who, apart from that rare walk outside the city walls, leaves Athens only to fulfill his civic duty in military service.[67] Despite its mythic frame, however, this account of daimonic eros discloses something essential about Socrates as he is represented in Plato's dialogues, a duality that seems to correspond to the dual lineage of the daimon Eros. Like Eros, Socrates is characterized by a seemingly limitless capacity for generating discourses while in conversation with others, a peculiar resourcefulness which seems to be connected with his ability to divine what kinds of education are appropriate for different kinds of human souls. It is in these pedagogic contexts that Socrates makes the strongest claims about his discursive practice, professing to a kind of technical knowledge he variously characterizes as knowledge of erotics,[68] the practice of the one true political art,[69] or his participation in the art of maieutics.[70] It is also in these contexts that we see Socrates associated with the drugs and wizardry Diotima attributes to the resourcefulness of the daimon Eros.[71] However, like daimonic Eros, Socrates seems to be even more fundamentally characterized by a kind of poverty or lack, and it is his recognition of that lack that seems to be his central defining characteristic. As he claims in the *Apology*, Socrates differs from most human beings in his awareness that he lacks understanding of the greatest and most important matters, and this claim seems to imply both that he can recognize

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[67] See *Apology* 29d–31b, 35b, *Crito* 50a–54e, *Charmides* 153d, *Meno* 70e–71b; compare *Timaeus* 19d–e.

[68] *Symposium* 177d–e, *Charmides* 155c–e, *Lysis* 206a.

[69] *Gorgias* 521d.

[70] *Theaetetus* 149a–151d.

[71] *Republic* 608a, *Phaedo* 77e–78a, *Theaetetus* 149d, *Charmides* 155c, 156d–157d, *Meno* 80b.

when he lacks understanding, and that he has a sense for what kinds of understanding fail to qualify as understanding the greatest and most important matters.[72] This ability to recognize his lack of understanding seems to include a sense for which questions are prior and which questions are posterior in the order of a given inquiry. Socrates is skilled at seeing when something necessary has been left out of an account, something without which a given avenue of inquiry seems to come to an end. In short, he recognizes that he is at a loss (ἀπορέω), and, as Meno suggests, he makes others at a loss when he speaks to them.

Socrates continually asserts, and perhaps overstates,[73] his own sterility and incapacity for giving birth to beautiful discourses that he would call his own. Like the daimon Eros, he continually believes himself to be in need, he philosophizes throughout his life, but his sense of the insufficiency of his understanding of the intelligible and divine makes it such that he never attains anything like the one philosophic science of Diotima's higher mysteries. He is always more in lack than resource with respect to the divine, and it is this poverty, rather than his lack of monetary resources, that I believe Socrates is gesturing to when he characterizes himself in the *Apology* as "in infinite poverty through service to the god."[74]

XI

One final difference between the three dialogues will help to summarize the interpretive strategy I have been pursuing. This is the divergence between the roles Socrates' "daimonic sign" plays in each dialogue. If, following most scholars, we bracket the *Theages* as questionably Platonic, the fullest description of Socrates' daimonion occurs at *Apology* 31c–d. There Socrates claims that a certain daimonic sign has appeared to him from childhood, which when it comes always turns him away from something he is about to do but never urges him forward. As we might now expect, this spiritual voice has a special prominence in the *Phaedrus*. While Socrates refers in the *Apology* to numerous occasions in the past when the daimonion came

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[72] *Apology* 21b–23b.
[73] Compare *Theaetetus* 150c–d with 149c.
[74] *Apology* 23c.

to him to dissuade him from a course of action, only in the *Phaedrus* does it come to Socrates, as he claims, in the course of the dialogue itself. When it does so, moreover, it is a little more voluble than his description of it in the *Apology* would seem to allow. It not only dissuades him from what he is about to do, but demands he make atonement for an offense against the god.[75] In the *Republic*, on the other hand, Socrates' daimonic sign is gestured toward only to be dismissed as something "not worthy of speech" (οὐκ ἄξιον λέγειν) for the enigmatic reason that "it may have come to pass, perhaps, to some one other, or no one before."[76]

By contrast to both these accounts, in the *Symposium* Socrates himself is identified with the daimonic. This can indicate one respect in which Plato intended his own discursive activity to have a "daimonic," mediating role. As Julius Moravcsik has argued, Plato's poetic representation of Socrates in the dialogues is meant to play a particular role in a reader's philosophic education.[77] As Socrates presented an idealized portrait of Socratic philosophy in his account of his dialogue with Diotima, Plato presents an idealized portrait of Socrates in the dialogues, and the beautified Socrates of the *Symposium* seems to gesture toward this Platonic idealization.[78] Plato is suggesting, I believe, that essential to our reflections on the good are reflections concerning what a good human being is like. This activity is necessarily an imaginative, poetic activity; we think about the good by imagining to ourselves what a good human being would do in a particular situation, or by thinking about what we ourselves would do if we were that good human being. Socrates as he is presented in the dialogues is a mediating figure whose poetic representation is meant to aid us in our reflections about the beautiful and the good. Yet, as the *Symposium* shows, such idealizations are inherently problematic. There is with all such poetic representations a danger that we will become stuck on the beauty of the image and become lovers of philosophy rather than lovers of wisdom—lovers of Socrates rather than lovers of the good toward which Socrates points us. Alcibiades, who thinks he has seen

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[75] *Phaedrus* 242b–c. Compare C. J. Rowe, *Plato: Phaedrus, with Translation and Commentary* (Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1986), 164–5.

[76] *Republic* 496c.

[77] See Julius Moravcsik, *Plato and Platonism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992), 108–15.

[78] Compare *Symposium* 174a with *Letter 2* 314c.

"mind" inside Socrates' "most divine" speeches and glimpsed inside Socrates himself to find statues "divine and golden and entirely beautiful," reminds us that this was by no means a danger that Socrates was simply able to overcome.[79]

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[79] An earlier version of this essay was presented to the Ancient Philosophy Workshop at the University of California at Berkeley. I am grateful to Thomas Bartscherer, G. R. F. Ferrari, Robert Pippin, Stewart Umphrey, and Richard Velkley for helpful comments, questions, and criticisms. I am particularly indebted to Michael McShane, whose help was instrumental at every stage from first conception to final draft.

"RIGHTS" IN ARISTOTLE'S *POLITICS* AND *NICOMACHEAN ETHICS*?

VIVIENNE BROWN

I

RECENT DEBATES HAVE EXAMINED AGAIN whether the concept of individual natural "rights" is significant for Aristotle's political philosophy and ethics. Fred D. Miller's *Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's* Politics is the most sustained recent attempt to argue that Aristotle's *Politics* is centrally concerned with the issue of individual rights based on nature and that no anachronism is involved in arguing this.[1] Aristotle's *Politics*, it is argued, should thus be seen as the precursor of later theories of individual rights, although it would be a mistake to infer from this that Aristotle employed a specifically liberal understanding of rights even though his work is foundational for those later theories. In a symposium in this *Review* devoted to discussing Miller's arguments, a number of both supporting and critical responses were published.[2] One result to emerge from this symposium was the fundamental lack of agreement on how to translate key Greek terms such as *to dikaion/ta dikaia* (literally "the just thing" or "the just things") which Miller argues should sometimes be translated as "just-claim right."[3] This lack of agreement among the most authoritative classical

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[1]Fred D. Miller, Jr., *Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's* Politics (hereafter, "*NJR*") (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). By "rights based on nature" is meant rights based on natural justice, not rights possessed in a prepolitical state of nature; *NJR*, 88, 90–1, 108–11, 122–3. Compare Fred D. Miller, Jr., "Aristotle and the Origins of Natural Rights," *The Review of Metaphysics* 49 (1996): 891–2.

[2]"Aristotle's *Politics*: A Symposium," *The Review of Metaphysics* 49 (1996): 731–907.

[3]*NJR*, 97–101. This is accepted in Roderick T. Long, "Aristotle's Conception of Freedom," *The Review of Metaphysics* 49 (1996): 775–802. It is questioned in Richard Kraut, "Are There Natural Rights in Aristotle?" *The Review of Metaphysics* 49 (1996): 755–74; Malcolm Schofield, "Sharing in the Consttution," *The Review of Metaphysics* 49 (1996): 831–58; and John M. Cooper,

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scholars raises important methodological issues concerning the kind of criteria that may be appropriate in such a dispute.

The evidence of the symposium suggests that linguistic arguments are by themselves insufficient in addressing a conceptual dispute of this kind since both the issues at stake and the principles of translation are of a philosophical nature. Indeed, in the course of this symposium, skeptics of Miller's thesis raised a number of methodological queries. Richard Kraut wonders what it means to say that Aristotle employs the concept of "natural rights": even granting the similarity between some of Aristotle's ideas and those of later rights theorists, "the problem, however, is that Aristotle makes so little use of them in his political and moral thinking that it is uncertain what attributing the concept [of natural rights] to him amounts to."[4] Malcolm Schofield offers a related skeptical thought when he argues that, even if a case could be made for sometimes translating *to dikaion* and its cognates in terms of "(a) right," and he remains unconvinced by most such translations, this would add nothing of explanatory or analytical substance to Aristotle's account which is based on the notion of desert (*axia*).[5] In addition to these philosophical questions, issues of historicity and anachronism also surfaced in the debate: Schofield raises some historiographic issues concerning interpretation, with Miller defending himself against the charge of anachronism by arguing that "it is reasonable to look for continuity as well as change in the history of political philosophy."[6] Issues of historicity, however, also raise theoretical questions of interpretative principles that cannot be addressed simply by linguistic means.

This paper aims to contribute to this philosophical and methodological debate by pursuing some theoretical issues concerning the conceptions of political rights that are being used. This will involve taking seriously Miller's argument that the *Politics* includes a developed account of natural rights in a Hohfeldian sense.[7] The paper will also be responding both to Kraut's questions about the nature of the concept of a "right" and his suspicions concerning essentialist ap-

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Justice and Rights in Aristotle's *Politics*," *The Review of Metaphysics* 49 (1996): 859–72. See also Fred D. Miller Jr., "Aristotle and the Origins of Natural Rights," (hereafter, "*ONR*") *The Review of Metaphysics* 49 (1996): 873–907.

[4]Kraut, "Natural Rights in Aristotle?" 773.

[5]Schofield, "Sharing in the Constitution," 833–4, 852–4.

[6]Schofield, "Sharing in the Constitution," 831–2, 856–7; Miller, *ONR*, 907.

[7]Miller, *NJR*, especially 93–111, 121–8; *ONR*, 881–2.

proaches to construing the meaning of such a concept,[8] and to Schofield's arguments that translating the *Politics* in terms of "rights" would add nothing to the fundamentals of Aristotle's analysis and that interpretations of his work should take account of broader historiographic issues. The paper will argue that some definite philosophical implications would follow from the inclusion of such rights in the *Politics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, but that these implications are absent from these texts and, indeed, are inconsistent with key elements of Aristotle's analysis. The paper therefore concludes on the skeptical note that a convincing case has yet to be made that political rights of a Hohfeldian kind are employed in Aristotle's *Politics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*.[9]

II

One of the difficulties in disputes over the presence or otherwise of rights concepts in Aristotle's (and other) texts is that it is not always clear what is meant by "rights." *NJR* tries to make this more specific by using the notion of rights as defined in the work of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld which was itself a response to the perceived ambiguity and looseness of legal terminology even in the writings of the most eminent legal analysts and judges.[10] Hohfeld's argument was that many legal notions are largely figurative or metaphorical importations from other fields, and so these "chameleon-hued words" are

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[8] Kraut, "Natural Rights in Aristotle?" 757, 773–4.

[9] A number of translations were consulted in writing this paper, but nothing is meant to hang on any particular translation used since the argument of this paper addresses how the notion of "rights" may be understood and defended textually. Translations consulted include *Aristotle: The Politics*, ed. Stephen Everson, trans. Benjamin Jowett, and rev. Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); H. Rackham, *Aristotle: Politics* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1990); T. A. Sinclair, *Aristotle: The Politics*, rev. T. J. Saunders (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992); *Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics*, ed. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1934); Roger Crisp, *Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Terence Irwin, *Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985); J. A. K. Thomson, *The Ethics of Aristotle*, rev. Hugh Tredennick (London: Penguin, 1976).

[10] W. N. Hohfeld, *Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning* (hereafter, "*FLC*") (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923), 23–64, first published *Yale Law Journal* 23 (1913).

often used with an imprecise blend of literal and figurative meanings with the result that different kinds of legal rights are frequently confused; for example, even in legal contexts, the term "right" is often used loosely to refer to whatever may be lawfully claimed.[11] Arguing against this loose terminology, Hohfeld differentiated between four different kinds of rights terms by placing them in the context of the different jural or legal relations which constitute them, and to this end the different kinds of rights (claim-right, privilege/liberty, power, immunity) are displayed in a defining scheme of jural opposites and correlatives. This scheme is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: *Hohfeld's scheme of jural relations*

Jural opposites	claim-right no-right	privilege/ liberty duty	power disability	immunity liability
Jural correlatives	claim-right duty	privilege/ liberty no-right	power liability	immunity disability

According to Hohfeld's approach the meanings of the different kinds of rights are given in terms of the scheme of jural relations. For example, if "X has a claim-right against Y that Y Øs," the jural correlative is that "Y has a duty toward X to Ø" and the jural opposite is that "X has a no-right against Y."[12] Central to the construction of the Hohfeldian scheme of rights is the notion of correlativity: the relationship between two jural agents, X and Y, comprises two symmetrical relations—X's relation with Y, and Y's relation with X—where each one is, as a matter of logic, the correlative of the other. Thus, talking of "X's claim-right that Y Øs" is logically equivalent to talking of "Y's duty to X to Ø." The action denoted by X's claim-right against Y is thus not X's action but Y's action; for this reason, a claim-right is sometimes referred to as a "passive" right rather than an "active" right since the action referred to is the action of the duty-holder not the right-holder. For example, to say that X, who is Y's creditor, has a claim-right that Y repays the loan, is equivalent to saying that Y, who is X's debtor, has a

[11] Hohfeld, *FLC*, 30–1, 35–8.
[12] Hohfeld, *FLC*, 38.

duty to X to repay the loan; according to either expression, the action being denoted is the action of the duty-holder not the action of the holder of the claim-right. A rigorously Hohfeldian approach to Aristotle's texts would therefore need to establish how these jural relations are central to or constitutive of political relations in the *Politics*.

NJR argues that the evidence of rights locutions in Aristotle shows that all four of Hohfeld's rights concepts are present—*to dikaion* (claim-right), *exousia* (liberty/privilege), *kurios* (authority/power) and *akuros/adeia* (immunity)—even though there is no single Greek term that denotes the generic notion of a "right."[13] Indeed, the absence of a generic Greek term for a right is even taken to provide a parallel with Hohfeld's analysis which also does not have a generic term for "rights" and identifies what is commonly thought of as a right by the term "claim-right."[14] Although ostensibly adopting Hohfeld's scheme, however, *NJR* departs from it in significant ways. This raises some fundamental questions as to the kind of rights analysis that *NJR* claims to find in Aristotle's texts and the implications of these rights for the political analysis that is then attributed to Aristotle.

Crucially important for Miller's argument are the claims to citizenship and political office, and these are held to be Hohfeldian claim-rights.[15] *NJR*, however, construes correlativity to mean that "X has a claim right to Y's Aing if, and only if, Y has a duty to X to do A," thus reinterpreting Hohfeld's notion of correlativity in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.[16] Having made this move, *NJR* then weakens this condition to that of a necessary condition only, on the grounds that not all duties are correlative to a claim-right. Although a claim-right entails a correlative duty, some duties, such as those in the Mosaic code (for example, the duty not to covet a neighbor's ox) and the duty of charity, are held not to imply correlative claim-rights; and in some cases, *NJR* argues, the claim-right is "in some sense more basic than, and helps to ground, the correlative duty."[17] Miller therefore rewrites Hohfeld's notion of a claim-right: by weakening the "if, and only if" relation to "only if," Miller writes that "X has a claim right to Y's Aing *only if* Y has a duty to X to do A."[18]

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[13] *NJR*, 93–117.
[14] *NJR*, 106–7.
[15] *NJR*, 97–101.
[16] *NJR*, 94.
[17] *NJR*, 95–6.
[18] *NJR*, 96, original emphasis. This reasoning is also applied to the other three types of rights.

This departure from Hohfeld's strict correlativity of claim-rights and duties is accompanied by transposing the action denoted by the claim-right from the duty-holder to the holder of the claim-right, so that X's claim-right is not that Y Øs but that X can Ø. *NJR* thus slips into a way of talking about claim-rights in which the right-holder has a claim to have or to do something—to disputed goods, to citizenship, to act as a defendant or prosecutor in a court of law, to political office—which is an active rather than a passive right.[19] *NJR*'s notion of a just claim or right to have or to do something is therefore not the same as a Hohfeldian claim-right that another do something. Furthermore, construing claim-rights as active rights implies that Y's duty is only to let X do the action denoted by the right. The duty-holder's action is thus sidelined to merely accepting or not preventing the right-holder's action.

These changes raise a question as to how a claim can be identified as a claim-*right*. A duty that is correlative to a claim-right functions as a "moral sanction" or "side constraint'" on the actions of others.[20] A duty is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for the existence of the claim-right, however, and so the mere presence of a duty on another agent does not provide evidence that X's claim is a claim-right because it could always be the case that the duty is not the sort that is correlative to a claim-right; for example, it does not follow from the fact that a person has a duty to give alms to the poor that any particular indigent has a claim-right to such assistance.[21] To overcome this difficulty there would need to be either an alternative sufficient condition for a claim-right or a theoretical account of the two different kinds of duties so that those that are correlative to a claim-right can be differentiated from those that are not. It might be thought that the difference between claims and claim-rights lies in the legal enforceability of the claim-rights and the duties, but if legal relations are to be justified in terms of natural claim-rights such an argument would appear to be circular; or, similarly, if a natural claim-right is held to justify the right-holder in making a claim against the duty-holder, there again needs to be some independent argument as to why any particular claim does indeed carry this justification; otherwise the argument would again appear to be circular.[22] Without a theoretical

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[19] *NJR*, 97–101; compare 115.
[20] *NJR*, 97.
[21] *NJR*, 96.
[22] *NJR*, 95.

means of identifying which claims are claim-rights or which duties are of the correlative sort, it is not clear how it can be decided whether any particular claim is a claim-right or not since showing that there are duties present as well as claims is not by itself sufficient to establish that the claims are claim-rights held correlatively against those other agents. This theoretical difficulty is linked to the diminution of the duty simply to allowing the claimant to do what is claimed, rather than providing the action denoted by the claim-right since the action denoted by the claim-right is now separate from the action denoted by the duty.

By altering Hohfeld's notion of the correlativity of claim-rights and duties, *NJR* thus replaces Hohfeld's strict notion of X's claim-right that Y Øs with a loose notion of X's claim to Ø. This non-Hohfeldian usage of rights terminology is also illustrated by the support that *NJR* claims from earlier translations that Aristotle's *to dikaion/ta dikaia* can be translated as "rights" or "claims," as those earlier translations too are not using these terms in their strict Hohfeldian sense but are examples of the loose or metaphorical renderings of these terms against which Hohfeld's work was directed. The works of A. C. Bradley, and of Franz Susemihl and R. D. Hicks, were published prior to Hohfeld's and so it would be unlikely for them to show an awareness of the distinctions pioneered by Hohfeld, and indeed their notion of a right has more in common with those loose notions of a claim against which Hohfeld was arguing than with Hohfeld's notion of a claim-right.[23] Bradley, referred to by Susemihl and Hicks, discusses "political rights" as "the right to the franchise," but this is a claim to something and not a claim-right that another do something. There is no suggestion of any correlative duties to these rights, and the only duties mentioned are those that men owe to the state and which provide a reason why all men may rightly claim the suffrage.[24] Furthermore, if there were to be any correlative duties in Bradley's account they

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[23] Franz Susemihl and R. D. Hicks, *The Politics of Aristotle* (London: Macmillan, 1894), 405 n. on 3.12.1282b20, cited at *NJR*, 97 n. 25; and A. C. Bradley, "Aristotle's Conception of the State," in *A Companion to Aristotle's Politics*, ed. D. Keyt and F. D. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 49–50, cited at *NJR*, 87, 97 n. 25.

[24] Bradley's argument in "Aristotle's Conception of the State," 49, that "Let us take, as an example of political rights, the suffrage. The poor man, then, claims this privilege as his right," contains just the sort of loose usage of different rights terms (claim, privilege, and right) that Hohfeld argued against.

would surely have to be owed by the state against whom the men were claiming the suffrage, not by other men, but this would be an inapposite illustration for *NJR*'s interpretation of the *Politics* since all Aristotle's rights and duties are held to be individual rights.[25] Thus, citing translations which simply use the words "right" or "claim" is not sufficient to establish that such translations are using rights concepts in a Hohfeldian sense.

These alterations to the notion of a claim-right also have implications for the kind of relationship that obtains between the agents X and Y. In arguing that rights and duties are held only by individuals and not by collective agencies or the polis, *NJR* contrasts Aristotle's analysis with a liberal argument such as John Locke's where individuals may retain rights against the government.[26] In distancing Aristotle's political theory from liberal theories such as Locke's, however, *NJR* moves further away from Hohfeld's analysis by setting up a system of rights-holdings that are claimed competitively against other individuals, and this leads to a particular kind of political analysis. Miller's political analysis centers on the argument that "individuals are disputing (*amphisbētousi*) over political offices" such that each disputant "is claiming that *he* should occupy the offices on the grounds of alleged superiority."[27] Once the dispute has been resolved, the successful candidates have a "just-claim right" to office and the unsuccessful claimants have a duty to yield. This right to office is an active right, not a passive Hohfeldian right, and the duty is on the unsuccessful claimants to yield in ceding their unsuccessful claims. The fact that successful claims to office are accompanied by a duty on the unsuccessful claimants to yield does not by itself demonstrate that the claims of the successful are claim-*rights*, however, since the duty on others to yield might be a noncorrelative sort of duty (perhaps owed to the polis or to the gods, for example) to abide by the distribu-

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[25] "individuals have rights *within the polis* against other individuals, including the rulers, but there is no suggestion of rights *against the polis* in Aristotle"; *ONR*, 880; although see the slight qualification at n. 14. Compare *NJR*, 112. I have been unable to find a further discussion of rights against the rulers.

[26] *ONR*, 879–80. This is not the place for a detailed examination of Locke's use of rights terminology, although it is arguable that much of the current exegesis of Locke's arguments also misapplies Hohfeldian terminology. Locke and rights terminology is examined in V. Brown, *John Locke, Language and Liberalism*, in preparation.

[27] *NJR*, 100; also *NJR*, 107, 123; *ONR*, 882.

tion. Furthermore *NJR*'s disputatious citizens are unlike Hohfeldian jural agents in that, prior to the distribution of offices, these individuals are rival claimants to the same offices, whereas in Hohfeld's system a debtor and a creditor, for example, are not contending for the same right but represent the two sides of the same financial relationship. *NJR*'s citizens are thus rivals, and the political significance of the judgment of the distribution is that it determines which of the rival citizens are to be successful. Throwing the duty entirely on the unsuccessful rival claimants thus emphasises the adversarial individualism of *NJR*'s interpretation of Aristotle's political analysis at the expense of a broader political recognition of the results of the distribution. An alternative way of theorizing Hohfeldian claim-rights for Aristotle's *Politics* would be to say, for example, that worthy individuals have claim-rights against the rulers (or the polis or some function within it) that their worth should be publicly acknowledged, so that the correlative duty on those rulers (or some function within the polis) is to recognize individual worth in distributing the offices.[28] Whether such an ascription of claim-rights and duties to Aristotle's texts or to the actual constitution of Athens could be justified is another question entirely; the point is simply that such an application of Hohfeldian notions would provide a very different conceptualization of political relations from the individualistically adversarial one offered in *NJR*.

The textual evidence adduced to support *NJR*'s argument concerning rights to political office is examined in the following section, but for now the question at issue is what *NJR*'s interpretation implies about the nature of the alleged claim-rights and duties and, hence, about the nature of relations within the polis. It implies that ethical and political relations are conceived in terms of individual relations that are fundamentally agonistic or adversarial in that citizens are contending against each other as if they were rivals in a lawsuit. *NJR* thus models Aristotle's political analysis in terms of an agonistic juridical metaphor—an agonistic juridicalization of political relations—in which citizens are theorized as rival claimants in a lawsuit contesting against each other for offices, and in which the functions of the polis

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[28] As argued in Ernest Barker, *The Politics of Aristotle* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), 150 n. 1: "The last three chapters—IX, X, and XI [of book 3]—have all been concerned, in different ways, with the general problem of distributive justice, or, in other words, with an attempt to determine what persons, in view of their contribution to the state, should be specially recognized by it in its distribution of office and honour."

are theorized as the judgments handed out in a contested lawsuit in settling disputes between rival litigants.[29] *NJR* defends this juridical metaphor by applying an interpretation of the disputing parties at a law-court at *Nichomachean Ethics* 5.4 to the dispute over the constitution at *Politics* 3, but in doing this *NJR* also inserts the language of rights so that, just as disputing parties at law are held to be contesting rival claim-rights, so too are the disputants over the constitution. The detailed textual exegesis offered in *NJR* is discussed later in this essay; the point being registered here is that Hohfeld's analysis of correlative jural relations is transformed into an adversarial model of individual rival litigants and that it is this agonistic model that is applied to Aristotle's political analysis.

Finally, there is an issue as to how these claim-rights are natural claim-rights, an issue that goes beyond Hohfeld's analysis which was concerned with positive law. According to *NJR* just-claim rights to office are decided upon by the just distribution. Prior to the distribution, all the claimants are contending against each other for these claim-rights, and it is only with the announcement of the just distribution that the holders of just-claim rights are identified, thus establishing which of the rival claimants are to be right-holders and which are to be duty-holders.[30] It is not clear, however, in what sense these purported claim-rights can be natural claim-rights if they are decided upon by that distribution rather than determining it. *NJR* cites Bradley's distinction between a natural right to the suffrage, based on "real justice," and a positive right to the suffrage, where the absence of the latter could be challenged on the basis of the former. Yet in *NJR* the natural or just-claim rights are decided upon by the just distribution as the outcome of a contested lawsuit; the allocation of natural rights thus emerges as the outcome of the lawsuit, and so natural rights do not determine that outcome. Here the implications of the overarching juridical metaphor seem to be at odds with the arguments concerning natural justice; the juridical metaphor provides a model of political relations in which the allocation of political rights and duties is determined as the outcome of a juridical process, but the significance of natural rights and duties would seem to suggest that these rights and

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[29] *NJR*, 97–101, 107–8, 123. The Greek verb *agōnizomai* includes contending at the games, in fights, or in the law courts; Liddell and Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).

[30] *NJR*, 100.

duties should have some role in determining the outcome of that juridical process.

This section has posed some questions about the jurisprudential analysis being employed in *NJR*, and it has argued that the particular adaptation of Hohfeld's scheme put forward in *NJR* results in a particular kind of political analysis that leaves unanswered some crucial questions concerning the theoretical formulation and normative justification of these purported natural claim-rights and duties. Section 3 examines in detail the textual arguments put forward in *NJR* to justify such claim-rights to office; and section 4 offers an alternative interpretation of Aristotle's texts and a critical assessment of *NJR*'s application of Hohfeld's scheme of jural relations in interpreting Aristotle's political philosophy.

III

In *NJR* the account of rights is split between two separate chapters: chapter 3 on justice provides an account of the relationship between justice and rights, but it is not until the following chapter 4 on rights that an account of Hohfeldian claim-rights is provided. One consequence of this ordering of the argument is that the vitally important analysis of the relationship between distributive justice and rights in chapter 3 is conducted prior to the elaboration of Hohfeldian claim-rights, and has only a footnote referenced forward to the following chapter for a defense of "the ascription of rights claims to Aristotle."[31] A weakness of this approach is that the issues concerning the meaning of "just claims or *rights*"—issues concerning the formal characterization and normative standing of such rights as claim-rights—are not addressed in the chapter ostensibly devoted to analyzing the relationship between justice and rights and are taken for granted thereafter in discussing the various rights locutions in Aristotle's texts.

According to *NE* 5.3, distributive justice concerning the allocation of common goods such as offices and honors requires a geometric proportionality, or an equality of ratios, between people's *axia* (worth, merit, or desert) and the value of the common goods or shares distributed to those people. The principle of geometric proportionality is thus the principle of distributive justice, and it determines a

[31] *NJR*, 71 n. 8.

person's just share of common goods. *NJR* argues further, however, that there are rights to these shares. What are the precise arguments used to establish this?

The argument in chapter 3 starts with the account of geometric proportionality at *NE* 5.3 and Aristotle's principle of distributive justice as an equality of the ratios of *axia* and shares for the two-person case. The "governing principle" or "geometrical proportion" is given as follows:

$$\frac{\text{Merit of X}}{\text{Merit of Y}} = \frac{\text{The value of X's share}}{\text{The value of Y's share}} \qquad \text{(P1)}$$

The argument of this paper is independent of the question whether *axia* might be translated as "desert" or "worth" rather than "merit," and so the word *axia* will be retained throughout. What is crucial, however, is the next stage of Miller's account as it is here that the right-hand side of the equation given as P1 above is rewritten in terms of the "rights" of X and Y instead of the "value of shares" of X and Y.[32] This crucial move is made without citational support from Aristotle's texts and is given as follows:

> Distributive justice presupposes a partitioning of a common asset into portions (e.g. parcels of property or political offices). A distribution (*dianomē*) is a function which assigns to each person in a given domain one of these portions. The result is that each person has a just claim or right[33] to a portion of the whole. Justice requires that rights be proportional to the merit of the right-holders:

$$\frac{\text{Merit of X}}{\text{Merit of Y}} = \frac{\text{The right of X}}{\text{The right of Y}^{34}} \qquad [\text{(P2)}]$$

This is the first time that the relation between distributive justice and rights is explained and defended in *NJR*. The third sentence introduces the term "right" as equivalent to "just claim," but these terms are not explained; instead, the sentence carries a footnote referring to

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[32] *NJR*, 71.

[33] The following footnote is given here: "Section 4.3 below defends the ascription of rights claims to Aristotle"; *NJR*, 71 n. 8.

[34] *NJR*, 71.

the following chapter for a defense of "the ascription of rights claims to Aristotle." There is no mention of correlative duties. At this crucial stage in the argument, therefore, it cannot be known what kind of claim or right is here being imputed to Aristotle.

Further, it is said that "the result is that each person has a just claim or right to a portion of the whole," but it is not clear what the just claim or right is the result of. The passage seems to suggest that a person has a just claim or right to a share as a result of a distribution (*dianomē*). Just claims or rights to a share are thus the result of a just distribution, presumably, in the sense that they are determined by the relative *axia* since justice requires that rights be proportional to the relative *axia*. This seems to make just claims or rights dependent on the just distribution according to the *axia*. This raises a question of the relationship between the two principles of distributive justice, which are marked above as P1 and P2. *NJR* seeks to argue that P1 can be rewritten as P2, so a crucial question is what is implied by P2 that is not implied by P1; or is the introduction of rights at this stage simply adding an idle cog to the machine?[35]

An effect of the use of rights language here is that rights appear to carry some separate analytic or normative function. Agents are said to "have" rights, and these rights are separate from the things to which the rights refer. This feature of rights language is evident in the choice of example that immediately follows the above passage in *NJR*. In the only citational reference to Aristotle's texts at this stage, the argument is made as follows:

> For example, if *X* contributes one mina to a business venture while *Y* contributes ninety-nine, *X* has a just claim to only one-hundredth of the net earnings (see *Pol.* 3.9.1280a25–31). When the distribution does not conform to this principle—when individuals receive something other than what they have a right to—there will be justified complaints.[36]

In this passage it is argued that individuals should receive only what they have a right to. Individuals thus "have" rights to things, and having these rights is distinct from having the things themselves. The significance of the reformulation of just shares as rights in P2 is thus that rights now seem to be invested with some kind of independent theoretical standing of their own since people can have rights to shares in-

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[35] As argued by Schofield, "Sharing in the Constitution," 852–4.
[36] *NJR*, 71.

dependently of having those shares. It is this independent theoretical standing that gives rights talk its power since the rights that individuals have can be used to challenge the justice of existing outcomes. But in P2 the right to a share is determined by the relative *axia* and so does not actually have any independent standing. Yet the language of rights seems subtly to insert a separate criterion into Aristotle's argument, in that individuals should receive what they have a right to. In contrast to the passage above, where rights to a share are the result of a just distribution, the suggestion in the business venture case is that rights provide a principle for deciding whether a distributive outcome is just. A difficulty in trying to make sense of the relation between P1 and P2 is thus that the notion that just claims are the rights to what is justly distributed somehow seems to run alongside the quite different notion that just claims as rights determine what is a just distribution. This dual argument reappears in chapter 4, but before turning to that chapter, there are a number of points to be noted about the example of the business venture, the only passage from Aristotle's text cited in support of the argument in chapter 3 concerning distributive justice and claim-rights.

First, the kind of right that Miller claims to have found in the business venture case has not yet been explained (since it is to come in the subsequent chapter 4), and so the sort of duty entailed by this right or the question of who might be the holder of this duty is also not addressed in the business venture case. As an example of what is later argued to be a claim-right the business venture case thus turns out to be somewhat opaque. Furthermore, it could be argued that the duty entailed by any individual partner's claim-right to a fair share of the business proceeds lies with the partnership as a collective group and not with any one individual partner who may be thought to have gained at another partner's expense.[37] If the business venture example is taken seriously as a political illustration, it would therefore imply that citizens' claims for distributive justice are held against some collectivity or function within the polis or against the constitution, rather than against individual rival claimants for office.

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[37] Indeed in *ONR*, there is a shift in wording that suggests just this point: "When individuals do cooperate for mutual advantage, however, justice entails that each of them has just claims against the others"; *ONR*, 888; "the others" refers collectively to the rest of the partnership, not to particular individuals.

Second, on purely translational grounds, the evidence of the business venture case is weak. It is a central plank of *NJR*'s argument that the expression *to dikaion* is sometimes used in a sense equivalent to that of a claim-right. From this it would be expected that such a use of *to dikaion* would be provided from this business venture example, too, given that this is the only example given to illustrate the central link between distributive justice and rights in chapter 3, but no translation of the business venture case is provided there to show this.[38] Indeed, the business venture passage does not actually contain a usage of *to dikaion* that would be amenable to such a translation as a right since the only use of *dikaion* at *Politics* 3.9.1280a25–31 is in the negative expression *ou gar einai dikaion* which is normally translated as "it is not just" or "it would not be just." It is the former expression—"it is not just"—which is given in the translation of the passage provided in *ONR*: "For if one person has contributed [only] one mina out of a hundred but another has contributed all the rest, it is not just for the first person to get an equal share with the second."[39] In spite of this, however, Miller immediately goes on to infer that the passage implies a claim-right: "The point is clearly that each partner has a just claim—a right—to a share of the proceeds proportionate to his contribution."[40] There is no explanation provided, however, as to how "it is not just" implies that each partner has a just claim or right.

Third, the passage at *Politics* 3.9.1280a25–31, shows how distributive justice as it applies to business ventures is mistaken for the polis, since it uses the wrong notion of *axia*; the polis is concerned not with money or wealth but with excellence or virtue, and so the *axia* relevant for it should reflect this. There is thus an important sense in which the business venture case is being used as a counter-example in the *Politics* for the political analysis of *axia*. The business venture case leads up to the argument that the *axia* that is significant for the polis is not the contribution of money or wealth but of political excellence (*politikē aretē*), and that it is this excellence that is relevant for geometric proportionality.[41] But *to dikaion* does not appear in this

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[38] The index locorum in *NJR* gives pp. 71, 125, 157, 161 for this passage but none provides a translation.

[39] *ONR*, 888.

[40] *ONR*, 888.

[41] *Politics* 3.9.1281a4–8. This is not the end of Aristotle's argument, however; see below.

later passage. The business venture example, therefore, hardly supports Miller's argument that *to dikaion* entails the notion of a just claim or right which is central to Aristotle's political analysis.

Chapter 4 then attempts to show that the unspecified just claims or rights of chapter 3 correspond to Hohfeldian claim-rights and that these claim-rights are natural rights. The case of political rights as contested rights to office will be considered here, as this forms the core analysis for *NJR*'s overarching model of disputatious citizens such that the disputes about political justice at *Politics* 3 are held to be modeled on the disputes about distributive justice at *NE* 5. The chapter provides a translation of a crucial passage at *Politics* 3.12.1282b18–30 that is interpreted in terms of political rights. In the previous chapter 3 on the relation between distributive justice and rights, a footnote referred forward to chapter 4 for a defense of the ascription of rights to Aristotle, and now the defense is given that political rights to office are claim-rights (or just-claim rights) with their necessary (not logically equivalent) correlative duties, but all that is provided is the following statement:

> For Aristotle is considering a context in which individuals are disputing (*amphisbētousi*) over political offices (1283a11). Each of the parties is claiming that *he* should occupy the offices on the grounds of alleged superiority, and the resolution of the dispute will involve determining which members of society have a just claim to political offices. The presumption is that people who are superior in some respect and thus are more deserving have certain rights against others who are inferior in that respect and have, accordingly, a duty to yield. The right to hold office thus resembles a Hohfeldian claim right.[42]

Individuals are "disputing" (*amphisbētousi*) over the offices. The "resolution of the dispute" involves "determining which members of society have a just claim to political offices." This might suggest that it is the just claims that determine what is a just distribution, and such an interpretation would be consistent with *NJR*'s emphasis on the importance of claim rights. During the prior period when all the contestants are putting forward their claims, however, there are neither just claim holders nor duty holders because the composition of these two groups is determined only with the resolution of the dispute and the allocation of offices. Citizens are not therefore claiming the offices on the basis of the just-claim rights which they actually have, since

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[42] *NJR*, 100.

what is at issue is the identification (or determination) of which individuals have the superior *axia* and therefore the just-claim right. It is here that the importance of the juridical metaphor of political relations comes into play since the resolution of the dispute over the distribution of offices is modeled in terms of the outcome of a law case that decides upon the winners and losers amongst the rival litigants. Just-claim rights are therefore *post hoc* rights that are determined by the resolution of the dispute according to the relative *axia*. It follows that just-claim rights, or rights based on nature, can only be rights to the particular just shares that are assigned; they cannot be rights to be assigned a particular share. Having a just-claim right to political office thus means no more than that the individual has been assigned a particular just share according to the relative *axia*; it cannot refer to a claim that anyone has in advance of the just distribution and so it cannot determine what an individual's just share should be. Returning to the discussion above of the dual argument of *NJR*, it transpires that in spite of the importation of the language of rights and the powerful ambiguity of the notion of "having a just-claim right," such a right amounts to no more than the right to one's justly allotted share.

There is also the question as to why the just-claim rights established by the just distribution are meant to be just-claim *rights*. *NJR*'s argument is that the distribution determines which claims to office are successful and which are unsuccessful, and that the unsuccessful claimants have a duty to yield, but there is no argument provided to establish why the right-holders can make claims against the unsuccessful or why the duty to yield is a correlative duty to those claim-rights. According to *NJR*'s account, the duty to yield could just as well, indeed more reasonably, be taken as a noncorrelative duty analogously with the duty to charity; for example, the duty to yield could be a duty owed by the unsuccessful citizens to the polis (or to the rulers, the constitution, or the gods) to abide by the official distribution. This would make the duty a public matter of political order in maintaining the distribution rather than a private matter between erstwhile rival individuals. The right to hold office is thus quite unlike a Hohfeldian right since there is nothing to show that the holders of the rights and duties are correlative jural agents rather than winners and losers as in a court case involving rival litigants.

This lacuna concerning duties also shows up in the textual evidence cited. In Miller's translation of the passage at *Politics* 3.12.1282b18–30 there is no mention of duties; the translation of *to dikaion* as a just-claim right cannot therefore be interpreted as a Hohfeldian claim-right which is held against another individual who has the correlative duty.[43] To establish that the claim is indeed a claim-right requires at least that this correlative duty is registered in Aristotle's text, but *NJR*'s translations fail to provide this and, furthermore, no Greek locution is offered for the "duty" which is alleged to be correlative to *to dikaion*.[44] The argument in chapter 4 simply assumes that the mere assertion of a "right" implies that Aristotle must have had in mind that these were claim-rights against others who held the correlative duties, even though *NJR* does not argue that Aristotle actually mentions the duties that are correlative to political rights. The next piece of textual evidence provided is that of *Politics* 3.13.1283b17–18, 21–3. Translations of these passages also fail to refer to the claim-rights being held against other individuals correlatively holding the duty, but this does not prevent that conclusion being drawn: "These expressions are used to assert a right—i.e. to make a just claim against other individuals."[45]

In the final paragraph of this section in chapter 4 on claim-rights, however, it is argued that the correlativity between rights and duties leads Aristotle sometimes to use *to dikaion* for the correlative duty rather than the claim-right itself. Two final citations from the *Politics* are included which are meant to support this, but *NJR*'s own interpretations of these passages are in terms of what is "just" or "unjust," and are not in terms of duties whether correlative or not.[46] The first citation from the *Politics* is at 7.3.1325b10–12, but *NJR* construes *peithesthai dikaion* as "it is just to obey" and not, say, as "it is a duty to obey." With reference to the final citation from *Politics* 5.8.1308a9, it is argued that "the phrase *adikein eis atimian* [is used] in the sense of 'unjustly depriving [someone] of honour'," so here *adikein* is construed as "unjustly" and not, say, as "failing in the duty of." Indeed,

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[43] *NJR*, 100. Cooper, "Justice and Rights in Aristotle's *Politics*," 870–2, disputes the translations of "rights" here.

[44] Apart from *to dikaion* itself; see below.

[45] *NJR*, 101. This also applies to the passages cited at *Politics* 3.16.1287b11–13 and 6.3.1318a23–4.

[46] *Rhetoric* 1.14.1375a9–10, is used to support this, but here *dikaia* are said to include "oaths, promises, pledges, and rights of intermarriage."

NJR construes *adikein* as "doing an injustice" when a person fails to respect another's claim-right, rather than as "failing in a duty." Thus *NJR*'s own translations fail to substantiate the argument that here *to dikaion* and its cognates refer to the correlative duty rather than to what is just (or unjust).

This section has reviewed the core argument in *NJR* that Aristotle's political rights to office are just-claim rights (or natural rights) in a Hohfeldian sense, and it has concluded that neither the specific arguments nor the textual evidence cited support this core argument.

IV

The previous sections have examined Miller's core argument that Aristotle's *Politics* and *NE* employ individual just-claim rights. This brings us back to Kraut's fundamental questions concerning what is meant by a "right" and what it is that is "essential to the concept of a right," and also to Schofield's remarks about the historiographic issue of appropriate linguistic context. The approach of this paper to the questions raised by Kraut and Schofield has been to use Hohfeld's analysis of rights since this is what *NJR* claims to use, but this is not to say that Hohfeld's analysis provides an account of the essence of rights. Hohfeld's analysis is itself historically specific, being the product of early twentieth-century American analytical jurisprudence and has been subject to extensive debate.[47] Furthermore, Hohfeld's analysis was a response to what was perceived as the loose and incorrect usage of the various rights terms, even by the leading legal authorities of Hohfeld's time. Thus Hohfeld's scheme is not a universal scheme—either temporally or conceptually—within which all discussions of rights must necessarily be placed whatever their historical, philosophical, or linguistic context, and it is therefore anachronistic to expect earlier writers necessarily to be deploying those conceptual distinctions which Hohfeld's work set out to emphasize and which legal theorists are still debating.

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[47] For a recent contribution see Matthew H. Kramer, N. E. Simmonds, and Hillel Steiner, *A Debate Over Rights: Philosophical Enquiries* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). V. Brown, "On reformulating Hohfeld's scheme of jural relations," unpublished paper, offers a critique and extension of the Hohfeldian scheme of jural relations.

Whether Hohfeld's scheme is a useful one for understanding Aristotle's *Politics* and *NE* extends beyond disputes as to how individual words are to be translated and also depends on whether the Hohfeldian jural framework is congruent with Aristotle's political philosophy. In other words, consistent with Hohfeld's approach, it is in analyzing the use of these rights concepts within larger theoretical frameworks that some headway may be made. This suggests that such debates concerning the use of specific concepts are not resolvable at the level of individual concepts alone but need to take into account the broader theoretical structure or discourse within which such concepts are employed in generating the theoretical results that are associated with them.[48]

There is thus a prior question concerning the kind of theoretical structure or discourse that could sustain or generate such concepts. Following Miller's own appeal to Hohfeld's classification, the theoretical structure that is relevant for his argument is one embodying specific jural relations. This implies that the larger structure of Aristotle's political philosophy would need to be formulated in terms of a developed metaphor of jural/legal relations which serves to operationalize the relevant principles of distributive and corrective justice (whether natural justice or the positive law of the polis) by means of specific relations between the various individual agents who are designated as the bearers of the appropriate rights, duties, and so forth. Hence, in order to ascertain whether Aristotle could employ the concept of political claim-rights with respect to the distribution of offices within the polis, it is necessary to examine the overall theoretical structure of his political philosophy and the place of justice within it.

The objective of the section on justice in *NE* 5 is the establishment of the principles of justice as an other-regarding virtue aiming at another person's benefit and even at personal cost to oneself rather than against others.[49] It is the search for "the nature of justice and injustice."[50] Whereas what is just (*to dikaion*) conceived as universal justice concerns what is lawful in relation to another, what is just conceived as particular justice concerns what is equal or fair (*to ison*) in relation to another.[51] This requires establishing the general principles

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[48] See also M. F. Burnyeat, "Did the Ancient Greeks Have the Concept of Human Rights?" *Polis* 13 (1994): 1–11.

[49] See *NE* 5.1.1129b25–1130a13.

[50] *NE* 5.1134a14–16.

that guide what is equal or fair: for distributive justice this is the principle of geometric proportionality with respect to the appropriate notion of *axia*,[52] and for corrective justice it is arithmetic proportionality.[53] The standpoint of these investigations, therefore, is that of establishing the general principles of justice that determine the just outcome and with respect to which specific allocations of shares and gains/losses may be judged.

This theoretical framework is different from a Hohfeldian framework of jural relations between agents. Aristotle's approach requires comparing outcomes (shares and gains/losses) with the just outcome as determined by the application of a general rule or principle of justice. Comparisons are thus between outcomes and the just proportion, and this applies to both distributive justice at *NE* 5.3.1131b16–20 and corrective justice at *NE* 5.4.1132a6–10. The Hohfeldian framework, however, is structured in terms of the defining jural relations between the agents who are the bearers of the rights, duties, and so forth. Questions of justice are framed in terms of these jural relations rather than in terms of a general standard of justice since it is the relations themselves which embody the principles of justice that are operative.

It is the argument of this paper that both the Hohfeldian framework and Miller's adaptation of it are alien to Aristotle's *NE* and *Politics*. The nearest that the *NE* comes to theorizing the norms of justice in terms of individual citizens who are disputing is at *NE* 5.4 on corrective justice in private transactions where those who are disputing seek justice from a judge. The passage at *NE* 5.4.1132a19–24 is the first passage cited (and translated) in *NJR* in direct support of *to dikaion* as a Hohfeldian just-claim right.[54] Nowhere in Miller's translation of this passage is "just-claim right" actually offered as a translation of *to dikaion*, but nonetheless it is inferred that this must be Aristotle's meaning:

> According to this passage, disputing claimants assume they will get justice (*to dikaion*) from the judge who is settling the dispute; and if they think the judge has correctly resolved the dispute, the disputants "say that they have their own" (1132a27–9). In this context, then, *to dikaion* means that which one receives in a just settlement of a dispute—i.e. to

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[51] *NE* 5.2.
[52] *NE* 5.3.
[53] *NE* 5.4.
[54] That is, it introduces the section on just-claim rights, *NJR*, 97–101.

> get that which is "one's own." This is clearly what the claimant has a right to or is entitled to (cf. *Pol.* 4.4.1291a39–40). It is the task of the judge to determine what each party has a just claim to, i.e. what each owes to the other. Hence, *to dikaion* has a use which anticipates Hohfeld's notion of a claim right. I translate this use of *to dikaion* as "right" or "just claim" or more fully "just-claim right" (i.e. a right based on a claim of justice).[55]

The strategic move in this passage is in the third sentence which infers, from the argument that *to dikaion* means "that which one receives in a just settlement of a dispute" or that which is "one's own," that *to dikaion* "is clearly what the claimant has a right to or is entitled to." Here as elsewhere in *NJR* there is an unargued move from "what is just" in some sense to "what the claimant has a right to." It is also unargued to say that the judge's task is to determine "what each party has a just claim to" and that this amounts to "what each owes to the other," rather than that the judge has to determine what would be the just outcome or equal gains/losses.

NJR's defense of this inference, however, is based on an interpretation of what is "one's own" in the second sentence. This is elaborated in the following paragraph where, in response to the point that having or getting "one's own" is a broader notion than having or getting "what one's entitled to," it is argued that having "one's own" should here be construed narrowly in the sense of having a right to the thing since: "The disputing parties are making opposing claims to the same piece of property. Each claims that it is just for him to possess the object and for the other party not to interfere with his possession. To 'have one's own' in this case is clearly to have one's claim legally enforced."[56] Thus the argument that *to dikaion* refers to a Hohfeldian just-claim right is based on the interpretation that what is "one's own" must refer to property in the modern sense of a claim-right with its correlative duty. This however is to assume what has to be proved, namely, that Aristotle's concepts are equivalent to Hohfeldian rights. Returning to Aristotle's text, however, provides a very different argument concerning what is one's own since there the analogy of the line is used to explain arithmetic proportion and this has nothing to do with rights. Aristotle's passage continues (from 5.4.1132a19–24) as follows:

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[55] *NJR*, 97–8.
[56] *NJR*, 98.

> Now the judge restores equality: if we represent the matter by a line divided into two unequal parts, he takes away from the greater segment that portion by which it exceeds one-half of the whole line, and adds it to the lesser segment. When the whole has been divided into two halves, people then say that they "have their own," having got what is equal. This is indeed the origin of the word *dikaion* (just): it means *dicha* (in half), as if one were to pronounce it *dichaion*; and a *dikast* (judge) is a *dichast* (halver). The equal is a mean by way of arithmetical proportion between the greater and the less.[57]

There is no mention here of rival claims or of disputing parties. Nor is there any mention that having "one's own" refers to property rights or implies having one's claim legally enforced or being owed something by the other. Nor is there any mention of *to dikaion* in a sense other than "just." On the contrary, the point of the passage is that when people say that they "have their own," they have actually "got what is equal" in accordance with the principle of "what is just."[58] Furthermore, the passage continues to emphasize the significance of this general principle of equality by advancing an etymology of the words *dikaion* and *dikast* in terms of *dichaion* and *dichast* which refer to halving something (*dicha*: half). Equality as the general principle of corrective justice is thus accorded root importance not only in what the judge is meant to be doing and in what people "say that they have," but also in the proposed etymology of the key legal terms which is in accordance with what people themselves understand to be happening.[59] In view of this, even in the instance of corrective justice between private litigants, there is no evidence to accept the argument that *to dikaion* really means a claim-right against one's erstwhile rival claimant.

NJR argues that it is this model of disputing contestants in *NE* 5.4 that should be applied to the dispute over the constitution at *Politics* 3; it is this connection between the two texts that is used to justify the juridical metaphor for political relations.[60] Yet as individuals are not

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[57] *NE* 5.4.1132a24–32. *NJR* does not provide a translation of this passage; the translation here is Rackham's, but nothing is meant to hang on this particular translation.

[58] At *NE* 5.4.1132b16–20, "they say they 'have their own'" when there is "a mean between gain and loss," that is, when they "have neither lost nor gained."

[59] In the Penguin translation this derivation is said to be false, p. 181 n. 3.

[60] *NJR*, 107–8, 123.

disputing their rights at *NE* 5.4, there is no basis for applying a rights-based model of lawsuits to the theoretical dispute over the constitution at *Politics* 3. In doing so, however, *NJR* conflates the dispute over the constitution with a dispute between rival individual claimants for office.[61] Aristotle's use of the verb "dispute" (*amphisbēteō*) in the constitutional debate at *Politics* 3.6–13 is with reference to the different interested parties or groups who are trying to claim constitutional power for themselves, and so the disputants are not individual rivals for office but the parties, classes, or partisans who are disputing self-interestedly about the constitution, and it is against these factional disputants that Aristotle's own argument is being directed.[62] All the different parties are said to accept the principle of geometric proportionality in which shares are determined by the relative *axia*, yet the parties disagree about the relevant *axia* since each one wishes to promote its own distinguishing *axia* and, hence, the constitution that would give power to itself: the oligarchs argue for wealth/birth, the democrats argue for free birth, and the aristocrats argue for excellence or virtue.[63] This constitutional debate about the *axia* that should receive political recognition poses a difficulty (*aporia*) that political philosophy has to resolve,[64] and so Aristotle first considers whether the offices should be distributed according to superior excellence in whatever respect, but this is immediately rejected.[65] *NJR*, however, interprets this passage to mean that individuals are disputing as to which ones of them are superior in terms of some already agreed *axia* since "the presumption is that people who are superior *in some respect* and thus are more deserving have certain rights against others who are inferior *in that respect.*"[66] The context for Aristotle's discussion here (at 1282b24–30 and 1283a11–15) is the dispute between different parties and their rival *axiai*, not between rival individuals given some agreed *axia*. Aristotle carries on considering the constitutional dispute between different groups and their *axiai*,[67] and finally the discussion is turned around to question the very notion of

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[61] Compare *NJR*, 100, 123.

[62] For example, at *Politics* 3.8.1280a6, 3.9.1281a9–10, and 3.12.1283a11; compare *NJR*, 100, 123 n. 100.

[63] *Politics* 3.9.1280a7–25; compare *NE* 5.3.1131a25–9, *NJR*, 124–8.

[64] Compare *Politics* 3.8.1279b12–15.

[65] See *Politics* 3.12.1282b18–30.

[66] *NJR*, 100, emphases added; the reference for "disputing" is given as *Politics* 3.12.1283a11.

[67] *Politics* 3.12.1283a15–3.13.1283b27.

distributing offices to the few rather than to all the citizens who would thereby share in both governing and being governed.[68] Thus, whatever Aristotle's final verdict on the constitutional dispute is thought to be, the passage at 1282b18–30 (which forms the core argument concerning claim-rights to office in chapter 4) does not provide support for the argument that the dispute over the constitution is modeled on a rights-based lawsuit or that individual claimants are disputing their rights to office as if in a lawsuit.[69]

NJR argues that the verb "dispute" (*amphisbēteō*) carries connotations of legal dispute.[70] To the extent that *amphisbēteō* does carry such legal connotations, it is Aristotle's presentation of the constitutional debate that is being modeled in terms of a disputed lawsuit. Yet if Aristotle's notion of "dispute" at *Politics* 3.6–13 is indeed related to that at *NE* 5.4 concerning corrective justice as *NJR* argues, then the model of the lawsuit that is relevant for Aristotle's presentation of the constitutional dispute is one that is settled in accordance with the general principle of "what is just." Aristotle's own solution to the difficulty posed to political philosophy by the constitutional dispute would thus be functioning rhetorically as the authoritative and disinterested judgment of "what is just" that settles a disputed lawsuit, and so Aristotle's own role in this would be analogous to that of the judge or *dikast* at *NE* 5.4. *NJR*, however, misconstrues the rhetorical force of Aristotle's presentation and solution of the constitutional debate by conflating it with a description of the way in which individual disputants claim political offices for themselves and so it fails to identify the moral significance of Aristotle's solution to the difficulty posed to political philosophy as the judgment of "what is just."

Aristotle's emphasis in the *NE* on general principles of justice in establishing just outcomes accords with the concern in the *Politics*

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[68] *Politics* 3.13.1283b27–1284a3. At 3.13.1283b27–30, it is argued that "none of the principles" on which men claim to rule over others is right. V. Brown, "Self-Government: The Master Trope of Republican Liberty," *The Monist* 84 (January 2001): 60–76, examines some implications for Aristotle's notion of freedom (*eleutheria*).

[69] Gewirth, *Reason and Morality*, 100–1, does not interpret *amphisbētousi* in individual terms: "Aristotle's analysis of the divergent grounds on which different groups in the state lay disputatious claim (*amphisbētousi*, *diamphisbētousi*), even justly (*dikaiōs*), to political authority."

[70] *NJR*, 123.

with the importance of the constitution in establishing the polis, since good constitutions must be informed by principles of justice. The constitution defines the relation between the polis and its citizenry, and it embodies ethical principles for facilitating the common good. This is at the core of Aristotle's political philosophy: the constitution—the framework of laws based on ethical principles—is what structures and facilitates the proper political life of the polis, its commitment to the common good, and its procedures for allocating common resources. It is the case, then, that relations between individual citizens fall under the terms of these general principles,[71] rather than that political relations are constituted by the individual correlative rights and duties between citizens conceived individually as rival litigants. The constitution should thus embody principles of justice which are to be applied in establishing the common good (and this will include adjudicating private disputes), but this is not the same as saying that the proposed constitution and the norms of justice embodied in it are to be theorized in terms of a juridical metaphor of litigious contests between individual citizens.[72]

V

The claim that Aristotle's political philosophy should be understood in terms of Hohfeldian natural rights raises important methodological issues that transcend linguistic disagreements over the translation of particular words. This paper has proposed that these disagreements need to be set in a wider theoretical or philosophical context of the meaning of different "rights" terms and that the theoretical implications of imputing the Hohfeldian framework, or even a version of it, to Aristotle's political and moral philosophy need careful

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[71] Such principles would need to be interpreted and applied in the particularity of the instances that make up the life of the polis.

[72] This suggests that the linear spectrum of the dichotomy between "individualist" and "holistic" approaches to Aristotle's notion of the common advantage (*NJR*, 194–224) fails to take account of the complexity of the ways in which the relationship between the individual and the polis is theorized in the *Politics*. Brown, "Self-Government: The Master Trope of Republican Liberty," examines the significance for Aristotle's *Politics* of the homology between self-government within the soul of a free man and self-government within the polis, and how this trope was constitutive for some later accounts of republican liberty.

examination. When analyzed in this wider theoretical context, Aristotle's writings are not well chosen as a example of an early discourse on natural Hohfeldian rights.[73]

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TOWARD AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO ARISTOTLE AS A BIOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHER

SOPHIA M. CONNELL

I

EVER SINCE BALME'S GROUNDBREAKING WORK on the subject, there has been substantial progress in our understanding of the importance of biology in Aristotle's philosophy.[1] Despite a certain reluctance to incorporate treatises on animals into the undergraduate curriculum,[2] it is now inadvisable to avoid any reference to Aristotle's biological work when discussing most aspects of his thought.[3] The new

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[1]David Balme, "The Place of Biology in Aristotle's Philosophy," in *Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology*, ed. Allan Gotthelf and James Lennox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Mary Louis Gill, *Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). Montgomery Furth, *Substance, Form and Psyche: An Aristotelean Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). *Biologie, Logique et Métaphysique chez Aristote* (hereafter, "*Biologie*"), ed. Daniel Devereux and Pierre Pellegrin (Paris: Édition du C. N. R. S., 1990). *Aristotelische Biologie: Intentionen, Methoden, Ergebnisse*, ed. Wolfgang Kullmann and Sabine Föllinger (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997).

[2]Many selected translations and general introductions used in the classroom offer very little if any readings on biological aspects of Aristotle's work. See for instance, *Aristotle: Introductory Readings*, ed. Terence Irwin and Gail Fine (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), and *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Meanwhile, two quite different versions of Aristotle are available from recent introductory accounts of his philosophy. In Terence Irwin's "Aristotle," in the new *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward Craig (London: Routledge, 1998), 414–35, the word "biology" is absent from all 30 of the headings which supposedly delineate Aristotle's concerns. In contrast, David Charles's "Aristotle," in *The Philosophers: Introducing Great Western Thinkers*, ed. Ted Honderich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 23–31, groups the biology with the metaphysics as one of the three central areas of Aristotle's thought. Pedagogic practice may have some important influences on the more widespread perception of Aristotle's interests and aims.

[3]Geoffrey Lloyd, "Aristotle's Zoology and His Metaphysics: The Status Quaestionis, A Critical Review of Some Recent Theories," in *Biologie*, 7–35.

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tendency of scholarship on Aristotle's biology employs various methodologies but, in the main, argues for the importance of Aristotle's biological treatises on the basis of the assistance they might provide for understanding some of the more intractable problems in Aristotle's thought.

The philosophical issues examined in relation to biology, then, are already determined by reference to other nonbiological texts. After the problems arising in more canonical texts have been clarified, the reader is invited to turn to the biological treatises in the hope of finding some solutions. Thus, for example, the biological treatises are resorted to in seeking a solution to interpretative logjams or issues left unresolved and obscure in the *Posterior Analytics*.[4] Aristotle's systematic study of animals has also been used to throw light on "concepts at the centre of his metaphysical analysis of substance" and "[les] dilemmes bien connus des livre centraux de la *Métaphysique*."[5]

The approach to Aristotle's biology that looks for comprehensive solutions to well-established problems usually brings with it a clear agenda. Often the biological texts are treated as evidence for established interpretations.[6] But although entrenched views can sometimes be supported by these less familiar texts, a more fundamental reappraisal is often the more appropriate response to the insights provided by the biology. One of the most prominent examples relates to syllogistic demonstration, which, although advocated in the *Posterior Analytics* as the only road to scientific truth, does not appear explicitly in any biological work. The biology, along with other Aristotelian scientific texts, were initially resorted to by modern commentators in

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[4] Allan Gotthelf, "First Principles in Aristotle's *Parts of Animals*," in *Philosophical Issues*, 196–7; David Charles, "Aristotle on Meaning, Natural Kinds and Natural History," in *Biologie*, 167. In addition see David Charles, "Aristotle and the Unity and Essence of Biological Kinds," in *Aristotelische Biologie*, 27–42.

[5] Gotthelf and Lennox, "Introduction to Part IV" of *Philosophical Issues*, 287; Devereux and Pellegrin, "Introduction" to *Biologie*, 3–4. See also Allan Gotthelf, "Notes Toward a Study of Substance and Essence in Aristotle's *Parts of Animals* ii-iv," in *Aristotle on Nature and Living Things*, ed. Allan Gotthelf (Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1985), 27–54; David Balme, "Aristotle's Biology Was Not Essentialist," in *Philosophical Issues*, 9–20, and his "The Place of Biology"; Cynthia Freeland, "Aristotle on Bodies, Matter and Potentiality," in *Philosophical Issues*, 392–407; John Cooper, "Metaphysics in Aristotle's Embryology," *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 214 (1988): 14–41.

[6] A point noted by Lloyd, "Aristotle's Zoology."

order to discover whether Aristotle applied his syllogistic in the actual practice of scientific investigation.[7] Study of the biological works on this basis sometimes manifests itself as an attempt to find *Analytics*-type demonstrations, even if these appear in a more "relaxed" form.[8] More often, however, scholars are willing to see different methodologies operating in the biological and logical treatises.[9] After many years of close study, it is now generally agreed that Aristotle must have changed his mind, or at least modified his views, about scientific methodology, and this presents considerable difficulties for those who wish to use the biology to clarify the *Posterior Analytics*.

Perhaps it is because many long-standing problems have not been successfully resolved by using the biological texts in the traditional way that a new approach, which gives the biology a more equal philosophical status, has recently started to take a more prominent position in the scholarship.[10] Instead of focusing on how the biological texts might help us to strengthen or refine our views of Aristotle's philosophy, some scholars have suggested that the biological texts themselves might be capable of changing our frame of reference. James Lennox, for example, in his "Material and Formal Natures in Aristotle's *De Partibus Animalium*,"[11] bases his discussion on a philosophical issue internal to one biological text. In the *Parts of Animals*, Aristotle states that nature is both matter and form and that both must be studied by the natural scientist. Lennox sets out to clarify the meaning of this statement before speculating about what consequences Aristotle's study of animal natures might have for the interpretation of Aristotle's thought more generally.

> [A]ttempting to preserve the unity of the composite by strongly identifying matter and form in the actual composite may have trouble

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[7] Jonathan Barnes, "Aristotle's Theory of Demonstration," in *Articles on Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji (London: Duckworth, 1975), 65, and his "Introduction" to *Aristotle: Posterior Analytics*, translation and commentary by Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), xii.

[8] Wolfgang Detel, "Why All Animals Have a Stomach. Demonstration and Axiomatization in Aristotle's *Parts of Animals*," in *Aristotelische Biologie*, 63, and Gotthelf, "First Principles."

[9] For example, Charles, "Aristotle and the Unity," 27.

[10] Early examples of this approach include James Lennox, "Are Aristotelian Species Eternal?" in *Aristotle on Nature*, 67–94, and L. A. Kosman, "Animals and Other Beings in Aristotle," in *Philosophical Issues*, 360–91.

[11] In *Aristotelische Biologie*, 163–81.

> accommodating the dynamic interaction of material and formal natures in the explanations we have looked at, as well as the extensive role played by material natures in those explanations. Conversely, downplaying the importance of material natures in Aristotle's science can be accomplished only by ignoring a sizable portion of the biological corpus.[12]

Another example of this type of approach occurs in "The Matter of Mind: Aristotle on the Biology of Psychic Processes and the Bodily Aspects of Thinking,"[13] in which Philip van der Eijk questions the common separation of the biological from the psychological aspects of Aristotle's work, on the grounds that this separation is not at all apparent in the majority of Aristotelian texts. A latent Cartesianism in much modern commentary has perpetuated the assumption that mental activity in Aristotle is neither determined nor even affected by bodily processes.

A methodology which begins with the investigation of issues raised by biological texts and only then attempts to integrate them with better known aspects of Aristotle's work, may not appeal to those who regard any problems located in biological texts as inherently unphilosophical and thus as only of interest to the historian or antiquarian.[14] By initially attempting to apply biological texts to Aristotle's philosophy, scholars of the biology no doubt wished to avoid such objections. Gotthelf coaxes the skeptical reader with the promise that "fundamental insights into Aristotelian philosophical thought await those who . . . venture into these works."[15] But by assuming that biology could only be relevant if successfully used to clarify the canonical philosophical texts, the older approach implicitly conceded that nothing of philosophical importance could come from Aristotle's biology in its own right. When Gotthelf and Lennox encouraged us to

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[12] Lennox, "Material and Formal Nature in Aristotle's *De Partibus Animalium*," in *Aristotelische Biologie*, 181.

[13] In *Aristotelische Biologie*, 231–58.

[14] Barnes, "Introduction" to the *Cambridge Companion*. Against this view see Kosman, "Animals," 391, and David Charles, "Method and Argument in the Study of Aristotle: A Critical Notice of the Cambridge Companion to Aristotle," in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, vol. 15, ed. C. C. W. Taylor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 231–58.

[15] Allan Gotthelf, "Introduction" to *Aristotle on Nature*, viii. Allan Gotthelf seems especially concerned to prove "how worth systematic study, from a philosophical point of view, the biological treatises are"; Allan Gotthelf, "The Elephant's Nose: Further Reflection on the Axiomatic Structure of Biological Explanation in Aristotle," in *Aristotelische Biologie*, 95.

study Aristotle's biology because of "the lessons these treatises might provide for our understanding of central areas of Aristotle's general philosophical thought," they assumed that whatever is central to Aristotle's thought is antecedent to biology.[16]

There is a long tradition of marginalizing Aristotle's biology, both intellectually and biographically. In terms of the biographical development of Aristotle's thought, the biological treatises have often been assumed to mark a senescent reaction against Platonism. Jaeger's influential account proposed that Aristotle's biological treatises were composed in the last stage of his life, when he had moved as far away from the Platonic ideal as possible, and immersed himself in empirical experience at the expense of abstract thought.[17] Owen similarly argued that Aristotle's anti-Platonic phase was concurrent with his biological researches, although he located the latter in the middle of Aristotle's life, when he was residing in Asia Minor.

Most scholars now concur with Owen that the hands-on biological research was carried out on Lesbos in the middle of Aristotle's life,[18] but since such works as the *Generation of Animals* and the *Movement of Animals* exhibit an intellectual sophistication on a par with much of the *Metaphysics* and the *Ethics*, it is generally thought

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[16] Allan Gotthelf and James Lennox, "Preface" to *Philosophical Issues*, xi.

[17] Werner Jaegar, in his *Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1923), appears to have construed Aristotle's biological work as similar to the private studies undertaken by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century gentleman naturalists (328–9). This attitude can still be found in modern scholarship. For instance, Jonathan Barnes, who sees no philosophical merit in studying Aristotle's biology, refers to his role as "a private researcher" as separate from his activities as a philosopher. See Barnes, *Aristotle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 18. Both Jaegar's and Barnes's investigations of Aristotle focus on the *Metaphysics* or on logic. On this trait in Jaegar see A. H. Chroust, "The First Thirty Years of Modern Aristotelian Scholarship," in *Aristotle's Philosophical Development: Problems and Prospects*, ed. William Wians (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), 47.

[18] D'Arcy Thompson, *Aristotle's Historia Animalium* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910); H. D. P. Lee, "Place-names and the Date of Aristotle's Biological Works," *Classical Quarterly* 42, no. 2 (1948): 61–7; David Ross, *Aristotle* (London: Methuen and Co., 1923), 3; Barnes, *Aristotle*, 9; John Randall, *Aristotle* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 17; David Balme, *Aristotle's History of Animals Books VII–X* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 25, and J. L. Ackrill, *Aristotle The Philosopher* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 4.

that the biology was not systematized and recorded until later on. This implies that Aristotle was thinking about biology for much of his life; and as Balme has suggested, there was likely to have been a "reciprocal influence" between the biology and those texts which are traditionally considered to be more central to his thought. But although Balme notes biology and philosophy probably had a mutual impact on one another in Aristotle's work, he still separates the two.[19] Similarly, Lloyd's suggestion that Aristotle attempted to apply metaphysics to biology implies their separate development.[20] This assumption is problematic, and even anachronistic since it employs a modern distinction between scientific and philosophical pursuits which Aristotle could not have possessed. Because Aristotle himself does not attempt to distinguish the biological from the philosophical, it makes sense to read all Aristotelian texts as potentially representative of the same philosophical outlook.[21]

Instead of applying the biology to problems in other contexts, this paper will suggest approaching Aristotle's biology as potentially philosophical but without, as far as possible, having a preconceived idea of what that philosophy has to be like. By taking the biological texts seriously as sources of information about Aristotle's philosophy, this approach will advocate assessing the philosophical import of the biological treatises on their own before attempting to integrate them with discussions in other works. The integration, when it takes place, must always leave intact any understanding reached through study of biological phenomena in their own right. Thus, for instance, if parts (*moriai*) define certain aspects of living organisms in the context of biology, a more "philosophical" usage imported from elsewhere will not help us understand what Aristotle means in the biology. Furthermore, each different discussion of *moriai* must be viewed as an

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[19] Balme, "The Place of Biology," 11–12, 18.

[20] See Geoffrey Lloyd, *Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of His Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 90–1.

[21] Pierre Pellegrin's investigation of the philosophical import of *eidos* and *genos* looks to both the logico-metaphysical and biological texts (see Pellegrin, "Logical Difference and Biological Difference: The Unity of Aristotle's Thought," in *Philosophical Issues*, 313–38). Lennox ("First Principles") also attempts to gain information about Aristotle's philosophy of kinds from biology. Yet both articles tend to privilege the nonbiological texts, especially when formulating the problems at issue and specifying exactly how these ought to be resolved.

equally relevant indicator of Aristotle's understanding of the concept and none should be subordinated to any other. Whether the discussion occurs in the *Metaphysics* or the *Progression of Animals*, each requires independent study before it can be integrated into an account which legitmately represents Aristotle's views on the matter.

II

The Generation of Animals and the Metaphysics. This paper will attempt an illustrative application of the methodology outlined above, through a selective consideration of the *Generation of Animals* and the *Metaphysics*.[22] In the case of the *Generation of Animals*, the tendency to relegate biology to some embarrassingly unphilosophical corner of Aristotle's mental life becomes particularly acute. According to the developmentalist approach, this treatise was conceived in Lesbos when Aristotle was on honeymoon.[23] The speculative association of a treatise on animal reproduction with a period in Aristotle's life when he can be expected to have been distracted from more ethereal intellectual preoccupations is surely no coincidence.[24] Perhaps it was the mere proximity of a woman that made a great philosopher

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[22] Frank Lewis sets out what he expects to find in the embryology on the basis of a slightly broader analysis of *De Anima* and the *Physics* as well as the *Metaphysics*. See Frank Lewis, "Aristotle on the Relation between a Thing and Its Matter," in *Unity, Identity and Explanation in Aristotle's Metaphysics*, ed. Theodore Scaltsas, David Charles, and Mary Louise Gill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 247–77. But his framework of analysis still comes from elsewhere. Other scholars have suggested that the *Generation of Animals* is the place to look for insights into metaphysical issues but have also done so by starting with problems external to the work. For example, Alan Code, "The Aporematic Approach to Primary Being in Metaphysics Z," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Supplement 10 (1984), 19.

[23] "The lagoon at Pyrrha, on Lesbos . . . was the scene of much of Aristotle's research into marine biology, and one can imagine that those of his evenings not spent with his new bride were filled with thoughts of the philosophical implications of observations made and collected"; Gotthelf, "Introduction" to *Aristotle on Nature*, viii. See also David Balme, "Aristotle: Natural History and Zoology," in *Dictionary of Scientific Biography*, ed. Charles Gillispie (New York: Scribner, 1970), 1:258–66.

[24] Such an association might play on a familiar literary trope. Compare the gentleman poet and fervent naturalist in A. S. Byatt's novel *Possession* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1990), whose interest in the reproduction of jellyfish is associated with his desire to impregnate a young acolyte (248, 250).

concentrate so much time on something so ignoble as the mating of animals? How would it be possible in that case to take these biological dabblings seriously?

Clearly, animals exist, develop, and change in ways more complicated than any other class of thing. The *Generation of Animals* is, in fact, part of Aristotle's attempt to provide a rigorous conceptual understanding of these complex processes and concentrates on the crucial ability to generate new life, present in almost all animate existence. Aristotle attempts to explain the events surroundings the generation of animals in terms of the matter and form of which all entities are composed. In book 1 of the *Physics*, Aristotle explains that change requires a substratum (*hupokeimenon*), an underlying stuff, that persists (*hupomenein*) throughout the transition; this is the matter.[25] In the case of animal generation, the matter is the female contribution of menstrual blood.[26] The form makes an entity what it is and, originating in another individual (either in their mind or their nature), it is imposed upon the preexistent matter. The father's semen conveys form to the offspring in the natural process of generation.[27]

Problems concerning matter and form and their relation to substance are the bread and butter of much philosophical literature on Aristotle largely because of their problematic status in the *Metaphysics*. Substance is supposed to have ontological and epistemological priority and could be either an entity comprised of matter and form or form on its own. The unity and knowability of the combined variety ("composite substance") are particularly problematic. The two things (matter and form) within this sort of substance might threaten its unity while the matter in it makes it difficult to define and thus know since matter defies definition.[28] Moreover, by rejecting the transcendental ontology of Platonism, Aristotle was compelled to limit existence to the particular, creating problems for understanding the status of types—or general forms—of entities.

For many scholars of Aristotle the *Generation of Animals* is redeemed by the fact that it can shed light on such problems. The *Generation of Animals* is often thought to provide potential insights into

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[25] *Physics* 1.7.190a19, 1.7.190b13, 1.9.192a31–2. For the text of the *Physics* see *Aristotelis Physica*, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950).

[26] *Generation of Animals* 1.20.729a21–4, 1.20.729a31–2.

[27] *Generation of Animals* 1.21.729b19–21, 1.22.730b10–15.

[28] *Metaphysics* 7.10.1036a9, 7.11.1037a28, 7.15.1039b28–30.

composite substance in particular because all animals must be combinations of form and matter. In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle makes clear that living substance cannot be understood without reference to matter.[29] But because matter defies definition, many have wondered how it would ever be possible, on Aristotle's view, to define something like "human being." Although Balme thought that this issue, which originates in *Metaphysics* book 7, could be resolved with the help of embryology, his solution is largely derived from the *Metaphysics* itself.[30] When Aristotle writes of substance that, "the proximate matter and the shape are the same and one, the former potentially, the latter actually,"[31] Balme takes this to mean that, at any given instant, matter can be actualized to become one with form and can, therefore, be described and defined.[32] This supposed reduction of matter to form (when somehow suspended outside temporal succession) is then put into practice in the *Generation of Animals* where the father's form contains specifications for his particular attributes, suggesting that matter has been formalized into a description.[33] Thus, Balme uses the *Generation of Animals* in order to support the resolution of a problem in the interpretation of the *Metaphysics* without considering that the *Generation of Animals* might either leave such problems behind, or complicate their solution to the point at which they have to be reformulated.

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[29] *Metaphysics* 6.1.1025b25–1026a6, 7.11.1036b28–30.

[30] See James Lennox, "Aristotle's Biological Development: The Balme Hypothesis," in Wians, *Aristotle's Philosophical Development*, 229–48. Balme was in general very concerned with biology in its own right in Aristotle but he was also influenced, it seems, by his comprehensive training in the logical and metaphysical corpus. His 1987 article "Aristotle's Biology," for instance, takes it cue from the biology, but includes two appendices which are almost entirely concerned with problems in the *Metaphysics* and *Topics* and are together longer than the main article.

[31] *Metaphysics* 8.6.1045b18–19. Unless otherwise indicated, the translation is mine, following the text from *Aristotelis Metaphysica*, ed. W. Jaegar (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957).

[32] Lloyd, "Aristotle's Zoology," 26; Michael Loux, "Composition and Unity: A Examination of Metaphysics H.6," in *The Crossroads of Norm and Nature: Essays on Aristotle's Ethics and Metaphysics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 247–79; and Lewis, "Aristotle on the Relation," 255 n. 20, have questioned this interpretation of *Metaphysics* 8.6. The passage continues to qualify the identification of matter with form: "each thing is one, since potentiality and actuality are *in a way* (*pôs*) one"; *Metaphysics* 8.6.1045b19–21.

[33] Balme, "The Place of Biology," 18–19, and "Aristotle's Biology," 306.

Cooper also explores the *Generation of Animals* with the *Metaphysics* in mind.

> One would expect these explanations [in the *Generation of Animals*] to reveal something about the character of Aristotelian forms and perhaps even to help resolve some of the many questions not clearly settled by him in his metaphysical writings.[34]

For Cooper, the embryology promises to reveal whether form for Aristotle is particular or universal and in what sense it could be said to be either. He seeks to determine which characteristics originate from the father's contribution of form to the offspring and concludes that these must include some particular features that make one individual within a kind different from another. The extension of form into areas usually identified with matter is assisted by Cooper's insistence that the female contribution cannot in any way positively determine the outcome of generation: the male semen "forms" the offspring in every sense of that word.

Like most recent work on the *Generation of Animals*, these two examples concentrate on Aristotle's discussion of heredity[35] in the hopes of elucidating the form that is said to pass from father to offspring. However, as Balme himself concedes, Aristotle does not appear to be concerned in the *Generation of Animals* with whether form is universal or particular or whether its essence can be defined; he is attempting rather to elucidate generative processes, many of which involve matter rather than form.[36] The fact that the *Generation of Animals* does not appear to have any straightforward answers to the questions posed by the *Metaphysics* hardly seems surprising. The issues raised and explanations offered by the *Generation of Animals* may, however, present the reader with different metaphysical insights of their own, including a different way of characterizing form and matter.

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[34] Cooper, "Metaphysics," 14.

[35] *Generation of Animals* 4.3.

[36] Balme, "The Place of Biology," 19. The word "form" does not occur in the whole of the section on heredity.

III

Matter. Many of the examples Aristotle uses in the *Metaphysics* are of inanimate objects produced through crafts. The roles of matter and form in the generation of a new substance are elucidated with the help of a bronze sphere: bronze is matter that changes from being unformed to being made spherical.[37] In the artifactual instance, the same matter exists before and after the substance comes into being, and may even exist after it has been destroyed (for instance, if the sphere were to be melted down).

In the case of natural generation, however, it is much harder to detect a clearly persistent material before, during, and after the emergence of substance.[38] For in this case, that which preexists and then becomes the body of the offspring is female menstrual blood (or menses) and this neither persists in the offspring's body nor does it reappear after its death.[39] This raises the question of why substantial change in the biological realm does not appear to fit the pattern offered by Aristotle in his *Physics* and *Metaphysics*.[40] Freeland suggests that this difficulty might be resolved by taking a closer look at biological change in texts such as the *Generation of Animals*.

> [I]t seems impossible to point to something which serves as both matter 'for' and matter 'of' a living creature, as bronze does for statues. . . . If we are puzzled . . . , then the obvious place to turn for help is to the biological works, and to the *Generation of Animals* in particular. Unfortunately no easy answers are forthcoming; metaphysical insights threaten to vanish amidst a myriad of biological details.[41]

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[37] *Metaphysics* 7.8.1033a24–31. Compare *Metaphysics* 12.3.1069b35–1070a4.

[38] Michael Loux, *Primary Ousia: An Essay on Aristotle's Metaphysics Z and H* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Gill, *Aristotle on Substance*, and Myles Burnyeat, et al., *Notes on Eta and Theta of Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Oxford: Sub Faculty of Philosophy, 1984).

[39] In the *Metaphysics* Aristotle focuses on the craft analogy, noting that the matter which persists thoughout a change can be reidentified because the finished product is characterized by a term related to it. Thus the bronze can be found in the finished product if it is called "brazen" (*Metaphysics* 9.7.1049a18–25). Instances of natural change do not fit this pattern, however, since a child is never characterized as "menstrual bloody." Compare Kosman, "Animals," 375.

[40] Many now consider it important to explore natural as well as artificial examples in Aristotle. For example, Furth, *Substance, Form and Psyche*; Michael Ferejohn, "The Definition of Generated Composites in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," in *Unity, Identity, and Explanation*; and Kosman, "Animals."

[41] Freeland, "Aristotle on Bodies," 392–3.

Freeland is disappointed by the lack of metaphysical insight available in the *Generation of Animals*, measuring success in terms of how well biological generation can be mapped onto artifactual production.[42] Since animals and plants are substances in the "highest degree,"[43] however, it also seems possible to conclude that when studying biological change we must leave the craft analogy behind; after all, craft analogies are used by Aristotle not only to illustrate how two processes resemble one another, but also to point out how they radically differ.[44] The *Generation of Animals* may offer new insights, which are not necessarily always comprehensible in terms of artifactual analogy, into how matter persists in this (arguably much more fundamental) instance of substantial change.

Unlike bronze, menses are a highly complex product of an animal's nutritive process. The mother's soul ensures that her contribution is "potentially the same in character as the body whose secretion it is."[45] As Aristotle explains:

> The true reason why each of these parts is formed is that the residue provided by the female is potentially the same in character as the future animal will be, according to its nature.[46]

The female material can also be described as alive to a certain extent. Unfertilized "wind eggs," the avian equivalent of menses, are living because they can die (that is, they can rot).[47] In book 3 of the *Generation of Animals* Aristotle explains that the white part of the wind egg contains the principle of life and has nutritive soul.[48] Elsewhere he remarks that this female contribution is a perfect or complete plant fetus.

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[42] Gotthelf and Lennox, "Introduction to Part IV," in *Philosophical Issues*, 289: "Biological generation has certainly proved an obstacle for these attempting to understand the place of matter in Aristotle's theory of unqualified coming into being."

[43] *Metaphysics* 7.7.1032a16–20.

[44] *Physics* 2.1.

[45] *Generation of Animals* 2.4.738b3–4.

[46] *Generation of Animals* 2.4.740b19–22. The translation of the *Generation of Animals* is sometimes my own and sometimes follows that of A. L. Peck in the Loeb Classical Library edition (*Aristotle: Generation of Animals* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942]), the text of which I also employ.

[47] *Generation of Animals* 2.5.741a20–4.

[48] *Generation of Animals* 3.1.751b2–8, 3.1.751b23–8.

> The [wind] egg, regarded as the fetus of a plant, is complete (*teleion*), but regarded as the fetus of an animal it is incomplete (*ateles*).[49]

Since the female matter is described as plantlike, one might question how it could exist only as matter and not as a completed substance in its own right. Moreover, if the female contribution has some sort of soul, then it would seem that it has form; how then, one might ask, can it be identified solely with matter? Menses and wind eggs may be ensouled, and count on a plant level as a substance but are still classified as matter in the context of animal generation.

It is clear that in animal reproduction, matter is complex and specific and is already on its way to becoming a new animal. In the *Metaphysics* too, when Aristotle attempts to explain what kind of matter is needed for the generation of a human being, the complexity of the issue soon becomes apparent.

> Whenever someone inquires what the cause is, since cause is said in many ways, it is necessary to give all the possible causes. For instance, what is the material cause of a human being? The menses. What is the moving cause? The semen. What is the formal cause? The essence [*to ti ên einai*]. What is the final cause? The end [*to telos*]. . . . But it is also necessary to give the most proximate causes. What is the matter? Not fire or earth, but the matter proper [*idion*] [to a human].[50]

This passage has often puzzled its readers, first of all because it does not clarify what the matter proper to a human is and further because it is unclear how matter could persist in this case.[51] Menses are disqualified on the basis of their failure to meet the persistence requirement and Aristotle is typically thought to have another material in mind. Perhaps it is earth which persists? Earth appears to exist before, during, and after generation: food, which is concocted into blood, menses, and eventually the body, is earthy and when an animal dies, it decays into earth. However, in an animal's body, earth does not exist in the same way that bronze does in the bronze sphere since earth is only potentially present throughout the life of the animal.[52] Moreover,

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[49] *Generation of Animals* 3.7.757b19–20.

[50] *Metaphysics* 8.3.1044a33–b3.

[51] Gill, *Aristotle on Substance*, 146–68; Loux, *Primary Ousia*, 249; and Burnyeat et al., *Notes*, 33.

[52] The animal is not earthy in the same way as the sphere is "brazen." For this view see Gill, *Aristotle on Substance*.

Aristotle clearly states that earth is not peculiar (*idion*) enough to be the proximate matter.

Another candidate for persistent animal matter is blood.[53] Aristotle sometimes claims that blood is not a part of the animal and that its animal heat is inessential to it.[54] Thus, there can be something called blood which exists before the animal comes to be and after it dies. Blood might also be thought to persist from the menses to the body of the offspring; but again this is not equivalent to the artifactual example since animal bodies are composed of more than just blood.

Both these approaches assume that in order to meet the persistence requirement, one must find materials that are simpler than menses, and yet Aristotle obviously did not consider these materials to be complex enough to count as the matter proper to the human (or any other animal). Two other passages from the *Metaphysics*, which also comment on the state of the material out of which a human is formed, appear to indicate that even the very specific menstrual blood is not complicated enough to qualify.

> One must distinguish when something is potentially a particular thing, and when it is not. For, it is not always so. For example, is earth potentially a human being? No, but rather when it has already become semen [that is, menses], and perhaps not even then.

> The semen [that is, menses] is not yet [potentially a human being]; for it must undergo a change in another medium [*en allô kai metaballein*]. But when, by its own principle, it already has the proper character, it is already potentially a human being, whereas in the former state it needed another principle; just as earth is not yet potentially a statue, because it must undergo a change before it becomes bronze.[55]

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[53] Lewis, "Aristotle on the Relation," and Freeland, "Aristotle on Bodies."

[54] Blood is not a part: *Parts of Animals* 2.10.656b21; Lewis, "Aristotle on the Relation," 267. Blood is not essentially hot: *Parts of Animals* 2.3.649b22–28; *Meteorology* 4.11.389b9–15; Lewis, "Aristotle on the Relation," 262–3. For the text of the *Parts of Animals* see *Aristotle: Parts of Animals, Movement of Animals, Progression of Animals*, ed. and trans. A. L. Peck and E. S. Forster (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1937).

[55] *Metaphysics* 9.7.1048b36–1049a3 and 9.7.1049a15–19. In both quotations, "semen" refers to the female generative contribution, as Gill notes (see Gill, *Aristotle on Substance*, 229). Although he is sometimes thought to deny the existence of female semen, Aristotle often refers to the menses as a sort of semen. See Sophia Elliott [Connell], "The Role of the Female Principle in Aristotle's *De Generatione Animalium*" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Cambridge University, 1997), 39–45.

The menses are not complex enough to be properly potentially human because they have to have undergone some change, analogous to that which earth must undergo in order to become bronze. This reference to crafts is not very helpful, however, since the change indicated appears to be conception: the male is "another principle" and the "other medium" the uterus.

Once conception has occurred, the embryo becomes implanted. At this point it has its own principle (that is, its heart) and begins to draw nourishment to itself, actualizing its nutritive soul.

> The heart first appears as distinct in all blooded animals. For it is the first principle of the uniform and non-uniform parts of the body. And it is appropriately called a first principle of animals and animate composites [fetuses?], when they begin to require nourishment, for indeed that which lives, must grow.[56]

Having a heart makes the embryo able to begin nourishing itself and also forming and fashioning all the other parts of its body.[57]

It appears that the stage indicated by the *Metaphysics* passages, when the embryo is properly material and potential, could be this one of nutritive actuality.[58] Yet perhaps even this stage is not advanced enough since the animal embryo must still pass through other potential stages. It may have a heart, but it must also develop functional digestive organs before it can survive without umbilical attachment to its mother, who provides it with predigested nourishment.

> [S]ince [the fetus] is already an animal potentially, but incomplete [*ateles*], it must take hold of nourishment from elsewhere; and this is the reason it uses the uterus of the mother, just as a plant uses the earth, in order to take hold of nourishment, until it is completed enough to count as a potentially locomotive animal.[59]

Before birth, a new animal is not entirely in control of its nutritive faculty, the actualization of which appears to come by gradual degrees rather than all at once. The embryo will not be a potential human, and

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[56] Reading *zôon* rather than *on*. *Generation of Animals* 2.4.740a17–21.

[57] *Generation of Animals* 2.1.735a21–2, 2.4.740a8–9. Because it fashions its own parts, the embryo's body cannot be continuous with the mother's menstrual blood, as those who advocate the existence of persistent blood would wish to have it.

[58] Gill, *Aristotle on Substance*, 232.

[59] *Generation of Animals* 2.4.740a24–8.

thus matter for a human, until it is potentially locomotive, and then presumably also potentially sentient and intelligent.

We can see now that matter persists in animal generation not as one type of stuff, like bronze, but as series of stages in the gradual development of complex functions and faculties. It seems unnecessary in this context, then, to look for a type of matter that persists throughout developmental changes. Earth, blood, menses, the embryo—all are stages along the way to a completed substance; this is the matter with which Aristotle is concerned in the embryology. As the *Metaphysics* explains, composite substance is unified because matter is the potentiality and form the actuality of substance.[60] Thus, in this fundamental example of ontological change, "matter" is understood to be a potential state of substance by Aristotle. This does not mean, however, that it is earth or blood which persists by being potentially present since neither represents the proper material state of an animal. Instead, matter persists in development through stages of very advanced potential and persists in a fully grown animal as the potential to move, perceive, and generally function.[61]

IV

Form. Despite the problems raised above in connection with matter, the craft analogy might still seem particularly relevant to an understanding of form in natural generation. Within the *Generation of Animals*, especially the earlier books of the treatise, Aristotle employs the analogy several times to explain the male role in generation.[62] Indeed, nature and craft are similar in the case of substantial generation in that both require external agency. Usually, natural objects have an internal source of change,[63] but in the case of substantial

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[60] *Metaphysics* 8.6.1045b18–21.

[61] The last three references to the *Metaphysics* come from books 8 and 9, where Aristotle has moved away from the static model of matter and form, more prominent in book 7. It is possible to view Aristotle's metaphysical distinction between matter and form as essentially dynamic. Kosman, both in his "Animals" and the later "The Activity of Being in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," in *Unity, Identity, and Explanation*, argues along these lines by insisting that Aristotelian forms (especially souls) must consist in activities.

[62] *Generation of Animals* 1.21.729b16–18, 1.22.730b5–32.

generation there is an external agent, namely, the father. Aristotle still distinguishes nature from craft in this context, however, by offering an analogy that shows how the male acts as an agent in a much more limited sense than the craftsman does.

> How is it not possible that [the new animal] is generated by the agency of something external? For in a way it is possible, but in another way it is not. The semen . . . has in it the movement which the mover set in motion. It is possible that A moves B, and B moves C, and that this works like the miraculous automatic puppets. For while at rest their parts somehow exist potentially; and when something external moves the first part, then immediately the next part comes to be in actuality. . . . It [the semen] moves not by being in contact anywhere now, but by having been so.[64]

Only in the very first instant at conception does the male act as an external agent. In the natural world, form appears to be more limited, providing a final determining momentum to materials that are naturally designed to develop in specific ways.

The *Generation of Animals* describes several instances which illustrate that the matter of animal generation can act on its own to some extent without the imposition of form. For instance, some female fish, which have only the material for generation, probably produce offspring without male input.

> If there is some genus of animal which is female and has no separate male, it is possible that this generates offspring from itself. This has not so far been reliably observed, it is true, but some instances in the class of fishes give cause to suspect that it may be the case.[65]

There are also many instances of spontaneous generation in which animals emerge from materials such as mud, sea water, slime, snow, clothes, cheese, and even books.[66] In the *Generation of Animals*, Aristotle is particularly concerned with the spontaneous generation of ostrakaderms (that is, shellfish and barnacles).[67] Form is not

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[63] *Physics* 2.1.192b8–18.

[64] *Generation of Animals* 2.1.734b5–17.

[65] *Generation of Animals* 2.5.741a33–6; after Peck, 205.

[66] *Historia Animalium* 5.15.547b12–16.548a24, 5.19.551a1–552a24, 5.30.556b25–32.557b13, 6.14.569a11–16.570a20.

[67] *Generation of Animals* 761a14–763b16.

operative in these instances: the matter not only acts alone but also determines what kind of creature is produced.[68]

In instances of parthenogenic and spontaneous generation it appears that form exists, at least to some extent, in the generative material.[69] Although this may seem plausible, Aristotle never explicitly considers it but instead only allows that the male contributes form. Rather than imposing an interpretation of what form represents from elsewhere in Aristotle's works, it seems better to conclude that in this context the male's formal role is always to complete generation.[70] Completion, then, indicates the presence of form and anything lacking in completeness must remain mere matter. This means that matter in Aristotle's biological ontology extends beyond the qualities of the *Metaphysics* example of passive bronze which cannot move itself.[71] Although Aristotle clearly would never characterize matter as an individual thing existing strictly "in itself,"[72] he does allow, even in the *Metaphysics*, that sometimes matter is able to initiate its own movement or change.[73]

When not focusing on craft examples, in which matter is inert, the idea that matter moves itself is in some respects easier to accept as Aristotelian. When a creature is not yet complete and exists at various undeveloped stages, it is material. The embryo, in its plantlike state, does not yet count as an individual animal; it is matter in the process of acquiring its proper form. Even the early stages of human or animal life (the dependence of suckling in the baby or the absence of intellectual skills in the child) show that the point at which a natu-

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[68] "All the ostrakaderms arise by spontaneous generation in mud, though they exhibit differences according as the mud differs: in slimy mud oysters grow, in sandy mud, cockles"; *Historia Animalium* 5.15.547b19–20. A. L. Peck, *Aristotle: Historia Animalium*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

[69] It has been suggested on several occasions that Aristotle needed to posit that form comes from the female as well as the male, for example by Claudius Galen, *De Semine*, edited and translated with commentary by Philip De Lacy (Berlin: Akadmie Verlag, 1992); Furth, *Substance, Form, and Psyche*; and Lesley Dean-Jones, *Women's Bodies in Classical Greek Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

[70] *Generation of Animals* 2.5.741b5-6: *"aei to arren epitelei tên genesin."*

[71] *Metaphysics* 1.3.984a23–4, 7.6.1071b30–2.

[72] *Metaphysics* 7.3.1029a20–1, 7.10.1035a9, 8.1.1042a29, 7.16,1040b5–10.

[73] *Metaphysics* 7.9.1034b3–5. Compare *Metaphysics* 7.9.1034a16–18, 7.7.1032a30–2.

ral substance has form is not as clear-cut as in the artifactual instance. It seems more likely that, as far as Aristotle is concerned, an animal is not complete or fully formed until it is capable of reproduction.[74] This explains why spontaneously generated animals do not have a formal cause: they are infertile. For Aristotle, ostrakaderms and their equivalents just never seem to grow up, remaining incomplete and unfinished. They do not have a formal cause because they do not have a proper form at all, consisting instead of mere (living, breathing) matter.

Matter that can initiate its own motion or change, although not an individual entity, is not absolutely beyond the realm of natural explanation for Aristotle. The term *automatos* is employed by Aristotle to characterize accidental or unintentional events, but spontaneous generation (*he genesis automatos*) does not fall into this category because of its regular occurrence: all ostrakaderms are produced by it.[75] Aristotle must see these instances as part of the natural order, indicating that natural matter strives toward form, even when there is no formal agent.

V

Species.[76] In the *Generation of Animals* the father acts to complete generation, which is only achieved once the offspring has the same form as the father does; that is, the same type of form.[77] In the *Metaphysics* the continuation of species or forms in the natural world

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[74] *Generation of Animals* 2.1.735a17–19 reads: "[the nutritive faculty] is also the faculty of generating another creature like itself, since this is a function which belongs to every animal and plant that is complete (*teleiou*) in its nature." Compare *De Anima* 2.4.416a19 (*Aristotelis De Anima*, ed. W. D. Ross [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956]).

[75] See David Balme, "Development of Biology in Aristotle and Theophrastus: Theory of Spontaneous Generation," *Phronesis* 7 (1962): 91–104; James Lennox, "Teleology, Chance, and Aristotle's Biological Works," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 20 (1982): 219–38; and Geoffrey Lloyd, *Aristotelian Explorations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 105–23. Aristotle insists in the *Physics* that regular events are not accidental. See *Physics* 2.5.196b10–16, 2.5.196b37–197a5, and James Lennox, "Aristotle on Chance," in his *Aristotle's Philosophy of Biology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 250–8.

[76] The Greek term *eidos* can be translated as either "form" or "species."

[77] *Generation of Animals* 2.1.731b31–732a2.

is emphasized at various points: an animal of type A always generates offspring of type A.[78] Thus Aristotle envisages form as that which can be generalized over all particulars in a specified kind, which would appear to make it a universal. At the same time it must also be a particular in order to act in particular instances of generation.[79] In order to clarify how form can be both general and particular, commentators sometimes turn to Aristotle's embryology. Here, however, answers to such questions are hardly forthcoming, and new problems proliferate.

Aristotle does not provide a hard and fast distinction between the general form and the particular characteristics that the father contributes in his semen. A new animal will be of type A but will also inherit various inessential features from its parents by which it is said to resemble them. As Balme has pointed out, since the father contributes only form, it is unclear how he imparts these material characteristics. In order to solve this paradox, Balme proposes that the father's inessential features are not really material but have been formalized into a definition and so are part of his form.

> If Socrates is considered without regard to past or future he consists entirely of informed matter; at any one moment all his matter is determined by form, and it is that form that can be defined.[80]

One consequence of Balme's claim is that it becomes difficult to understand how if the father's form is specific to him, form is also general and continuous over time. Balme believes that general form is not something in itself but instead consists in a set of essential (or teleologically necessary) features.[81] According to Aristotle, general form (or species) is not generated[82] in the sense that there is no separate process by which a form comes to be, other than the process by which a particular thing is generated, gradually over time.[83] Therefore, the father's essential features are imparted simultaneously with

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[78] *Metaphysics* 7.7.1032a25, 7.8.1033b32, 7.9.1034a35–b8, 7.9.1034b18, 9.8.1049b25–6, 12.3.1070a8, 12.3.1070a27–8, 12.3.1070b34, 14.5.1092a16.

[79] Some of the references to animal reproduction in the *Metaphysics* are meant to point out that a particular animal generates another particular animal, against the Platonist who may hold that universals ("Forms") cause particulars. See *Metaphysics* 12.3.1070a27–30.

[80] Balme, "Matter in the Definition," 52. This move follows on from his understanding of *Metaphysics* 9.6.1045a18–19. Balme, "Aristotle's Biology," 295, 302–6, 310, 312, and his "Matter in the Definition: A Reply to G. E. R. Lloyd," in *Biologie*, 50.

the inessential ones. Balme's hypothesis is a very apt and important clarification of general form in Aristotle's ontology: each individual possesses essential features without needing a supervening entity to constitute these.

There appear to be two difficulties with Balme's account, however. First of all, it seems motivated by a desire to find a mechanism which explains the continuity of kind from one generation to the next, a demand originating from a modern perspective which Aristotle would not have shared. The theory of evolution has made it clear that animals do not always breed true, which has predisposed modern interpreters to question how Aristotle could defend the claim that they do.[84] Balme considers that Aristotle failed to prove the impossibility of the degradation, evolution, or transformation of type, and in fact leaves the door open to them through his account of fertile cross-breeds as well as the inheritance of accidental features.[85]

Although Aristotle does not explain in detail what it is that ensures the continuity of kinds, this does not mean he is unable to maintain that it occurs. Both the *Generation of Animals* and the *De Anima* assert that animals strive to be eternal by reproducing the same form from one generation to the next.[86] Aristotle holds that it is part of the makeup of the natural world that the best individuals continue, and will always continue, to produce others like themselves in kind. If he considers replication to be reliable, then Aristotle does not need to

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[81] Balme, "Aristotle's Biology," 299. Although Aristotle does not comprehensively divide essential from inessential features, those features necessary to a type are connected with what is good for that creature and its continuance, in the later books of the *Generation of Animals*. See Charles, "Aristotle and the Unity"; Balme, "Aristotle's Biology"; and James Lennox, "Kinds, Forms of Kinds, and the More and the Less in Aristotle's Biology," in *Philosophical Issues*, 339–59.

[82] *Metaphysics* 7.8.1033a24–31, 7.8.1033b18, 8.3.1043b16.

[83] Christopher Shields, "The Generation of Form," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 7 (1990): 367–90, gives a clear and persuasive account of this position.

[84] David Balme writes, "[Aristotle] needs to validate the explanatory power of species and to show why the universal likenesses must persist"; Balme, "Aristotle's Biology," 299.

[85] David Balme, *Aristotle's De Partibus Animalium I and De Generatione Animalium I* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 97; Balme, "Aristotle's Biology," 298; Herbert Granger, "Deformed Kinds and the Fixity of Species," *Classical Quarterly* 37 (1987): 110–16; Lennox, "Aristotelian Species," 89.

[86] *Generation of Animals* 2.1.731b32–732a3; *De Anima* 2.4.415a25–b9.

posit a mechanism to ensure that it happens.[87] Even the existence of fertile crossbreeds, which Aristotle remarks on in the *Generation of Animals*, does not threaten the continuation of this natural order.

> [W]hen a male and a female of different species copulate (which happens in the case of animals whose periods are equal and whose times of gestation run close, and which do not differ widely in size), the first generation, so far as resemblance goes, take equally after both parents (examples are the offspring of fox and dog, and of partridge and common fowl), but as time goes on and successive generations are produced, the offspring finish up by taking after the female as regards their bodily form [*telos apobainei kata to thêlu tên morphên*], just as happens when seeds are introduced into a strange locality—the plants take after the soil, the reason being that the soil provides the material, that is, the physical body, for the seeds.[88]

Because crossbred offspring end up having the bodily aspect of the female parent, without the form of the male, Aristotle must hold that crossbreeding results in the loss of form. This means that those crossbreeds whose bodies resemble foxes actually represent unfinished, incomplete dogs. The male parent has failed to act to produce another like itself in this instance, rendering the generation of crossbreeds equivalent to spontaneous generation. Animal forms do not change over time in the case of crossbreeds because Aristotle believes that form is lost.

The second difficulty for Balme is that it seems unnecessary, and confusing, to suggest that all material aspects of an individual are also its "form." In this instance Balme seems driven by the need to label anything that has a possible description as "form" or "formal";[89] but description need not indicate the presence of form. Throughout the *Generation of Animals*, Aristotle describes many materials, such as female menses, embryos, and ostrakaderms, none of which is "form"

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[87] Montgomery Furth stresses the importance of understanding Aristotle's commitment to the reliability of replication in the natural world (see Furth, "Specific and Individual Form in Aristotle," in *Biologie*, 93). However, he also maintains that some kind of "copying mechanism" must have been part of Aristotle's theory, likening this to DNA (see Furth, *Substance, Form, and Psyche*, 139–41). A similarly anachronistic view can be found in the Nobel prize winner Max Delbruck's speech "Aristotle-totle-totle," in *Of Microbes and Life*, ed. Jacques Monod and Ernest Borek (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).

[88] *Generation of Animals* 2.4.738b28–36; after Peck, 185–7.

[89] As is also the case in Cooper, "Metaphysics." For a refutation of this view see Lloyd, "Aristotle's Zoology."

or "formalized." The problem that the father's contribution of material qualities to the offspring poses for Aristotle is never resolved, partly because he never attempts to resolve it.

In general, to search for form in all instances when matter is described or when it changes or develops is not a helpful way to proceed when reading the *Generation of Animals*, where the model of matter and form is less static and dichotomous than the craft analogy would suggest.[90] Form is not a static structure instantiated at a single moment since a new animal must come into existence through gradual potential stages. The various levels of developmental activity mean that matter is not entirely passive and can even bring about generation on its own under certain conditions. In these cases (such as, parthenogenesis, spontaneous generation, and crossbreeds), the absence of form renders the resultant animals "material."

Animals with forms always reproduce others of the same kind as themselves through the form transmitted by the male.[91] Not only must offspring be complete to count as having form, but their parents have to have produced them sexually. Some animals will therefore not qualify as possessing form because they are "incomplete": this includes those who (1) do not reproduce, (2) do not reproduce others like themselves, or (3) are unlike their parents.[92] When matter produces animals, this is not due to form but is an instance of a type of matter that moves itself, the result of which can never become a proper individual. In Aristotle's embyology, since the use of "form" is limited to the specification of completed reproductive animals, any incomplete substance, even if very complex, is matter. Clearly, then, biological materials are far from being entirely indistinct and indefinite.

VI

Biology and Philosophy. In conclusion, then, I want to speculate again about the significance of animal reproduction, as detailed in the

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[90] In books 4 and 5 of the *Generation of Animals* Aristotle appears to move away from hylomorphic models altogether, choosing instead to characterize hereditary and accidental features in terms of the "potentialities" and "movements" in the generative residues.

[91] *Generation of Animals* 2.1.735a19–20.

[92] *Generation of Animals* 1.1.715b6, 2.1.733a2–3, 4.4.770b5–6.

Generation of Animals, for the more general study of Aristotle's philosophy. It is still quite common for philosophers to isolate Aristotle's *Metaphysics* as the conceptual foundation of his philosophy,[93] an approach which disregards the fact that, for Aristotle, biology is, in an important sense, metaphysics. It is tempting to reduce Aristotle's philosophy to the *Metaphysics* in this way since it bears a certain resemblance to the abstract character of many modern philosophical discussions. Yet Aristotle himself neither regarded the study of living things to be separate from philosophical speculation nor expected to settle metaphysical issues by employing strictly abstract arguments.[94]

Those who attempt to apply traditional philosophical problems in Aristotle to the study of his biology often overlook the fact that new problems that arise from investigation in the biological texts could not have been anticipated in other, more familiar texts.[95] The preceding brief study of the *Generation of Animals* has shown up a tension between viewing kinds (forms) as powerful forces in the natural world, while also considering them to be absent in many lower animals. Since many animals do not possess form and are merely some advanced state of matter, it is necessary to try to understand how Aristotle's account of them differs from that of contemporaries like Empedocles who explain biological development in terms of complex materials.[96] Aristotle is usually disdainful of such explanations, citing the necessity of seeds for natural generation as proof of the importance of form in the world.[97] Yet his own account of spontaneous generation depends on matter rather than form and, in this instance contrary to his usual injunctions, discusses regular natural phenomena that have neither formal nor final causes.[98] It may be that Aristotle's

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[93] For example, Barnes, "Introduction" to the *Cambridge Companion*, ix; and Loux, *Primary Ousia*, 50.

[94] My thesis is not as strong that of Furth, who holds that the *Metaphysics* only makes sense in light of the biology (see Furth, *Substance, Form, and Psyche*; Allan Gotthelf, "A Biological Provenance," *Philosophical Studies* 94, nos. 1–2 [May 1999]: 38). It seems to me that there are many parts of the *Metaphysics* and of other Aristotelian texts that do not involve biological subjects. I contend merely that many discussions in biological texts need no external validation in order to count as philosophical.

[95] Lloyd hints that the zoology ought to be studied without constantly assessing its implications for interpretations of other works (in his "Aristotle's Zoology"). He follows through with this idea in *Aristotelian Explorations*.

[96] *Physics* 2.2.194a20.

[97] For example, at *Parts of Animals* 1.1.640a19–26.

[98] See Lennox, "Teleology, Chance," for a full account of this position.

awareness of the presence of regular generation, even in the case of spontaneous generation, makes his position significantly different from that of Empedocles, however. For Aristotle, incomplete and deficient animals have to be understood as aiming toward a better existence and as striving to emulate the more ideal situation, such that the whole of lower life appears to be embryonic.[99]

The study of animal generation also reveals how difficult it is to separate formal and material factors in the natural world, where matter on its own is so complex it sometimes appears to mimic form. In this context, then, the craft analogy cannot help since it is too static. The natural world is not constructed and does not work just like the crafts; indeed, the reverse seems to be the case—crafts copy nature.[100] Natural objects take priority in Aristotle's ontology, possessing properties that crafts will never be able to exemplify. Aristotle's theism also plays a role in this account: the overall structure and operation of the world is centered around a God who is the best and most stable of existent things. The presence of the divine in the world is manifested through living things which strive to perpetuate themselves and their forms. This scheme emphasizes the moving, changing, and striving aspects of existence which cannot be found in static artifacts. This is why the divisions between constituent states, such as matter and form, cannot always be satisfactorily delineated in natural instances.

Although it can be important, informative, and indeed unavoidable to approach Aristotle's work from within modern philosophical categories (such as "ontology" and "epistemology"), it is also vital to remain aware of the radically unfamiliar aspect of his thought.[101] Study of the biological texts brings this out more than some others. The *Generation of Animals* shows us an Aristotle who envisages the world as filled with entities which are always moving forward, striving to exist or maintain their existence and which sometimes do not admit

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[99] Aristotle notes the likeness of the embryo (*in utero* and *in ovum*) to a plant at various points (*Generation of Animals* 2.4.739b34–740a2, 2.4.740b9–11, 3.2.753b28).

[100] *Physics* 2.2.194a22, 2.8.199a16.

[101] David Charles ("Method and Argument"), Aryeh Kosman ("Aristotelian Metaphysics and Biology: Furth's Substance, Form, and Psyche," *Philosophical Studies* 94, nos. 1–2 [May 1999]: 57–68), and John Rist ("On Taking Development Seriously," in *Aristotle's Philosophical Development*, 361) all agree that it is important to recognize how strange Aristotle's philosophy is to us.

of straightforward division into aspects and parts. It may be necessary to recognize the strangeness of this more often in order to better appreciate the biological aspects of Aristotle's philosophy.[102]

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[102] The seeds of this article were sown at a meeting of the Northern Association for Ancient Philosophy in April 1999 at the University of Durham. I am grateful to the participants for their comments and questions, and especially to Philip van der Eijk and Christopher Rowe. I would also like to thank Phil Connell, Geoffrey Lloyd, and Charlottte Witt for making helpful suggestions on earlier versions of this piece and to St. John's College, Cambridge, for financial support.

ARISTOTLE'S φρόνησις: A TRUE GRASP OF ENDS AS WELL AS MEANS?

GAËLLE FIASSE

ANY SCHOLAR INVESTIGATING ARISTOTLE'S ACCOUNT of φρόνησις sooner or later encounters the question whether φρόνησις concerns means to the ends of human actions or those ends themselves. There is an abundance of literature, mostly French, on the topic;[1] nevertheless, the question is worthy of reconsideration, because an element essential to answering the question, namely an understanding of the ends of human action or πρᾶξις, has not received adequate treatment in the literature to date. One reason for this oversight is that Aristotle defines πρᾶξις as having its end in itself, in distinction from ποίησις which has its end in something external to itself. Hence, when Aristotle says in *Nicomachean Ethics* 3 that actions are for the sake of things other than themselves,[2] scholars have tended to conclude that

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[1]See, among others: Pierre Aubenque, *La Prudence chez Aristote* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1963), 7–30; Pierre Aubenque, "La prudence aristotélicienne porte-t-elle sur la fin ou sur les moyens?" *Revue des études grecques* 78 (1965): 40–51, which is an article responding to René-Antoine Gauthier, "Compte-rendu de l'ouvrage de Pierre Aubenque sur *La Prudence chez Aristote*," *Revue des études grecques* 76 (1963): 265–8; Carlo Natali, "Les fins et les moyens: un puzzle aristotélicien," *Revue de philosophie ancienne* 6, no. 1 (1968): 107–46; Richard Bodéüs, *Le philosophe et la cité: recherches sur les rapports entre morale et politique dans la pensée d'Aristote* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1982), 60–78; Pierre Rodrigo, "Aristote: prudence, convenance et situation," *L'Enseignement philosophique* 5 (1992): 5–17, republished in *Aristote, l'eidétique et la phénoménologie* (Grenoble: Millon, 1995); Jean-Yves Chateau, "L'objet de la *phronèsis* et la vérité pratique. Sur l'unité et la cohérence de *l'Éthique à Nicomaque*," in *La vérité pratique. Aristote. "Éthique à Nicomaque." Livre VI* (Paris: Vrin, 1997), 185–261; Danielle Lories, "*Proairesis* et *phronèsis*: des moyens et des fins," in *Le sens commun et le jugement du 'phronimos.' Aristote et les stoïciens* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Peeters, 1998), 138–43; Thomas M. Tuozzo, "Contemplation, the Noble, and the Mean: The Standard of Moral Virtue in Aristotle's Ethics," *Apeiron* 28 (1995): 129–54.

[2]*Nicomachean Ethics* (hereafter, "*NE*") 3.3.1112b33.

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Aristotle is confusing moral action and poietic action in this passage. In addition, there is an ambiguity about the very notion of an end in the *Nicomachean Ethics* which has not been fully recognized and explained. It is clear from the beginning that happiness is the end of ethics; yet it is worthy of note that Aristotle speaks of ends both in the singular and in the plural. If πρᾶξις is a specific action in specific circumstances, and if, as Aristotle says, it has its end in itself, how are we to understand these ends, or this one end, happiness, as the end of a particular action? Could it be in fact the case that practical actions have ends other than themselves, as the passage from *Nichomachean Ethics* 3 suggests? Since Aristotle says that the principles of actions are their ends, is there one end (or perhaps several ends) which unifies moral activity? How can an indeterminate end such as happiness, the supreme good, be the real end of a specific action? To answer these questions we will need to explain, in a manner consistent with Aristotle's other statements, how moral action has its end, how it can have an end other than itself, and what are the different perspectives in which things can be regarded as ends. We will then be in a better position to reconsider what it is that makes our actions moral and how the morality of our actions is related to φρόνησις in its role as the discerner of practical truth.

I

The End of πρᾶξις *as Distinguished from the End of* ποίησις. Aristotle's comparison of the end of πρᾶξις and the end of ποίησις is fundamental to an appreciation of how πρᾶξις has its end. The distinction between πρᾶξις and ποίησις is highlighted several times in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and also in other texts: "a certain difference is found among ends, some are activities, others are works."[3] Whereas ποίησις, artistic or productive activity, has as its end a determined thing, an extrinsic work which is an end only in a relative sense, πρᾶξις, by contrast, has its end in its activity, its ἐνέργεια. The end remains in the exercise (χρῆσις) of the activity itself. A specifying characteristic of πρᾶξις is that it has no temporal termination or limit

[3] *NE* 1.1.1094a3–4: "τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά." See also *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a20–b2; *Eudemian Ethics* (hereafter, "*EE*") 2.1.1219a13–17; *Magna Moralia* 1.24.10.1197a11.

(πέρας).[4] This is because πρᾶξις or moral action is an activity that has already achieved its end. It is complete (τελεία) in itself: the end and the activity together constitute the action. Πρᾶξις does not aim at effecting a result that any one of our five senses can witness; instead, the coexistence of the end and the action is its accomplishment or completion. The perfection of the moral agent, the actor, can only lie in acting.

Yet the additional clarification Aristotle provides in book 6 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* cannot be overlooked, for it is here that he says that while ποίησις has an end other than itself, "moral action is the End[5] absolutely, because it is εὐπραξία that is its end and desire aims at this."[6] Unfortunately, little commentary has addressed the fact that strictly speaking it is not acting or πρᾶξις that is the end of πρᾶξις but εὐπραξία, acting well. Aristotle's clarification becomes even more important in light of the relation Aristotle exposes between εὐπραξία and εὐδαιμονία.

In effect, εὐπραξία means, for Aristotle, not only acting well, but acting happily. The etymological connection, indicated by the prefix "εὐ," is reinforced by Aristotle's identification of εὐπραξία and a refined definition of εὐδαιμονία. Even in the general definition, where happiness, the principle and end of ethics, is synonymous with living well and acting well,[7] happiness is identified with εὖ πράττειν. In this general sense, happiness is man's end necessarily; it follows from his being a rational animal. Hence it is an object neither of deliberation nor of choice, but an imperative object of pursuit. As Aristotle puts it in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, "We wish to be happy and say we do, but it would not be appropriate to say that we choose to be,"[8] and in the *Eudemian Ethics*, "about the end no one deliberates, this being fixed for all."[9] The desire for happiness is at the root of all human activities,

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[4] *Metaphysics* 9.6.1048b18–23. The notion of a termination is distinct from that of an end.

[5] Harris Rackham's translation of τέλος ἁπλῶς by "the End" with a capital letter is preferable to William David Ross's (revised by James Opie Urmson), "an end in the unqualified sense." "The End" captures better the "absolutely" which is the meaning of ἁπλῶς.

[6] *NE* 6.2.1139b1–4; See also *NE* 6.5.1140b6–7.

[7] *NE* 1.4.1095a20: "τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν."

[8] *NE* 3.2.1111b28–9.

[9] *EE* 2.10.1226b10.

moral and productive activity alike, and, we might add, contemplative or speculative activity. Happiness, the ultimate end of man, is realized throughout the duration or entire course of a man's life.

However, since specifying the supreme good in which happiness consists is at issue in *Nicomachean Ethics* 1, Aristotle provides a more refined definition of εὐδαιμονία, one closely connected with εὐπραξία. Happiness, he says, is an activity, an ἐνέργεια.[10] It is not something we possess. It may require certain indispensable goods, certain natural dispositions, and certain spiritual perfections, but the possession alone, even of all and the best of these is not happiness. Happiness, furthermore, is not knowledge that we acquire as the result of theoretical inquiry. It is neither a state nor the potential for an activity; it is, on the contrary, an activity. For example, it is the πρᾶξις of loving one's friend "in act" as opposed to simply having a friendship with him. Happiness consists, as Aristotle tells us, in an activity of soul, according to perfect virtue, in conformity with the rational nature of man.[11] Happiness is attained in πρᾶξις; it is the finality of πρᾶξις.[12]

II

Reconsidering the End of πρᾶξις *in the Light of* ἐνέργεια. As we have seen, Aristotle distinguishes moral action or πρᾶξις from ποίησις. The former is an immanent activity, the latter a transitive action. Moral action, unlike transitive action, has an immanent end, one which resides and remains in the subject, in his activity. The end of moral action is neither a work nor any efficiency external to the exercise itself, that is, outside acting well and happily. The end of moral action is the activity itself, acting well and acting happily. It is be-

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[10] See also *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050b1: "ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια . . . διὸ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία"; *Politics* 7.3.1332a9: "[τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν] . . . φαμὲν δὲ . . . ἐνέργειαν εἶναι καὶ χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείαν"; *NE* 10.6.1176b1 and 1177a10: "ἡ εὐδαιμονία . . . ἐν ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις"; *Politics* 7.7.1328a37: "ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον, αὕτη δὲ ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσίς τις τέλειος."

[11] *NE* 1.7.1098a4.

[12] *Physics* 2.6.197b5: "ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς τις· εὐπραξία γάρ"; *Politics* 7.3.1325a32: "ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς ἐστιν"; *Poetics* 6.1450a17–20: "<ἡ δὲ εὐδαιμονία> καὶ ἡ κακοδαιμονία ἐν πράξει ἐστί, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρᾶξίς τις ἐστίν, οὐ ποιότης."

cause this activity is itself excellent that it is good for us. Yet does this mean that Aristotle regards the good of moral activity as only immanent? Here we arrive at a notable aporia. Let us then consider more closely the structure of immanent activity, that is to say of act or ἐνέργεια.

The definition of happiness as an ἐνέργεια in the *Nicomachean Ethics* calls to mind Aristotle's theory of act most fully explicated in the *Metaphysics* and in *On the Soul*. Ἐνέργεια, Aristotle explains, is the act of a potentiality.[13] As such, ἐνέργεια is the end of a potentiality, and it is for its sake that the potentiality exists. The examples Aristotle provides to illustrate what an ἐνέργεια is are not insignificant. Several times in the *Metaphysics*, the Stagirite uses sight, thought (or contemplation: θεωρία), and happiness as exemplary ἐνέργειαι.[14] By contrasting these with walking and building, he makes clear that happiness, like sight and thought, is a complete activity which has its end in itself. In this respect ἐνέργειαι differ from motions or processes (such as walking or building).

In *On the Soul*, Aristotle explains that the different powers of the soul need an object to be actualized or to be in ἐνέργεια. Food, for example is the object of the nutritive powers, the sensible is the object of the sensitive powers, and the intelligible is the object of the intellectual powers.[15] Thus, the act of sight, which we call seeing, is an ἐνέργεια which depends on color in act.[16] What is seen determines the seeing. It is the sensible thing that permits the sensitive power to be in act[17] since the capacity to see is only actualized by something which is visible in act. That is to say that the passage from potentiality to act is made possible only by a heteronomy of the vital power. As a result, an act (ἐνέργεια) signifies both the act of the object and the act of the power at the same time. "The activity of the sensible and that of the sense is one and the same act, and yet the distinction between their being remains [ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως]."[18]

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[13] *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a8–13.

[14] *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a35, 9.6.1048b25.

[15] *On the Soul* 2.4.415a22: " οἷον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ νοητοῦ."

[16] "ὅρασις γὰρ λέγεται ἡ τῆς ὄψεως ἐνέργεια, ἡ δὲ τοῦ χρώματος ἀνώνυμος." "The actuality of sight is called seeing, but the actuality of colour has no name"; *On the Soul*, trans. John Alexander Smith, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle. Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 3.2.426a14.

[17] *On the Soul* 3.7.431a5.

[18] *On the Soul* 3.2.425b25–7.

The act of intellection is analogous since the intellectual power needs intelligibles to be in act, just as the sensitive power needs sensibles. Our vital powers require something external to themselves in order to be actualized.

Moral activity is an ἐνέργεια analogous to the act of our vital powers, and Aristotle says this explicitly. Moreover, as we have indicated, εὐδαιμονία, the end of πρᾶξις, is an ἐνέργεια.[19] We should expect, then, that both moral action and εὐδαιμονία will be in some measure heteronomous. Moral action, for instance, has to be activity in relation to a reality in act, a reality also called "good" and a cause of moral action. Desire aims at this good; it is what is sought. It is a fundamental principle of Aristotle's that goodness is in things: being and goodness, the first principles of metaphysics and ethics respectively, are related. That is to say that the goodness of things precedes and causes our appetite. In the words of the Stagirite, "we desire the good because it seems to us to be good, rather than it seems to us to be good because we desire it."[20] The desirable object, the good, moves us.[21]

The Good in the supreme sense will then be the best object of our most excellent activities, those which alone are able to bring about happiness. Our most excellent activities, according to Aristotle, are, on the one hand, contemplation or theoretical activity since θεωρία is the most excellent activity in itself, and, on the other hand, friendship, which extends to political justice. The supreme good, therefore, will be the best object of θεωρία and the friend or the person whom we seek to benefit (and, by extension, the city). Aristotle includes friends and the city in the highest good, the object of our most excellent activities. We should not be surprised, then, by his statement in the *Rhetoric* that the highest virtues must be those which are most useful to others since virtue is a capacity to be beneficent (ἡ ἀρετὴ δύναμις εὐεργετική).[22]

However, someone could claim that πρᾶξις resembles a movement, a κίνησις, more than an ἐνέργεια and could thereby mount an objection to the thesis that moral activity is actualized by an external

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[19] See note 10.
[20] *Metaphysics* 12.7.1072a29.
[21] *On the Soul* 3.10.433a27.
[22] *Rhetoric* 1.9.1366b4.

end. As we have noted, ἐνέργεια and κίνησις are not always identical;[23] in fact, in the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle identifies the exemplary ἐνέργειαι by distinguishing them from κίνησεις. Furthermore, a passage in the *Eudemian Ethics* actually asserts that action is a motion: "ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις κίνησις" thus supporting the objector's claim. However, we can easily recognize that πρᾶξις in this context is used in a very broad sense. Aristotle is attempting to establish the omnipresence of excess and deficiency, "in any sort of action, both scientific and non-scientific, both technical and untechnical. For motion is continuous and *action is a motion.*"[24] Gymnastics, medicine, architecture, and navigation are the examples he uses to support his argument. Now, let us note that Aristotle's examples belong more to the sphere of ποίησις than to the sphere of πρᾶξις. By doing so, we can recognize that when Aristotle says that πρᾶξις is a motion, he is not using πρᾶξις in the specific sense of moral action.

In the second place, even if it were the case that πρᾶξις is a κίνησις, we would still be justified in claiming that it requires an external good to be actualized since motion too is heteronomous. The living creature is moved by intellect, imagination, choice, wish, and desire (ἐπιθυμία).[25] More explicitly, Aristotle states that "the object of desire or of intellect first initiates movement."[26] The capacity for movement is itself moved by a motive: a goal, or an object capable of stimulating it. When I walk, for example, I am trying to get to a particular place, or to avoid being late, or to improve my health, and so on. The capacity does not move by itself. The human being's relation to an existing reality specifies his own mode of operation. For Aristotle,

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[23] *Physics* 3.2.201b31–3: "ἥ τε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μέν τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἀτελὴς δέ." See also *Metaphysics* 9.6.1048b34, 11.9.1066a20: "ἥ τε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖ τις, ἀτελὴς δέ"; *NE* 7.15.1154b27: "οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινησίας"; *On the Soul* 2.5.417a16: "ἡ κίνησις ἐνέργειά τις, ἀτελὴς μέντοι"; *On the Soul* 3.7.431a6: "ἡ γὰρ κίνησις τοῦ ἀτελοῦς ἐνέργεια ἦν, ἡ δ' ἁπλῶς ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα ἡ τοῦ τετελεσμένου."

[24] *EE* 2.3.1220b20–5.

[25] "ὁρῶμεν δὲ τὰ κινοῦντα τὸ ζῷον διάνοιαν καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ προαίρεσιν καὶ βούλησιν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν." "Now we see that the living creature is moved by intellect, imagination, purpose, wish, and appetite.... Wish, however, impulse, and appetite, are all three forms of desire"; *Movement of Animals*, trans. Arthur Spenser Loat Farquharson, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle. Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 6.700b16–18.

[26] *Movement of Animals* 6.700b24: "ὥστε κινεῖ πρῶτον τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ διανοητόν."

the vital operations of man, just like his vital powers, always have something else as their object,[27] in contrast to those of the being who is Thought-thinking-Itself, or God. God's goodness is in an activity that requires nothing other than himself since he is "too good to think of anything other than himself." We, by contrast, find our good in an activity which involves a reference to something other than ourselves "ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ εὖ καθ' ἕτερον."[28]

Finally, the thesis we are developing does not concern πρᾶξις in relation to its external object (where we might in some cases describe πρᾶξις as a κίνησις) but in terms of its end from an ethical perspective. Happiness is the first principle and end of all human activity; hence we are considering the end of πρᾶξις in relation to εὐδαιμονία. Since any number of texts define εὐδαιμονία in terms of πρᾶξις and ἐνέργεια, we seem justified in concluding that, ethically considered, that is to say in terms of the moral agent's desire for happiness, πρᾶξις is an ἐνέργεια.

III

The End of πρᾶξις*: Differing Points of View.* It is important to emphasize that this good, this reality which we have spoken of as actualizing our vital activity, is also the end of our activity as its goal, as, literally speaking, "that for the sake of which we accomplish certain things."[29] As Aristotle indicates, "every appetite is directed towards an end, for that which is the object of appetite is the principle (ἀρχή) of practical thought."[30] That the end of our activity is always a good

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[27] *Metaphysics* 12.9.1074b35.

[28] *EE* 7.12.1245b14–19; see also *NE* 9.4.1166a22.

[29] Aristotle sometimes distinguishes two kinds of ends in another sense. When he does so, he is not distinguishing the activity from the object but first the soul as end, in the way that knowledge is an end, and second the vital activity which is an end, in the way that the exercise of knowledge is an end. See *On the Soul* 2.4.415b20: "Διττῶς δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τό τε οὗ καὶ τὸ ᾧ." "'End' has two meanings, namely, the end itself and the subject for whom the end is an end." Also *On the Soul* 2.4.415b2; *EE* 7.15.1249b15. At *Metaphysics* 12.7.1072b1–2, we find two definitions of the final cause, but this text may be corrupt. On this, see the excellent analysis of Enrico Berti, in "De qui est fin le moteur immobile?" in *Essais sur la théologie d'Aristote. Actes du colloque de Dijon*, ed. Michel Bastit and Jacques Follon (Louvain-la-Neuve: Peeters, 1998), 13 n. 20.

that we pursue is a recurrent theme in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. There are many goods which we can choose to be the end of πρᾶξις, and our activites can be said to have many ends.

An end is only perfect, however, when it is chosen for its own sake and when it is a perfect good.[31] "The good" has a more extended meaning than "the end." Aristotle illustrates this point with the example of wealth. While wealth is certainly among the goods pursued by men, it will nevertheless never be a perfect good because it is always pursued for the sake of something else. Only the object of our most perfect vital activites is a final end,[32] capable of completing us.[33] It is imperative that we recognize that, in such a case, the perfect activity and the perfect object that determines the activity are equally the final end, and both the subject and the object are in ἐνέργεια.

Grasping the distinction that Aristotle makes between the good as object of our operations and the operations themselves is a prerequisite to understanding the end of πρᾶξις. From an ethical perspective, happiness can only be something within the purview of the agent's responsibility. The end of the agent's moral action can only be the operation itself by which he attains the good. Aristotle explains in the opening book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* that the good of beings is in their proper operations.[34] His identification of the end of human beings with certain actions (πράξεις) and certain activities (ἐνέργειαι) is, he notes, consistent with the traditional tripartite division of goods: external goods, goods relating to the body, and goods related to the soul. Aristotle defines the human good or happiness in terms of the goods of the soul.[35]

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[30] *On the Soul* 3.10.433a15: " Καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ἕνεκά του πᾶσα· οὗ γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις, αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ·"

[31] *Physics* 2.2.194a27; *NE* 1.5.1097a25–30.

[32] *NE* 10.4.1174 b 21–3: "[it follows that in the case of each sense] the most pleasant is the most perfect and the most perfect is that of the [organ or] power well disposed in regard to the finest of its objects [ἡδίστη δ' ἡ τελειοτάτη, τελειοτάτη δ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιότατον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν]."

[33] "The things which have attained a good end are called complete (τέλειον); for things are complete in virtue of having attained their end"; *Metaphysics*, trans. William David Ross, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle. Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 5.15.1021b25. Τέλειον means "perfect," "complete," "that which has attained its end."

[34] *NE* 1.6.1097b25.

[35] *NE* 1.8.1098b12–19.

If we overlook the distinction between the good as object of our operations and the operations themselves, the meanings of "good" and "end" in the *Nicomachean Ethics* will remain ambiguous because it is not the business of ethics to differentiate the good from the activity which attains it. Recognizing the distinction, however, and remembering that our potencies to action require an external good-end to be actualized, permit us to appreciate structural relations which Aristotle does not think it necessary to mention. In the books on friendship, for example, Aristotle is concerned with showing that the concrete exercise of friendship, for which man is responsible, is effectively a good. It goes without saying that friendship implies that the friend is a good and that it is he who actualizes the ἐνέργεια of friendship as its end. In the *Rhetoric*, however, Aristotle states explicitly that not only is friendship a good, but the friend is also, because the latter is desirable in himself (καθ' αὑτόν).[36] Both friendship and the friend are to be found among the goods which are recognized as such beyond all doubt. The friend is loved for himself, he is chosen for his own sake, and we desire his good. He is himself even the more closely connected to the ultimate end which is happiness since nobody could be happy without friends, to the extent that we are ready, if necessary, to give our lives for them.[37] Friends and friendship alike can be considered ends but in different respects. Consequently, if we consider the ambivalence of the meaning of "end," which signifies both the activity of the subject in which he can attain his perfection and the object specifying this activity, it seems correct to assert the following of πρᾶξις in regard to its end in different respects: πρᾶξις has its end in itself (or more precisly in εὐπραξία); πρᾶξις is actualized by a good-end; and πρᾶξις aims at an ultimate end.

The fact that the end can be considered from different perspectives has a direct bearing on the question of the relation of moral activity to ends and means. From the point of view of the ultimate end, happiness, our most perfect activities—those in accordance with virtue—will always be regarded as means to happiness, although in themselves they are ends. Correspondingly, from the point of view of the activity, properly speaking, both its operation and the good-end that is its object, can be considered its ends. Considering the activity

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[36] *Rhetoric* 1.6.1362b19.
[37] *NE* 9.8.1169a25.

in terms of its operation, the good will always be regarded as a means. On the other hand, considering the good in itself, this good will sometimes be a means, sometimes an end. Taking friendship as an example, the activity of loving another appears in itself to be a real end, a means to being happy. The friend, then, will be the best means to loving another, although, in himself, the friend is an end (and only as an end in himself can he actualize the friendship).

There is, therefore, no contradiction in the following two propositions. On the one hand, my happiness, the ultimate end of my moral activities, is immanent since it is by means of my own activities that I am capable of attaining it. On the other hand, I am not, for myself, my own end since, first, I am only finalized by an extrinsic good that I desire and that I pursue and, second, my happiness is only possible to the extent that I transcend myself and orient myself toward a true good which attracts me and completes me.

IV

Prudence and the Ends of πρᾶξις. When we turn to consider the object of prudence and to specify its relation to πρᾶξις, that is to say, to specify its role regarding ends and means, it is necessary to remind ourselves first of all that, compared to happiness, even the most perfect activities and the goods which actualize them appear as means, although in themselves they are ends. Aristotle says that prudence grasps the means; nevertheless, he makes it clear that the mark of a prudent man is to deliberate well about what sorts of things bring about the good life, "not in some particular respect," but wholly (ὅλως).[38] The prudent man is interested in means because he aims at the ultimate end.

In the second place, we can see that there is not only a hierarchical relation between different moral actions but also a necessary causality. Indeed, if we recall the different conceptions of the end of πρᾶξις and if we take note of what Aristotle tells us in the chapter on deliberation in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, it appears that the most perfect activities necessitate intermediate activities, and that these latter are important because they are efficient causes of the end. The

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[38] *NE* 6.5.1140a25–30.

Stagirite in fact explains that we must consider how and by what means the end can be attained, and after that, how these means themselves can be attained, until we arrive at the first cause.[39] In other words, a particular good can seem to us to be a means to becoming happy. It is then an object of προαίρεσις. Yet because this good is also, in another respect, an intermediate end, an object of βούλησις, it is going to inspire us to seek new means. Regarding the good in this respect gives us no grounds to oppose βούλησις and προαίρεσις since in this case βούλησις aims at a realizable end, causing the deliberate choice (προαίρεσις) of means thereto. The two are therefore causally linked.[40]

The overlap of ends and means does not seem to be reserved to poietic action. In the chapter on deliberation in *Nicomachean Ethics* book 3, Aristotle uses a telling analogy which consists in showing that in the field of art or production we seek sometimes tools, sometimes how to use them. Similarly, in other spheres, he says, we have to consider sometimes what means to employ (δι' οὗ), sometimes how (πῶς) exactly to attain the end from the given means. The context of this analogy suggests that Aristotle is using an example from art to help us grasp the proper perspective of moral activity. That is to say, he does not confuse the domain of poietic activity and the moral domain; rather, he uses an analogy to illustrate what he explained before, namely, the necessary overlap of ends and means. This interpretation of the purpose of the analogy is corroborated by what follows in the text. Aristotle adds, as further illustration, the sentence which has provoked so much scholarly discussion: "the province of deliberation is to discover the actions that are within one's own power to perform, and all our actions aim at ends other than themselves [αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα]."[41] His affirmation does not appear to be in contradiction with what we know about πρᾶξις from the ethical point of view since it remains in perfect conformity, on the one hand, with Aristotle's development of the different ends of agency in the book 1

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[39] *NE* 3.3.1112b19.

[40] On the causal link, see, for example: "for since they wish (βουλόμενοι) to live with their friends, they do and share in those things as far as they can"; *NE*, trans. William David Ross, rev. James Opie Urmson, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle. Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) , 9.12.1172a7.

discussion of happiness, and, on the other hand, with the different perspectives in which ends can be regarded.

Furthermore, in this same passage in *Nicomachean Ethics* 3, Aristotle makes it clear that we deliberate about means in light of an end but not about the particular facts in themselves, just as the prudent man is he who deliberates well about what sorts of things lead to the good life, but "not in some particular respect." He adds, "if we are to be always deliberating, we shall have to go on to infinity."[42] That deliberation requires a stopping point is not only in keeping with Aristotle's definition of deliberation, since the person who is deliberating well chooses at the opportune moment in a determined time, it is also in keeping with Aristotle's explanation of happiness in book 1. Like archers who aim at a target, we must aim at the supreme good, he explains. Otherwise everything we choose will be for the sake of something else, *ad infinitum*, so that our desires will be empty and vain:[43] we would miss the target. In order to attain our true end and stopping point, even if it is imposed upon us as it were, insofar as it is proper to our human nature, it is necessary to recognize it and to choose what leads to it. In turn, choosing what leads to the supreme good involves not only choosing to engage in the most excellent human activities but also choosing concrete and specific goods and engaging in concrete and specific actions which serve as means. In choosing to love, for example, we need to choose someone good to love; in choosing to contemplate, we need to find the best object to contemplate. In addition,

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[41] René-Antoine Gauthier asserts without hesitation, "Nous avons déjà signalé comment dans tout ce passage Aristote applique à l'action morale une analyse faite pour la production, au risque de compromettre l'originalité qu'il a ailleurs reconnue à l'action morale; il en arrive ici à se contredire formellement, en déniant expressément à l'action (πρᾶξις) l'immanence dans laquelle il avait reconnu sa caractéristique propre, et en lui attribuant une fin extérieure à elle-même, ce qui partout ailleurs est la caractéristique propre de la production (ποίησις)"; *L'éthique à Nicomaque*, 2d ed. (Louvain: Publications universitaires de Louvain Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1970), 2:203–4. Likewise, Pierre Aubenque: "On peut regretter qu'Aristote ait trop souvent confondu action technique et action morale et qu'il ait pensé la πρᾶξις sur le modèle de la ποίησις"; *La prudence*, 145. Both Emmanuel Martineau and Pierre Rodrigo have reproached Aubenque for his severity toward Aristotle. See Emmanuel Martineau, *La provenance des espèces. Cinq méditations sur la libération de la liberté* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982), 213; Rodrigo 10 n. 18.

[42] *NE* 3.3.1113a2.

[43] *NE* 1.1.1094a18–22.

in order to love someone, we need to discern how to do so in the specific things we do with and for him; we need to determine what his good is. Likewise, in order to have time for contemplation, we need to organize our other activities to afford ourselves the opportunity of theoretical activity.

Consequently, if prudence has reference to those means which lead to the happy life (that is to say, to all the things, ends and means, that are necessary to attain happiness and not to the particular facts in themselves), we can conclude, granted the differing perspectives in which we can take into account ends and means and their mutual and necessary overlapping, that prudence is directly connected to the morality of our actions, to their ends. Indeed, if the principles of our actions are the ends of our actions, prudence allows man to reach his end. Prudence determines our actions, which are moral when we take account of the end suited to man's nature, that is to say, the activities of contemplation and friendship (doing the good for my friend and for others who are members of the city). Possessing this supreme virtue, the prudent man always considers even his most insignificant actions as means, in other words, as efficient causes, of the ultimate end that he pursues in his most perfect activities according to virtue. Every πρᾶξις, then, has its end in εὐπραξία and is directly connected to the ultimate end: Prudence is therefore this dianoetical virtue, the virtue capable of ordering our contingent actions.[44]

It befits the prudent man, the man who has acquired this dianoetical virtue, to aim at the true end effectively and to attain it through this hierarchical overlapping of ends and means. It is he, after all, who has acquired the virtues necessary to the true orientation of his desire.[45] Indeed, moral virtue ensures the rightness of the end at which we aim, while prudence ensures the rightness of the means we adopt in pursuit of that end. One cannot be a prudent man without moral virtue,[46] and conversely, one cannot obtain moral virtue without prudence.[47] On the other hand, the man who lacks prudence will

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[44] As opposed to the interpretation of Pierre Aubenque: "Aristote sera tenté de calquer l'analyse de l'action prudemment conduite sur celle de l'action techniquement réussie, se contentant d'ajouter *in fine* que la prudence ne va pas sans vertu morale et se distingue donc de l'habileté, mais incapable alors de présenter comme autre chose qu'un lien extrinsèque et accidentel le rapport de la prudence à la moralité"; *La prudence*, 145.

[45] *NE* 6.12.1144a8.

[46] *NE* 6.13.1144b30, 6.12.1144a35.

not attain his end. Prudence will then be principally evident in everyday actions, throughout the whole of the prudent man's life. The prudent man is the man who seeks both the true ends and how to realize these ends in order that his concrete everyday life be a happy one. He knows, therefore, how to recognize those real goods which are capable of actualizing his faculties. This propensity to his finality unifies his moral life.

It is characteristic of prudence, then, that it does not deliberate about the ultimate end, happiness, because this end is man's by nature. On the other hand, neither does the φρόνιμος interest himself in the particular facts in themselves. He looks at reality with regard to his ends and their means.[48]

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[47] *NE* 6.13.1144b16.

[48] I am grateful to Sarah Donahue for helpful comments on this article and for reviewing my English.

ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE HEGELIAN TURN

TOM ROCKMORE

THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW CENTURY provides a good time to reflect on the most influential philosophers of this period, or those most likely to survive, or again whom we should be reading in a hundred years. The answer one gives to this type of question obviously depends on what one thinks philosophy is about. I would like to suggest that at the beginning of the new century, at the start of the new millennium, the philosopher we will and should still be reading at the end of the new century is not one of the obvious candidates, like Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine, Heidegger, Peirce, or Dewey, Rorty's favorite, but the nineteenth century German thinker, G. W. F. Hegel.

Heidegger, who insists on the importance of coming to grips with Hegel but who did not know much about contemporary philosophy, seems not to understand the extent to which the discussion of his time was deeply dependent on Hegel.[1] Almost thirty years ago Richard Bernstein made a strong case for Hegel as the figure against whom the main contemporary philosophical movements react. Bernstein had in mind Hegel's influence on philosophies of action or activity, including the Marxist interest in practice (*praxis*).[2] A different way of making a

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[1]Heidegger, who was no fan of Hegel and whose nondialectical approach lies at the antipodes of Hegel's, declares in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* that if philosophy is to survive and prosper, it must come to grips with Hegel. See Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 178. His discussion of time in *Being and Time* is an effort to do so. See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), §82, pp. 480–6. In sounding the call to return to Hegel, Heidegger is faintly echoing Otto Liebmann's famous neo-Kantian rallying cry to return to Kant. See Otto Liebmann, *Kant und die Epigonen: Eine kritische Abhandlung* (1865; reprint, Berlin: Reuther und Reichard, 1912). For discussion of neo-Kantianism, see Thomas E. Willey, *Back to Kant: The Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical Thought, 1860–1914* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978).

[2]See Richard J. Bernstein, *Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971).

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similar claim would be through Hegel's influence on the three new philosophical movements which have emerged over the last century: American pragmatism, analytic philosophy, and what is misleadingly called the phenomenological movement.[3]

Each of these movements is built on a reaction to Hegel. Peirce, the founding figure of American pragmatism, was influenced by Hegel throughout his career, claiming finally that his own view is a non-standard form of Hegel's.[4] The phenomenological movement is based on Husserl's influence. Sartre even claims that Husserl invented phenomenology. Yet since Hegel was also a phenomenologist, at most Husserlian and post-Husserlian forms of phenomenology represent variations on a theme but not a wholly new type of philosophy.

In considering Hegel's relation to analytic philosophy, Bernstein mainly focuses on action, especially action theory. Although he points out the utter disdain which then existed for Hegel among analytic thinkers, he notes that for reasons concerned with the internal dialectic of the analytic discussion, the possibility of a *rapprochement* with Hegel now exists.[5]

I believe Bernstein was right but for reasons which a generation ago he did not fully grasp. He correctly picks up the hidden continuity between the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Russell and Moore, and the idealism against which they rebelled.[6] He notes that analytic philosophers and Hegel share a concern to describe human action,[7] but he notes neither the distortion inherent in the analytic reaction to Hegel nor the way that analytic philosophy, even then, was already returning to Hegelian idealism.

On the Analytic Reaction to Hegel. Even among great philosophers, Hegel stands out as a widely misunderstood but equally influential writer. In claiming that Hegel is often misunderstood, I am not saying anything new about someone who, in the best of cases is an astonishingly difficult thinker.[8] It would hardly be surprising if analytic

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[3] See Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982).

[4] "My own philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a strange costume"; *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Harteshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935), vol. 1, par. 42.

[5] See Bernstein, *Praxis and Action*, 233.

[6] See Bernstein, *Praxis and Action*, 232.

[7] See Bernstein, *Praxis and Action*, 317.

philosophers, who are generally uninterested in Hegel, who tend not to know the texts well, and who are more interested in problems than people, did any better in reading Hegel than his other students.

The relation of analytic philosophy to Hegel, on which I will be concentrating here, is largely unknown, even to historians of philosophy.[9] If I am right, Hegel turns out to be a key but mainly unacknowledged figure in analytic philosophy, from whom it departs and to which it is now returning, but which it has twice misunderstood. The first, highly productive misunderstanding was one ingredient in the rise of analytic philosophy. It remains to be seen whether the second misunderstanding, which is only now taking shape, will prove as productive in the further evolution of analytic philosophy.

This paper will study the two main phases of the reaction of analytic philosophy to Hegel. The first, a turn away from Hegel which for many analytic philosophers persists to this day, and which concerns the problem of the existence of the external world, was part of the process of working out the distinctive analytic position. The second, current turn is toward Hegel among selected analytic writers, concerned with the problem of knowledge after the analytic critique of classical empiricism. I will further be arguing that beyond the analytic misreadings of Hegel, we do well to turn toward him for what is

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[8]The Hegel discussion is littered with misunderstandings of his position, including its Marxist misreading as a pillar of reaction (This attitude is already present in Engels, the first Marxist. See Friedrich Engels, *Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy*, trans. C. P. Dutt [New York: International Publishers, 1941]), the right-wing religious misreading which still persists (See Cyril O'Regan, *The Heterodox Hegel* [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994]) and the left-wing antireligious misreading as entirely secular (Kojève is only the best known example. See Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. [New York: Basic Books, 1969]).

[9] John Passmore, the best historian of English language philosophy, makes only a few perfunctory remarks about G. E. Moore's highly influential attack on idealism, which was and still is often taken as simply disposing of Hegel. Passmore notes that the former favors external relations against those who, influenced by Hegel, favor internal relations. See John Passmore, *A Hundred Years of English Philosophy* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966), 207–8. Yet he simply overlooks Moore's main objection, which concerns the existence of the mind-independent, real external world, whose affirmation is the central goal of Moore's attempted refutation. See Passmore, *A Hundred Years of English Philosophy*, for references to the immediate discussion surrounding Moore's article.

currently the best clue about how to continue the discussion of knowledge.

"Idealism"? The analytic turn away from Hegel early in the century was fueled by the conviction that he, like other idealists, wrongly denies the existence of the external world. In order to evaluate this complaint, it will be necessary to say something about "idealism," the form in which the objection is raised in analytic philosophy, and Hegel's position.

There is no natural way of using "idealism," which is always used normatively or stipulatively. Idealists do not often clarify the term, which their opponents typically employ very loosely to designate anything they reject. Idealism traditionally plays a prominent role not only in the analytic aversion to Hegel but in the Marxist critique of what they call bourgeois philosophy. It is generally understood by its proponents and its opponents in terms of a binary opposition, which is presumed to be exhaustive, and which opposes idealism to something else, such as materialism, realism, naturalism, or even empiricism.

"Idealism" is used to cover an implausibly broad variety of positions in reference to Plato, Berkeley, the German idealist tradition, British idealism, and so forth. As concerns Plato, this term alludes to the notorious theory of forms or ideas which is imputed to Plato, whose own position remains shrouded in mystery. Berkeley's antimaterialism leads to the famous slogan *esse est percipi*, which has apparently nothing other than the name in common with Plato. For German idealism, it is usual to distinguish at least four different subforms correlated with the four great names: Kant's critical idealism, Fichte's subjective idealism, Schelling's objective idealism, and Hegel's absolute idealism. Then there are further uses of the term among the British idealists, including Bradley, McTaggart, Bosanquet, and others.

Analytic philosophers, who are often not well versed in the history of philosophy, especially in idealism which they tend to reject, use the term "idealism" diffusely. Putnam typically rejects the view that "mind *makes up* the world" which he ascribes to Hegel.[10] Yet it is unclear what it would mean "to make up" the world, or what this verb

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[10] Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), xi.

is intended to mean, or even how Hegel could reasonably be held to illustrate this doctrine.

Moore and British Idealism. Moore's knowledge of Hegel, as opposed to the British Hegelians, is apparently indirect, certainly very sketchy. In *Principia Ethica* (1903) he mentions authors who employ such "Hegelian terms" as "organic whole," "organic unity," "organic relation"[11] and a metaphysical Hegelian approach to ethics.[12] In *Some Main Problems of Philosophy* (1928), which reproduces lectures given in 1910–1911, without referring to any specific text he depicts Hegel as holding, in violation of the law of excluded middle, that objects can simultaneously have contradictory properties, leading to a critique of relations.[13] In these and other writings he seems to be opposed less directly to Hegel than to his British disciples, such as McTaggart and above all Bradley.[14]

British Hegelianism developed on the heels of J. H. Stirling's famous book, *The Secret of Hegel* (1865).[15] Early on both Russell and Moore were loosely Hegelian. As an undergraduate, under McTaggart's influence, Russell considered the ontological argument to be sound and regarded himself as a Hegelian.[16] He notes that about the same time, but for a shorter period, Moore was also a Hegelian under McTaggart's influence.[17] Russell seems to have convinced Moore, who was skeptical, to attend McTaggart's Hegel lectures.[18] Moore, who later rejected McTaggart's ideas, was especially opposed to Bradley, the most original of the British Hegelians, who as late as

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[11] See G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 30. See also p. 34.

[12] See G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, 110.

[13] See G. E. Moore, *Some Main Problems of Philosophy* (New York: Collier, 1962), 190–1.

[14] This doctrine was specifically developed in Bradley, who holds in the first book of *Appearance and Reality* that every existential claim falls into contradictions which concern no more than mere appearance. See F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality* (1893; reprint, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1916). See also chapter 3.

[15] J. H. Stirling, *The Secret of Hegel* (London: Longman, Roberts and Green, 1865).

[16] See B. A. W. Russell, *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967), 63.

[17] See Russell, *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell*, 64.

[18] See Paul Levy, *Moore: G. E. Moore and the Cambridge Apostles* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 125, 148.

1924, decades after the publication of his main work, *Appearance and Reality* (1893), was still regarded as the most significant British philosopher.[19]

Analytic philosophers, who reject British idealism, are often relatively uninformed about it. Standard works on the history of analytic philosophy usually devote a few desultory pages to British idealism, described as a strange, mysterious doctrine which they profess not to understand, which can barely be stated, and in which no one endowed with a shred of common sense should believe.[20]

The British idealists thought well of Hegel. It is a stretch to say they were Hegelian in any deep way, although the belief that they were earned them the solid enmity of later analytic thinkers. Like other British Hegelians, Bradley stood for so-called Absolute Idealism, including metaphysical claims about reality, or the universe as a whole, as distinguished from mere appearance, as well as ultimate truths surpassing scientific claims. In style and in substance Bradley and the other British idealists were antithetical to traditional British empiricism, which they opposed, but which, in different ways, was reasserted against them by Moore and Russell. Traditional British empiricism supposed there was a real, mind-independent external world which is discovered but not constructed by the subject. It is diametrically opposed to Bradley's thesis, in his view the essential message of Hegel, that there is no extra-spiritual reality since everything lies within spirit.[21]

Moore's Critique of (British) Idealism. Early analytic philosophy tended to revive classical British empiricism in various forms. On the way to his later theory of knowledge by description, Russell initially held that meaning required a correlation between the words in a sentence and something outside it.[22] Moore's critique of idealism is

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[19] See J. H. Muirhead, *Contemporary British Philosophy* (1924; reprint, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953), Preface, p. 11.

[20] Warnock seems to know almost nothing about British idealism, which he regards as difficult to describe. See G. J. Warnock, *English Philosophy Since 1900* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 2–10.

[21] See Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 552.

[22] See Bertrand Russell, *Principles of Mathematics* (New York: Norton, 1964), chapter 4, pp. 42–52. For discussion, see D. F. Pears, *Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy* (New York: Vintage, 1967) chap. 1, pp. 13–25.

mainly directed against British idealism, against which he reaffirms a common sense form of classical empiricism.

Moore was interested in the problem of the existence of the external world, and in the refutation of idealism for allegedly denying it, over a long period of time stretching from his early "Refutation of Idealism" (1903) through "Is Existence a Predicate?" (1936) and "Proof of an External World" (1939). The problem was always the same. He was convinced that idealists asserted very queer claims about the world, basically unlike the rather ordinary view which he asserted against them.

Moore begins the "Refutation of Idealism" by claiming that for modern idealism the universe is spiritual.[23] This remarkable claim is doubly interesting. First, it indicates his awareness of a distinction between modern and other forms of idealism. Second, it simply ignores Hegel and other German idealists, none of whom holds this or an analogous view, and takes up English-language idealists like Berkeley and Bradley. Since the proposition he proposes to dispute is Berkeley's view that *esse* is *percipi*, it seems that for Moore, Berkeley represents modern idealism in general.[24] Against Berkeley, Moore maintains that to be is not to be perceived. He further denies, against Bradley, that what is experienced is identical with the experience.[25] On the contrary, sensation is always sensation of something.[26] We are then always already outside spirit since all sensation is sensation of something.[27]

Moore, Existence, and Later Analytic Philosophy. In maintaining that reality has nothing to do with sentience, Moore is close to realism, which is ordinarily understood as the idea there is a mind-independent world and that truth and knowledge in fact grasp it as it is. In

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[23] See "The Refutation of Idealism," in G. E. Moore, *Philosophical Studies* (1922; reprint, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), 1. Bradley makes a similar claim. See Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 552.

[24] See Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, 5. He also says he intends to refute idealism in the form it was recently stated by A. E. Taylor, the great Plato scholar. See Moore, Ibid., 8: "My paper will at least refute Mr. Taylor's idealism, if it refutes anything at all: for I shall undertake to *show* that what makes a thing real cannot be its presence as an inseparable aspect of a sentient experience."

[25] See Ibid., 19, 22.

[26] See Ibid., 24.

[27] See Ibid., 27.

a later article, Moore links his reassertion of realism against idealism to Kant. He recalls Kant's famous remark about the scandal that philosophy must take the existence of the external world on faith before remarking that it is by no means sure that Kant's own proof is successful.[28] Moore's proposed alternative consists in the reassertion of what he took to be common sense claims, such as "Here is one hand . . . and here is another."[29]

Moore's effort to refute idealism understood as denying the existence of the external world was influential in the later analytic debate. His commonsensism is consistent with traditional English empiricism but inconsistent with Kant, who affirms the existence of the external world but denies immediate knowledge. It is inconsistent as well with the widespread attack on empiricism later developed in analytic philosophy by such writers as Wittgenstein, Quine, Davidson, Sellars, Putnam, and Rorty.

Moore's claim for immediate knowledge was attacked by Wittgenstein in a manner influenced by Russell. The latter was concerned with definite reference, or denotation.[30] In contending that knowledge of physical objects is merely descriptive, he distinguishes sharply between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description.[31] In *On Certainty* Wittgenstein denies any claims for direct knowledge, what Russell calls knowledge by acquaintance. For Wittgenstein, Moore misuses the term "to know" in refuting idealism, which cannot be answered by claiming immediate knowledge at all.[32] He further maintains, in going beyond Moore and Russell, that claims to know are mediated by a frame of reference (*Bezugssystem*).[33] In both *Philosophical Investigations* and in *On Certainty*, he elaborates the frame of reference as a language game, in which words are meaningful in relation to their employment.[34]

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[28] "Proof of an External World," in G. E. Moore, *Philosophical Papers* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 27.

[29] See Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, 144.

[30] See Russell, "On Denoting," in *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, ed. Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), 103–15.

[31] See "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," in Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic* (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1957), 202–24.

[32] See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), §§520–1.

[33] See Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, §403.

Wittgenstein's attack on Moore's rehabilitation of realism against idealism yields two suggestions. First, the problem of the existence of the external world is the kind of nonproblem which interests philosophers but could not be solved. Second, our knowledge claims cannot be justified through an appeal to experience but only against the background of a conceptual framework.

The former idea was later developed in physicalist form by Carnap. In *The Logical Structure of the World* (1928), he provides a rational reconstruction of knowledge through concepts which immediately refer to the empirical given. The type of physicalism Carnap professed in this book, which was shared by many other members of the Vienna Circle, with the important exception of Neurath,[35] comes down to an ontological claim about reality as ultimately physical. If reality is composed of physical entities, then everything that is real, hence meaningful, can be known empirically, or on an empirical basis; and since what cannot be known empirically is obviously not real, cognitive reference to it cannot be meaningful.

Carnap applied this latter idea to eliminate pseudoproblems, what Kant would call bad metaphysics, from epistemology, in an article published in the same year, "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language."[36] Following the early Wittgenstein's view[37] that metaphysical sentences are unverifiable, hence meaningless, he argues that statements either asserting or denying the reality of the external world are mere pseudostatements.

The latter suggestion was taken up by Sellars who, in Wittgenstein's wake, makes a half-way turn toward Hegel, hence contributes to healing the breach between analytic philosophy and the latter opened by Moore and Russell. In "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," Sellars, like Wittgenstein, rejects the idea of direct givenness,

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[34] See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1956), §§43, 197, 264, 340; see further Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, §§61, 65, 82, 560.

[35] In a famous paper, he decisively criticized the very idea of protocol sentences. See Otto Neurath, "Protocol Sentences," in *Logical Positivism*, ed. A. J. Ayer (New York: Free Press, 1959), 199–208.

[36] See Rudolf Carnap, "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language," in *Logical Positivism*, 60–82.

[37] See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1963), proposition 6.53.

which is basic to classical British empiricism, and restated in Moore, as no more than a myth.[38] His central point seems to be that we do not and cannot depend, as classical empiricists believe, for the justification of claims to know on immediate experience whose probative force is undermined by the rejection of the myth of the given.

Moore's Criticism of Idealism. Moore's attack on idealism, which was influential in creating the well-known analytic enmity against Hegel which persists to this day, is astonishingly imprecise. It is unclear whether he intends to criticize all modern forms of idealism, British idealism in general, Bradley, Berkeley, or perhaps only the Platonist A. E. Taylor.

Moore claims that idealism denies the existence of the real, mind-independent external world whose existence we can prove. The proposed refutation is inadequate in respect to idealism in general and to Kant and Hegel in particular. Moore cannot refute idealism in general since there is none; there are only idealists who hold different views. He does not establish a central theme common to all modern forms of idealism, even to Berkeley, Bradley, and British idealism, much less to Kant, Hegel, and German idealism. Since he does not show that Berkeley and the British idealists share the same or relevantly similar views, even if his arguments were valid against the former, it would not follow that they counted against the latter.

The term "idealist" seems to have been invented by Leibniz, who, responding to Bayle, objected to "those who like Epicurus and Hobbes, believe that that soul is material"and went on to add that in his own position "whatever of good there is in the hypotheses of Epicurus and Plato, of the great materialists and the great idealists, is combined here."[39] Moore's problematic view of idealism is close to an early usage of the term in Christian Wolff. According to the latter, who is thinking of Berkeley, idealists acknowledge only ideal objects existing in our minds but deny the independent reality of the world and the existence of material bodies.[40] Yet this view fails to characterize Kant. In the critical philosophy, where he elaborates "good idealism," Kant does not deny but rather affirms the existence of the external

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[38] See Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).

[39] G. W. F. Leibniz, *Philosophische Schriften*, ed. C. I. Gerhardt (Berlin: Weidmann, 1875–1890), 4:559–60.

world in criticizing the "bad" idealism he detects in Descartes and Berkeley.

Moore, who does not successfully criticize Kant's effort, provides a selective account of it.[41] This is not the place to enter into the details of Kant's argument. Suffice it to say that in invoking direct, unmediated, immediate knowledge, which Kant denies, Moore merely begs the question. His proposed solution bears approximately the same relation to Kant's difficulty as Dr. Johnson's reported refutation of Berkeley: both simply miss the point.

Hegel and the External World. Moore's attack on idealism for denying the existence of the external world is unfair to Hegel as well. It is still adversely affecting interpretations of Hegel decades after it was launched. An instance among many is Burnyeat's reading of idealism as the view that "all there is is mind and the contents of mind,"[42] leading to his mistaken suggestion that Plato's contention that there is something independent of thought falsifies Hegel's claim to see anticipations of his own position in Greek thought.[43] Yet Hegel begins from the assumption, which is common to all the main figures in German idealism, including Kant and all his idealist successors, that the problem of knowledge concerns mind-independent objects given in experience and knowledge.

Hegel, who scarcely helps his readers, says little directly about his position, but he gives us ample clues throughout his writings that he does not deny but rather affirms the mind-independent external

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[40] Christian Wolff, *Psychologia rationalis*, in *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. J. Ecole, J. E. Hofmann, M. Thomann, and H. W. Arndt (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1972), II. Abteilung. Lateinische Schriften, vol. 6, §36, p. 25.

[41] Any reasonably comprehensive account of Kant's view of this theme would need to consider at least his three main references to the problem in the *Critique of Pure Reason*: the remark in the B introduction about the scandal of philosophy (See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), 36; Bxxxxix) the discussion in the Fourth Paralogism concerning ideality in the A edition, in regard to outer relation (See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 400–9; A367–80) and the famous "Refutation of idealism" in the B edition (See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 288–98; B274–87).

[42] See M. F. Burnyeat, "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed," *Philosophical Review* 41, no. 1 (January 1982): 8.

[43] See Burnyeat, "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed," 22 n. 23.

world, hence that the analytic charge originated by Moore is simply false.

Here are three such clues. To begin with, in the so-called *Differenzschrift*, his first philosophical publication, he advances the view, which he never later renounces, that philosophy begins in (ontological) difference.[44] His position can be simply characterized through the complex assertion that epistemological unity depends on ontological disunity, or difference. In this connection, it is crucial to note the distinction, on which Hegel insists, between the opposition between subject and object, in which the latter is simply defined as negation of subjectivity, and claims to know mind-independent objects as they are, which Hegel simply rejects.[45] Second, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel presents a phenomenology of the experience of consciousness. The stage-wise development of consciousness includes consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason, whose final phase is absolute knowing (*absolutes Wissen*), in which the subject is said to know and to know that it knows its relation to what is other than itself. Sense-certainty, the initial phase of consciousness, tells us that something is, or exists, hence acknowledges the existence of the external world but not what it is, which further requires perception. Third, the same basic position is further developed in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* where Hegel provides an important account of the "Positions of Thought to Objectivity."[46]

It is incorrect to tax Hegel with denying the existence of the external world in any way, for instance, by reducing it to spirit. Moore thinks that either one denies the existence of the external world, or one must acknowledge its existence and be able to know it as it is. The third possibility, which he does not consider but which Hegel defends, is that the existence of the external world can be conceded, or at least not denied, although no claim is made to know it as it is. There is an enormous difference between the traditional realist claim to know the mind-independent external world[47] and the weaker, but

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[44] See G. W. F. Hegel, *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, trans. by H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977).

[45] At the beginning of the *Differenzschrift*, Hegel objects to Kant's supposed hypostasization of thing in itself as absolute objectivity, that is, as wholly independent of subjectivity. See Hegel, *The Difference*, 79–80.

[46] G. W. F. Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic*, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), §§19–83, pp. 45–134.

more defensible acknowledgment that there is an external world, which provides empirical constraints on claims to know but which cannot itself be known as it is. Hegel acknowledges the existence of the external world, but he denies the further claim that we can know it as it is in holding that claims for truth and knowledge are limited wholly and solely to the contents of conscious experience. Since he acknowledges the role of the external world in knowledge, Hegel is an empiricist, although in a different way from either classical British empiricism or Kant.

Empiricism and Idealism. Following Moore, empiricism and idealism are often viewed as opposed. Yet empiricism and idealism are not incompatible but compatible. In the present context, it will be appropriate to distinguish three forms of empiricism, of which the second and third types are compatible with forms of German idealism.

Classical British empiricism, whether in Bacon's view that the mind is the mirror of nature or in Locke's view that complex ideas consist of simple ideas that cannot be wrong, claims to know the real external world as it is. This claim is denied in German idealism, which follows Kant's seminal suggestion that we can know only that we know what we in some sense construct, which is arguably the central insight in the critical philosophy. Unlike classical empiricists, such as Locke, who claim that complex ideas are constructed out of simple ideas which cannot be wrong, Kant never claims to know the mind-external world as it is but only to receive from it the sensory content out of which perceptual objects are constructed. Kant, who denies the classical empiricist claim for direct, immediate knowledge, offers a second type of empiricism on the basis of his famous assertion that all cognition begins in but is not limited to experience.[48] His a priori form of empiricism concerns the transcendental analysis of the conditions of the possibility of experience and knowledge of objects.

Hegel has often been seen as the paradigmatic anti-empiricist by analytic philosophers like Moore and his conceptual heirs; it is not often noticed that he favors a third form of empiricism. Hegel follows Kant in rejecting the very idea that we can consciously know

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[47] See Michael Devitt, *Realism and Truth* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

[48] See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 43; B1.

mind-independent objects as they are but denies against Kant that we can specify the transcendental conditions of knowledge. He criticizes classical empiricism on the grounds that direct, immediate experience, which shows only that something is but not what it is, is not the richest but the poorest kind of knowledge.[49] He several times rejects the Kantian distinction between the general conditions of the possibility of knowledge whatsoever and the actual process of knowledge,[50] hence transcendental philosophy as Kant understands it. He describes the Kantian effort to clarify the conditions of knowledge prior to seeking knowledge as natural but not scientific on the grounds that pure reason cannot be understood either as an instrument or as a medium. Since what we perceive is altered by the way it is perceived, there is no way to sustain the distinction between the way the object is in itself, as a mere object of thought, and as it appears within experience.[51]

Hegel's conception of knowledge is a variant of Kantian "constructivism." This approach originates in a famous letter to Herz toward the start of the critical period, which prefigures the position Kant later works out. Kant formulates his concern as a question: "What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call 'representation' [*Vorstellung*] to the object [*Gegenstand*]?"[52]

Kant's idea of the cognitive object can be understood in two main ways: as a mere object of thought,[53] and as a mind-independent object which "affects" the cognitive subject. Kant consistently inclines toward the second reading in various efforts to refute idealism understood as the denial of the reality of the external world. This suggests that he accepts the idea of a mind-independent world, which is prior to and independent of experience and knowledge of objects. A version of this reading is further adopted in Fichte's concern to provide an orthodox extension of the critical philosophy, for instance in his basic definition of experience as contents of consciousness accompanied by a feeling of necessity.[54]

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[49] See the analysis of "Sense-certainty" in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 104–38.

[50] See Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic*, §10, pp. 33–4.

[51] See G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), §73, p. 46.

[52] See Immanuel Kant, *Philosophical Correspondence, 1759–1799*, trans. Arnulf Zweig (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 71.

[53] See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 539; B566.

Kant's question concerns the problem of how a representation refers to (mind-independent) objects which do not affect it. In response, in the first *Critique* he famously claims that reason (*Vernunft*) knows only what it in some sense constructs (*hervorbringt*).[55] In short, knowledge cannot depend on knowing the mind-independent external world as it is since we can only know that we know what we in some sense construct.

Hegel holds that claims to know should not be understood as simply immediate, that is as a posteriori, or as a priori, namely, as the result of the theoretical analysis of the conditions of knowledge in general; they should rather be understood as the result of thinking through the successive levels of the experience of consciousness in the course of which truth and knowledge emerge. In criticizing Kant, Hegel abandons any version of the correspondence view of truth since the relation of the representation to the external object cannot be known. Knowledge requires an identity, or coincidence, between the view of the object and the object as given in experience. In place of Kant's a priori analysis of the conditions of any experience and knowledge of objects whatsoever, Hegel proposes a more pragmatic conception of knowledge according to which theories are tried out and evaluated in terms of practice.

Analytic Pragmatism. Moore's unjustified critique of Hegel is an influential factor in the analytic disinterest in idealism which persists to this day. The turn away from Hegel, which has been so productive in the development of a distinctive analytic philosophical approach, has recently been supplemented by a nascent, still very modest turn toward Hegel, which is embedded as it were in a wider analytic turn toward pragmatism.

We can distinguish between the general analytic turn toward pragmatism and the specific turn toward Hegel. The analytic turning to pragmatism has been underway for some time, since the early 1950s if it begins with Quine, since the early 1930s if it begins with Neurath. Recent analytic pragmatism is a distant consequence of the early Carnap's defeat at the hands of Neurath, as a result of which the idea of a

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[54] See "The First Introduction to the Science of Knowldedge," in J. G. Fichte, *The Science of Knowledge*, trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), §1, pp. 5–7.

[55] See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 19; Bxiii.

seamless foundationalist web between empiricism and science was abandoned.[56] A straight line leads from Neurath's criticism of protocol sentences to Quine's view of the underdetermination of theories, his related turn to pragmatism, and, beyond Quine, to Putnam. In different ways, Quine, Putnam, Rorty, and many others[57] are all party to this turning. Among the most important analytic philosophers at present, only Davidson remains a holdout. Rorty, the self-proclaimed heir to Dewey, whom he constantly but eccentrically invokes, seems in some ways as distant from pragmatism as Davidson, who never claims to be a pragmatist but whom Rorty has controversially tried to recruit for the cause.

Ironically, as concerns pragmatism Quine and Davidson represent the two analytic extremes.[58] This is ironic since Davidson, who is often thought of as Quine's strongest follower, is in fact one of his deepest critics. If we limit the discussion to Quine, Rorty, and Putnam, we have three different analytic forms of pragmatism.

Quine's influential view of pragmatism, like the rest of his position, is very spare. He had already stopped mentioning pragmatism when he composed *Word and Object* (1960). To the best of my knowledge, the term has not appeared in his writings for decades. His minimalist view of pragmatism can be inferred from a few remarks, primarily in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," but also in "Identity, Ostension and Hypostasis," a pair of essays written around 1950. In the former, he links his rejection of the analytic–synthetic distinction and reductionism to a shift toward pragmatism.[59] In the latter, he suggests that since claims to know depend on a prior conceptual scheme, which cannot be compared to reality, we should abandon the idea of a mirror of reality, or a realistic standard, in favor of a pragmatic standard.[60] In these and other writings, Quine refuses a priori claims to

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[56] See Otto Neurath, "Protocol Sentences," in *Logical Positivism*, 199–208.

[57] Other prominent examples, whom I will not discuss in this paper, include C. I. Lewis, Nicholas Rescher, and Joseph Margolis. Quine even includes Carnap among the pragmatists. See "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in W. V. O. Quine, *From A Logical Point of View* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 46.

[58] This is pointed out well by McDowell. See his discussion of "Davidson in Context," in *Mind and World*, 129–161.

[59] See *From A Logical Point of View*, 20.

[60] See Ibid., 79.

know of all kinds, as well as claims based on facts unrelated to a prior framework, since he denies there is any fact of the matter. Based on these indications, by inference for Quine "pragmatism" means that, as he explicitly says, claims to know must meet the test of experience as a whole, or as a corporate body.[61] In a word, pragmatism means epistemic holism and, conversely, epistemic holism means pragmatism.

For Quine, the shift to pragmatism follows from epistemic holism. Putnam has always been close to Quine, hence to pragmatism. Quine's holism calls attention to an explanatory gap between sensory information and theory. Putnam's internal realism draws the conclusion in pointing to plural interpretations of the single mind-independent real. Putnam has always also seen his interest in pluralism as close to James's commitment to pluralism in *A Pluralist Universe* and other writings.[62]

Putnam's pluralism, which survives his recent abandonment of internal realism, leads to an explicit commitment to a Jamesian form of pragmatism. Like Carnap, one of his early heroes, Putnam is always changing his mind. The history of Putnam's development reflects the formulation and later abandonment of a series of ideas, often while they are still influential, most recently in his decision to give up internal realism.[63] As stated in *Reason, Truth and History*, there is a contrast between external realism, a so-called God's eye view, or view without perspective, and internal realism, the view that there is more than one "'true' theory or description of the world."[64] Putnam was never too clear about what this view entails. In the initial formulation, he claims that internal realism concerns both the mind-independent world and the world as produced by our concepts.[65] These views are very different. Certainly, the latter smacks of idealism, which he is at

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[61] See *From A Logical Point of View*, 41.

[62] Putnam has often written on James in recent years. For Putnam's view of his relation to James's pluralism, see, for example, "James's Theory of Perception," in Hilary Putnam, *Realism with a Human Face*, ed. James Conant (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 36–8.

[63] See Hilary Putnam, "Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry into the Powers of the Human Mind," *Journal of Philosophy* 91, no. 9 (September 1994): 445–517.

[64] See Hilary Putnam, "Two Philosophical Perspectives," in *Reason, Truth and History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 49.

[65] See Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*, 54.

pains to avoid. He has recently abandoned this view, however construed, in a shift to natural realism, his new name for direct realism.[66] In so doing, he gives up sense data for the direct experience of external objects. Putnam, who notes that this view goes all the way back to Aristotle, claims it is first stated in nonmetaphysical fashion by William James. Although he rejects James's suggestion that the world is in part the product of our minds, he accepts the idea that normal veridical perception picks out external things.[67] He denies any interface between the mind and the external object of perception,[68] and he agrees with what he calls the great insight of pragmatism that what is important in our lives must be important in philosophy.[69] Hence, pragmatism for Putnam comes down to the view that claims to know rest on natural realism, or direct perception of the external world, which can be interpreted in different ways.

Rorty is the main figure in contemporary analytic philosophy most closely identified with pragmatism. In *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, he takes Quine's part in arguing it is meaningless to claim that our conceptual scheme mirrors reality.[70] His view of pragmatism closely follows Wittgenstein's influential shift from an early representationalist view to a later (social) contextualist theory of justification. His argument, which is skeptical in tone, rests on the claim that philosophy peaks in analytic philosophy. If analytic foundationalism fails, then philosophy in all its many forms fails. Since philosophy is concerned with knowledge, and since analytic foundationalism fails, there is nothing interesting to say about knowledge. For Rorty, as for Kant, the problem of knowledge is representational, and representations cannot be compared with what they represent as traditional empiricism requires. On this basis, he draws a sharp distinction between epistemology and hermeneutics in contending that the latter is not and cannot be another means to pursue epistemological concerns. In a later collection of essays, he suggests that the great pragmatists, by which he means James and Dewey (but strangely enough not Peirce), should not be seen as offering theories of knowledge, by which he seems to mean that they do not subscribe to the idea that to

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[66] See Putnam, "Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses."
[67] See Ibid., 454.
[68] Ibid., 488.
[69] Ibid., 517.
[70] See Quine, *From A Logical Point of View*, 79.

know means to get it right about the world, that is, to represent it accurately.[71] Epistemologists are concerned with theory, but pragmatists are concerned with practice, ultimately with helping us cope. He has further clarified his view in a more recent paper on "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth," where he develops the idea that pragmatism consists in giving up correspondence with reality.[72] Here he maintains—using James as his standard since he thinks Peirce does not go far enough—that Davidson's view that a theory of truth cannot compare sentences with objects[73] qualifies him as a pragmatist.

Three Analytic Forms of Pragmatism Compared. The disparities in these three analytic views of pragmatism are real and significant. Quine is concerned with how we can reasonably be said to know; Rorty, who is an epistemological skeptic, is concerned with why we can reasonably be said not to know; and Putnam is occupied with what and how we know. Quine, who refuses other standards, accepts a pragmatic measure as the only one meaningful for knowledge. Rorty takes the need to apply such a standard as tantamount to skepticism. In criticizing empiricism, in particular Carnap's Vienna Circle view, Quine follows Neurath in seeing pragmatism as the responsible alternative. By implication Rorty takes the failure of Vienna Circle reductionism, manifest in Neurath's successful critique of Carnap, as suggesting that no claim to truth is now meaningful.

The difference between Quine and Rorty turns on their respective attitudes toward the idea that knowledge depends on correspondence with reality. Quine, who is undismayed by the impossibility of showing that our conceptual scheme mirrors reality, adopts a weaker but acceptable claim in adapting Duhem's form of scientific holism. Rorty, who presupposes a sharp, perhaps overly sharp, distinction between theory and practice, contends that in theory we cannot know how our ideas match up with the independent world although in practice we cope by invoking social standards. Quine, who is opposed to

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[71] See "Pragmatism, Relativism and Irrationalism," in Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 160–75.

[72] See Richard Rorty, *Philosophical Papers* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1:126–50.

[73] See Donald Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," in *Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 307–19.

analytic foundationalism, and who opposes reductionism, sees an alternative to it in pragmatism. Rorty, who is committed to analytic foundationalism but disappointed that it fails, sees no reasonable alternative to it which will yield knowledge.

Quine's holism presupposes that claims to know cannot be judged through an appeal to facts. Since facts cannot be separated from perspectives, there is no fact of the matter. On the contrary, Putnam's natural realism commits him to the view that the independent world is given as it is, although he also maintains that different interpretations are possible.[74]

Pragmatism and Analytic Pragmatism. Analytic pragmatism is obviously very different in different writers. How does it relate to pragmatism? The answer is complicated, more so than one would think. Quine's approach to pragmatism runs through Duhem, whose relation to pragmatism is not obvious. Rorty comes to pragmatism mainly through the later Wittgenstein and Sellars, whose views he reads as continuous, less so through Heidegger or even Dewey, whom he ostensively champions. Putnam at least makes the turn to pragmatism on directly pragmatic grounds. This does not mean his theories are more pragmatic than the others, only that he is more interested in the texts. Rorty reads Wittgenstein (and Sellars) as supporting the social view of verification ingredient in his own turn to pragmatism. Putnam regards Wittgenstein as misread as a social verificationist in his own turn to pragmatism.

As a doctrine, pragmatism is at least as various as its analytic proponents by implication think it is. Pragmatism has never been a homogeneous movement. Peirce's annoyance at his (claimed) misreading at the hands of James is well known. Like analytic philosophy, pragmatism has become even less homogeneous as it has developed. James's opposition to monistic idealism is reflected in the title, *A Pluralistic Universe,* he gave to his last book.[75] If pragmatism eschews monism for pluralism, it is fitting that the pragmatist movement to which James belonged do so as well. In a well-known paper from 1908, ten years after the official inception of pragmatism, Lovejoy dis-

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[74] See Putnam, "Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses," 514.

[75] See William James, *A Pluralistic Universe* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912).

tinguished no less than thirteen varieties.[76] In "How To Make Our Ideas Clear," Peirce maintains that meaning is indissociable from future practical consequences.[77] More recently, Cornel West has suggested that pragmatism is a form of cultural criticism.[78]

Analytic Neo-Hegelianism. The very possibility of Moore's form of empiricism, which is based on direct knowledge, is undermined by the multifaceted critique of empiricism starting in the later Wittgenstein and continuing in Neurath, Quine, Sellars, Davidson, Rorty, and others. Following this critique, there are two very different schools of thought about justifying claims to know. One is to make a surreptitious return to empiricism. After the lengthy analytic critique of empiricism, Davidson and Putnam have lately been engaged in resurrecting a form of what they had earlier banished. A kind of empiricism is manifest in Davidson's attempted resurrection of the correspondence theory of truth and in Putnam's revival of direct realism. Both views depend on coming back in direct touch with the mind-independent external world, hence on falling back into what Rorty describes as a bad habit borrowed from Descartes.[79] The other option is to turn to Hegel.

The specifically Hegelian turn, which is still in its nascent stage, is mediated by several factors, including the effect of the later Wittgenstein on the subsequent debate, and increasing attention to Sellars, in-

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[76] See "The Thirteen Pragmatisms," in A. O. Lovejoy, *Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963), 1–29.

[77] "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object"; C. S. Peirce, *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings of Peirce*, ed. Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 1:132.

[78] "The fundamental argument in this book is that the evasion of epistemology-centered philosophy—from Emerson to Rorty—results in a conception of philosophy as a form of cultural criticism in which the meaning of America is put forward by intellectuals in response to distinct social and cultural crises"; Cornel West, *The American Evasion of Pragmatism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 5.

[79] This is an instance of what Rorty refers to as "the bad habit British empiricists took over from Descartes—the habit of asking whether mind ever succeeds in making unmediated contact with the world, and remaining skeptical about the status of knowledge-claims until such contact can be shown to exist"; Richard Rorty, "Introduction," in Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 9.

cluding Sellars's interest in Hegel. The later Wittgenstein directs attention to a contextualist view of knowledge sometimes referred to as linguistic idealism.[80] Wittgenstein's indirect rehabilitation of idealism calls attention to its general resources.

Wittgenstein's contextualism has been read as social and as asocial. These different readings of Wittgenstein's later contextualism lead to two different views of Hegel. There is a straight line running from a social reading of Wittgenstein, which can be illustrated by Kripke's well known interpretation,[81] through Sellars's flirtation with Hegel, to Brandom's still very recent and still very nascent explicit turn to Hegel.

Building on the later Wittgenstein, in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" Sellars clearly signals his receptivity to Hegel in what he describes as *Méditations hégéliennes*[82] as well as in his frontal attack on classical empiricism, which he calls the myth of the given. Sellars's rejection of the latter builds on Hegel's famous critique of "sense certainty" at the beginning of the *Phenomenology of Spirit.* Hegel's target is immediate knowledge, which presupposes an epistemological given, in English empiricists such as Bacon and Locke, and in Kant's critical philosophy.[83] If the immediate given cannot be known, as Hegel contends, then empiricism as it has been understood in the English tradition and even in Kant is indefensible. In restating Hegel's argument in an analytical idiom, Sellars rejects the idea of direct givenness, in Hegelian terms immediacy, as no more than a myth in favor of the justification of claims to know within what he calls the logical space of reasons.[84]

In *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,* in defending antirepresentationalism, Rorty takes over a form of Sellars's social justificationism.[85] In the introduction to the recent republication of Sellars's essay, he underscores its importance, which he compares to Wittgen-

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[80] See David Bloor, "The Question of Linguistic Idealism Revisited," in *Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein,* ed. Hans Sluga and David F. Sterne (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 354–82.

[81] See Saul A. Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982).

[82] See Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,* 148.

[83] For his later critique of empiricism, see Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic,* §§37–60, pp. 76–107.

[84] See Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,* §36, p. 76.

[85] See Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 170.

stein's *Logical Investigations* and Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." With an eye to Sellars, he touts Brandom, his own former student, as making a bid to take analytic philosophy from its Kantian stage in Sellars (for Rorty's purposes Sellars is both a Kantian and a Hegelian!) to a new, Hegelian stage by replacing the old reliance on representation through a view of inference.[86]

In his recent book, *Making It Explicit*, Brandom develops Wittgenstein's, Sellars's, and Rorty's social justificationism. Although Rorty refers to Hegel, in discussing inference instead of representation, Brandom alludes primarily to Frege, Sellars, and Dummett.[87] His book peaks in the idea that claims to know are justified within the context of social self-consciousness.[88]

A rival and very different form of analytic Hegelianism is currently being developed by McDowell, who is critical of social justificationist readings of Wittgenstein and Sellars, assumed by Rorty, as well as his own colleague, Brandom. McDowell is as committed to Wittgenstein as Brandom but to a different Wittgenstein. The difference between McDowell and Brandom in this respect, which is major not minor, can be summarized in three points. To begin, McDowell rejects the social justificationist reading of Wittgenstein on which Brandom relies.[89] He further rejects the view that meaning is socially constituted, on which Brandom in part relies. He finally rejects the very idea that there is a problem about the norms of reason, the problem which is central to Brandom's recent work and which motivates his turn to a pragmatic Hegel.

McDowell's turn to pragmatism and to Hegel is recent; there is no direct trace of it in a collection of his papers over the past twenty years.[90] He admits that his own view might count as a form of pragma-

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[86] See Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, 8.

[87] See Robert Brandom, *Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing and Discursive Commitment* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), xvi.

[88] See Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, 643.

[89] In the early 1990s, he published two papers on what he sees as the misrepresentation of intentionality in the later Wittgenstein in Kripke's and Wright's versions of the familiar social justificationist interpretations. See "Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy" and "Intentionality and Interiority in Wittgenstein," both reprinted in John McDowell, *Mind, Value, and Reality* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 263–78 and 297–324.

[90] See John McDowell, *Mind, Value and Reality* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).

tism as Rorty understands it but says little more about it.[91] McDowell, who sees Hegel as standing on Kant's shoulders[92] and acknowledges his influence on such writers as Marx and Gadamer,[93] regards him as correcting such Kantian ideas as the supersensible.[94] In recent lectures, McDowell criticizes Sellars for allegedly misreading Kant in a way which closes off access to Hegel as continuing and correcting Kant.

His critique of Sellars is related to his own effort to work out an updated version of Kantian intentionality. McDowell points out that Sellars proposes a Kantian approach to intentionality, understood as the relation of thought and language to the world in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" and then in its sequel, *Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes.* He suggests that Sellars interprets Kant as claiming that sensibility is purely receptive in order to "avoid the dialectic which leads from Hegel's *Phenomenology* to nineteenth-century idealism."[95] Clearly McDowell, who is concerned to avoid any easy conflation of Hegel and Wittgenstein, is also not frightened by the perspective of idealism. In a defense of Hegel against Sellars, McDowell contends that Hegel's theory, which contains an internal constraint, does not require an external constraint.[96] He concludes, on this basis, that Sellars is correct that for Kant sensibility plays a transcendental role but that for Hegel the necessary empirical constraint is provided by the objects of perception. In this way, he implicitly acknowledges Hegel's often overlooked empiricism.

The Emerging Analytic Hegel. How does the pragmatic Hegel relate to Hegel? Since Moore, the analytic use of Hegel has often been very loose and only distantly related to the texts. Rorty typically sees Sellars and then Brandom as moving toward Hegel. He does not notice even the most obvious differences between the latter and Hegel,

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[91] See Ibid., 155.

[92] See Ibid., 111.

[93] See Ibid., 117 n. 8.

[94] See Ibid., 83.

[95] Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics*, 16; cited in McDowell, "Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality," 466.

[96] "Hegelian Reason does not need to be constrained from outside, precisely because it includes as a moment within itself the receptivity that Kant attributes to sensibility"; McDowell, "Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality," 466.

or even between himself and Sellars.[97] In adopting the logical space of reasons Sellars, who disqualifies so-called folk epistemology, borders on scientism,[98] which is clearly alien to Hegel's concept of spirit.

The nascent approaches to Hegel in Brandom and McDowell are both more dependent on the reading of Kant, the later Wittgenstein, and Sellars than on the interpretation of Hegel. At stake is how to read Wittgenstein, hence how to relate a prior commitment to him to a further commitment to Hegel. For Brandom, through the turn to social justification Wittgenstein and Sellars provide a corrective to Kant, whose views are continued in Hegel. For McDowell, this is a misreading of Wittgenstein, which Sellars had a hand in perpetrating. In the latter case, Sellars prevents us from seeing the interest of Hegel in correcting Kant.

My doubts about Brandom's reading of Hegel derive from a certain insensitivity to basic differences between such main analytic stalwarts as Sellars and Quine on the one hand and Hegel on the other. It is proper to distinguish epistemic holism, or the Quinean view that theories meet their fate as a whole; the allegedly Wittgensteinian "social" justification of claims to know in relation to a form of life; and the Hegelian idea that claims to know are indexed to the historical moment. Quine would be the first to be surprised to be compared to Hegel. The justification of claims to know through epistemic holism is very different from the social justificationism that Brandom and others attribute to Wittgenstein. There is not only a social but above all a crucial historical dimension to Hegel's concept of spirit (*Geist*). Even if it is social, a neo-Wittgensteinian perspective is not historical; it is, hence, incompatible with Hegel.

McDowell sees Hegel not as simply in opposition to, or as merely rejecting, but rather as attempting to complete Kant's theories. Although he has not yet worked it out in his writings, he seems to glimpse the historical dimension in Hegel. As examples I cite two remarks: his claim against Davidson that givenness is not unrevisable

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[97] Rorty conflates Sellars's view of justification through the space of reasons with epistemological behaviorism, or the view that rationality depends on what society lets us say, which he attributes to Wittgenstein and Dewey. See Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 174.

[98] For Sellars's well-known scientism, see "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," in Wilfrid Sellars, *Science, Perception and Reality* (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1991), 1–41.

but only appears so if we abstract from mediation;[99] and his remark, against Sellars, that subjectivity and objectivity emerge together out of the space of reasons.[100] Both points amount to the insight that what Sellars influentially calls the space of reasons is not ahistorical but historical. To use other language, which brings together McDowell's readings of Hegel and Wittgenstein, there is nothing outside the conceptual realm which stops nowhere short of the fact by which it is constrained.[101]

None of the main pragmatists of the golden age or the more recent analytic pragmatists is a clearly historical thinker. In at least glimpsing the historical dimension in Hegel, McDowell points the way to a Hegel who, although supposedly pragmatic, rather lies beyond pragmatism and whose full range of resources remains to be appropriated by analytic writers.

Hegel, Pragmatism, and Analytic Philosophy. It is not surprising, since both pragmatists and idealists have been unclear about the relation between pragmatism and Hegel, that analytic philosophers tend to conflate them. Hegel influenced various pragmatists, but it is a stretch to believe, as is sometimes claimed by pragmatists and Hegel scholars, that there is a basic similarity in the various positions. Peirce, the founder of American pragmatism, later claimed that his view was a strange form of pragmatism.[102] Similarly Royce, a very good student of German idealism, later took to calling himself a pragmatist.[103]

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[99] See McDowell, *Mind and World*, 186.

[100] See Ibid., 186.

[101] See Ibid., 44–5.

[102] "The truth is that pragmaticism is closely allied to the Hegelian absolute idealism, from which, however, it is sundered by its vigorous denial that the third category (which Hegel degrades to a mere stage of thinking) suffices to make the world, or is even so much as self-sufficient"; Peirce, *Collected Papers*, vol. 5, par. 436. For a study of Peirce's knowledge of Hegel, see "Hegel and Peirce," in *Peirce, Semiotic, and Pragmatism: Essays by Max H. Fisch*, ed. Kenneith Laine Ketner and Christian J. W. Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 261–82.

[103] In his later years, Royce, who was a leading American authority on German idealism as well as an original thinker, who defended a form of idealism, took to calling himself a pragmatist and an absolutist. See Josiah Royce, *Lectures on Modern Idealism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 258.

It would be a mistake to conflate the genesis of pragmatism, which is clearly influenced by Hegel, with the resultant positions which only overlap up to a point. Hegel and pragmatism share the concern with knowledge after foundationalism. Like the analytic thinkers who turned to pragmatism, Hegel and the pragmatists, including Dewey,[104] are all contextualists. In refusing a correspondence view of truth, all deny that we can know the mind-independent external world as it is in adopting an antirepresentationalist approach to cognition. The crucial difference lies in their respective views of the relation of truth, knowledge, and history.

There is a distinction between historical knowledge, which pragmatists, particularly Dewey, were very interested in, and the claim for the historical character of knowledge which separates Hegel from most prior philosophers, from all the pragmatists and, with the possible exception of McDowell, a very careful reader of texts, from analytic neopragmatists. The pragmatists and their analytic allies concede Hegel's point that claims to know are justified contextually, or in relation to the background. As I see it, the difference lies in the particular view of contextualism and in its possible link with history.

Unlike the pragmatists, unlike the analytic philosophers, indeed unlike anyone earlier and like few later writers, Hegel is a deeply historical thinker. As concerns theory of knowledge, most philosophy is ahistorical; it prefers to concentrate on claims to know which are either independent of time and place—as in the frequent description of knowledge as entailing the grasp of the mind-independent real as it is, say, through accurate representation—or "indexed" to the context. At a minimum, "contextualism" means that knowledge claims are justified in terms of the prevailing context.

The idea that contexts might change is sometimes mentioned, as in Peirce's idea that claims to know are justified by their acceptance by the group of qualified scientific observers, or Wittgenstein's suggestion that concepts and the meanings of words, which depend on language-games, change as language-games change.[105] This suggests, but does not work out, the further idea that context is related to history. Hegel's merit is to see clearly, perhaps for the first time, that

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[104] Dewey, who typically denies there is a general problem of knowledge, points out that we accept different views as a function of their social utility. See John Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (New York: H. Holt, 1938), 8.

[105] See Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, §65.

contextualism is inseparable from historicism, from a historical comprehension of claims to know.

Hegel on Spirit, Knowledge, and History. Hegel's view of knowledge as historical depends on spirit (*Geist*), his main but, in view of the huge Hegel literature, surprisingly much neglected philosophical discovery.[106] Hegel's conception of spirit is loosely based on the third person of the Trinity, its least developed aspect, as well as on such secular sources as Rousseau, Herder, Montesquieu, Fichte, and others. Hegel transforms what in thinkers such as Montesquieu is a claim about the spirit of a people, according to Fichte a people such as the Germans, and in Herder a claim about the perspectival nature of claims to know, into a justification of cognitive objectivity.

In contemporary jargon, one can say that Hegel denies that claims for truth and knowledge depend on grasping facts in independence of a conceptual framework, perspective, point of view, or conceptual scheme. He further denies that knowledge claims can be defended apart from and prior to experience. Knowledge claims are based on spirit, that is, on impure, or social, reason, namely, on the standards, norms, or values adopted by a particular society in various cognitive and other domains in a given historical moment. In a word, particular constative or evaluative claims can only be accepted or rejected in terms of the wider set of views prevailing in a given historical time and place.

The idea that first-order claims are accepted or rejected as a function of their relation to second-order, or background, claims is obvious enough. All cognitive disciplines consider new views on the basis of what is regarded as present orthodoxy. Contemporary physical science is heavily influenced by quantum theory and relativity theory, which together provide the dual scientific background within which contemporary scientific claims are accepted or rejected.

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[106] Most accounts of Hegel do not say much about spirit. For the only full-length treatment of which I am aware in the literature, see Alan Olson, *Hegel and the Spirit: Philosophy as Pneumatology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). For a rare application of spirit to knowledge, see Terry Pinkard, *Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Surprisingly, Forster's recent study of Hegel's *Phenomenology* offers no detailed treatment of his view of spirit. See Michael N. Forster, *Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

In the main, claims to know are justified in terms of their fit within a more general series of ideas which dominate the debate in a historical moment. New claims, which require the rejection, not only of single theories, but of the general theoretical matrix in which they are embedded, naturally require a higher standard of proof. It would be very difficult, although not unprecedented, certainly not impossible, for a theory to be accepted at present which claimed, say, that a particle moved faster than the speed of light. Its acceptance would mandate the rejection of the theory of relativity, as the acceptance of the theory of relativity early in the twentieth century required the rejection of Newtonian mechanics. Unlike Kant and other foundationalists, for Hegel, who rejects epistemological foundationalism of any kind, we cannot knowingly formulate claims to know which are true now and forever, hence beyond time and place. At best we can only formulate claims to know which are accepted or rejected on the basis of their relation to a shared conceptual framework which can never be isolated from the wider community and which is always potentially subject to further change. This is the meaning of Hegel's famous suggestion that claims to know are indexed to the historical moment.[107]

Among contemporary writers, this idea has arguably been best understood by Kuhn, as well as Fleck and Collingwood. Like Fleck, Kuhn sees that what we call facts are social constructs, which are not found but made.[108] Like Collingwood, he understands that our views are indexed to larger conceptual formations which hold sway for a time before passing into history.[109] He refuses the idea that science is getting closer to knowing the way the world is, even to a final theory, which is sometimes identified as the aim of science,[110] while maintaining a conception of cognitive objectivity. Unlike Hegel, who understands the intrinsic historicity of claims to know and of the knowing process as it evolved, Kuhn lacks the further, crucial insight

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[107] See G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 11.

[108] See Ludwik Fleck, *Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact*, trans. Ted Bradley and Thaddeus J. Trenn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

[109] See R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).

[110] See Steven Weinberg, "The Revolution That Didn't Happen," in *The New York Review of Books* 45, no. 15 (October 1998): 48–52. See further, Steven Weinberg, *Dreams of a Final Theory* (New York: Vintage, 1993).

concerning the link between the social and the historical. He understands that claims to know are indexed to the social context, but he does not grasp that they are also indexed to the historical moment.

Conclusion: Analytic Philosophy and the Hegelian Turn. This paper has discussed the massive analytic turning away from Hegel almost a century ago and the recent, more modest, incipient turn, or return as an offshoot of the turn to pragmatism in the wake of the analytic critique of classical empiricism. I have argued that analytic philosophy has misunderstood Hegel on both occasions. Moore's classic refutation of idealism, which brought about the enduring analytic disaffection with, indeed scorn for, idealism is not decisive against any form of idealism, least of all Hegel's. It is obvious that the recent analytic attention to Hegel is largely misconceived. With the possible exception of McDowell, analytic philosophers one and all, empiricists, realists, neopragmatists, and contextualists alike, understand knowledge as ahistorical, in the latter case as indexed to context. Hegel, however, clearly understands claims for truth and knowledge as thoroughly historical, as indexed not only to context but also to the historical moment.

The recent opening of analytic philosophy to extra-analytic doctrines can be read in different ways. One is to imagine that it is merely a passing fancy, a transitory stage, which is unimportant in the grand scheme of things, insignificant for philosophy and even for analytic philosophy. Another is to imagine that this new situation is significant for analytic philosophy which, as it matures, will prove more accepting of other views. Whether or not the analytic reading of Hegel is correct is perhaps less important than the implicit acknowledgment that at this point in time even for analytic philosophy it is important to exploit resources outside the analytic debate however conceived.

This angle of vision suggests that in some not too distant future, perhaps not immediately or even in our lifetime, we can expect that the differences between the analytic way of doing things and other approaches will finally have been overcome. If this were true, one might anticipate that a single overall philosophical movement would arise in which, shoulder to shoulder as it were, like workers in the vineyard of truth and knowledge, all parties will be striving together toward the common philosophical goal. Something like this idea of a radiant philosophical future is suggested in Rorty's claim, which is overly en-

thusiastic but I believe wildly mistaken, that through their "proto-Hegelianism" Sellars and Brandon overcome the split between analytic and continental philosophy.[111]

My own view of things lies somewhere between these two extremes. I am neither overly emboldened by the recent analytic interest in other types of philosophy nor unwilling to acknowledge its importance. Certainly, in taking other ideas seriously analytic philosophy is changing and departing from its less tolerant past. Yet euphoria is out of the question. Even real enthusiasm seems misplaced. In all likelihood, and despite appearances, the different philosophical movements are not about to join forces in one happy conceptual circle since deep issues which divided them many years ago still separate them and will, I venture to guess, continue to do so in the foreseeable future. In my view, any predictions that in the near or even distant future we will all have our shoulders to the same philosophical wheel, or even that we are likely to agree on anything approaching a common view of the tasks at hand, appear unjustified. Philosophy has been divided among proponents of different points of view virtually since the beginning, and that seems unlikely to change whatever happens in analytic philosophy.

In the wake of Hegel's passing his closest followers thought that he had brought philosophy to a high point and to an end.[112] Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Marx were each critical of Hegel for different reasons, reluctant to identify with him, and reluctant even to identify with philosophy.[113] The general turn away from Hegel after his death, the return to Kant after the middle of the nineteenth century, and the rise of analytic philosophy nearly a hundred years ago have all tended to cover up the link between Hegel's discovery of spirit and a view of knowledge as through and through historical. This insight has further been missed in the rise of American pragmatism, which is not historically minded, and in the analytic turns away from and most recently toward Hegel.

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[111] The text says "prope-Hegelianism," which looks like a misprint. See Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, 11.

[112] See Heinrich Heine, *Religion and Philosophy in Germany*, trans. John Snodgrass (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 152.

[113] See Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, trans. David E. Green (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1967).

I will close with a remark about knowledge and history in order to resist the idea, implicit in conceptual pluralism, in the idea of philosophical tolerance that in the grand scheme of things theoretical differences do not matter since all views are worthy of respect. On the contrary, such differences do matter since there are indeed fundamental disagreements about which conceptions correctly, or at least more properly than other alternatives, depict the epistemological problem. One such difference is the very idea that knowledge is historical. I believe that claims to know are not only social but historical as well and that the work of the new century will consist in rethinking knowledge on a historical basis, hence in developing Hegel's deepest insight.

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SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

ELIZABETH C. SHAW AND STAFF

ALBERTUS MAGNUS. *On Animals: A Medieval Summa Zoologica.* 2 vols. Translated and annotated by Kenneth F. Kitchell, Jr. and Irven Michael Resnick. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. xliv + 1827 pp. Cloth, $150.00—The year 1249 marked a turning point in the intellectual career of Albert the Great. This was the year he finally acceded to the pleas of his Dominican confreres to compose a work explaining the natural science of Aristotle. The immediate product of this decision was Albert's paraphrastic commentary on the *Physics*, but there were long-term results as well. This work was but the first part of what was to become one of the major literary productions of the Middle Ages; a production which would establish Albert as, according to his envious contemporary Roger Bacon, an *auctoritas* on equal footing with Avicenna, Averroes, and Aristotle himself. Albert's project, intended to "make the new learning of Aristotle intelligible to the Latins," was largely concerned with the natural sciences. He not only commented extensively on all of Aristotle's *libri naturales* but also recorded his own extensive researches in several fields. By far the largest part of this vast compilation of the sciences is that devoted to zoology. Albert's massive *De animalibus libri* XXVI is not only the longest of his Aristotelian commentaries but also represents one of the most extensive records of empirical observation published before modern times.

Given the historical importance of Albert's zoological work, it is remarkable that it has received so little scholarly attention. This is no doubt due in large part to the paucity of published resources. Despite the publication of the Latin text of the *De animalibus* by Hermann Stadler in 1916–20 based on the Cologne autograph (Historisches Archiv, W258a), the work has remained relatively unknown to all but a few specialists. This situation will be remedied in large part by the annotated translation of Kitchell and Resnick.

Their project has been no simple undertaking, for Albert's work presents a number of problems to the translator. The *De animalibus* is really a compilation of several different works written in different styles for varying purposes. The first nineteen books are a periphrastic commentary on Michael Scot's Latin translation from the Arabic of

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*Books received are acknowledged in this section by a brief resume, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgement does not preclude a more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. From time to time, technical books dealing with such fields as mathematics, physics, anthropology, and the social sciences will be reviewed in this section, if it is thought that they might be of special interest to philosophers.

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Aristotle's *Historia animalium*, *De partibus animalium*, and *De generatione animalium*. Albert, however, did not simply paraphrase Aristotle, but produced a *postilla*, that is, a continuous presentation of the source text integrated with interpretative remarks. The result is a commentary of a very different kind from the typical medieval glosses or *quaestiones*. This method, of course, raises the question of how much of the text is a presentation of Aristotle and how much represents Albert's own thought. In his edition, Stadler attempted to determine which words were taken from Albert's source and which were Albert's own composition. Kitchell and Resnick wisely do not attempt this, not only because of the inherent problems of such a project, but also because they realize that the whole paraphrase-interpretation must be considered Albert's creation. In addition to this commentary material, Albert added two books of comparative anatomy which do not correspond to any specific Aristotelian text. Here material taken from a variety of sources is synthesized. The final five books contain Albert's own zoological researches, many based on his personal observations and arranged in the manner of a traditional bestiary.

The translators manage to convey the differences of these variant parts of the work in their translation, providing the reader a sense of Albert's Latin original. In general, the translation is clean, precise, and occasionally elegant. The translators' notes on terms and on the difficult issue of zoological nomenclature are a great assistance to the reader. Cross references to Albert's *Quaestiones super De animalibus* and other commentaries as well as ancient and medieval sources are also included. Especially helpful are the many references to modern scholarship in the translators' notes. This last feature will certainly promote scholarship on specific elements of Albert's interpretation of Aristotle and of his own zoological descriptions.

The annotated translation is prefaced by a substantial introduction on the place of the *De animalibus* in the life and writings of Albert. A forward by William A. Wallace, O.P., provides additional historical and scholarly context for the work. Also included are a useful glossary of terms, a union bibliography of works cited in the notes, and an index. The book is handsomely illustrated with black and white reproductions of illuminations taken from medieval manuscripts.

The significance of Albert's zoological treatises for historians of science interested in the study of premodern biology is obvious. Albert's zoology is equally important for historians of philosophy, especially those working on the Aristotelian tradition. Two issues in particular demand a closer look at the *De animalibus*. The first concerns a long-standing debate over the relationship of Aristotle's account of scientific method in his *Posterior Analytics* to his actual research procedures in his scientific treatises. In numerous places in his commentaries and in his own research accounts, Albert provides useful indications as to how the method is to be applied in the actual study of animals. In addition, book 11 is specifically devoted to this topic and constitutes one of the best accounts of Aristotelian demonstration and division in the whole tradition. The second issue concerns the interpretation of the *Historia animalium* which has long been read as an early attempt at zoological systematics. In contrast, Albert interprets the work as a dialectical se-

ries of comparative descriptions collating the data of animal morphology and behavior as a preliminary to causal explanation. Thanks to the efforts of Kitchell and Resnick, Albert's historic contributions to both the history and philosophy of science will no longer remain the preserve of medievalists alone.—Michael W. Tkacz, *Gonzaga University.*

AMERIKS, Karl, editor. *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. xv + 306 pp. Cloth, $54.95; paper, $19.95—The Cambridge series of companions already includes a volume on Kant, another on Hegel, and yet a third promised on Fichte. So it may come as a surprise to find this further volume devoted to German idealism as a whole. The decision to add to the bookshelf of companions obviously makes financial sense for Cambridge, but in this case it is also amply justified by the interesting and provocative set of essays gathered together here by Karl Ameriks. The broader scope of this volume allows for more penetrating comparative studies, as well as the inclusion of figures who were important within the idealist tradition but who tend to get overlooked in collections that focus on one or another of "The Greats." Since much of the best recent scholarship (including Ameriks's own) has focused on comparative questions and on the contributions of various figures outside the standard canon, the volume also serves to illustrate the state of the art in German idealism studies.

Some of the contributions here cover fairly familiar territory—which perhaps is to be expected from a volume of this sort. The pieces by Frederick Beiser (on idealism and the Enlightenment), by Terry Pinkard (on Hegel's *Phenomenology* and *Logic*), and by Robert Pippin (on Hegel's conception of freedom) largely recapitulate the positions and interpretations they have developed in their books devoted to these topics. The volume has a more distinctive contribution to make, however, in the various pieces which cross the usual boundaries of philosophical historiography. It is a regrettable artifact of contemporary academic life that the literary and philosophical dimensions of German thought are so often treated in isolation from one another—too often by scholars who make a point of not understanding one another. This pigeonholing may have its rationale for certain purposes, but for interpreting the complex trajectory of German idealism it is an obstacle to understanding. The chief virtue of Ameriks's collection is that it steadfastly refuses to recognize the usual academic boundaries and accordingly enriches our understanding of both the canonical figures and their intellectual context.

Some examples: Daniel Dahlstrom's account of Johann Georg Hamann's and Johann Gottfried Herder's contributions to the early reception of Kant's philosophy will be familiar to many readers from Isaiah Berlin's masterful treatment, but his inclusion of Schiller provides an insightful survey of ground that has been less well trodden in the Anglophone philosophical literature. Paul Franks builds on Beiser's work to

develop a much more nuanced account of the debate over nihilism in the writings of Friedrich Jacobi and his various critics. However, the best pieces here are those that go furthest from the usual epicenter. Charles Larmore's piece on the "*Fruhromantiker*" merits special comment. Building on recent German scholarship, he develops an interpretation of the writings of Hölderlin and Novalis as mounting a principled challenge to the ideal of transparency and wholeness in philosophical inquiry, and (somewhat too briefly) he introduces us to Friedrich Schlegel's conception of the place of irony in philosophy. In these and several other essays the volume insistently broadens our vision of this tumultuous and difficult period in the history of philosophy.

It is perhaps to be regretted that the volume includes no sustained discussion of Goethe's relationship to German idealism. The volume opens with a version of the Hollywood "Homes of the Stars" figure—a period map of Jena marking the residences of the various luminaries. (The map is beset by at least one inaccuracy, I fear, since it portrays Fichte as living near the Saalsfluß "in the early 1800s," though in fact he fled Jena once and for all in 1799.) Once cannot look at the map without thinking with awe of Goethe's accomplishment as Weimar minister in gathering together such an extraordinary group of thinkers—to say nothing of the challenge of administering such an iconoclastic and ultimately unstable faculty. However, it is not only Goethe's administrative genius that figures in the idealist tradition. His writings on color presented an important contemporary alternative to Kantian models of scientific inquiry, and his plays and novels (particularly *Werther*, *Faust*, and *Meister*) provided both models and targets for the writings of the canonical idealists. Yet aside from the occasional footnote, his role is largely unnoticed here. However, complaints of omission are easy to make in any undertaking of this sort, and Goethe's absence from the scene does not detract from the accomplishment here: a philosophically penetrating and historically rich survey of both the history and the modern scholarship on German idealism.—Wayne M. Martin, *University of California San Diego.*

AMERIKS, Karl. *Kant's Theory of Mind: An Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. xli + 348 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $19.95—This is the second edition of an influential book that first appeared in 1982. No significant changes have been made in the text, but a substantial Preface and a briefer Postscript have been added. They contain close considerations of important work on Kant's theory of mind that appeared after the first edition as well as a review, in the Preface, of the bearing that sets of Kant's lecture notes, discovered too late to be absorbed into the original book, have on its main thesis. The thesis is that Kant's theory of mind is closer to traditional metaphysics than most interpreters have allowed, and in particular that he is, in a way to be very carefully circumscribed but not trivialized, an immaterialist. The lecture notes add additional weight to the claim that Kant was

fully in command of and partly adapted a full complex of doctrines of rational psychology (that is, demonstrations of the nature of the soul from reason) and that his criticism of these over the two editions of the *Critique of Pure Reason* cannot represent a total but only a partial and complicated reversal. The reader of the quotations from the lecture notes will be startled; it is as if one were reading the paralogisms positively signed. However, reflection shows that this cannot be and that Ameriks's less abrupt transition, too "fine-grained" for ready summary, is more defensible.

The introductory first chapter sets out the approach of the study, which may be summed up in the related terms of "development" and "complexity." Ameriks sets out the four stages through which Kant's views matured and argues that when this context is taken into account a much less reductively critical Kant emerges who, though less revolutionary, is more fruitful for current issues.

A close reading in this spirit of the paralogisms (his proof that certain dogmatic assertions of rational psychology are formally fallacious) begins in the second chapter with the chief features of the soul treated in the first two paralogisms. Now an obvious danger of Ameriks's approach is that the interpretation will become so tortuous that the *Critique*, which ought to be anyone's basic reading, becomes inaccessible to all but full-time Kant scholars. The opposite turns out to be the case. The chapter ends with a listing (p. 74) of the kinds of immateriality, simplicity, and substantiality attributable to the soul, tabulated against Kant's views (1) as the superficial and common reading understands them; (2) as the evaluated actual text present them; (3) as a development of the critical elements of Kant's philosophy reveals them. The third column, the fruit of Ameriks's approach, might well be the one most plausible even to a student coming to the *Critique* without preoccupations but also without background knowledge, for example the many-faceted motivation of Kant's immaterialism that emerges in the face of his expressed agnosticism.

A defense of the fourth paralogism starts with a close analysis of Kant's treatment of human embodiment. One reason why this third chapter is particularly interesting is that Kant is so recessive about the question that must be among the first and most persistently haunting to a reader: how does the apperceptive I appropriate organs of perception, how do we locate ourselves in space? Ameriks shows that Kant was cognizant of the problem but had no really satisfactory solution, though he eventually comes to the conclusion that to know ourselves empirically, as we must, the external world cannot be merely representational. In this world the soul does have spatiality, but only virtually; it has focused spatial effects without inhabiting a spatial point (pp. 100, 108). Ameriks shows that this paralogism ultimately attacks spiritualism, the doctrine of the separability of the thinking being from matter.

The fourth chapter treats of personal identity over time, the subject of the third paralogism. Kant is eventually committed to ultimate uncertainly concerning our noumenal self. Next comes a brief chapter on immortality, the topic on which Kant most distances himself from rationalism but treats least extensively. The penultimate chapter deals with the

tensions in the treatment of independence or transcendental freedom in the first *Critique*, before the moral law established itself for Kant as an a priori fact. The final chapter focuses on Kant's claim of the ideality of the self, which Ameriks finds not so much questionable as insufficient.

No brief summary can do justice to Ameriks's close reasoning, complex argumentation, crucial use of Kant's precritical writings, and careful consideration of recent treatments. Yet far from making the *Critique* inaccessible, Ameriks confirms what lay readers sense—that they are facing a tensed, problem-laden monument to prolonged reflection.—Eva Brann, *St. John's College, Annapolis.*

ANDERSON, John C. *Why Lawyers Derail Justice: Probing the Roots of Legal Injustices*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999. xiii + 236 pp. Cloth, $40.00; paper $18.95—In an excellent work on the American legal system, John C. Anderson holds modern legal theory as largely to blame for the gross injustices that he claims commonly occur. Anderson begins by listing a number of examples of legal injustices and then spends the rest of the book explaining why misguided legal theory is to blame. His critique begins with the most representative and influential of twentieth-century legal theorists, Ronald Dworkin, then moves back to Kant, whom he holds to be the intellectual forefather of the errors of modern legal theory. The fourth chapter attempts to rehabilitate Aristotle's theory of natural justice (stressing the virtue of *epieikeia*, or equity) and the book ends with a series of proposals for correcting the legal system.

Anderson understands the more than forty examples of legal injustices that he lists in the first chapter (including children removed from adopted parents, abortion, and inflexible welfare) as caused by the dominance of a "legalist" mindset. Lawyers today deal with the question "what is law?" rather than asking "what is just?" and it is this changing of focus from justice to law which leads to the dominance in theory of what Anderson terms the legalist fallacy. He describes this fallacy as arising either when one holds that the legal system is in itself inherently just or does not need to have justice as its aim, or when a legal text or universal rule is looked for rather than recognizing that a just outcome takes account of the particularity of a case. The bulk of the book then seeks out the origins of the legalist fallacy.

In the second chapter Anderson provides an exacting critique of modern legal theory, engaging in argument with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound, Jerome Frank, Hans Kelsen, and even going as far back as Jeremy Bentham. The bulk of the chapter, however, focuses on Dworkin's brand of liberal formalism. Dworkin is a formalist in his reliance on textual interpretation by an elite consisting of what Dworkin terms "Herculean" judges following his three extralegal principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process. Dworkin insists that such a legal system would ensure that the law would manifest no "gaps," that every particular crime and circumstance would fall under a general prin-

ciple. Anderson demonstrates through a close reading of Dworkin that the first of his three extralegal principles, justice, is reducible to fairness. Then Anderson criticizes the supposed virtue of fairness by demonstrating Dworkin's refusal to make evident and justify the vision of the good underpinning it and by demonstrating its affinity to Chief Justice Robert Taney's argument in the Dred Scott Case. Both Taney and Dworkin demonstrate "the ultimate intellectual bankruptcy involved in determining issues of morality and justice purely in legalistic terms" (p. 59). Dworkin's theory fails by its unwillingness to recognize the teleological nature of human actions and in its misunderstanding of natural communities and also by failing to provide sufficient justification for the modern notion of sovereignty which Dworkin sees as grounding the law's legitimacy in the "community of principle" represented by the legal profession itself.

Anderson moves on in the third chapter to argue that the formalism and legalism of Dworkin can be traced back to Kant. Anderson's critique of Kant is not terribly original in arguing that his moral philosophy is empty formalism and that its two main principles, the universalizability maxim and the kingdom of ends, conflict with each other. Where Anderson interests one most is in skillfully relating Kant's system to contemporary legal theory and in showing the degree to which Kant represents the most significant obstacle to a rediscovery of an Aristotelian jurisprudence focused on the virtue of *epieikeia.*

In the fourth chapter Anderson attempts to rehabilitate an interest in an Aristotelian theory of natural justice. Anderson believes that current legal debate is at an impasse between natural law theorists and legal positivists and formalists. He wishes to avoid this debate by starting from Aristotle's recognition of the interconnectedness of justice and friendship. The attraction of this approach is in its recognition of the powerful force for justice that custom and law can become if geared towards habituating men to natural justice. There are problems with Aristotelian natural justice, however, and to his credit Anderson recognizes that injustices do arise in natural polities and that natural justice must be widened to include strangers. There is also the problem of the artificiality of the modern nation state as a powerful stumbling block to any attempt to resuscitate natural justice. Anderson believes that focusing on the aspect of the Aristotelian virtue of justice termed *epieikeia* is the key to moving beyond faulty contemporary legal theory and its concomitant injustices. Of course reliance on a virtue means that moral education from birth is made the essential factor in the creation of a more just legal system, but is that not really the only perennially effective method of avoiding injustice?

Anderson is at his most provocative in his suggestions of possible reforms that would move jurisprudence away from its current legalistic formalism in the direction of natural justice. These reforms include the elimination of licensing of the legal profession (participation in the law is too important a civic virtue to be restricted to an elite guild), opening of judgeships beyond lawyers, eradication of sovereign immunity, term

limits for federal employees with adjudicative powers, offices by rotation along with limited legislative sessions and reduction of corporate advantages in the law.

Why Lawyers Derail Justice is an excellent scholarly work revealing the fundamental errors in thought that have resulted in the Tower of Babel (Anderson's analogy) known as the American legal system. Although it is difficult to do justice to the depth of Anderson's arguments succinctly, I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in philosophy of law or moral philosophy in general.—Brian J. Fox, *Washington, DC.*

BARRAZA, Alejandra Carrasco. *Consecuencialismo, por qué no.* Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 1999. xx + 412 pp. n. p.—Dr. Barraza submits a detailed study of utilitarianism and its offspring, consequentialism, and purports to show why it is not an acceptable moral system. As G. Anscombe pointed out, it arose when ethics was no longer based on the virtues and people looked for a way to evaluate moral actions in conformity with the predominant technological outlook. Consequentialism holds that the criterion of morality is that of the best overall result possible, whereas for utilitarianists it is the greatest amount of pleasure, satisfaction, or happiness. John Stewart Mill's utilitarianism is examined in great detail (pp. 23–133). Mill felt that the criterion of morality cannot be something intuitively known, but has to be easily recognizable, as, for instance, the consequences of our acts, namely the greatest happiness proper to man as a human being. Mill experienced some difficulties when trying to integrate duties with regard to others. His answers to eight objections raised against his theory are seen as insufficient by Barraza, as is Mill's justification of the principle of "the greatest happiness." Mill's ethics is profoundly marked by the spirit of the Enlightenment, that is, by a type of rationalism related to the empirical sciences; everything was to be explained by one simple principle, without any reference to religion. Important points in the system are the stress on freedom and equality, freedom being the primary value. Mill seeks to secure the greatest possible space for personal freedom, which, however, is limited by the interests of others. Equality results from impartiality which demands that the happiness of the agent is not placed above that of others. Furthermore, Mill's ethics is characterized by its optimism and its social orientation, aiming as it does at the well-being of the greatest number. However, despite a semblance of coherence Mill's work is full of ambiguities. A glaring difficulty is that the intention of the agent has nothing to do with the results and their evaluation.

In the second part of her study Barraza considers later developments of utilitarianism, the so-called consequentialist systems and the objections raised against them. G. E. Moore points to a fallacy insofar as the good is defined by the good. To escape from it some speak of "the correct" and "the not-correct." Making "satisfaction" the final criterion can easily lead to a violation of man's dignity and rights (p. 222). The impar-

tiality proposed as an essential part of the system has the advantage of universalizing, but does no justice to the different relationships one has. Moreover, it is difficult to be totally impartial. Barraza thinks that utilitarianism leads to the destruction of its own roots, namely the uniqueness of the human individual. There is a need for self-identification, whereas consequentialists keep insisting on the fact that one should become an impersonal, impartial, and neutral agent. Furthermore, it is difficult to explain what justice is and what human rights are about. Many consequentialists argue that what is useful is also just (p. 262). Others speak of intangible rights which come before one can apply the criterion of usefulness. However, they hold that the advantage of consequentialism over deontologist systems is that it proposes an object to be attained. Another form of consequentialism stresses that correct conduct is determined by general patterns of action prevalent in a society—"rules of thumb" (p. 286). A further type of consequentialism puts motivation in the first place: the ultimate motivation must be to maximize usefulness. Does one have to pursue the greatest positive effects attainable? Most consequentialists seem to think so (p. 307). Finally, Barraza lists a number of objections (p. 355 and following): the concept of happiness is insufficiently defined; the respect of human rights is subordinated to practical usefulness; it is not easy to evaluate the results of actions, especially on the long term; the demand to maximize usefulness is asking too much; it is difficult to reconcile consequentialism with the moral views of common sense; a person would be good, not because of his perfection but because he produces good results.

The study is a complete, objective, and well argued survey of consequentialist positions, but somewhat marred by many repetitions. Dr. Barraza might have developed the different points on which there is some contact between Aristotle's ethics and consequentialism. Moreover, referring in a general way to "ethics based on the virtues" as an alternative system without further explanation and without resorting to the natural law ethics of Thomas Aquinas, leaves the reader in the dark as to what is the correct moral system.—Leo J. Elders, *Institute of Philosophy "Rolduc," Kerkrade, The Netherlands.*

BETT, Richard. *Pyrrho: His Antecedents and His Legacy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. xi + 262 pp. Cloth, $60.00—An important addition to the study of ancient skepticism, this book argues that there were three schools of thought associated with the name of Pyrrho in antiquity, and that although they are distinct from one another on crucial philosophical points they are similar enough to be linked genealogically. First comes Pyrrho himself in the fourth and third centuries B.C.E., who took the metaphysical position that "reality is inherently indeterminate" (p. 39) and therefore chose a way of life characterized by distrust of sensory experience, avoidance of theoretical inquiry, and freedom from emotional disturbance. In a cautiously argued chapter

entitled "Forerunners," Bett argues for Pyrrho's originality; some earlier philosophers distrusted theory and some sought freedom from disturbance, but Pyrrho was the first Greek thinker to connect the two themes, so far as we can tell.

Second comes Aenesidemus in the first century B.C.E. The debate between the Academy and the Stoics has brought all claims about the nature of reality under suspicion, and so Aenesidemus cannot accept Pyrrho's indeterminacy thesis. Yet he allows some talk about appearances, which include everything that can be expressed under relativistic qualification. Like Pyrrho, Aenesidemus assumes what Bett calls the invariability condition: that if x is by nature F, then x is invariably F, and not F merely under certain conditions. From this condition, together with the observed variability of objects in our experience, both philosophers conclude that our experience cannot guide us to determinate knowledge of the natures of things. The inference parallels Plato's argument from opposites in *Republic* 5, although in the absence of a theory of Forms it leaves Pyrrho holding that all things are indeterminate, and Aenesidemus that they are relative. Pyrrho is no relativist; nevertheless, Aenesidemus chooses to name his school after Pyrrho in order to distinguish it from the Academy.

The terminal stage of Pyrrhonism is represented in the prevailing tenor of Sextus Empiricus' works apart from his *Against the Ethicists*, which follows an Aenesideman line. This third stage is what most modern scholars take Pyrrhonism simply to be: the school that holds back from all opinions, treating relativistic statements and claims about the natures of things with equal distaste. This stage is reached from the earlier ones by dropping the invariability condition. Without that, Pyrrhonists cannot reject competing claims about reality, as Aenesidemus routinely does; instead they must remain open to the possibility that any view may be true or false of the nature of things.

This is a plausible and philosophically interesting reconstruction of the development of a major school of thought in antiquity; as such, it deserves the close attention of scholars and of anyone interested in varieties of skepticism. Bett acknowledges, however, that the case for his reconstruction cannot be proved. We do not know enough about the first two figures to attribute any views to them with certainty. The sources for Pyrrho are especially weak; Bett makes heroic efforts on their behalf, but I am not persuaded that we know enough about Pyrrho to show that one account is more plausible than another. The sources for Aenesidemus are much better; Bett's use of evidence here is judicious, philosophically astute, and historically plausible. We cannot be certain that he is right, but his case is so strong that for scholars to withhold consent would show an excess of skepticism. Rarely are philosophical acumen and scholarly care married as well as they are in this book.—Paul Woodruff, *The University of Texas at Austin.*

CHANG, Curtis. *Engaging Unbelief: A Captivating Strategy from Augustine and Aquinas*. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2000. 187 pp. Paper, $11.99—The head of InterVarsity Christian Fellowship at Harvard, MIT, and Tufts, Curtis Chang turns to the seminal works of Augustine and Thomas as a way of engaging the challenges of postmodernity. He accordingly argues that Aquinas's *De Civitate Dei* (*DCD*) and Aquinas's *Summa Contra Gentiles* (*SCG*) were composed precisely to challenge a world growing suspicious, if not negligent, of the Christian story. The rhetorical strategy Chang cleverly uncovers in both *DCD* and *SCG* is threefold: both Augustine and Thomas enter their opponents' unique stories and worldviews, both retell that story by reinterpreting that story on their opponents' own terms, and finally, each capture that retold tale and tell the eternal story of Christianity in a way that is now intelligible and attractive to their interlocutors.

Chang begins by looking at the Roman Empire and the fall of Rome in 410. The symbols and the narratives that maintained the Roman way of life for centuries were crumbling and in his treatment of this disintegration, Augustine foreshadows Nietzsche by dismantling the entire history of Rome to show it for what it really was, the mere masking of human power. Thus referring to the *DCD*, Chang concludes: "Before Antonio Gramsci coined the term 'ideological hegemony' to describe how the powerful shape popular belief for their own ends, before Michel Foucault claimed to have revealed previously unsuspected tools of oppression, this masterpiece of political deconstruction had been sitting on the shelves for over a millennium" (p. 74). This section ends with an examination of how Augustine next enters and captures Plato and the dynamics of Roman religion.

Like the *DCD*, then, Chang next looks at Thomas's *SCG* as a text written as a direct response to a call for evangelization on the eve of an all-encompassing cultural and religious challenge—Thomas's response to Raymond of Peñafort paralleling Augustine's response to Marcellinus. As Chang's thinking goes: as Augustine faced the breakdown of Roman unity, Thomas's Christian Europe faced the threat of Islam. Thomas is presented as the most respectful of opponents, never attacking Averroes and other Muslim philosophers directly, and always inviting those who reject Christianity to see "how that particular experience makes sense only in a more coherent and wider story. . . . If the challengers do not join Aquinas's wider picture of reuniting with God, they will remain trapped in the viciously shrinking cycle of attachment to lesser things" (p. 127). That is, Thomas invites his readers to look at their own experience and attendant longing for perfection and completion in light of the Christian promise. Thomas's understanding of creation in time, God's knowledge of particulars, and the Incarnation are also taken up here.

Each section on Augustine and Aquinas also includes brief biographies and Chang's Appendix takes the reader through the scholarly dispute surrounding the *SCG* as a missionary text. What Chang does throughout is helpful: turning to the Christian Masters to offer a modern-day piece of apologetics. One should, however, consider the following critiques. We must be very careful when imagining Augustine's age as one "fully Roman and Christian," as Chang does throughout.

Augustine did not live in a "Christian society." The later Roman Empire was perhaps no longer legally hostile to Christianity but it was far from embracing it. For example, there are no instances of the state assisting financially in the erecting of Christian buildings or statues, Roman buildings were void of Christian symbols, and bishops played no role—neither official nor ceremonial—in the selection and installation of public magistrates. At the time of Augustine's composing *DCD*, Donatists equaled Catholics in North Africa in number and importance and as Raymond Brown has recently confessed, Augustine's world was "not the orderly structure" once believed (see "New Evidence" in his re-released *Augustine of Hippo*). This critique is valid for Chang's view of Aquinas's world as well. That is, Thomas never saw Islam as the immediate threat of Christian culture. It is true that the *SCG* is directed toward Muslims, but it is also directed toward "Jews and other *errantes*." Its intent is thus greater than presented here: not only directed against the errors of Islam but against all "falsehood opposing the divine truth" (*SCG*, I.1.4). The lamentable irony is, of course, that the medieval synthesis achieved by Thomas came under more attack from his fellow Christians than it ever faced from Muslim thought. Finally, Chang's call for the postmodern world to find ultimate meaning in the Christian lecture or sermon (for example, p. 156) would sound quite strange to both Augustine and Aquinas. Whereas Chang calls for a "new media" in proclaiming the Christian story, such as film, Augustine and Thomas continue to direct their interlocutors back to the ancient liturgy, the Eucharistic drama in which the Christian story is not only proclaimed but continued.—David Vincent Meconi, S.J., *University of Innsbruck.*

CLAY, Diskin. *Platonic Questions: Dialogues with the Silent Philosopher.* University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000. xxiii + 309 pp. Cloth, $40.00; paper $17.95—Diskin Clay's *Platonic Questions* is a bold attempt to represent the essential trajectory of Plato's unique way of philosophical writing in order to induce the reader to imitate Plato. Nevertheless, the question Clay's readers need to ask him is whether we can read Plato, at this point in history, having enough in common with his vital philosophical concerns to be able to imitate the way he philosophized in his dialogues? Clay's bold project calls for such a bold question.

A proposed way of reading the well-known works of any philosopher, being located in a certain time and place, must argue against other contemporary ways of reading that philosopher. Clay's main target in this book is the way contemporary analytic philosophers have read Plato, precisely because they "tend to anesthesize us to Plato's moral, political, and metaphysical [that is, theological] concerns." To counter this type of misreading, Clay proposes his own "appropriate stress on Plato's political philosophy" as "the heart of his philosophy and his most abiding concern" (p. xiii).

In his concern with Plato's political philosophy, Clay's particular analytic target is Sir Karl Popper who most famously read the *Republic* (in Clay's words, "the acropolis of the Platonic dialogues" [p. 286]), to be a proto-fascist primer, a prediction of the type of philosophically justified totalitarianism all too familiar to Popper's readers in the second half of the twentieth century. Such totalitarianism had, of course, clearly demonstrated that it would tolerate none of the type of free inquiry that makes philosophy possible *ab initio*. Clay's point is that "Popper ignored the open character of the Platonic dialogue that leaves its readers with problems rather than solutions" (p. 169).

Clay's critique of Popper, however, seems to entail a blatant contradiction. Did Clay not state in the prologue that his concern is with Plato's political philosophy because that is the heart of his philosophy? Yet in his repeated debate with Popper he emphasizes that the true concern of the *Republic* is "the 'justice' of the individual soul" and that the philosophical city (*Kallipolis*, "the beautiful city") is only a metaphorical construct to help us understand the soul's real inner multiplicity by its own imagined multiplicity. To resolve this contradiction, let it be remembered that Socrates, who is the only model of a philosopher we get from Plato (with the possible exceptions of Parmenides and Diotima), began his philosophical career by being addressed by a god. Only then, it seems, did he have a vantage point from which "to examine myself and others" (*Apology*, 38a). Yet that examination of others is certainly a political program, especially considering the fact that justice, which is *the* political virtue, is an ubiquitous concern of Plato. Indeed, how could the philosopher develop his soul without the necessarily political connection to his interlocutors? Unlike Aristotle's vision of the true philosophical life (*Nicomachean Ethics*, X), a Platonic philosopher never seems to be totally apolitical. It is more a question *of* which polity he is a part of, and *in* which polity he is only a participant. It would seem that the philosopher's true city would have to be with the gods *and* other philosophers, not only with other humans even if they are philosophers.

If Plato's intent in his political discussions, paradigmatically in the *Republic*, is to show how a city's dogmatism can be limited so that philosophers can philosophize while still living in that city, and if Plato-like philosophers do that by speaking to and being spoken to by each other (*dialogesthai*), then it would seem that we need to know *what* philosophers can speak to each other about those divine beings who absolutely transcend the humanly founded city, even the very best such city yet to be. Without being able to engage in that type of knowledge, we would never be able to understand—that is, imitate—Plato's true political concerns. Without this transcendent perspective, any view of the city, or whatever other comprehensive form of human polity is present or proposed, will inevitably become totalitarian—even for philosophers—inasmuch as it has no real limit above it to thereby contain it. The question that remains, though, is: Are we able, as was Plato (and Aristotle and the Stoics), to experience again the heavens as divine (that is, as the epitome of *physis*)? If not, then despite the best efforts of Diskin Clay and other modern "Platonists," those who wish to philosophize with true Platonic *eros* will have to do so by accessing another revelation of

the divine powerful enough to contain even the best human city possible. Hence, we might need to read Plato as did Augustine, or Alfarabi, or Maimonides, or perhaps even as did Eric Voegelin. By very much sidestepping the theological question in Plato (as did Leo Strauss, who plays such an influential role in *Platonic Questions*), which Clay himself accuses analytic philosophers of repressing, he has not, unfortunately, even told us how to become Platonic political theorists. Because of this unaddressed question is his book, we learn much more from the book's insightful parts than from the book as a whole. However, that is still saying a lot for the book.—David Novak, *University of Toronto.*

CRAIG, William Lane. *The Tensed Theory of Time: A Critical Examination.* Synthese Library: Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, vol. 293. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000. x + 287 pp. Cloth, $123.00—William Lane Craig is Research Professor of Philosophy at Talbot School of Theology (La Mirada, California). Quentin Smith considers him "one of the leading philosophers of time," and his impressive, exhaustive three volume series on God, time, relativity, and eternity clearly demonstrates this. As the first two volumes are devoted to the problem of time—examining whether a dynamic/tensed (A-theory) or static/tenseless (B-theory) view of time is correct—I review them back-to-back.

Section 1 of *The Tensed Theory* deals with "The Ineliminability of Tense" (chapters 1–5) while section 2 addresses "Arguments Against an A-Theory of Time" (chapters 6–7, which cover McTaggart's Paradox and the Myth of Passage, respectively). Chapter 1 explores the philosophy of language and its relation to time (tense, indexicals, and so forth). According to the A-theorist, tense is real in a metaphysical sense, not simply a feature of language (B-theory). Ordinary language usage genuinely and strikingly exhibits tense, and the B-theorist must somehow show that the tensed view of time (A-theory) must be self-contradictory and therefore false (p. 21); in the absence of such a proof, the best the B-theorist can do is show that tense is superfluous. Yet a tensed view of time ought to be accepted as true (that is, corresponding to the way the world is), as tensed sentences cannot be reduced to tenseless propositions without loss of meaning.

Chapter 2 examines the Old B-Theory of Language (advocated by Russell, Frege, Quine, Hans Reichenbach, J. J. Smart), which attempted to de-tense language (a) by replacing tensed expressions with appropriate dates and/or clock times (presumably without loss of meaning) or (b) by analyzing tensed expressions in terms of token reflexivity. The first strategy has widely been recognized as a failure; tense and indexicality are irreducible and essential to explain certain human thoughts and actions. Token reflexivity (translating tensed sentences into tenseless ones without loss of meaning) does not deliver what it promises; information *is* lost in translation, and tense again proves inescapable to motivate human action. Thus tense is not superfluous.

Chapter 3 discusses the New B-Theory of Language (most notably promoted by D. H. Mellor), which admits to the necessity of tensed language but denies any objectivity to tensed facts/events: they are still tenseless, and A-theorists have wrongly reified them. However, the New B-Theory is "logically defective" (p. 96) in that it, for example, fails to give any coherent account of truth conditions and confuses truth conditions with truth makers in tensed sentences.

Chapter 4 discusses theories of direct reference, examining the B-theorist's *tu quoque* argument in particular—namely, if "the A-theorist's arguments for the reality of tense are correct, then there must be spatially 'tensed' facts as well, which no one will admit" (p. 97). However, this argument proves ineffectual as well, as tense proves inescapable both in language as well as in reality. This is borne out by our very experience of tense as properly and irreducibly basic (chapter 5); while this idea of properly basic belief (ably exposited by Alvin Plantinga) is *prima facie* rather than *ultima facie*, it stands up to Mellorian counterexamples or potential defeaters (for example, witnessing the alleged presentness of a supernova through a telescope), which Craig deftly rebuts. That said, belief in tense and temporal becoming as real is universal and enjoys the status of being an intrinsic defeater to speculative B-theoretical arguments.

Chapter 6 brings us to the objection to the A-theory known as McTaggart's Paradox, which seeks to show that an A-series of events is self-contradictory or leads to a vicious infinite regress of A-theoretic determinations. However, J. M. E. McTaggart's underlying metaphysic (events as substances and the assumption that if time is real, all events—including past and future ones—are equally real) and his misconstrual of absolute becoming raise serious objections to his view. Also in this chapter, Craig, a presentist (holding that "the only temporal items which exist are those which are present" [p. 208]), gives a very helpful discussion on presentness and existence.

The final chapter ("The Myth of Temporal Passage") examines a second objection, which turns out to be a misunderstanding of "the flow of time," which certain B-theorists claim that A-theorists hold. Among other arguments, presentists (A-theorists) reject a substantivalist view of time, denying a literal flow of time (p. 221); it is a mere metaphor for temporal becoming.

These two objections against the A-theory ultimately fail, and the ineliminability of tense from language and our rich, properly basic experience of tense offer *prima facie* warrant for an A-theory of time. Further examination of the B-theory, however, is necessary and thus taken up in the companion volume, *The Tenseless Theory of Time*.

In this book, though, Craig ably and rigorously argues for an A-theory of time, and *The Tensed Theory of Time* offers a comprehensive analysis and important advances on this particular theory of time.—Paul Copan, *Trinity International University and RZIM*.

CRAIG, William Lane. *The Tenseless Theory of Time: A Critical Examination.* Synthese Library: Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, vol. 294. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000. x + 256 pp. Cloth, $103.00—This companion volume to philosopher (and A-theorist) William Craig's *Tensed Theory of Time* is an excellent exposition and critique of the arguments for a tenseless (B-theory) of time as well as a presentation of arguments against it; thus, in light of the *Tensed Theory* volume, Craig sees an A-theoretic (tensed) understanding of time vindicated. The present volume is, again, divided into two parts: "Arguments for a B-Theory of Time" (chapters 1–5 deal with the Special Theory of Relativity [SR], and chapter 6 addresses the alleged mind-dependence of temporal becoming) and "Arguments Against a B-Theory of Time" (chapters 7–9 deal with philosophical objections to the B-theory and chapter 10 with theological objections to it). Craig's meticulously researched and well-reasoned book exhibits an impressive grasp of the physics of relativity and its various interpretations.

In chapter 1 ("SR and the B-Theory") examines the presumption that SR demands a B-theoretical understanding of time ("all events in spacetime are equally real"), thus "excluding the objective reality of tense and temporal becoming" (p. 3). Craig argues that the various bizarre and counterintuitive scenarios brought on by the SR (Twin Paradox, length contraction of rods in motion, clock retardation) must be critically examined. In the first place, much depends upon which interpretation of SR is adopted: the Einsteinian relativity interpretation (which is a theoretical construct rather than an ontology or depiction of reality, leading to a denial of any objective frame of reference and simultaneity and affirming a pluralist ontology) or the Minkowskian spacetime interpretation (in which a shared, objective unified reality exists independently of observers or reference frames). The former is counterintuitive and fantastic as well as explanatorily deficient. What then of the alleged rod-length contraction and other such examples to undercut the notion of simultaneity and any objective reference point? The spacetime interpretation, which would vindicate a B-theory, views an unchanging, four-dimensional object "from different angles" or varying coordinates (p. 25). Craig is convinced, though, that the SR poses no challenge for an A-theory (and he hints at this in bringing up the Lorentzian model), but the very underlying assumptions of SR must be scrutinized.

Chapter 2 ("Time and Its Measures") goes back to Newton's important (but often ignored) distinction between metaphysical/absolute time (and space) and relative time (and space). Newton's theistically-inspired outlook—in which God is of everlasting duration and is omnipresent—maintains that there exist both a metaphysical (absolute) time and a metaphysical space, which are unaffected by (relative) physical time and space and their measurements. Despite some of Newton's shortcomings (relativity theory *does* correct Newton's concept of physical time), his concept of metaphysical time is unaffected. In fact, it was Einstein who essentially secularized physics (p. 53), which becomes the topic of chapter 3 ("The Epistemological Foundations of SR"). Inspired by a philosophically problematic positivism (through the influence of the militantly antimetaphysical Mach as well as Poincaré), Einstein

stripped away Newton's metaphysical time and space, leaving only physical time and space. For Einstein, reality is "reduced to what our measurements read" (pp. 63–4), and verificationism permeates Einstein's work on relativity. His work was eagerly received by positivistic philosophers and physicists. They arbitrarily rejected anything that smacked of metaphysics—an assumption that has been shown to be incoherent and inadequate (p. 74). What the B-theorist must recognize is that the A-theorist can consistently embrace SR, but the deeper issue between the relativity and spacetime interpretations is metaphysical.

Chapter 4 ("SR's Elimination of Metaphysical Time") notes that positivism has played an essential role in SR. However, positivism is virtually universally recognized to be false. Thus, with Newton, the A-theorist is free to distinguish between physical/relative and absolute space and time. It was, in fact, positivism—not breakthroughs in modern physics—that led to the rejection of absolute simultaneity (p. 85). Chapter 5 ("The Vindication of Lorentz") argues that a neo-Lorentzian interpretation of relativity, which is harmonious with an A-theory of time, is preferable in several ways to an (often nonempirical and *ad hoc*) Einsteinian version. Thus the vindication of a B-theory of time in view of SR has not been shown.

Chapter 6 ("Three Arguments for the Mind Dependence of Becoming") attacks Grünbaum's three faulty arguments against the A-theory. Grünbaum misconstrues presentness and offers what turn out to be linguistic confusions to support a B-theory. Craig argues that presentness is absolute, that past and future are relational terms anchored in what is absolutely present, that Grünbaum begs the question by ignoring the distinction between metaphysical time and physical time, and that Grünbaum wrongly assumes that events can, say, have the property of futurity (when in actual fact only presentness is a real property of events).

In chapter 7 ("The 'Spatializing' of Time"), Craig discusses the tendency of B-theorists (for example, Hawking) to spatialize time, which is both unjustifiable and metaphysically incoherent. In chapter 8 ("The Incoherence of Mind-Dependence of Becoming"), Craig points out the serious dichotomy into which the B-theorist is forced by her view. Besides the potential problem of self-referential incoherence and the rejection of our properly basic experiences of temporal becoming, there is "the metaphysical dichotomy between the external, physical world and the inner life of the mind which is intolerable" (p. 177). Chapter 9 ("The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics") shows that endurantism (embraced by A-theorists) is conceptually superior to perdurantism (embraced by virtually all B-theorists); perdurantism suffers from being metaphysically counterintuitive, defying the phenomenology of personal consciousness, invalidating moral responsibility, and so forth. Chapter 10 ("*Creatio ex nihilo*") puts forward theological objections to the B-theory from the biblical doctrine of creation out of nothing, which affirms the universe's origination and temporal beginning (also being well supported by big bang cosmology), which is difficult to account for in the B-theorist scheme of things.

In light of Craig's *Tensed Theory* and *Tenseless Theory* volumes, he concludes that "it is the A-theory of time which must be judged to be

correct. Time is tensed" (p. 221). Indeed, philosophers of time and philosophers of science—not to mention metaphysicians—are indebted to Craig and will need to interact with the remarkable and substantial case he has made—Paul Copan, *Trinity International University and RZIM.*

DANCY, Jonathan. *Practical Reality.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. xii + 187 pp. Cloth, $35.00—The central thought of Jonathan Dancy's *Practical Reality* is that any philosophically adequate account of reasons for action has to preserve the sense of the idea that agents can act for good reasons. Though platitudinous enough, this notion embodies the central difficulty faced in the theory of reasons for action: that the notion of a reason for action serves two roles, that of explaining action and that of justifying it. It is sometimes suggested that there is mere ambiguity here: there are motivating reasons and there are justifying reasons, and never the twain shall meet. However, to adopt this expedient is to commit oneself to the view that the reasons that are good and the reasons for which agents act are entities of two very different kinds, and thus that it is impossible for an agent to act for good reasons. An account of good reasons and of motivation that enables us to explain how this is indeed possible fixes the agenda for *Practical Reality.*

The first chapter sets the stage by bringing out various distinctions: between reasons considered as motivating and reasons considered as normative, and among various philosophical positions on the nature of motivation and normativity. The remaining seven chapters naturally divide into two parts. The second and third chapters are on the nature of normative reasons. In these chapters Dancy criticizes a couple of popular answers to the question "What kind of thing is a good reason?" and offers his own account. The fourth through eighth chapters take up the problem of motivating reasons as it appears in light of his answer to the question about normative reasons. Given the nature of normative reasons, how is it possible for agents to act for good reasons? In these chapters Dancy is concerned not only to show that the nature of good reasons undercuts various widely affirmed theories of motivation; he is concerned also to show that his own account of motivation both exhibits that possibility and is not itself subject to debilitating criticisms.

In answering the question "What kind of thing is a good reason?" in chapters 2 and 3, Dancy considers there to be three main accounts worth considering: on desire-based views, good reasons are grounded in our desires; on belief-based views, good reasons are grounded in our beliefs; on value-based views, good reasons are grounded in valuable states of affairs. Dancy's argument against desire-based views is in the form of a dilemma. Most desires to ϕ are based on reasons to ϕ, though some (what Dancy calls, as a class, "urges") are not. When a desire to ϕ is based on a reason to ϕ, that desire does not add to the stock of reasons that one has to ϕ. However, urges do not provide reasons for acting either: they do not provide reasons either to satisfy the urge or to

take a means to satisfy the urge (pp. 33–43). Dancy argues that belief-based views fail also: while it might appear that one's believing that one ought to ϕ gives one a reason to ϕ, the reason at work is instead a non-belief-based reason not to refrain from ϕ-ing while believing that one ought to ϕ (pp. 53–4). (Dancy surprisingly fails to consider here the wide literature on the requirement to act in accordance with conscience, which is concerned with this very issue.)

The upshot of chapters 2 and 3 is, then, that good reasons are not grounded in agents' psychological states but in valuable states of affairs. However, the most philosophically prominent accounts of motivation understand motivating reasons in terms of agents' psychological states. It turns out, then, that all such theories of motivation—all of which Dancy labels as instances of "psychologism" (p. 15)—fail to explain how agents can act for good reasons. According to psychologism, what agents are motivated by are psychological states; but, as Dancy argues in chapters 2 and 3, good reasons are not grounded in psychological states; and so psychologism rules out the possibility of agents' acting on good reasons. Interestingly, it turns out that this is a matter on which Thomas Nagel's and even Dancy's own earlier theory of motivation fare no better than straightforwardly Humean models. Whether one understands motivating reasons as unmotivated desires or desires motivated by beliefs or simply beliefs makes no difference: if we reject the view that good reasons essentially involve psychological states, then any of these versions of psychologism turns out to undermine the possibility of agents' acting on good reasons.

Dancy's alternative view is that it is the valuable states of affairs themselves that should figure in our accounts of motivation, so that agents can act for good reasons. Agents' beliefs that these states of affairs are worth promoting or pursuing may be, on Dancy's view, necessary for the agents to be thus motivated, but this necessity is that of an enabling condition: it makes possible the agent's being motivated, but it is not what is doing the motivating (pp. 127–8). The deepest difficulty for such a view, as Dancy recognizes, is that it runs into the problem that motivating reasons are supposed to explain agents' actions, but the valuable states of affairs, which are supposed to be doing the motivating, in some cases do not obtain. For example, on Dancy's view, the least misleading way of formulating Saul's motivating reason for persecuting the early Christians is: Saul persecuted the Christians because persecution of the Christians was God's will. Yet it is not the case that the persecution of the Christians was God's will; how, then, can "the persecution of the Christians was God's will" explain anything? Dancy's task thus is to defend the propriety of "non-factive" explanations, that is, explanations in which the *explanans* is not the case. In defending non-factive action explanation, Dancy appeals to the primitive notion of acting "in the light of," which is non-factive; he argues that more straightforwardly causal factive explanations of an agent's action are no more illuminating than explanations framed in terms of the considerations in light of which the agent acted (pp. 162–3).

Practical Reality is a philosophically rich, densely argued, and (not coincidentally) blessedly short (less than 200 pp.) book. I should note

also that while Dancy has wisely chosen to segregate in appendices some of his text that is not crucial to his line of argument, it would be unwise for readers to pass these over. They are very interesting indeed, and one of them ("On Detaching," which concerns a certain argument form in practical reasoning) is of especially high theoretical import.—Mark C. Murphy, *Georgetown University.*

DELSOL, Chantal. *Eloge de la singularite. Essai sur la modernite tardive.* Paris: La Table Ronde, 2000. 251 pp. Cloth, 130.00 FF—Probably the first striking feature of this book is to be found in its title. "Late modernity" is incomparably more adequate and philosophically more intelligent than "late capitalism/imperialism" which means nothing except a pointless bow in the direction of an intolerable form of (waning) totalitarianism. The second feature is the name of the author herself, one of the few true political philosophers at a time when "consultants" and pundits active in the so-called field of politology are a dime a dozen. Serious readers in the field are undoubtedly already quite aware of the massive and highly meritorious work of Chantal Delsol, which includes surveys of political doctrine in the twentieth century, a deep-going work on the much disputed concept of "subsidiarity" and others.

Delsol starts her work with a fundamental question (in fact one that ought to be called "elementary," except that it is asked surprisingly seldom): why is it the case that by 2000, societies that had barely weathered the horrors of two (sometimes more) shapes of totalitarianism find themselves mired in mental and existential approaches that seem strikingly similar to those of their infamous predecessors. In other words, Delsol wonders (and she is not the only French intellectual who asks this question) whether we are not heading toward a new kind of totalitarianism, a totalitarianism of the "center," the kind of conformity against which early twentieth-century authors of dystopias had warned us earnestly. This reflective approach is the point of juncture where political and moral philosophy show themselves in need of each other.

Delsol discusses systematically, in an often witty and always eloquent style, the different defects of the mental horizon inside which "late modernity" encloses and ultimately humbles us: references to Aldous Huxley's dystopian "brave new world" appear more than once. This study explains convincingly that the denial of human imperfection and general reductionism, although apparently contradictory principles, go hand in hand as a matter of fact. What the commands of "late modernity" aim to achieve is to catch human nature in a pincer-like movement. On the one hand, the personal and individual are to be smashed by the institution of categories, by the attribution of indelible marks of gender, race, class, and the like which are meant to exhaust the definition of the person. On the other hand the bonds of culture and group community are decisively cut, sometimes in the most cruel and brutal way. The result is in an all too large number of cases a whittling down of subjectivity and interiority. Evil is no longer admissible or even possible among our contempo-

raries; it is banished to the past and to history, which are ever more violently blamed, or else to selected "monsters," individuals or groups who (deliberately or out of impotence) do not accept the Procrustean molds of political correctness.

What happens in practice, according to the French philosopher, is that moral universals (which she affirms) are all too quickly translated into positive law in ways which contribute to the abasement of both and to the annihilation of identity. "Paradise on earth" as a practicable and achievable route ensues, much as it ensued from the ideals and intentions of the great totalitarian systems. "Salvation by institutions" seems to her one of the great and dangerous temptations of this turn of the century. By contrast, the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe seem to Delsol a blow struck not just in favor of political freedom and independence, but rather a gesture in the direction of the recovery of Being. Their consequences may have been largely disappointing (the reader may think), but the intention pointed to by Delsol was undoubtedly at least a dimension of those historical events.

Is the study too pessimistic? I for one believe so. Chantal Delsol writes from an almost exclusively European standpoint and seems less familiar with the spirited wrestling going on in North America, where a lot of these matters are still in the balance, admittedly as cliffhangers, but at least not yet entirely solved or lost. The other important aspect worth discussing is the argument's connection with religious values. There is no doubt that the French philosopher understands quite well that the hasty abandonment of religion in and by "late modernity" (and usually the adversity toward, even persecution of, religious values) is part and parcel of the various sociohistorical ailments she diagnoses. Several times there are clear references to this matter. Still, this reviewer would have liked an even stronger explanation of the connections between the secular and the religious, and of the ways in which moral philosophy tends to become unstable, perhaps to crumble, in the absence of a religious background and vindication.

On the whole this is a first-class work, well in the tradition of Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers (particularly when it discusses the question of evil). It displays a fresh and encouraging freedom of thought, for which the intelligent reader remains thankful. It also continues in a promising way an already impressive body of work that ought to be much better known on our side of the Atlantic and that would bring here much needed insights.—Virgil Nemoianu, *The Catholic University of America.*

FERRARIN, Alfredo. *Hegel and Aristotle.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. xxii + 442 pp. Cloth, $64.95—This ambitious and exciting study appears in a series concerning philosophers in the Kantian and post-Kantian European tradition. Ferrarin opens with a clear statement of his goal: "This work does not merely intend to show the extent to

which Hegel is indebted to Aristotle or the degree to which his interpretation of Aristotle is at times arbitrary or misguided. To be sure, it will also spell out such points, but it is not intended simply to be an exposition of Hegel's interpretation of Aristotle. It can be characterized as a detailed analysis of the relation between Hegel's interpretation of Aristotle's thought and his usage and elaboration on it. Its main task is to show the tensions that result from this contrast" (p. 4). Ferrarin works out his account in four parts (further divided into eleven chapters), "The History of Philosophy and Its Place Within the System" (pp. 31–101), "Logic And Metaphysics" (pp. 105–97), "Aristotle and The *Realphilosophie*" (pp. 201–369), and "Conclusions" (pp. 373–411). The volume is completed by an extensive Bibliography (pp. 413–28) and two Indices (pp. 429–42).

This goal, analyzing Hegel's interpretation of Aristotle, explains why Hegel comes first in the title of the work and why it rightly appears in a series on Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy. Further, Ferrarin demonstrates remarkable control of a range of problems in Hegel, Hegelian studies, and the bibliographical issues raised by this tradition. Part 1 discuses Hegel's notion of the history of philosophy as well as its place within his system. Here Ferrarin's scholarly skills are at their impressive best. He addresses the history of the texts, considers the arrangement of the material that he expounds, and presents a powerful analysis of a number of difficult topics in Hegel. In part 2, Ferrarin provides an analysis of the lectures on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and the relation between the *Metaphysics* and Hegel's *Science of Logic*. Part 3 completes what Ferrarin calls "the comprehensive analysis" by considering the relation of Hegel's *Realphilosophie* to the "Aristotelian supposed philosophies of nature and of spirit" (p. 10). Ferrarin's conclusion takes up a substantive issue and provides an historical assessment. He first argues for the originality and legitimacy of many of Hegel's points, but at the same time criticizes Hegel for bringing unwarranted, finally indefensible assumptions to his reading of Aristotle. The final historical assessment concerns the place of Aristotle in German philosophy prior to and during Hegel's time. The final sentence of this study reveals much of its passion and style: "But it is doubtless that Hegel contributed, in the influence of his philosophy and the example of his study of Aristotle's texts, to the subversion of many run-of-the-mill commonplaces surrounding Aristotle's philosophy, bringing it back to life after centuries of oblivion, occasional piecemeal exploitation, or passive reception" (p. 411).

Although it is an outstanding study of Hegel, this work is not without defects. I must mention (so as be done with it) the surprising number of typographical errors. More important, Ferrarin does not discipline himself to stay within the limits defined by his project; rather, he takes up a number of issues in Aristotle independently of Hegel's reading of Aristotle. Here he is in serious trouble. "It is time to turn to Aristotle. After what has been argued above, it will be obvious that Aristotle would hardly have recognized himself in such a systematic philosophy. This consideration, however, is secondary. What is to be seen is not whether Aristotle shared such a system or its fundamental inspiration, but whether he could have" (p. 82). What it means to ask whether Aristotle

could have "shared such a system" is never made clear. Rather, this question opens the door to a one paragraph summary of Aristotle, his Hellenistic editors, and Neoplatonism: "Aristotle offered a comprehensive account of problems and their treatment. His thought acquired a different tone once his works were edited, in the Hellenistic period. . . . With Porphyry the Aristotelian logic was adopted in the Neoplatonic curriculum as a requirement before students moved on to the study of the Platonic dialogues" (p. 84). Ferrarin's analysis of Aristotle is everything that his account of Hegel is not: it arbitrarily jumps from text to text without regard to the problem at hand, it fails to take arguments on their own terms, and it shows insufficient control of the secondary literature. These problems, which appear throughout the book, are entirely unnecessary given Ferrarin's original thesis and what is an excellent study of Hegel and his use of Aristotle.—Helen S. Lang, *Trinity College.*

GADAMER, Hans-Georg. *Hermeneutics, Religion, and Ethics.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. xiv + 172 pp. Cloth, $25.00—This collection contains some of Gadamer's best essays, including: "Kant and the Question of God" (1941); "On the Possibility of a Philosophical Ethics" (1963); "On the Divine in Early Greek Thought" (1970); "The Ontological Problem of Value" (1971); "Thinking as Redemption: Plotinus between Plato and Augustine" (1980); "Myth in the Age of Science" (1981); "The Ethics of Value and Practical Philosophy" (1982); "Reflections on the Relation of Religion and Science" (1984); "Friendship and Self-Knowledge: Reflections on the Role of Friendship in Greek Ethics" (1985); and "Aristotle and Imperative Ethics" (1989). Rather than describe each essay, this review will content itself with presenting the predominant ethical and theological doctrines found in this compilation.

Gadamer builds his moral doctrine on a sound Aristotelianism. Rejecting the unconditional and *a priori*, he grounds ethics precisely in the conditionedness of man, especially in the determinations arising from family, society, and state. In fact, Gadamer's sense of this conditionedness is so strong that he examines the human only "within the horizon" (p. 32) of that comprehensive society natural to it—the *polis*. For it is under this inevitable influence of the *polis*—the influence of training, education, and way of life—that man acquires ethos, that is, "moral being" (p. 28). Ethos in its turn determines prudence, the concrete insight (directly obvious to the well-trained soul) which discerns the appropriate action for the immediate situation. Philosophical ethics then follows upon prudence, but only as the "self-clarification of the determinations of concrete ethos" (p. 74), that is, as a reflective development of what is already present within the active, insightful, and well-trained person.

It might be thought that Gadamer here teaches a kind of relativism (because prudence is determined by actual ethos and actual ethos by experiencing a particular *polis*), but he says forthrightly that the *polis* is "common to us all" and that we are all "answerable" to its "true form" (p. 32).

Gadamer's philosophy of the divine begins with the key concept of "supraindividual being." Nominalist science affirms that the only things which exist are the single individuals encountered in experience, and it relegates all else (kinds, essences, laws, the spiritual, and so forth) to the status of logical entities. Gadamer, however, affirms that it is in experiential knowledge itself that one discerns the supraindividual, especially in certain aspects of corporeal reality (for example, the being of an organism), as well as in the aforementioned "conditionedness" of man. Indeed, through the awareness of the conditions imposed upon human freedom and knowledge, one is readily poised to move "beyond" the individual's limitations and discern "in the being of the universal, the common and binding, the higher reality of being" (p. 16).

This leads us to the supraindividual concept of "the being of things as a whole" (p. 37)—the being which the earliest Greek thinkers identified with the divine. Awareness of this concept led to a continuous philosophical search for the "ground" of "the whole," the enduring eternal principle which accounts for the whole's being, unity, order, and uniqueness. Some sought this ground of the whole "within" the whole, but the strong intuition that the divine has life and thought led to a search for more transcendent explanations. Finally, the most developed Greek theology, the Aristotelian, concluded that divine being (the unmoved mover) is not the essence of all being, but is the enduring reality by which the essence of being in general is properly envisioned. First the experience of being "brings in all the predicates of life and divinity" (p. 57), and if the divine predicates are then accurately attributed, the "being of the whole" may then be re-visualized in relation to divine being.

Despite Gadamer's insightful treatment of this issue, it might be said that he leaves tantalizingly incomplete a presentation that tends toward an affirmation of being's analogous character. This incompleteness, combined with his assertions that in the experience of being we encounter "the predicates of divinity" and that "in the being of the universal" one discerns being's "higher reality," leaves the reader with a hint of mitigated pantheism and ontologism.

Gadamer also treats of the divine from the standpoint of religious faith. Faith, a subjectively certain "comportment toward the holy" (p. 122), is something *sui generis*, centering on an object which, like the mythological, "cannot be thought in advance" (p. 127). In this context, humans do not comport themselves toward the divine as toward something whose attributes are discoverable "within" the community of being. Rather, they incline toward something "unreachable by the longing of thought" and "not described in terms of its own being and appearance" (p. 127).

This is an essential book for the Gadamer enthusiast. It is rich in relevant questions, striking paradoxes, careful distinctions, and useful clarifications. At times his doctrine is mysterious, but the overall impression one receives is of a realist who is respectful of the enduring community

of being and the enduring community of man.—Christopher Albrecht, *St. Basil College.*

GORNER, Paul. *Twentieth-Century Germany Philosophy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 225 pp. Paper, $14.95—Paul Gorner must be commended for a masterful exposition of some of the major trends and thinkers of the German tradition of the twentieth century. He seeks out what would comprise a unique mode of philosophizing of the German tradition. He finds this mode to consist of a specific influence and reading of Kant at the level of transcendental philosophy and its attendant debates. Indeed, the author constantly refers various trends and thinkers to Kantian problematic of the constitution of transcendental conditions of experience, ethics, and the thing in itself. This includes the issues of egological solipsism, the problems of communal participation in various epistemic ventures, and the question of presuppositions. While the text is written to emphasize the transcendental trend, it also shows the intrinsic issues and challenges to this trend in German tradition, specifically with respect to the questions of transcendental consciousness, Being, history, interpretation, and language.

The first topic, transcendental consciousness, is addressed by the author in terms of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. Phenomenology is explicated along the major components that belong to transcendental awareness: intentionality, intuition of essences, internal time consciousness, intersubjectivity, descriptive method, life world, transcendental phenomenology and its resultant phenomenological idealism. The author takes pains to show precise differences between the naturalistic, psycho-physical realm and the realm of awareness, the intentional consciousness, that is required to access the natural domain. It is made clear that such a consciousness is neither reducible to nor derivable from any naturalistic factors.

The second topic opens with the question of Being of beings as fundamental ontology, explicated by Martin Heidegger. The treatment of this topic includes a critique of Husserl's transcendental consciousness as the grounding phenomenon, and introduces more basic phenomena of "being in the world." Yet the latter is founded on the basic Heideggerian distinction between Being and beings; such that human "being in the world" is a happening that opens the temporal horizon of Being as it appears with the temporality of beings. Here, for the author, Heidegger undergirds the primacy of consciousness by a more fundamental "experience" that transgresses traditional separation between the human and world and between human and human. As beings in the world we are always beings with others. Yet as beings in the world we disclose entities only partially due to our own temporality (our being toward death), and hence the temporality of the horizon of Being. Finally,

the author explicates the problematic of Kant through Heidegger's interpretation of "appearance" wherein the distinction between the thing in itself and appearance becomes redundant.

Although Heidegger addresses the problem of language and interpretation, these topics are the theme of the section on Hans-Georg Gadamer and philosophical hermeneutics. The author shows the differences between Gadamer's understanding of hermeneutics and Heidegger's fundamental ontology, and also the difference between the basic meaning of the term "consciousness" in Husserl and Gadamer. For Gadamer consciousness is not perceptual but comprises "understanding" that is historically situated. Yet this does not mean that our understanding is completely tied to a specific historical era and hence all interpretation of other era's and their texts is purely "our own." The author draws a precise line between interpreting everything from one's own historical context and Gadamer's efforts to establish the conditions for the possibility of understanding and interpretation as such. Here the author emphasizes the topics of prejudgment, fore-structure, and above all effective history wherein the fusion of open historical horizons and our own context-bound horizon converge. This type of convergence opens the ground for the understanding of other historical contexts whose horizons are accessible to us. In this sense, the problem of the understanding of the "other" and indeed of other historical periods and traditions is undercut. According to the author, the problem of historical relativism and transcendental idealism is equally surpassed.

A challenge to philosophical hermeneutics appears in the next section with critical theory as it is expounded by Jürgen Habermas. The focus of this section is on Habermas's controversy with Gadamer's hermeneutics, and rationality as communicative action. Basically, Habermas challenges hermeneutics on grounds that it is irrational to the extent that the historically effective consciousness as a language laden tradition acts as a force, as a blind being that cannot be circumvented or explicated rationally. In this sense, Habermas is regarded as a partial exponent of enlightenment. Yet, according to the author, for Habermas enlightenment is inadequate due to its positing of an abstract subject instead of a rationally communicating community as a condition for consensus. However, consensus must include interests that are material (in the sense of world as produced) and not merely formal agreements. This means that communicative action, as discursive, is the very rationality that offers ways to resolve issues in terms of validity claims inherent in the very nature of discursive practice. The author raises here an important question: is the communicative action as discursive a transcendental condition in Habermas's theory?

The answer to this question could be found in the next section on transcendental pragmatics, expounded by Karl-Otto Apel. According to Gorner, Apel is a follower of transcendental philosophy, even if in a modified form. The modification includes discursive practice, termed by Apel transcendental semiotics. While Husserl had a subject-object correlation, he failed to deal with the way intersubjective communities are formed by way of sign systems. At the outset, the latter involve the subject in a linguistic community. Once this is recognized, then the grounding of all philosophical thinking must rest on transcendental con-

ditions that are basically argumentation. The author argues that for Apel it is impossible to circumvent argumentation without performative self-contradiction. The latter phrase means that any argument against Apel's position contradicts itself in practice since it employs arguments. Moreover, all arguments point to an ideal possibility of agreements toward which such arguments point.

Paul Gorner's text expounds on the usual themes and figures in German philosophy of the twentieth century. It could be enhanced by different extensions of the works of such philosophers through thinkers whose interpretations differ from the traditional ones. Just to open a minimal point: Husserl is deemed to be a solipsist, having no need for others. Yet the work of Bernhard Waldenfel's *Zwischenreich des Dialogs* demonstrates the opposite view: the priority of "poli-centric consciousness" prior to subject-subject relationship. Such an extension might call for another text.—Algis Mickunas, *Ohio University.*

HOBBS, Angela. *Plato and the Hero: Courage, Manliness and the Impersonal Good.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. xvii + 280 pp. Cloth, $59.95—This remarkable study on courage breaks new ground in Platonic scholarship, looking to Plato, not the poets, for an inquiry into what counts as true heroism. Hitherto, among Plato scholars scant attention has been paid to courage on its own, apart from its connection to the other virtues. Hobbs, by contrast, makes courage her central theme, thereby elevating courage to a new order of prominence in the Platonic calculus of virtues.

Hobbs contrasts the Greek conception of courage, inherited from the Archaic poets, with that of Plato. A common presupposition supporting the Archaic view is that some virtues are specifically male, courage being the most prominent. This is born out in the etymological link between the word for courage, *andreia*, and its Greek root, *aner*, the word for man. One of the principal tasks of the book is to ask whether the Greeks themselves had an understanding of courage independent of its association with warfare, fighting, or physical prowess—traditional manly pursuits. This has more general ethical implications, for if one restricts the notion of courage to manliness, as do the prephilosophical authors, what possibility is there of a reasonable conception of feminine courage, not to mention feminine virtue? True human flourishing demands a reconstituted understanding of courage, one that incorporates a wider range of human activities, including the activity of philosophy itself. "It is not simply the case that *andreia* can manifest itself in the practice of philosophy at least as well as on the battlefield; *andreia* is also, in all its manifestations, just as much the provenance of women as of men" (p. 246–7). Plato, Hobbs argues, reshapes the traditional notion of courage in a way that makes it suitably congenial to the life of philosophy while presenting, for the first time, a gender neutral conception of courage.

Courage in Plato is closely associated with *thumos* or spiritedness, introduced as part of Plato's tripartite soul doctrine in Book IV of the *Republic*. Hobbs regards *thumos* as the psychological foundation of courage and counts herself among the minority of scholars who find good reason for taking *thumos* as an integral part of Plato's psychology. Thus, the first two chapters are devoted to an analysis of *thumos* and its connection to *andreia*. Among the virtues of this work is the attention given to role models, central to Plato's ethics and key to the author's contention that role models decisively contribute to the shaping of *thumos*. Hobbs's study accomplishes what many other mosaic approaches to Plato, those that run across many of the dialogues often at the expense of coherence, fail to do—it maintains the focus of its central theme. After the initial discussion of *thumos*, chapters 3–5 discuss courage in the *Laches*, *Protagoras*, and *Republic* respectively, while the *Apology*, *Crito*, *Hippias Major* and *Minor* are discussed together in chapter 6. Hobbs excels at showing how the tripartite psychology of *Republic* 4, through the addition of *thumos*, provides the basis for a more textured discussion and a more adequate account of *andreia* than those of the *Laches* and *Protagoras*.

Chapter 7 returns to Homer and the tragic perspective involving a detailed analysis of Achilles as the hero in whom *thumos* has run amok, partly owing to the nonphilosophical assumption that one must make a noble choice at the expense of a flourishing life. Chapter 8 provides the needed corrective to errant *thumos*, which, properly attuned to the beautiful and the good, issues in a new conception of courage, one that is in the service of the life of philosophy. One would expect the book to end here with Socrates as a new kind of hero and a new kind of model of courage. Plato, according to Hobbs, remains skeptical and somewhat ambivalent about the possibility of convincing his mostly male audience to accept "a gender-transcendent ideal of humanity" (p. 249). Thus, the "philosophical ideal" aimed at in chapter 8 is supplanted by a final chapter that discusses the *Symposium* and, in particular, the complicated case of Alcibiades, whose *thumoeidic* characteristics never quite ascend from the arena of public opinion. A final Epilogue briefly treats *andreia* in the *Politicus* and *Laws*.

Hobbs has provided a valuable study of courage and a very detailed treatment of *thumos*. One wonders, however, about Socrates and what role *thumos* plays in his philosophical life. Socrates stands out as uniquely *athumetic*. Hobbs, herself, questions whether "even Socrates is finally to be transcended as a model" (p. 249). Additionally, what are the essential characteristics of the philosopher's courage and in what way do they differ from those of the conventional hero? Is the philosopher courageous in a different way than, say, the military or civic hero?

As in Plato, one is grateful for provocative questions and for the fact that the author has opened a new vein in Platonic investigations that offer rich opportunities for further scholarship.—Jerrold R. Caplan, *California Lutheran University*.

HOENEN, Maarten J. F. M., and BAKKER, Paul J. J. M., editors. *Philosophie und Theologie des ausgehenden Mittelalters: Marsilius von Inghen und das Denken seiner Zeit.* Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2000. x + 322 pp. Cloth, $101.00—For over a decade, scholars at the University of Nijmegen, joined notably by German and Polish colleagues, have organized studies of Marsilius of Inghen's (d. 1396) thought and writings. International conferences were held at Nijmegen in 1986 and at Lublin in 1993 (proceedings published in 1992 and 1993); the present volume (dedicated to Henk A. G. Braakhuis) reflects the advances in research that have occurred since then.

During the 1360s–1370s, Marsilius was a renowned teacher in the Arts faculty at the University of Paris. In the fifteenth century, with William of Ockham and John Buridan he was considered a paragon among the *nominales*, that is, those philosophers who denied the extramental reality of universals and who developed refined techniques for the semantic and logical analysis of terms and concepts. Throughout the fifteenth century Marsilius's thinking (*via marsiliana*) was widely influential, and his commentaries on works of Aristotle were often used as textbooks in the new universities in Germany, Vienna, and Krakow. Marsilius is frequently called a "disciple of Buridan"; in fact, at Paris he incepted in the Arts faculty (1362) under William Buzer of Utrecht; as William Courtenay states, according to University regulations "by definition [he] could never have studied under the Picard master Jean Buridan" (pp. 4, 16; see below). Nonetheless, he was influenced greatly by Buridan's writings.

Although he began his theological studies at Paris while teaching in the Arts faculty, Marsilius did not lecture on the *Sentences* until 1392–1394 at Heidelberg, where he was the first Rector. Marsilius was not well known as a theologian. In her essay on the reception of his writings at Heidelberg (based on inventories of the University Library, dated 1396, 1466, and 1500), Dorothea Walz records that at Heidelberg as elsewhere Marsilius's logical and philosophical writings were read and copied more than his scriptural and Sentential commentaries (pp. 259–88; see pp. 280–8). Moreover, Courtenay notes, his Sentential commentary reflects the theological issues discussed at Paris in the 1370s more than those discussed at Heidelberg in the 1390s (p. 11). Otherwise, the commentary survives in only five manuscripts.

Based on investigations of Papal Registers, Courtenay establishes the institutional setting at the University of Paris when Marsilius studied and taught there, details his career in the faculties of Arts and Theology, and concludes that his master in theology was probably the Cistercian James of Eltville (pp. 3–19). Courtenay proposes that in order to understand Marsilius's (or any other theologian's) intellectual formation, one must consider not only "the written sources that were available to him . . . but the personal contacts and oral teaching that he received." Research on "academic environments," he notes, "has only just begun" (p. 19); his essay proves that such research will yield rich fruit.

The essays concerning Marsilius's logical and philosophical writings "fine-tune" the current scholarly discussion. Paul Bakker investigates a question "*De tactu corporum durorum*" surviving separately in one

manuscript, which involves the problem of a vacuum; although the question is attributed to Marsilius in the manuscript and echoes his arguments in other writings, Bakker decides that it cannot certainly be assigned to him (pp. 121–58, with an edition of the question and another by Blaise of Parma). Olaf Pluta studies a question by Marsilius that likewise exists in a single manuscript: "*Utrum in homine anima intellectiva distinguitur ab anima sensitive*" (entailing another, "*Utrum intellectus utitur organo corporeo in intelligendo*"). Pluta shows that Marsilius's conclusion in this question, wherein he adduces theological arguments, differs from his teaching in questions in his commentary on *De anima*, wherein he follows the "natural light" of reason alone (pp. 159–74, with an edition of the question). Mieczyslaw Markowski judges that a substantial commentary on the first five books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which again survives in one manuscript, was likely composed by Marsilius (pp. 175–95). Egbert P. Bos keenly delineates differences between Buridan's and Marsilius's theories of supposition, and documents that they play a role in a treatise by John Dorp (Paris, after 1393) and in anonymous *Sophismata* (Prague, circa 1400; pp. 213–38, with edited texts). Hanna Wojtczak discloses the reception of the teaching of Marsilius and other Parisian "nominalists" in Benedict Hesse's commentary on the *Categories* (Krakow, 1416–1420; pp. 239–57).

Henk Braakhuis's fine essay, treating the (non-)distinction of propositions, bears directly on a disputed event in intellectual history. In 1340 regent-masters in the Arts faculty at Paris issued a Statute condemning "Ockhamists" for their practice of analyzing propositions in every kind of text according to the univocal properties of their terms and their personal supposition. Such logical analysis is supported by the principle that "no proposition should be distinguished" (according to different senses); those who universally apply this principle, the Statute declares, disregard the intentions of authors and the different subject-matters of different kinds of discourse (the technique would be wholly inappropriate, for example, for interpreting the metaphorical locutions in the Scriptures). John Buridan especially advocated the pedagogical principle that whereas strict "terminist" logic should be employed in the speculative sciences (logic, physics, metaphysics) a more rhetorical "logic" should be used in the practical sciences (ethics and theology); since this principle governs the Statute, Zenon Kaluza for one argues that Buridan was its leading author. To the contrary, Braakhuis demonstrates that in his early *Questiones Elencorum* if not in his later *Summulae* Buridan defended the nondistinction of propositions, as did Marsilius decades later (1360s) in his own *Questiones Elencorum* (pp. 91–119, with edited text). For Marsilius, Braakhuis concludes, "the logico-semantic views imposed by the Statute were in fact less influential than a consideration of the logico-semantic views voiced by the mature Buridan would have led us to believe" (p. 110). One should note, however, that the Statute of 1340 itself implies that strict analysis of propositions *secundum proprietatem sermonis* befits one kind of discourse, "sophistical disputations," although its immoderate use is inappropriate in "dialectical and doctrinal disputations" (see item 4); thus, one might argue that in admitting the nondistinction of propositions in questions concerning fallacies,

Buridan and Marsilius did not obviously ignore the principle of the Statute. In any event, Marsilius's practice in theology seems to be based on the principle of the "twofold logic" (see below).

The essays concerning Marsilius's theology are broader in scope. Sigrid Müller addresses the vexed question of "nominalist theology," seeking to discover common characteristics that bind together the diverse applications of semantic and logical analysis to theological questions by William of Ockham, Gregory of Rimini, and Marsilius (pp. 47–65). Manfred Schulze (anachronistically) views Gregory, Marsilius, and Gabriel Biel through the lens of the "pre-Reformation," in terms of their "Augustinrezeption" and their teachings on free will and grace (pp. 67–87). Manuel Santos Noya treats Marsilius's use of Scholastic "authorities" and evaluates his understanding of the *veritas theologica* by reference to "clear and distinct" concepts of revelation (*"Schrift-Prinzips oder Kirchen-Prinzips"*; pp. 197–210).

In his comprehensive essay, Maarten Hoenen masterfully defines the historical problematic of Marsilius's theological teaching, illustrating its character by an analysis of his treatment of God's knowledge of future, contingent, freely willed human acts (pp. 21–45). Hoenen shows that, according to the principle of the "twofold logic" and in respect of the mind's inadequacy before divine realities, whereas Marsilius systematically employed strict semantic and logical analysis in the liberal arts, his use of such in theology is restrained, in favor of the *communis opinio sanctorum*, typically represented by such thirteenth-century theologians as Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas. Thus Marsilius often distances himself from the logical analysis he himself exercises in philosophy, and which was employed in theology by Adam of Wodeham and Gregory of Rimini. Such analysis risks offending pious ears; in theology one should follow long-established tradition and "enslave one's mind to faith in obedience to Christ" (2 Corinthians 10:5). Marsilius's commentary on the *Sentences*, Hoenen argues, embodies the crucial question pertaining to theological method in the late fourteenth century; his practice, one might add, adumbrates the modern notion of "positive theology."

The essays in this volume, several of which append newly edited texts, constitute "an original contribution to (high) scholarship" and will convince students of medieval thought that the teaching of Marsilius of Inghen merits close attention.—Kent Emery, Jr., *University of Notre Dame.*

LONG, Eugene Thomas. *Twentieth-Century Western Philosophy of Religion 1900–2000.* Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000. xii + 538 pp. Cloth, $234.00—This is the first volume in a series—*Handbook* [sic.] *of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion*—of which the author is also editor. Two things strike one immediately: first, it is very impressive in its range and depth of coverage; second, it is outrageously expensive.

Kluwer's pricing policy is a disgrace which reviewers ought not to let pass uncriticized. It is a disservice to individual readers, to institutions, and to writers. The present author has evidently labored long, hard, and fruitfully, yet his work is not likely to be widely read because of an unwarranted cost imposed by the publisher. It is conceivable, though unlikely, that this criticism will affect the pricing of subsequent volumes, but it will be a cruel irony if the editor's own volume is then the one that is least widely read. Kluwer would be advised to reprice this volume at half the cost.

Long arranges his survey chronologically and (within this) by "school." Thus we have part 1: "Philosophy of Religion at the turn of the Twentieth Century: Absolute Idealism; Personal Idealism; Neo-Kantianism; Positivism and the Science of Religion"; part 2: "Between the Wars: Neo-Realism; Phenomenology; American Pragmatism; Personalism; Philosophy of History"; part 3: "After Mid-Century: Philosophical Analysis; Existential Philosophy; Neo-Thomism; Process Philosophy"; part 4: "At the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: Analytic Philosophy; Hermeneutics and Deconstruction; Critical Theory; Comparative Philosophy; Feminist Philosophy." I doubt that many people will read from cover to cover, and most will be coming to this with a fair bit of prior knowledge of one or more approaches. Given the latter fact they are likely to check out their own school and then dip into one or two others. In this respect it is a very useful resource as a work of first reference. Yet as such it commits a sin of omission in not providing a bibliography or suggestions for further reading. References are by footnote with "ibid." substituting for specifications in subsequent citations. This is an avoidable inconvenience.

Long's view of the field is that of an enthusiast. Where others might well have grown weary of the subject from having had to plow through so much of it, Long begins each section of the terrain afresh, finding interest everywhere he gently treads. Perhaps this is because he is alive to the fact that behind the books and papers stand real human beings striving to make sense of experience or to discover what reason alone can tell us about reality. The sense of the personal is maintained by providing brief biographical details of major figures as, for example, of Whitehead: "Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) was born in Ramsgate on the Isle of Thaney [Thanet] in England. Reared in an Anglican vicarage, he studied mathematics at Trinity College, Cambridge" (p. 369). One can almost smell the well-polished oak of Anglicanism.

An interesting test of an author's ability to be fair and to see the good (as well as the limitations) in contrasting philosophical approaches is presented by the task of giving account of both analytic, and hermeneutic and deconstructive traditions. Long passes this test with ease. He locates the central figures within an account of the main concerns of each approach and gives an informative summary of their main ideas. The chapter on hermeneutics and deconstruction is particularly good in this respect and brings out the extent to which philosophy of religion in the continental tradition is far removed from the natural theology of analytic philosophy and of neo-Thomism (the latter being the subject of another chapter).

Occasionally Long's efforts at fairness tend toward a lack of discrimination with some very minor figures receiving a level of attention their work does not merit. On balance, though, the benefits of comprehensiveness justifies the policy of inclusion. The drift from the high metaphysics of rationalism, via the scientific orientation of empiricism, through the synthesist efforts of process and neo-Thomist philosophies, to existentialism, hermeneuticism, deconstruction, and feminism suggest, as Long notes in his concluding remarks, a movement from realism to relativism. This raises the question of the future of philosophy of religion in the new century. Any conjecture in this area is likely to be question-begging with regard to the meaning of "philosophy" and of "religion." Long eschews any speculation about the future, though he writes of a shift to "an openness to the contributions of religious experience toward understanding and realizing the human." This may be true, but I suspect that it is unlikely to contribute much to the development of academic philosophy. For what it is worth, my own sense is that at least for the coming decade or two philosophy of religion is likely to be in recession. This may make Long's retrospective survey all the more useful to future students of the subject.—John Haldane, *University of St. Andrews.*

McGUIRE, James E., and TUCHANSKA, Barbara. *Science Unfettered: A Philosophical Study in Sociohistorical Ontology.* Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001. ix + 420 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $29.95—The authors' aim in this book is "to understand—from a philosophical standpoint—the social and historical nature of science, more precisely, its sociability and historicity" (p. 3). "This book was created within a dialogue" (p. ix) between the two authors, and between our "friends"—those who supported a hermeneutic stance toward the natural sciences—and our "antagonists"—those belonging to the analytic philosophy of science. The dialogue took place at the University of Pittsburgh where McGuire is a Professor of the History and Philosophy of Science and Tuchanska was a visitor from the University of Lodz in Poland. They describe their task as "overcoming the limits of analytic philosophy of science with respect to conceptions of the scientist, scientific cognition, and the objects of science." Expanding on this, the authors say that the task "requires going beyond the subject/object dichotomy that underlies scientific cognition and most modern philosophy. Certainly the subject/object opposition has been problematized. The names of Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Dewey, Husserl, Heidegger, or Gadamer come readily to mind. Their aim was purely philosophical: to reveal elements underlying both the subject and the object of cognition predominantly from the point of view of the individual cognizer. However, apart from the work of Hegel, Heidegger, Cassirer, Collingwood, and Gadamer, few attempts have been made to situate human cognition ontologically within the social,

the cultural, and the historical. Our aim is to address these dimensions of cognition, especially in regard to scientific cognition" (p. 3).

The philosophical standpoint of the book is taken as that of German philosophy and in particular of a "hermeneutical ontology." It is influenced predominantly by the early Heidegger (of *Being and Time*) and Gadamer (of *Truth and Method*). However, the book is critical of each, Heidegger for his "existentialist" starting point in *Dasein* (chapter 2) and Gadamer for his "linguisticism" and refusal to see the hermeneutic structure of the natural sciences (chapter 2).

In chapter 3, the authors extend "fundamental ontology" to "communities and practice." In chapter 4, science is analyzed in terms of its practice. Chapters 5 and 6 are on history, becoming, and the historicity of science. Chapter 7, the final chapter, is on scientific objectivity. There is a concluding Epilogue that attempts to summarize the positive outcome of the preceding chapters by reducing it to three "ontic-ontological circles": first, "practice and its ontic structural web, the network of factual social relations . . . [and] institutions"; second, "practice and meaningfulness . . . mutually related in an analogous way"; and third, "practice and the world, which it constantly converts into reality and objectifies" (p. 329).

The genesis of the book in what the authors describe as a dialogue between German hermeneutical ontology and Anglo-American logical analysis probably accounts for many of the stylistic peculiarities of the writing. To have a true dialogue, there must be enough common ground between the participants that there is a mutually mediating discourse capable of interpreting one to the other. That seems to be lacking in the dialogue reported on in this book. As a consequence, the book is difficult to read. It tends to reinforce some of the old stereotypes about continental philosophy, that it is "confused," "jargon filled," or "mystical," and some of the old stereotypes of analytic philosophy, that it is aggressively a-contextual, a-hermeneutical, and a-historical and incapable of dialogue except on its own terms. Nevertheless, the main line of the text's development is insightful and powerful and needs to be heard.

The central problem of the book is a failure in philosophical style: the book sets out to propose a hermeneutic socio-historical style of philosophy while employing throughout the argumentative strategies of analytical philosophy. The goals, methods, and presuppositions of these styles are different and the close reader is confused. In the hermeneutic tradition, philosophy is—has to be—a very personal endeavor, and its power to persuade is more like a historical narrative than an explanatory argument; it is dependent on the resonant strength of the author's voice in speaking from some coherent grasp of historical, philosophical, and scientific traditions to achieve an elucidation of human experience from some perspective. Philosophy of this kind is not a science in the traditional sense dependent on a clarification of concepts and a network of logical arguments, nor can it be simply articulated in a coherent matrix of universally true or false sentences. Hermeneutic philosophy always retains reference to a wholeness and totality within which the finitude of an author's discourse is established principally by the author's choice of relevance, selection, and emphasis.—Patrick A. Heelan, *Georgetown University.*

MCINERNY, Ralph. *Characters in Search of Their Author: The Gifford Lectures, Glasgow 1999–2000.* Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001. xii + 138 pp. Cloth, $25.00—McInerny brings his considerable learning and literary skills to a defense of natural theology against both the skeptic and modern atheist who deny its possibility. As the title of the book suggests, "we are all characters in a human drama in search of our author." If there is a God who is the author of us all, awareness of his existence should surely not be restricted to a few. Indeed, affirmations of the existence of God, or the gods, is as old as the human race. Modern atheism, an epistemological negation of that ancient and universal affirmation, is not a natural state, McInerny argues, but a consequence of the starting point of modern philosophy.

Since the epistemological turn taken with Descartes and, of course fostered by Kant, modern philosophical thought has been essentially atheistic. Philosophy has become largely a matter of challenging the inherited, a burying of one's predecessors or, as McInerny puts it, "a kind of reptile that abandons one skin after another." McInerny is convinced it is now a bone yard, a skeleton of its former self, having passed through the abattoir of doubt, linguistic reduction, and nihilism. There seems to be nothing, no major or even minor issue, on which philosophers are not in serious disagreement. The epistemological turn has led of late to the disappearance of even the concept of "truth." Having rejected the dependence of truth claims on reality, philosophers have developed theories of language to accommodate their ontological denial. Some have even argued that there is no point of arguing at all.

A century ago, William James observed that since Kant no one has felt the need to take up arguments for the existence of God. That dictum has become a received opinion, repeated time and again. Yet should it be accepted as true? Have the classical arguments for the existence of God been discredited, or have they been simply ignored?

Misgivings about classical proofs for the existence of God, McInerny is convinced, are not merely the result of faulty arguments that have been exposed but are in part engendered by the fear that if they worked, the one who accepted them may have to exhibit this by a change in his way of living. The moral import of a successful proof of God's existence is recognized by both the theist and atheist.

From the point of view of the believer, does natural theology matter? If natural theology is rejected, how then may the mind relate to God? Within Christendom there are two opposed positions which believers have taken, one holding that faith provides the only access to God and that consequently philosophical or natural theology is either a mistake or is surpassed by revelation, and the other that acknowledges the complementarity of faith and reason in their approaches to God. Søren Kierkegaard may be taken as a representative of the former; Aquinas and his modern commentators, including McInerny, of the latter.

Kierkegaard is skeptical about an objective or theoretical approach to God. John Henry Newman, though not a Kierkegaardian, similarly links proof to the disposition of the one offering proof. Both maintain that there is a kind of subjective disposition that is open to objective truth and another that is closed to its possibility. It is the just man who can

judge truly the demands of justice in a particular instance. It is the man whose will is fixed on the good who is likely to respond to the force of rational argument. When it comes to proof for the existence of God, an antecedent negative attitude will guarantee that the task will not be undertaken in a way that will allow the truth of the matter to shine through. A philosopher who is expected to follow the argument wherever it leads, should have an open mind, yet a believer, McInerny recognizes, does not philosophize in the expectation that his faith will be undermined. It is incontestable that religious belief influences the philosophizing of Christian philosophers, unless they are schizophrenic. Paraphrasing Emile Brehier, McInerny writes, "It seems obvious that believers, for whom the great questions of philosophy had already received their answers, could scarcely go about seeking those same answers." McInerny admits that "as a Catholic I am antecendently disposed to think that the tasks of natural theology can be successfully accomplished." Can the nonbeliever claim a similar privilege?

McInerny's disposition is only partly the result of his faith. As a historian of philosophy he is aware of the *status quaestionis* before the advent of Christianity. Viewed from the standpoint of the history of philosophy, the neglect of natural theology is almost incomprehensible. What is one to think of the not uncommon introductory courses in philosophy that begin with Plato and jump to Descartes while ignoring Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and Scotus, not to mention Maimonides and the Arab commentators on Aristotle? Classical philosophy, insofar as it predates Christianity, provides a preamble to the faith that has shaped Western culture, a culture woven out of strands provided by Athens, Rome, Jerusalem, and medieval Paris. Unfortunately, wherever Aquinas's Five Ways are treated, they are often taken out of context. Presented by Thomas as a summary of the then acknowledged ways to the recognition of a prime mover, or first efficient cause, which "everyone understands to be God," they can be understood only in the context of Aristotle's *Physics* and the works that preceded it.

Thomas begins his *Summa Theologiae* with the question, "Whether, besides philosophy, any further doctrine is required." Today it has fallen upon philosopher Karol Wojtyla, as John Paul II, in his treatise *Fides et Ratio* to defend reason itself, indeed natural science itself, in the face of philosophical nihilism.

McInerny ends his lectures with the observation that modern philosophy has unwittingly injected theology into philosophical discussion by defining truth or meaning in such a way as explicitly to exclude Christian faith as reasonable. "It is modern philosophy, in other words, that has thus injected theology into philosophical discussions."

In lucidity and breadth and depth, *Characters in Search of Their Author* resembles Etienne Gilson's *Unity of Philosophical Experience*, and, like the work of Gilson, should be a permanent addition to the personal library of anyone who is attempting to understand the animosity of contemporary philosophy toward matters of faith.—Jude P. Dougherty, *The Catholic University of America.*

MEIER, Heinrich. *The Lesson of Carl Schmitt: Four Chapters on the Distinction Between Political Theology and Political Philosophy.* Translated by Marcus Brainard. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. xxiv + 179 pp. Cloth, $26.00—In this volume, Heinrich Meier sets out to present what is "of lasting importance in [Schmitt's] political theology" (p. xxi). The four chapters seek to develop the theme of the radical "either-or" that faces human beings in Schmitt's thought. Meier argues the distinction between political theology and philosophy rests on their fundamental causes—faith in revelation and human wisdom. Schmitt's political theology and the choice he sees forced on mankind derives from the eschatological view of history found in revelation, in particular the final battle with the anti-Christ. There is a fundamental existential alternative between God and the anti-Christ that has an attendant choice between political theology and political philosophy. Coupled with this treatment of the existential necessities of being human is a presentation of Schmitt's critique of the modern liberal state and a report on his analysis of Hobbes's *Leviathan.* The book concludes with a chapter entitled "History, or the Christian *Epimetheus*" that considers the ethical ramifications of Schmitt's view of history and examines his thought in light of his endorsement of National Socialism and his anti-Semitism.

The first chapter begins with the statement "Moral indignation is no affair of political philosophy" (p. 1). Meier's assertion is the beginning of a remarkable plea for a fair reading of Schmitt's work. He offers four reasons for "thinking Schmitt himself." First, he hopes to shed light, by comparison to political theology, on the cause of political philosophy. Second, this comparison, combined with a fair reading, aims to show that Schmitt is not reducible to his Catholicism as many scholars have argued. Although, it seems the comparison reduces Catholicism much more than it wounds Schmitt. Third, the author takes into account the void created by the collapse of Marxist totalitarianism as a form of government. Political theology, by providing a sense of certainty and a critique of secular liberal capitalism, is gaining in popularity as something that fills that void. Last, Meier points out that there are similarities between political theology and postmodernism, particularly in the use of the appropriating event (*Ereignis*).

In chapter 2, the author recounts Schmitt's radical critique of modern society and analyzes his concept of the "enemy." Meier sees Schmitt as a thinker who rails against the arrogant "Prometheans" of modern science and the "bourgeois" values of modern liberalism. These values gall him as an attempt to promote peace and security in the interest of material comfort. That which promises peace and security can only be in the service of the "enemy" for Schmitt, since in revelation "peace and security" is the slogan of the anti-Christ. The science of man and its drive for domination of politics and nature is seen as a hubristic denial of our true purpose. Both science and the modern liberal state deny the fundamental truth of the "either-or" decision, of the decision between friend and "enemy," between faith and errant faith. Meier sees value in Schmitt's critique of modernity with its Nietzschean need for the dramatic and tragic in life. However, at times the presentation of Schmitt's critique amounts to a lament that the danger to his culture is lethargy in view of

what is important rather than repelling barbarians from the gate. Unfortunately, one cannot choose the crisis of one's age. Even philosophy does not escape Schmitt's anti-intellectualism since "contemplation is not obeying" (p. 16).

Chapter 3 entitled "Revelation, or He that is not With Me is Against Me" expands on the theme of the "enemy." Meier presents an insightful treatment of Schmitt's reading of Hobbes's *Leviathan*. This treatment is continued and completed in the fourth chapter, which also addresses Schmitt's unrepentant anti-Semitism in light of his political theology. Schmitt's examination of the *Leviathan* is interesting in that he finds in Hobbes something of a kindred spirit. Meier uses Schmitt's critique of Hobbes to underscore the ambiguity of the extreme eschatological view of history. Is Hobbes a hastener of the anti-Christ because of his influential theory of the modern state? Does he realize his role in history even as he claims the motto "peace and security"? These questions drive Schmitt's critique and underscore the ambiguity. How can we be sure we are restraining or hastening the coming of the final battle with our actions? Why should we be restrainers if the final battle is the purpose of historical development? For Schmitt, it is the end of history that determines the fundamental "either-or" of human existence and commands historical action. However, as Meier points out, it is this same end that renders all ethical action until the final battle ambiguous.

In considering what is of "lasting importance" in Schmitt's thought, Meier finds the articulation of the existential situation to be decisive in distinguishing political theology most clearly from political philosophy. Meier's presentation of this radical "either-or"—the choice between God and Satan, between theology and philosophy—echoes Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity. In Schmitt we find the harrowing answer to the rebuke that it is "not their love of humanity, but the impotence of their love, prevents the Christians of today—burning us" (*Beyond Good and Evil*, § 104) The extreme character of Schmitt's work, rather than bring the comparison into relief, effects its usefulness as a foil for political philosophy. Schmitt's political theology resists comparison in the same way it resists dialogue—by its reliance on an unreflective obedience to revelation. One could conceive of a comparison between political theology and philosophy involving Karl Lowith's work or Keirkegaard's that would of necessity need to be subtler, and so would be more instructive. As a politics, Schmitt's teachings represent the worst kind. Any relevance Schmitt's thought may have should fade, as it becomes clear that the fundamental problem for political philosophy in our age is the just administration of a culturally heterogeneous state. Schmitt's concept of the "enemy" and the consequent necessity of historical action he draws from it are proof that Meier in his plea for a fair reading of Schmitt is more fair to Schmitt than Schmitt is to any "other."—Michael J. O'Neill, *Washington, DC.*

NORRIS, Christopher. *Minding the Gap: Epistemology and Philosophy of Science in the Two Traditions.* Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000. xiii + 296 pp. Cloth, $39.95—*Minding the Gap* offers a large-scale narrative in terms of which to locate the two dominant traditions in Western philosophy during the twentieth century. It highlights the common roots of so-called analytic and continental philosophizing, as well as the subsequent interplay between these traditions. While such a project could be undertaken as a primarily cultural or social-historical one, Norris's account is largely silent about such "externalist" matters, preferring to concentrate almost exclusively on the explicit philosophical ideas and arguments of his protagonists. Indeed, the ultimate point of the narrative under construction turns out to be itself philosophical, for Norris wants to argue that the "gap" allegedly separating analytic from continental traditions in contemporary philosophy is anything but unbridgeable given his reading of what have been the philosophical issues central to each of the traditions themselves.

As will be evident, this is not a book for the uninitiated; in the absence of some prior acquaintance with the work of major figures in each tradition—Frege and Husserl, Kuhn and Bachelard, Quine and Derrida, to take but a few obvious cases—the reader faces some "hard sledding." At the same time, it must be said that Norris's gifts for clear and effective exposition are genuinely remarkable. Not only has he read widely and thoroughly, but he writes at just the right level of abstraction to enable the reader easily to grasp conceptual linkages among philosophical positions and arguments that would be difficult to recognize merely from a reading of original sources.

Although Norris explicitly says that in *Minding the Gap* he has devoted "equal attention to work on both sides of the notional rift between 'continental' (that is, post-Kantian mainland-European) movements of thought and 'analytic' approaches in the line of descent from Frege and Russell" (p. ix), a careful reading suggests that this is not quite so. The default discussion in almost every chapter of Norris's book is one carefully focused on some particular stage of development within the bounds of the analytic tradition. In almost every instance, however, the rationale for careful and circumspect analysis the author devotes to positions taken by various analytic thinkers is to expose apparent argumentative weaknesses or conceptual limitations within these positions. From this vantage Norris is then able to introduce various continental thinkers into his discussion as having either foreseen the sorts of difficulty in question, or, in some cases, as having previously mobilized insights enabling them to avoid or overcome them.

The book's introduction and eight substantial chapters provide less a continuous line of argument than a series of closely related essays, each of which yields a slightly different angle of vision on the analytic tradition. (The first five represent modestly reworked versions of previously published articles.) Norris's central preoccupation in these early chapters is with the work of philosophers who not only played central roles in postempiricist philosophy of science but who have also been key figures in shaping the trajectories taken by both metaphysics and epistemology in the latter half of the twentieth century. Thus, foremost

among his protagonists are Quine, Davidson, Putnam, and Rorty, though the later Wittgenstein and Kuhn also receive their due. In three final chapters of newly published material, Norris provides a nearly sixty page analysis of John McDowell's Locke Lectures, published as *Mind and World* (chapters 6–7) and a chapter length discussion of Thomas Nagel's recent book, *The Last Word* (chapter 8).

Virtually all of these essays are worth the price of admission simply as studies in the structure and development of key ideas in the hands of some of the most important philosophers of the century. Norris is superb at separating the wheat from the chaff, and thus in helping the reader grasp the inner logic of conceptual development. However, this appreciative narrative rendering of central developments in recent analytic philosophy is never put forward as an end in itself. Norris clearly believes that for all the ingenuity, brilliance, and logical acumen of its adherents, the analytic tradition has continually encountered *aporia* it is powerless to resolve within the limits imposed by its own understanding of philosophical inquiry. Foremost among these, he argues, is an apparently unrelievable tension between metaphysical realism and antirealism, a seemingly irresistible slide toward relativism with respect to issues of meaning and truth, and not least, the problem of reconciling reasons with causes (or spontaneity with receptivity, as McDowell puts it following Kant) within a broadly naturalistic conception of the world.

It is in connection with such problems that Norris introduces in each of his chapter-length essays ideas drawn from the work of one or more philosophers in the continental tradition. The fundamental insight underwriting these interventions is that in the wake of Quine's "Two Dogmas" paper and Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, the analytic tradition inevitably becomes (in principle at least) more accessible to interpretive and phenomenological approaches of the sort pursued by continental thinkers. Thus Norris's recurring suggestions (not always worked out in great detail), to the effect that specific elements in the work of, for example, Husserl or Derrida, Bachelard or Canguilhem, Gadamer or Habermas, or even the post-Kantian German idealists, might fruitfully be brought to bear on particular problems arising within the analytic tradition.

Norris is an able and enthusiastic exponent of the approach he endorses here for surmounting "the gap"; but beyond a handful of truly provocative illustrations of his larger claim, each resting on appeal to a small number of very specific texts from one or another continental thinker, the reader is left with largely promissory notes. Yet if anyone is in a position to provide hard cash for these notes, it is Norris himself. One hopes that he will turn his hand to that task shortly.—Vaughn R. McKim, *University of Notre Dame.*

PIPPIN, Robert B. *Henry James and Modern Moral Life.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. xi + 193 pp. Cloth, $49.95—Various philosophers have already written articles about what might be called the

philosophical lessons to be derived from James's tales and novels. Showing a close acquaintance with those articles as well as with recent literary studies of James's work, Pippin, the author of several earlier books concerned with modernity or with modern philosophical texts, has here produced a book which is at once a detailed and subtle interpretation of several of James's most famous fictional works (and of the nonfictional *The American Scene*) and also the presentation of an explicit philosophical view about "modern moral life" that appears to be adumbrated in those fictions. That view is that in the modern world, where fluid relationships based ultimately upon money or the (relative) lack of it have undermined traditional (sources of) authority, the possibility of a meaningful life for oneself turns out to require appropriate recognition of others in what amounts to a continuing dialogue, one in which the (never finally fixed) meaning of one's own intentions, desires, and attitudes is dependent, in large part, on what others "make" of them and on how they respond, while at the same time one's response to others is importantly determinative of who they are and of what they mean or meant. Expressed differently, the view is that there are, at least in the modern world, no social—and, indeed, no moral or psychological—facts, but only at best mutually supportive interpretations, each the product of a person's self-reflections and of one's responses to the reflections (in various senses) of that person in others. Pippin, however, is not directly concerned to defend the latter view, although it seems clear that he regards it as at least fundamentally correct. His principal concern, rather, is to defend, through his careful readings of various of James's works, the thesis that that view is implicit in such great works of James's as *The Portrait of a Lady*, *The Ambassadors*, *The Wings of the Dove*, and *The Golden Bowl* (among others). In a related way, Pippin takes James's wonderful stories about ghosts (such as *The Turn of the Screw*) or about secret truths (such as "The Aspern Papers" or "The Beast in the Jungle") to be concerned with modern persons who, despite their modernity, are committed, even if not in a wholly conscious way, to the existence of real social or moral facts of the matter.

On the whole, Pippin's book is excellently written, even if it is somewhat repetitious in its several enunciations of the main thesis. Since, however, Pippin's accounts of some of James's works are very controversial (one notable example is that, whereas Leon Edel took James's last novel, *The Golden Bowl*, to be unique among the great works of James's maturity in providing a happy ending for all of the principal characters, Pippin sees the novel as culminating in what he terms (p. 77) a "great moral crash" for all of those characters), and since, even if that were not so, one might think that there are few, if any, (meta-)facts about the psychological, moral, and social situations shown or partly shown in James's works (indeed, one might wish to extend one's claim, ultimately even to all texts), it is surprising that nowhere in his book does Pippin so much as raise the possibility that the meaning of any Jamesean work is not to be captured even by so subtle a reading as that which he himself offers here, but only, if ever, in the ongoing debate about the significance of that work which Pippin's book itself ought to

do much to stimulate.—Paul D. Eisenberg, *Indiana University Bloomington.*

PORTER, James I. *Nietzsche and the Philology of the Future.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001. xiii + 449 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $19.95—This work will be of interest to, and should be studied by, a wider audience than its title may initially suggest. The bulk of the work is devoted to Nietzsche's early philological writings, primarily his unpublished essays, notes, and sketches from the late 1860s to early 1870s and *The Birth of Tragedy.* Each of the five chapters following its substantial Introduction explores some single aspect of these writings, and they center respectively on Nietzsche's "Homer and Classical Philology," his never completed study of Democritus, his studies on ancient rhythm and meter, his "Encyclopedia of Classical Philology," and *The Birth of Tragedy*—although this final chapter ranges over a wider array of materials than do the others. Porter's provocative readings of these texts convincingly demonstrate the need for more attention to this largely neglected area of Nietzsche's writing. (Given that many of the texts Porter invokes are not readily available, one wishes that he had quoted them more fully and that fewer of the quotations had been consigned to the forbidding and somewhat distracting 132 pages of notes.)

However, such an outline of the work does little to indicate the real nature or sources of its interest. This remains significantly true even with the further essential specification that Porter undertakes to argue that, for example, Nietzsche's study of Democritus involves nothing less than an examination of the inescapability of idealism and also reveals the "impossibility of any philosophical beginning" (p. 114), that his studies of ancient rhythm involve not only explorations of the determinants of temporality itself but also "a commentary on the specular and asymmetrical processes of representation that have fashioned historical consciousness to date" (p. 166), that the "Encyclopedia," and read in its light *The Birth of Tragedy* as well, radically question widely held views of Nietzsche's understanding of the relation between the Dionysian and the Apollinian as well as of his supposed invention of or even privileging of a counterclassical antiquity, and the like.

A more complete appreciation of the interest of the work may be gathered from what Porter identifies as its three central aims. The first two of these aims are to contest the prevailing distinction between Nietzsche's work as a philologist and his work as a philosopher and to contest the prevailing periodization of Nietzsche's work into "early" and "late"—to contest, that is, the idea that the nature of and the concerns of Nietzsche's work underwent an important transformation after the publication of *The Birth of Tragedy.* In contesting these prevailing ideas Porter argues that "Nietzsche's writing and thinking are stranger, and more consistent, than they have been credited with being in the past" (p. 2). Porter's third aim, bearing directly on his argument that Nietzsche's writing is more consistent than has been appreciated, is to argue that

"one of [Nietzsche's] central concerns throughout his career . . . was to determine the ways in which philology and philosophy are symptomatic of modern cultural habits, ideologies, and imaginings" (p. 4). He argues that Nietzsche is, in this sense, engaged throughout in a critique of modernity. Indeed, Porter argues, more or less persuasively in individual instances, that "appearances notwithstanding" Nietzsche's philological writings are not directed toward or against particular philological ideals or purported results, but toward the "all-too-human subject of philology, the beholder of antiquity today," toward, that is, exposing the modern subject's "acts of self-deception, disavowal, and self-delusion" that constitute and are reflected in the various ideals of philology (p.12). While this exposing critique, for Porter, may to some degree qualify or make less seductive the misrecognized ideals of modernity—misrecognized because disavowed in being projected onto antiquity—and while it may uncover the psychological and cultural mechanisms that sustain these ideals, it is not in any deep sense liberating or transformative. Nietzsche, for Porter, most fundamentally "reminds his readers of their position as cultural subjects, and of his own as well" (p. 8).

This view of Nietzsche's work throughout his career, a view according to which, "appearances notwithstanding," he advances no views of his own, is developed through and depends upon a conception of the manner, or strategy, of his writing. Briefly, Nietzsche's writing throughout his career, for Porter, does not advance his own positive meanings but "enacts" or "performs" "the dilemmas of contemporary attitudes . . . , repeating prejudices, methods, assumptions, and contradictions" (pp. 17–18) in order to reveal them, the psychological and cultural mechanisms that sustain them, and, often, their instability or incoherence. His writing is thus, Porter argues, "fashioned as a trap, luring readers, performatively and demonstratively, . . . into the hidden recesses of their own subjectivity, their culture, and their conceptions of history" (p. 31). It becomes "a mirror of the reader" (p. 31). While this conception of the manner of Nietzsche's writing is no less controversial and open to argument than many of the claims and arguments that Porter advances throughout the text, and while his attempts to read Nietzsche in this manner are sometimes forced and less than wholly compelling, his development of it is a further important source of the interest of this work.—Steven G. Affeldt, *University of Notre Dame.*

RAMOS, Alice, editor. *Beauty, Art and the Polis.* American Maritain Association. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000. x + 310 pp. Paper, $15.00—This collection of twenty two essays, with an introduction by Ralph McInerny, is selected from papers presented to the 1999 meeting of the American Maritain Association.

The essays are grouped under three principal headings: I. The Foundations of Beauty, Art and Creativity; II. The Arts, the Artist and Interpretations; and III. Art, Morality and the Polis. Topics range from

Thomistic metaphysics underlying Maritain's aesthetics (J. G. Trapani, Matthew Cuddeback) to contemporary aesthetic theories (Brian J. Braman) and political considerations such as the effect of rock music on aesthetic sensibilities and morality (Wayne Harter). Contributors range from young scholars to professors *emerti*.

With such diversity in topics and contributors, the collection, nonetheless, has several unifying themes variously treated. Among the more interesting are: the relations between God the Creator and the poet or artist as creator, with positions considered ranging from God as the sole creator to the replacing of a religious by an aesthetic outlook (Patrick Downey, Braman); the inherent dangers and necessity of interpretation of works of art; the metaphysical and epistemological foundations of beauty in art and nature; the effects of art on the education of the emotions; and, how the understanding of aesthetic principles and their application contributes to the well-being of the individual in society.

The collection is catholic in that it offers something to every aesthetic persuasion without losing sight of the Thomistic framework. Following is a brief mention of a few essays the reviewer found especially interesting.

Ralph McInerny's introduction to the volume, "A Bracelet of Bright Hair About the Bone," written in the author's usual inimitable style, reminds the reader of the importance of aesthetics in the life of Jacques and Raissa Maritain, of the tradition, beginning with Aristotle which nourished Maritain's work, and of Maritain's own writing in aesthetics, especially *Art and Scholasticism* and *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry*. The short, but rich essay by J. G. Trapani, Jr., "Radiance: The Metaphysical Foundations of Maritain's Aesthetics," treats the relations between the love of radiance and the radiance of love, emphasizing Maritain's view in *Existence and the Existent* that love can become a vehicle for nonconceptual knowledge. Matthew Cuddeback's "Form and Fluidity" is a carefully crafted scholarly essay on the "Aquinian Roots of Maritain's Doctrine of the Spiritual Preconscious" (the subtitle).

The lover of Dante will appreciate the essay by Patrick Downey, "Dante, Aquinas, and the Roots of the Modern Aesthetization of Reality," which revisits Auerbach's treatment of Dante's vision of reality and considers the concept of "figural interpretation," endorsed by both Aquinas and Dante and extensively discussed in Auerbach's *Mimesis*.

Ralph Nelson in "Music and Religion in Gilson's Philosophy of Art" offers Gilson's position that sacred music should be beautiful and appropriate for Christian worship as a basis for criticism of modern approaches to religious music, as exhibited, for example, in *Jesus Christ Superstar*. Wayne Harter in "Dangerous Music" considers the advantages and disadvantages for the common good of censoring certain types of rock music.

The editor of the volume, Alice Ramos, provides a careful treatment of Aquinas's view on the beauty of the universe in relation to the human intellect, and considers the ethical implications of this relation in "Beauty, Mind and the Universe."

Space precludes mention of other individual essays, but each expresses a view worth considering. Taken together they provide a much needed counterbalance to contemporary aesthetic theories, many of which present the beautiful as a purely subjective experience or cultural construct.

Given the title and content of the volume, it is perhaps not inappropriate to note that the book, distributed by the Catholic University of America Press, from cover to cover is beautifully produced. The front cover in muted tones of gentle brown displays a photograph of Rodin's sculpture, *Pensee*, chosen, as the editor remarks, "not only for its beauty, but also as a reminder . . . that beauty is essentially found in the contemplative life, in the act of reason."—Anne M. Wiles, *James Madison University.*

SASSEN, Brigitte, editor and translator. *Kant's Early Critics: The Empiricist Critique of the Theoretical Philosophy.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. ix + 331 pp. Cloth, $54.95—This volume of translations of early Kant reception, both of critics and of a few defenders, makes available important texts, both for study of modern philosophy and for contemporary discussion of the relevance of Kant's immense historical influence. The volume's five sections address several of the main problems posed by the theoretical part of Kant's Critical Philosophy to his contemporaries, in particular the three central discussions centered on the Transcendental Aesthetic (5 texts), Idealism (5 texts), and the Categories (4 texts). The volume is heavily endnoted, providing many useful supplementary discussions and a wealth of references to other relevant works; two appendices give short sketches of the authors and other important figures in early Kant reception, and there is a glossary of German terms.

Sassen's introductions to the authors of the articles, while providing excellent summaries of the texts and placing them in historical continuity with Kant's works, each other, and other philosophical movements and developments, at times underplays the relevance of the criticisms made in early Kant reception to criticisms made by other more contemporary philosophical figures; this is not a shortcoming of her work, however, as these connections are easily noted when reading the texts.

While Kant's empiricist critics drew upon previous authors in that tradition, notably Locke, the discussions represented here are not "pre"-critical; their empiricism addresses gaps in the transcendental project of critique of perception, understanding, and reasoning by indicating the weaknesses and abstractness of Kant's own treatments. It is the necessity of the Kantian approach to philosophy that is called into question; these authors, sometimes charged with simply misunderstanding Kant's works or cleaving uncritically to previous dogmatic positions, as the

attention to their texts this volume makes possible reveals, develop quite consistent positions that address the Critical Philosophy on some of its own grounds, grounds it shares with other philosophical systems.

Many of the critics reject Kant's reduction of the self, God, and world to mere regulative ideas; this also entails rejecting the mere phenomenality of objects and of other selves, persons; recognizing the correctness of Kant's assertion that things cannot be known absolutely in themselves, they remain unconvinced that the nature of things cannot be known at all, specifically by empirical as opposed to transcendental or deductive means. Johan G. H. Feder jibes at one point, "I have never been so fortunate to see Königsberg and its famous philosopher, even though I have a lively and presumably in many parts correct representation of him. I have spoken with many persons who know him personally, who love and honor him. But who would refuse to accord him an existence independently of the representations of those who have seen him as well as of my representations?" (pp. 144–5).

Some of the critics attack Kant's use of language as obscure, as deliberately deviating from commonly accepted use of terminology, a charge that Georg C. Lichtenberg later considered in detail; in effect, Kant's Copernican Revolution achieved its purchase not only through close attention to concepts and intuition, but also through the development of a new philosophical vocabulary that disconcertingly displaced and resituated older ones. Early reception of the Kantian philosophy made use of not a few themes that are typically associated with twentieth-century philosophy, in particular with figures such as Bergson, Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty; though not mentioned by the same terms, these early critics hint at the centrality of the body, and the role of language in structuring cognition and relations, and intersubjectivity.—Gregory Sadler, *Southern Illinois University, Carbondale.*

SCHALL, James V. *Schall on Chesterton: Timely Essays on Timeless Paradoxes*. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000. xiv + 267 pp. Paper, $24.95—A book with the sole intention of mediating the thought of G. K. Chesterton would seem unnecessary. Is not Chesterton himself known and loved precisely for his uncanny ability to mediate for us—through his utterly translucent prose—what often seems an incomprehensible and opaque universe? However, just as the multiple mediators in the *Divine Comedy*, the Virgin Mary, Lucia, Beatrice, Virgil, and St. Bernard, in virtue of whom Dante was finally proffered the *visio Dei*, did in no way dim his final illumination, so also does Schall's mediation of the light of Chesterton diminish none of its brightness. On the contrary, Schall's reflections serve only to focus and intensify it.

"This book is a book about many things—poetry, philosophy, redemption, family, evil, blessedness, good humor, good will. Chesterton is someone who still teaches us, still delights us. These essays can teach us how to read him—carefully, prepared to encounter *all that is*" (p.

225). The forty-five essays in this collection (which comes to about five pages an essay) touch upon just about every facet of human existence, because they are, in a word, Chestertonian essays. That is, just as Chesterton's enormous mind could not help encompassing and articulating everything, even when he was only talking about one thing, Schall's reflections about Chestertonian particulars give us profound insights about *all that is*.

Each essay is the fruit of a consideration of one of Chesterton's fertile thoughts, gleaned from a chapter in one of his books, an essay he had penned in the *Illustrated London News*, or a phrase others had cited from him. The first chapter, "G. K. Chesterton, Journalist," explains how it is that the man who was best known for his supernal speculations on the nature of man, the cosmos, and God, and who was a jack of all trades and master of all—literature, theology, philosophy, poetry, detective stories, humor, science, literary criticism, politics, apologetics, economics, history, biography, travel—could identify himself in the end as merely a journalist. The answer, according to Chesterton, is that whatever ethereal ruminations and metaphysical pronouncements Chesterton might have uttered, they always had their origin in the flesh and mud, warp and woof, of ordinary life and ordinary things. Chesterton's newspaper articles may have ascended to the universal and the extraordinary, but they always began with the common opinions found in those very same newspapers. "The mystery of G. K. Chesterton's success in journalism, the thinking from which he did not shrink, the intellectual paths on which he did not fear to tread, is simply that he perceived that the truth about which he wrote existed there before everyone's eyes" (p. 20).

For Chesterton, as well as for Schall, every truth is connected to every other one; if you dig deeply enough into one particular aspect of reality, you are bound to unearth another. It is the same for the essays in this volume. One may open Schall's book at any page and begin reading to be instantly immersed in profundity, though it is the kind of profundity that appears too simple to be profound. Like Chesterton, Schall is able to portray the deep meaning of things without ever moving far away from those things. It is difficult, then, to give a generic summary of the essays in this collection, for the sundry, particular topics about which Schall writes remain particular topics even when they are made to illumine the universal. A partial list might help, however. Schall discusses the potential sanctity of cigarette-smoking souls, the miracle of mere existence, the untested hypothesis of Christianity, the nonsensicalness of nonsense, lusty and boisterous Christmas carols, the unbearableness of Jesus's mirth, the modern inability to blaspheme, the need for horrible words for horrible things, how tolerance is intolerance, shouting joyfully about cows with four legs and birds that fly, how dogmas are not dull, and the enemies of the man who had no enemies. In a generic way, it can only be said that the typical essay in this volume begins with an actual citation or paraphrased idea of Chesterton upon which Schall reflects. After that, the character of Schall's reflections are as unique and untranslatable as Chesterton's—one must read them for oneself to get the real import.

"The Enemies of the Man Who Had No Enemies." Schall ends his book with a chapter explaining how this Chestertonian paradox applies to Chesterton. Even those who vehemently disagreed with the girthful Englishman could never dislike him. Yet intellectually speaking, he made enemies of the entire modern world. The enemies of Chesterton were and are, in a word, the enemies of reality, those who do not care to see what is in front of their eyes—and who despise Chesterton for pointing both it and their ignorance of it out to them. The fact that he did it with such humor and mirth makes no difference at this deep level of contradiction. For Chesterton, the enemies of reality are the ideologues and utopians who want to substitute a joyless, humorless, technocratic control over the universe for the happiness and festivity which comes only from submitting oneself to it. Chesterton wrote, "I could never conceive or tolerate any Utopia which did not leave me liberty for which I really cared, the liberty to bind myself" (p. 237). *Schall on Chesterton* should be read by those wishing to bind themselves to the truth, a truth that both so brilliantly mediate.—Thaddeus J. Kozinski, *Manassas, Virginia.*

SCHONFELD, Martin. *The Philosophy of the Young Kant: The Precritical Project.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. xv + 348 pp. Cloth, $55.00—When Kant finished the *Critique of Pure Reason* in 1781, he was 56 years old and had already published more than 25 essays and monographs. In this precritical oeuvre the young Kant unabashedly answered some of the most difficult questions of theoretical physics, physical geography, cosmology, theology, and moral theory, advancing ambitious theories about the origin and history of the universe, the nature of space, the age of the earth and the stability of its rotation, the causes of earthquakes, winds, and fire, the ultimate components of reality, the soundness of optimism, the legitimate domain of logic, the character of the beautiful and the sublime, the first principles of theology and morality, the possibility of proving God's existence, and—tellingly, at the end—the connection between metaphysics and madness. Since this dizzying speculative array appears to be unified only by the young Kant's "metaphysical exuberance" (p. 178), his precritical thought is often dismissed as the work of an unfocused dilettante.

Through a careful reassessment of the first two decades of Kant's philosophical career (1746–66), Schönfeld overturns this outmoded caricature by demonstrating that Kant's pursuit of an ambitious "precritical project" provided his early work with an overarching unity. The young Kant presciently confronted what would become one of the deepest problems of modernity; he sought to develop a "philosophy of nature" which would bridge the emerging gulf between physics and metaphysics—the very gulf which, ironically, his own later critical work helped widen into an abyss. Long before the critical Kant insisted on the dualism of the sensible and the intelligible realms, the young Kant struggled to fuse the empirical-quantitative approach of Newton and the mecha-

nists with the rational-qualitative perspective of Leibniz and the Wolffians. His aim was to secure a place for the central tenets of German metaphysics within the emerging empirical perspective, reconciling "the metaphysical assumptions of a uniform structure of nature, of a purpose to the world, and of the possibility of freedom" with "a modern mechanical model of physical nature" (p. 9).

The young Kant sought to bring peace to three major fronts on the battlefield between physics and metaphysics by showing that an empirically coherent, mechanistic worldview need not reject the uniformity of nature, the purposiveness of history, or the reality of human freedom. Understanding the telos of nature as self-organization into a state of perfection (p. 110), Kant was the first correctly to explain the seasonal occurrences of monsoons (p. 77), the deceleration of the earth's rotation (p. 83), and he advanced a "nebular hypothesis" about the formation of the solar system which was confirmed two centuries later (pp. 113–17). Yet Kant's speculative fusion of physics and metaphysics did not always yield such edifying conclusions. His extension of Newton's law of universal gravitation led to outlandish ideas about extraterrestrial intelligence; since "the farther intelligent life-forms are from the sun, the less matter inhibits the unfolding of rationality," humans must occupy a "middle rung" on the "cosmic ladder" of intelligence, between "the small, sun-blackened, and heat-frazzled Mercurians crazily dashing about" and "the ponderous and somber sages of Saturn" (pp. 117–21). Worse, Kant's Newtonian suppositions propped up his opprobrious racist belief that skin tone correlates with intelligence, with black skin being a "distinct proof" of "stupidity" (pp. 121–4). Schönfeld nicely avoids hagiography (indeed, his rhetorical ethos occasionally swings a bit far in the other direction, and some of his rather quick dismissals will no doubt be contested), but on the issue of "Kant's Alleged Racism," Kant is let off the hook a bit easily: "Kant's racist opinions reveal the deficiencies of the man, but not the failings of his philosophy" (p. 124). As Schönfeld documents, however, Kant's personal prejudices led to philosophical contradictions as well.

Predictably, Kant's struggle to reconcile a noncompatibilist notion of freedom with a mechanistic worldview was no more successful than his attempts to "reconcile physics with a divinely inspired purpose" (p. 98). To account for libertarian freedom and a purposeful creator God, Kant introduces "two incompatible types of causation in one and the same world" (p. 99). He invokes a mysterious "physical influx" reminiscent of the vitalistic notion of an empirically efficacious yet naturalistically irreducible "living force" (p. 54) he had proposed in his earliest publication, a "debacle" mercilessly lampooned by Lessing (p. 37). Kant never solved this antinomy of freedom and determinism, but the very idea that there was no solution to such antinomies became a positive insight for his critical philosophy. Where the precritical project sought to marry the perspectives of physics and metaphysics, the critical philosophy made their divorce axiomatic, separating "a 'sensible world' described by science" from "an 'intelligible world' explored by metaphysics" (pp. 184, 246).

Schönfeld's grasp of the history of science is impressive, and his reconstructions of the young Kant's historical context are meticulous and instructive. By persuasively illustrating the inner logic of Kant's early development, Schönfeld's clear, well-organized, and copiously annotated book makes an important contribution to Kant scholarship.—Iain Thomson, *University of New Mexico.*

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. *Outlines of Scepticism.* Edited by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. xxxv + 248 pp. Cloth, $54.95; paper, $19.95—Reviewers greeted the first edition (1994) of this volume with enthusiasm and gratitude. Annas and Barnes made available something long needed: a modern translation into English, thoroughly informed by recent developments in the scholarly and philosophical discussion of Hellenistic philosophy, of Sextus Empiricus' *Pyrrōneioi Hypotypōseis* (*PH*), the *Outlines of Pyrrhonism.* Moreover, Annas and Barnes augmented their translation with three useful features.

First, in one series of footnotes, they provide extensive cross-references to other parts of Sextus' treatise, to other works of Sextus', and to other ancient writers' discussions of the same (or a related) topic; and sometimes, in the case of especially important or controversial passages, Annas and Barnes refer readers to relevant works of the modern secondary literature. (However, as Richard Bett pointed out [*Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 115 (1995), p. 212], the notes contain at least several small typographical errors; unfortunately, these were not corrected in this second edition. It also seems as if one or two pages of abbreviations were accidentally omitted between pp. ix–x, for the list jumps from Cicero to Porphyry; nonexpert readers are thus left to puzzle out as best they can entries in the notes like "Galen, *an pecc dig*" [p. 131 n. 329] or "Philo, *ebr*" [p. 37 n. 47].) Second, in another series of footnotes, Annas and Barnes indicate where they depart from the Teubner text of Mutschmann and Mau (Leipzig, 1958). These changes, although mostly minor, reflect a judicious engagement with textual details which should prove invaluable to any future editors and/or translators of Sextus. Third, Annas and Barnes provide two glossaries, one from Greek to English, the other from English to Greek—a feature so helpful that it should become standard for translations of this sort.

Despite the overall excellence and accuracy of the translation, several key terms—including *dogma* (and related expressions), *pathos*, and *phantasia* (which I shall not discuss)—are rendered in ways which, perhaps not surprisingly, fit best with the philosophical interpretation favored by Annas and Barnes but which also occlude alternative interpretations. (On the philosophical issues, compare pp. xxi–xxvii, especially pp. xxiii–xxv, of the Introduction, of which Barnes is the sole author.)

By translating *dogma* as "belief," Annas and Barnes leave Sextus advocating living a life without any beliefs whatsoever. Yet as Barnes showed in an earlier article ("The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist" [1982], reprint

in M. Burnyeat and M. Frede, *The Original Sceptics* [Indianapolis, 1997]), although the core meaning of *dogma* is indeed belief, it is used by philosophical and quasi-philosophical writers to refer to tenets, doctrines, or principles ("Beliefs," p. 69; compare pp. 70–3); and at, for example, *PH* I, 234–5, Sextus, in speaking of Platonic (and Stoic) *dogmata*, is surely speaking of Platonic (and Stoic) *doctrines* or *philosophical views*. Moreover, the political contexts in which the term *dogma* was originally used (compare "Beliefs," p. 68) suggest that part of what is involved in holding a *dogma* is *deciding* to hold it. We should also recall two central tenets of the Stoics (the star cases of those philosophers whom Sextus labels "Dogmatists" [*PH* I, 3 and *passim*]): (1) Belief is always up to us because it is always a matter of not only having an impression (*phantasia*) that something is so-and-so, but also actively assenting to that impression; (2) Such assent, if it is to be rational and thus conducive to a flourishing life, must be based on reason. For Sextus, holding a view *dogmatikōs* (which Annas and Barnes render as "dogmatically" or "in dogmatic fashion"; see *PH* I, 193, 197, 198, 202, 203, 204; II, 254) would therefore be holding it in the way in which his philosophical opponents, principally the Stoics, maintain we should hold views: on the basis of compelling, philosophical reasons. One might, therefore, prefer to translate *dogmatikōs* as "in the Dogmatists' fashion."

More important, when Sextus denies that a Pyrrhonist holds *dogmata* (*PH* I, 13), he need therefore only be denying that the Pyrrhonist holds views on the basis of (alleged) philosophical justifications; that, however, is perfectly compatible with his having beliefs (in, as Sextus puts it, a more general sense of *dogma* [ibid.]), for example, believing that honey tastes sweet.

Similarly, when Sextus says he is proceeding *adoxastōs* (*PH* I, 15, 23–4, 226, 231 [compare 240]; II, 102, 246, 254, 258; III, 2, 151, 235) that need not mean he is proceeding "without holding opinions" (so Annas and Barnes). This rendering sounds especially odd at *PH* III, 151, where number and counting are at issue. Sextus is not saying that when a Pyrrhonist counts, he has no opinions (he presumably does have beliefs about, for example, how many cats are sleeping on his sofa); Sextus rather is saying that one need have no philosophical views about numbers or their nature in order to count, say, cats. Thus *adoxastōs* seems simply to mean "without holding *dogmata*," namely, not *dogmatikōs*. (Barnes himself, in the earlier article, recognized that "[a]ll the *PH* passages will readily accept that meaning [namely, of *adoxastōs*]" ["Beliefs," pp. 78–9 n. 77].)

One reason why Annas and Barnes's translation of *dogma* and related words may seem attractive is because of how they construe *pathē*, namely, as "feelings." For Sextus repeatedly says that the Pyrrhonist will follow, *adoxastōs*, his *pathē*; and if these *pathē* are feelings (of a sort essentially lacking cognitive content), it is fairly easy to see how one could follow them without believing anything: the feelings themselves simply lead to, or issue in, the relevant behavior. Yet we should be open to the possibility that Sextus uses *pathos* not to refer to anything wholly noncognitive or merely phenomenological—something for which the term *pathos* is rather poorly suited in any event (one need

only recall that according to almost all ancient philosophers from Socrates onwards, beliefs are constitutive elements of the emotions [*pathē*])—but to emphasize the passive element in ordinary and Pyrrhonean believing. For the Pyrrhonist, just like an ordinary person, does not in general decide whether to believe what he believes; rather, he simply finds himself believing things. This does not mean that he uncritically believes whatever comes his way. Experience might well lead him, just as it leads ordinary people, not to believe, for example, that an oar is bent, if it is submerged in water. Moreover, the Pyrrhonist has found that whenever there is a question about which he does need to decide what to believe—on account of the "anomalies in things" which drove him (and the proto-Dogmatist) to philosophy in the first place (*PH* I, 12)—philosophical argumentation actually does not enable him to settle the matter but leaves him with equipollent arguments on both sides of the issue. As a result of this equipollence, he finds himself suspending judgment, at least insofar as philosophical justifications for a view (or its negation) are concerned. He cannot, for example, decide whether the nature of honey is such as to be sweet; indeed, he cannot decide whether items like honey or sweetness even figure in the fundamental inventory of the world. For all that, though, he can say that honey tastes sweet. Maintaining that this in no way involves believing that honey tastes sweet seems to be saddling Sextus with a dogmatist's conception of belief. We should, then, not construe the *pathē* in a way which simply precludes their having cognitive content. A more neutral translation, like "states" or "passive affections," would disclose this interpretative option.

All this is not to say that there is nothing to be said in favor of Annas and Barnes's preferred alternatives. There clearly is. Such a discussion might well have been part of a fuller introduction than the one provided, and would have been very welcome in this second edition. (Compare the quite extensive introduction of Benson Mates's in Oxford University Press's rival translation: *The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, [Oxford, 1996], pp. 4–85.)

On a more positive note: Annas and Barnes's truly enviable expertise with Hellenistic philosophy shines through in their translation of, and notes to, *PH* II which is concerned with logic, philosophy of language, and epistemology. As do most good things, this volume leaves one wanting more. We sorely need a new translation of another work of Sextus's, *Adversus Mathematicos* VII and VIII (which covers, more extensively, the same terrain as *PH* II). Indeed, Annas and Barnes's book leaves me wishing that the relevant Teubner texts would (finally) be revised or at least reprinted, or that, perhaps even more usefully for a broader range of readers, we could have a new Loeb edition (with Greek and English on facing pages) of all of Sextus. It is difficult to think of a better team than Annas and Barnes for producing such an edition. In any event, the present translation will be an essential starting point for any future work on the *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*.

Finally, a comment on the printing. This is one of the most poorly printed books I have come across from a major publisher in a long time. (To rule out that the problems were features merely of my copy, I checked three others, each of which contained similar defects.) Overall,

the printing is blotchy and smudged, looking like the product of a low resolution dot-matrix printer. On many, many pages, letters are broken or only partially printed. The Greek words in the glossaries (pp. 224–32) are particularly hard to read: the letters actually bleed into each other. The $54.95 which Cambridge University Press is charging for the hardback only adds insult to the injury: Sextus Empiricus, Annas and Barnes, and their readership surely deserve better.—Wolfgang-Rainer Mann, *Columbia University.*

VANDERBURG, Willem H. *The Labyrinth of Technology: A Preventive Technology and Economic Strategy as a Way Out.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000. xvii + 476 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $24.95—Willem Vanderburg holds professorships in both sociology and engineering at the University of Toronto, and is the founding director of the Centre for Technology and Social Development. This provocative, interdisciplinary work encompasses very diverse areas such as epistemology, history and philosophy of science and technology, ecology, and sociology. The book includes a preface (pp. xi–xvii), postscript (pp. 419–30), notes (pp. 431–65), and index (pp. 467–76). The main text is divided into four numbered parts and eleven numbered chapters, which are further subdivided into numbered sections (for example, 1.1).

In Vanderburg's epistemology, knowledge arises from a dynamic interplay of differentiation and unity. "There are knowledge strategies based on specialization, or knowing more and more about less and less, and those based primarily . . . on context, or knowing less and less about more and more" (p. 113). Modern science and technology are seen as too narrow-channeled, focused on economic "performance values" (p. 9), which minimize the context of "human life, society, and the biosphere" (p. 23). According to Vanderburg, all these aspects of existence are in fact intimately interrelated. The currently prevalent focus on science, technology, and narrowly defined economic achievement largely prevents most people from perceiving the dangers for human life, society, and the biosphere arising out of the triumph of the former outlooks. The core of Vanderburg's book is an exploration of how "preventive approaches" (p. 3), which would restore the balance, can be theorized and practically effected.

Chapter 1, "Preventive Approaches as a New Technology and Economic Strategy" (pp. 3–50), begins Vanderburg's very weighty analysis. He argues that preventive approaches, while aiding society and ecology, are also economically positive and truly efficient, if economy and efficiency are not defined reductively. Chapters 2 (pp. 51–88) and 3 (pp. 89–129) look at the individual and collective steps which would be required for preventive approaches to become more pervasive. In these two chapters, the current technological, scientific, and disciplinary outlooks which characterize engineering are criticized. Having conducted an extensive survey of the engineering curriculum (with the

participation of numerous students) Vanderburg finds it lacking in context values and preventive approaches. The engineering profession is important because it plays a major part in "the engineering, management, and regulation of modern technology" (p. 52). Vanderburg makes an interesting point about "the double meaning of ignorance," (pp. 89–93) contrasting the arrogance often found in professional experts who discount everything outside their narrow fields with the profound curiosity and willingness to acknowledge by real scholars that they know little about many areas of life.

Chapter 4 (pp. 133–61) gives some of the "Tools for Map-Making" (p. 133), which is what Vanderburg calls the process of assessing various social and ecological impacts of individual technologies—or of "mapping the ecology of technology" (p. 133). Chapter 5 (pp. 162–81) looks at the "Context Values for Map-Making" (p. 162). Chapter 6 (pp. 185–211) examines how "sustainable development" (p. 185) is to be conceptualized. Chapter 7, "Differentiating a Way of Life" (pp. 212–45), looks at how better and worse ways of social life can be ascertained from truly social and ecological standpoints. Chapter 8 (pp. 252–92) examines "Materials and Production" beginning with "the precautionary principle" (p. 252), which "recognizes that society, in general, and technology, in particular, depend on the life-support and other functions of the biosphere" (p. 254). Chapter 9 (pp. 293–322) looks at "Energy," emphasizing the importance of energy-conservation efforts—"negawatts" (p. 307)—and embracing "soft energy paths" (p. 299). Chapter 10 looks at "Work" (pp. 323–71). Vanderburg identifies a conflict in work situations between "knowledge embedded in experience" and "knowledge separated from experience" (p. 342). The latter is the usual mode for technical and scientific outlooks. Vanderburg sees Scandinavia (pp. 360–70) as a model for the structuring of work. Chapter 11, "The Built Habitat" (pp. 372–417), examines the place of big cities in the life of societies and the biosphere. Vanderburg discusses how catastrophic the late modern city has been to both social life and ecology.

In his Postscript, Vanderburg traces a thought experiment as to what might happen if his academic theories became more popular. However, he pessimistically concludes that such a success would only be a small step forward, because of the all-pervasive nature of technology today, which has become "a sacred" (p. 252) for our society. "It is only by means of an iconoclasm towards the deep cultural values and beliefs of our age that a mutation towards a humane and common future can occur" (p. 430).

Although the work may be seen as broadly neotraditionalist, its entirely unqualified praise of traditional societies and outlooks in contrast with late modern societies that are said to be much worse is questionable. At the same time, it maintains a curious silence about Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and those parts of the current-day system that arise out of the excesses of left-liberalism—rather than of the corporate right. The work could be seen to understate the roles of varied, much different politics and ideology in the utilization of technologies which may often be physically similar.—Mark Wegierski, *Canadian-Polish Research Institute.*

VERBEEK, Theo, editor. *Johannes Clauberg (1622–1665) and Cartesian Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century.* International Archives of the History of Ideas, vol. 164. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999. vi + 207 pp. Cloth, $103.00—Johannes Clauberg has always been recognized as an important figure between the new and the antique philosophy, but little has been done to assess his significance. The volume edited by Theo Verbeek is the first aimed at exploring Clauberg's position with respect to Cartesianism and the ramifications of his own arguments. It contains the papers delivered at a colloquium in Groningen in 1995. A first group of articles deals with Clauberg's first metaphysical construction, his *Ontosophia* (1646). Ulrich Gottfried Leinsle examines the sources of the *Ontosophia* in the *Pansophia* of Comenius, V. Carraud investigates the variants of the various editions of the *Ontosophia* until 1664 outlining the difficulties of conciliating ontology and theory of subjectivity, Jean-Christophe Bardout its impact on Malebranche, and Jean École on Wolff. A second group of articles deals with problems of knowledge. Aza Goudriaan writes about Clauberg's position on the knowledge of God, L. Spruit on perceptual knowledge, and Detlev Pätzold on causality. Claude Weber delves into Clauberg's attempt of providing a systematic description of the etymology of the German language, Theo Verbeek into Clauberg's activity as a teacher of Descartes's *Principia philosophiae,* and Christia Mercer into Clauberg's notion of corporeal substance. Michael Albrecht, finally, considers the impact of Clauberg's work from the peculiar and nonetheless very proper standpoint of "eclectic philosophy." A biographical and bibliographical sketch by Theo Verbeek concludes the volume.

Nobody will dispute that Cartesian philosophy belongs to the history of metaphysics. Yet its belonging there has something paradoxal, because Descartes never elaborated on the issue of *ens in quantum ens,* and especially because Descartes's first philosophy constituted itself in radical opposition to Post-Tridentine Catholic and Protestant scholastic philosophy. Besides, the term "ontology" itself did not exist in ancient Greek; it was a neologism that appeared first in 1612 in the *Lexicon philosophicum* by the Calvinist Rudolph Goclenius, which brought Clauberg, who was also a Calvinist, given his temporal and confessional proximity to Goclenius, to be the very first to publish a treatise carrying "ontology" in the title. The problem was that Clauberg considered himself as both a Cartesian and a defender of ontology. How can that work? Can ontology admit the *ego* in its singularity as its first foundation? What is the interest for the *cogito* from a scholastic point of view? (p. 13–14). Clauberg's answer was simple: conciliation, that is, to attempt the resolution of contradictions between isolated philosophical theses taken from various contexts and enunciated in form of antilogies in order to answer an initial question. In fact, Clauberg's *Metaphysica de Ente* (the third edition of the *Ontosophia,* which appeared in 1664) marks the beginning of the so-called Cartesian scholastic (p. 14), which is indeed a form of Cartesian Aristotelianism.—Riccardo Pozzo, *The Catholic University of America.*

WILSON, Malcolm. *Aristotle's Theory of the Unity of Science.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000. x + 271 pp. Cloth, $75.00—Nothing has so plagued twentieth-century philosophers of science as the demarcation problem—the effort to determine what constitutes science and marks it off from other human pursuits. We have come to the end of the century with, to say the least, no consensus among philosophers on this issue. This has led some, such as Larry Laudan, to announce the abandonment of the demarcation project, urging philosophers to turn their attention elsewhere. One wonders, however, whether all the options have been explored. In particular, has the problem been sufficiently investigated in light of its historical origins? This question takes on some urgency, not only with the failure of modern philosophy of science to develop a viable definition of science, but also in light of recent developments in Aristotle studies. After all, Aristotle was the first philosopher to attempt a systematic account of the nature of science and the details of this account have been a major focus of the scholarship of the past two decades, especially in the work of such scholars as Pierre Pellegrin, James Lennox, and David Balme, to mention only a very few.

In this context, Malcolm Wilson's treatment of Aristotle's conception of science is a welcome addition to the growing body of literature on this subject. Beginning with the distinction of the sciences according to their subject-genera in the *Posterior Analytics*, Wilson goes on to investigate the use of analogy, focality, and cumulation as apparent in Aristotle's other works. It is these modes of connection among the distinct sciences which allow an articulation of the relationships among them, thus solving the problem of the diversity within unity of the sciences. By means of this approach, Wilson is able to show how Aristotle provided a viable general definition of science while at the same time attending to the specific differences among the special sciences.

The thesis of this book must be understood in light of recent discussions of the relationship of the *Posterior Analytics* to Aristotle's scientific works, especially the biological treatises. Scholarship of the past two decades has abandoned the notion that the method described in the *Analytics* represents a formalized ideal, in contrast to the varied method actually used in the *libri naturales*. The tendency of earlier scholarship had been to interpret the method as a sort of *modus geometricus*, that is, as a formal axiomatic system. This tendency is missing from more recent studies which provide a more subtle interpretation of Aristotle's complex research dialectic as a two-stage method involving definition, division, and other techniques as a preparation for causal demonstration. Focusing on the relationship of the *Analytics* and the biological works, these latter studies have made progress in understanding the nature of science as a dialectical investigation of its particular subject-genus. Little, however, has been done by these scholars to articulate Aristotle's notion of the relationship among the various special sciences. Because it is discussed in some detail in the *Posterior Analytics*, genus subordination has received some attention, but Aristotle's other techniques of analogy, focality, and ontological inclusion have been relatively unstudied as elements of scientific method. Wilson, then, attempts to fill this gap by attending to these latter techniques and demonstrating their role within the general account of the *Analytics*.

Wilson locates much of his evidence for the role of analogy in the biological works, as one might expect. Two chapters are devoted to analogy in biology, treating the technique both in terms of the method of division and demonstration. Another chapter discusses the limits of focality in biology, but most of the treatment of focality derives from the science of being. Wilson gives particular attention to the definition of being in *Metaphysics* 7. A separate chapter deals with mixed used of analogy and focality, and the final chapter is devoted to what Wilson calls cumulation (the ontological inclusion of one potentiality within another, as the nutritive soul is included within the sensitive soul). Here he turns to the functions of the soul in *De anima* 2 and to friendship in the *Eudemian Ethics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The book also includes a bibliography of works cited, an index locorum, and a general index.

Wilson's book is a development of certain laudable trends in current Aristotle studies regarding the conception of science. It can also serve as a contribution to modern philosophy of science. By clarifying the application of that most difficult of Aristotle's works, the *Posterior Analytics*, to actual scientific research, Wilson has perhaps provided more options for the modern philosopher of science in dealing with such vexing problems as demarcation.—Michael W. Tkacz, *Gonzaga University*.

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CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES*

PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS

INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 41, No. 4, December 2001

Perplexity Simpliciter and Perplexity Secundum Quid: A Look at Some Contemporary Appeals to St. Thomas Aquinas, M. V. DOUGHERTY

Some recent commentators have attempted to demonstrate that Aquinas defends the possibility that an innocent agent can, through no fault of his own, find himself in a situation where he must to do something wrong. The author traces the cause of this misinterpretation to the fact that nearly all commentators, including these recent ones, focus on only four passages from the Thomistic corpus, and none of these passages can solve the issue definitively. The treatment of these four texts as exhaustive and canonical has led to infelicitous renderings of Aquinas's position on the matter. By examining the distinction Aquinas makes between situations that are *perplexus simpliciter* and *perplexus secundum quid*, and by looking at some ignored texts on the issue of moral dilemmas for innocent agents, it can be shown that those who argue for the existence of genuine moral dilemmas will have to look elsewhere than to Thomas Aquinas for support.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 99, No. 6, June 2002

The Ersatz Pluriverse, THEODORE SIDER

Reductive theories about possible worlds are attractive (for who can believe David Lewis's modal realism?) but cannot account for possibilities involving nonactual individuals, properties, and relations. Such possibilities are usually constructed as representations of the roles the nonactual entities

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*Abstracts of articles from leading philosophical journals are published as a regular feature of the *Review*. We wish to thank the editors of the journals represented for their cooperation, and the authors of the articles for their willingness to submit abstracts. Where abstracts have not been submitted, the name and author of the article are listed.

The Review of Metaphysics 55 (December 2001): 431–433. *Copyright* © 2001 *by The Review of Metaphysics*

would occupy, but this collapses apparently distinct possibilities in which different nonactual entities swap roles. The solution is to provide a holistic account of possible worlds, in which a single abstract entity—the "ersatz pluriverse"—represents the entire plurality of worlds all at once. The paper develops this theory in detail, answers objections, and compares the theory with modal fictionalism.

MONIST
Vol. 85, No. 2, April 2002

Calibrating Evil, HILLEL STEINER

This article explores the common idea that evil acts, though wrong, are neither merely wrong nor more wrong, but rather possess some common property additional to their wrong-making properties. To do this, it formulates and assesses the *Negative Counterpart Thesis* (NCT): that evil acts are the negative symmetrical counterparts of supererogatory ones. NCT is shown to be only partly correct: evil acts, in being forbidden ones, lack symmetry with supererogatory ones inasmuch as the latter are nonobligatory. The aforesaid symmetry therefore does not lie in their respective modal (deontic) properties but is, instead, to be found in their affective properties, whereby evil acts are pleasurable for their doers while supererogatory acts are painful to perform. This conception allows the quantifiability of evil—as in "the lesser of two evils"—construing its metric as a compound one, combining that of wrongness with that of pleasure.—Correspondence to: hillel.steiner@man.ac.uk

A Kantian Theory of Evil, ERNESTO V. GARCIA

Defining Evil—Insights from the Problem of "Dirty Hands," STEPHEN DE WIJZE

This paper offers a secular and qualitative account of the nature of evil that best fits with our deeply held moral intuitions. This secular understanding of evil eschews both a religious explanation and the reductionist positions in contemporary moral theory which explain the term "evil" as either morally primitive or merely as an intensifier of wrongful actions. Using insights derived from exploring the problem of "dirty hands," the paper outlines three conditions which account for the qualitatively different nature of evil; namely, the deliberate violation of persons with the intention to dehumanize, the gratuitous infliction of the "Great Harms," and the annihilation of the moral landscape. This paper argues that an action, project, or state-of-affairs is evil if it meets at least one these three conditions. The paper concludes by testing these conditions against a number of examples of actions that might be characterized as evil.—Correspondence to: dewijze@man.ac.uk

The Evolutionary Biology of Evil, PAUL THOMPSON

Moral Monsters and Saints, DANIEL M. HAYBRON

This paper argues for the moral significance of the notion of an evil person or character. First, the author argues that accounts of evil character ought to support a robust bad/evil distinction; yet existing theories cannot plausibly do so. Consequentialist and related theories also fail to account for some crucial properties of evil persons. Second, the author sketches an intuitively plausible "affective-motivational" account of evil character. Third, the author argues that the notion of evil character, thus conceived, denotes a significant moral category. It marks one end of a moral continuum that has, at the opposite pole, the saint. Fourth, the author argues that "frequent evildoing" accounts confuse this moral space with another: that defined by the moral hero and the moral criminal.

How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism: Is It Irrational to Be Amoral? SHAUN NICHOLS

The paper argues that moral rationalism faces serious empirical problems. First, two forms of moral rationalism are distinguished: Conceptual Rationalism and Empirical Rationalism. Conceptual Rationalists claim that the concept of a moral requirement is the concept of a motivating reason, so psychopaths who are not motivated by moral considerations do not make genuine moral judgments. The paper maintains that it is empirically dubious that it is part of our concept of moral judgment that psychopaths do not make moral judgments. Empirical Rationalism claims that moral judgment in humans is in fact a product of rational cognitive mechanisms, so it is insulated from criticisms about our concept of moral judgment. However, the article argues, Empirical Rationalism is undermined by recent evidence that psychopaths apparently do have a seriously disturbed capacity for moral judgment, and that the most plausible explanation of this deficit does not fit with an Empirical Rationalist account.—Correspondence to: nichols@cofc.edu

Evil and Human Nature, ROY W. PERRETT

Evil is often understood to be a very special moral category. It involves not just wrongdoing, but a special kind of intentional wrongdoing wherein: (1) the wrongdoing flows from a particular kind of character; (2) it is motivated by the agent's desire to do wrong because it is wrong; (3) it is accompanied by the agent's pleasure in wrongdoing; and (4) there is an absence in the agent of morally appropriate reactive attitudes. This article addresses the following three questions about evil so understood. Is such a concept of evil coherent? Is it required in order to explain the occurrence of moral evil? Is it compatible with a plausible theory of human nature? The author argues that although the concept of evil is coherent, it is unnecessary for explaining ordinary wrongdoing. It also sits ill with the more plausible theories of human nature.—Correspondence to: roy.perrett@anu.edu.au

Evil as an Explanatory Concept, EVE GARRARD

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Board of Directors of the *Journal of the History of Philosophy* is pleased to announce the establishment of the Kristeller-Popkin Travel Fellowships as part of the 40th anniversary of the founding of the *Journal.* The fellowships are in recognition of the scholarship and generous support that two of the founding members of the Board have given to the *Journal*: Paul Oskar Kristeller, the renowned Renaissance scholar, and Richard H. Popkin, the first editor of the *Journal* and noted historian of skepticism. Two awards of $1000 will be offered annually to young scholars in the history of philosophy to defray expenses incurred while traveling to do research. Candidates should have received their Ph.D. no more than six years prior to applying. Application forms can be obtained beginning January 1, 2002 from the *JHP* website (http://sapientia.hunter.cuny.edu/~philosophy/JHP/JHP.htm) or by writing to Professor Martha Bolton, Department of Philosophy, Davison Hall, Douglass College, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901–2882. The first deadline for applications is December 31, 2002. Awards will be announced in April 2003.

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